Security Policy

“The Russian invasion of Ukraine has changed the European security situation. This crisis is foundational, lasting and requires us to strengthen our Defense here at home too”, says Norwegian Defense Minister Odd Roger Enoksen (Center Party). “The government is constantly evaluating how Norway should contribute in the ongoing crisis. Norway is a flank country within NATO. We contribute every day through having and understanding of the situation, preparedness, as well as activities in our immediate areas. We also contribute to Ukraine with weapons and protection equipment and will contribute with NOK 2 billion in humanitarian aid. We are following the EU’s line of sanctions against Russia. And not least; we host the Cold Response 2022 exercise, which is currently taking place and having broad allied as well as Nordic participation. This is an exercise demonstrating strength and unity in the alliance”, Odd Roger Enoksen said.

On 16 March 2022, the Norwegian Defense Commission conducted an extraordinary meeting in relation to the war in Ukraine. The Defense Commission’s original task is to provide input on what will best maintain Norwegian security in a 10-to-20-year perspective, however, the Russian invasion of Ukraine has led the Commission to make an exemption. “We are originally a commission that does not have to be on top of day-to-day developments; our job is to lift our gaze and look far ahead. However, the Ukraine situation demands that we, too, assess what this will signify for us”, said Commission Chair Knut Storberget. “We all agree that this war has changed a lot in a short period of time. Several countries have abandoned their own restrictions and principles, things we did not see coming or even possible just a short time ago”, the Commission Chair said.

Norway has a geo-strategic important location; it has vast offshore natural resources, and a peace-loving populace not overly interested in investing in a strong military. This makes the country vulnerable and that is why Norway continues to militarily support the US in conflicts Norway otherwise would not engage in.

In 2016 Norway adopted a new long-term defense plan for the army and the home guard. Norway faced two defensive strategies.

1. The first one is dubbed "the maneuver concept" and was utilized by the Germans at the beginning of WW2, with forces in a flux to put the enemy off balance. A similar strategy was adopted by Norway until 2000, but with three times as many soldiers as 2017.
2. The second options is the so-called "exchange concept," with such historical examples as the "trench war" during WW1, the Maginot Line or the Mannerheim Line during WW2, neither of which proved truly successful. Today, this concept is embodied in forces with a capacity for attack from long distance, with long-range precision weapons, such as missiles, fired from ground level, aircraft or naval vessels. This latter option is beneficial in that it is likely to limit losses, while it also may be difficult to stop the opponent in this manner.

A March 2017 report by Brigadier Aril Brandvik identified crucial drawbacks in the 2016 defense plan. The Norwegian Armed Forces were found to be suffering from low combat readiness and lacking "real battle force" against a technically sophisticated opponent. With the exception of the Telemark battalion (with around 470 soldiers), intelligence battalion and special forces, the Norwegian Army was found to lack units that are ready for battle within a few hours. With only one brigade, and with weak range of anti-aircraft and artillery, the Norwegian Armed Forces was found to be able to defend an area corresponding to a middle-size Norwegian municipality with an area of 600 square kilometers, such as Rissa, Vardø and Førde — compared to the country's total area of 385,000 square kilometers.

The highly limited impact force made it thus difficult to defend Norway from potential aggression until the arrival of allies. However, the report also found vulnerabilities in encrypted communication, also with allies, especially over long distances. Additionally, the Brandvik report highlighted the lack of helicopters, which resulted in low mobility and high vulnerability of the land forces. Another problem identified was the absence of reserve forces, which would mean that the units would end up quickly worn down in battle due to breakage and technical errors. Yet another problem was that air defense allegedly had no effect on high-flying bomber and fighter aircraft. Finally, coordination between branches was found to be at a low level, as neither the National Guard nor the Border Guard was trained or equipped to cooperate with other combat arms or allies.

The Brandvik committee abandoned the ideas of meeting the enemy at the border or launching a high-tech guerilla war in the event of an enemy attack. The former option was determined as "too risky," while the latter admittedly gave no protection to own bases.

On 01 October 2015, the Chief of Defence presented his Strategic Defence Review regarding the future development of the Norwegian Armed Forces. The Chief recommended an increased emphasis on the defence of Norway. This requires a strengthening of surveillance and intelligence, increased readiness, responsiveness and endurance – as well as a strengthened ability to protect critical infrastructure. The structure will also make it possible for the Norwegian Armed Forces to solve their most demanding tasks, and it will strengthen the Armed Forces ability to contribute to NATO.

