1991 Reports

• People's Republic of China, People's Liberation Army Air Force Defense Intelligence Agency (May 1991)
• DESERT SHIELD AND DESERT STORM OBSERVATIONS Directory of evaluation and Standardisation US (June 1991)
• Reaching Globally, Reaching Powerfully: The United States Air Force in the Gulf War A Report - September 1991
• Airpower in Operation Desert Storm USAF FACT SHEET 91-03 Special Edition - May 1991
• RESERVE FORCES OF THE NATO ARMIES by Lieutenant Colonel Robert E. Tripp, March 1991
• THE DEMOCRATIC PLURALISM INITIATIVE IN TUNISIA: AN INDEPENDENT ASSESSMENT Prepared for USAID / Tunisia and Bureau for Europe and