The following five areas, in order of priority, form the basis for the structural recommendations:

1. Armed attack on Norway
2. Coercive diplomacy backed up by militarymeasures
3. Terrorist attacks
4. Exercising national authority and upholding national sovereignty
5. Contributions to international operations

To be a credible partner in NATO, the Norwegian Armed Forces must be strengthened by being provided with the necessary combative strength, presence and resilience to respond effectively to an attack on Norway. An adversary is to be deterred from using military force against Norway because a direct conflict with Norwegian and NATO forces would result in unacceptable losses.

The need for traditional invasion defence is much reduced following the end of the Cold War. Other tasks, such as international crisis management, have on the other hand assumed much greater importance. Norway, in concert with other countries, has contingency plans ready in case the need arises to intervene in minor regional armed conflicts either in or outside Europe.

Nordic countries, which are all small and all affluent, not least Norway, had grand aspirations to become or stay humanitarian great powers, as well as world champions in a lot of areas. This demonstrates idealistic elements in the self-perception of Nordic countries which have a historical legacy. Norway is, seen from the outside, a rich oil nation in the periphery which is rather self-sufficient and egoistic, expensive and a little exotic, but all in all harmless and not dangerous. A country for the especially interested. Norwegians would like to impress the rest of the world, and are very concerned about their international reputation, and what others think about them. After the oil affluence an element of bad consciousness has been added, as Norwegians do not want to be seen as unpleasant nouveau riches, but want to smarten up the profile by doing something good in the world.

By 2007 Norway was undergoing a philosophical, bureaucratic and public debate on what its defense policy, obligations and needs will be for the next five to ten years. The outcome will have significant implications for Norway,s ability to fulfill NATO obligations as well as its ability to cope with the potential of increased military threats in the Arctic. An additional factor in the debate is increased official interest in Nordic defense cooperation, with a particular focus on Sweden. The planned purchase of 48 new fighter aircraft (relevant to the Joint Strike Fighter program), and a decision on a costly fast patrol boat program top procurement concerns. As the debate intensified, 2008 would be a decisive year for Norway's defense capabilities and strategy.

Background to this debate included a government which rhetorically affirmed NATO as Norway's primary security provider but which was at heart skeptical of the use of military power in all but the most benign ways, tempted by the idea of closer Nordic defense cooperation and includes an anti-NATO party, the Socialist Left (SV) as a member of the governing coalition. The vigorous internal governmental debate over Norway,s contributions to ISAF, as well as repeated public negative comments concerning NATO and US missile defense plans are illustrative of the general impulse of this government.

The deaths of two Norwegian soldiers in Afghanistan in 2007 forced the government to finally publicly explain why Norway was in Afghanistan. Public support for Norwegian deployment to Afghanistan was roughly 50% but in large segments of society, and certainly in SV, there was a strong belief that military force creates rather than solves problems and that the military should be used only for UN mandated peacekeeping missions. This view was particularly prevalent among younger Norwegians who had no direct memories of US assistance during the Cold War or WWII. This has led the Government to keep silent about Afghanistan or to stress the development side only, implying that "others" do force, and Norway does reconstruction.

The Norwegian CHOD, General Sverre Diesen fought hard to protect Norwegian defense capabilities, to restructure the military away from a static territorial defense to a more expeditionary force and to make the political case for the need for the military and for increased resources for the MOD. He headed the MOD Defense Study (released in late 2007 along with a concurrent study conducted by largely civilian defense experts). The studies largely concurred with his assessments and judged future security threats against Norway to be not invasion but an isolated and limited use of force against Norwegian interests, likely to be in the Arctic.

In a speech on 26 November 2007, Diesen specified further, saying that increased Russian military activity in the Arctic could lead to such a conflict or to the use of military power to force the Norwegian government to change its policy on a controversial issue. Diesen stated further that in such a situation Norway would need to have the capability to cope without NATO support. The Studies also called for increased cooperation with Sweden and other countries to save money on equipment purchases, training and exercises. Newspaper editorials called the Studies brutally honest and compared the current funding levels (in terms of GDP) to defense spending in the 1930s, which was historically low and left Norway ill prepared to deal with the German invasion in April 1940.

In September 2009 the new Strategic Concept for the Norwegian Armed Forces was published under the title "Capable Force". In this Concept, the political guidelines for the further development of the Norwegian Armed Forces (NAF) are laid out. The Concept is based on the security and defence policy framework laid out in the current long-term plan for the period 2009-2012 (St.prp. nr. 48 (2007-2008), Innst. S. nr. 318 (2007-2008)). The main features of Norwegian security policy remain constant over time. However, there was a perceived need for a continuous adaptation of policy in order to reflect changes in the international environment. Three areas have been given particular priority: The High North, participation in peace operations within the framework of the United Nations (UN), and continued adaptation and modernisation of the NAF.

"One consequence of new geopolitical trends is that inter-state conflicts and realpolitik have re-emerged as more important factors in international politics. This in turn means that we have to take a balanced approach with regard to the attention which should be directed at international terrorism and intra-state conflicts in relation to interstate conflicts. Rivalry between great powers might jeopardise international stability. We already see re-newed tendencies by great powers to establish spheres of influence. We also face a zone of potential conflicts from Northern Africa to the Middle East and the Caucasus in the West, via Iraq and Iran to Afghanistan and Pakistan in the East. This vast area is characterised by a changing political landscape and regional instability, and also danger of increased great power rivalry linked to regional conflicts."

The term strategic concept is similar to the term used by NATO in its corresponding concept (The Alliance's Strategic Concept).The term used by EU in its overarching document is Security Strategy (A Secure Europe In A Better World. European Security Strategy), which comprises EUs common security and defence policy (ESDP). However, this document has a wider scope, as it also describes EU's foreign policy and the use of, inter alia, economical and diplomatic instruments. The corresponding US document (The National Security Strategy of the United States of America) is published by the White House. The term strategic concept was chosen since it in a better way indicates that the document is focussed on the guidelines for, and the use of military instruments.

Preservation of political sovereignty and defence of territorial integrity are the core elements in Norway's fundamental security policy interests. These interests include the protection of Norway's territory, population, critical infrastructure and also essential civil functions. The legitimacy of the NAF today also depends to a large extent on the role played towards the civil society at large. The Norwegian system of general conscription is upheld as a basis for the NAF. This system is vital in order to secure personnel with proper qualifications. The ability to assist the civilian society in case of emergency constitutes an important prerequisite for the NAF's legitimacy. The NAF have an important role to play as far as societal security is concerned, in close cooperation with civilian authorities.

The Defence Concept constitutes the main framework for the development of the Norwegian Defence Sector. The overall aim is to further develop the NAF into a modern, flexible and Alliance-adapted instrument of security policy, based on a balance between tasks, organisational structure and funding. The activities of the NAF will be based on close cooperation with relevant civilian authorities and on military conscription adjusted to current needs. Focus will be on securing and promoting Norwegian interests through the ability to handle a broad range of challenges, both nationally and internationally.

The NAF's role with regard to state security, i.e. conventional collective defence, is not as predominant as during the Cold War. However, the NAF must maintain a basis for regeneration in case more extensive threats should re-emerge. In this connection, it is important to maintain the institutional competence of the personnel. It is important that security and defence policy does not ignore conventional build-up in other states, which over time could represent a threat to Norway and NATO. Our state security is also ensured through the upholding of sovereignty in peace time and the ability to handle episodes and crises.

The Norwegian Armed Forces Joint Operational Doctrine was first issued in the year 2000. The main ideas on which the doctrine was based - manoeuvre theory and manoeuvre warfare - constituted the doctrine's operational method. FFOD 2000 was based on documents including the Chief of Defence's fundamental guidelines for the development and use of Norwegian forces in peace, crisis and war published in 1995. Prior to this there had been no written Norwegian doctrine that applied to the Armed Forces as a whole, although work was proceeding on the development of doctrinal guidelines, including tactical directives, for each of the service branches.

The Armed Forces Joint Operational Doctrine (FFOD 07) sets out overall guidelines as to how the Armed Forces should approach today's challenges and those of tomorrow. The earlier edition of the Armed Forces Joint Operational Doctrine (FFOD 2000) had both theoretical and cultural ambitions. First and foremost its aim was to inculcate and implement the concept of a manoeuvrist approach. The emphasis placed on developing a common operational culture means that FFOD 07 is toned down on the command and control side and contains few descriptions of procedures. On a national basis this is governed by the Chief of Defence's strategic directive for operational activity (Forsvarssjefens strategiske direktiv for operativ virksomhet - FSDO), and internationally by those NATO doctrines that Norway has ratified.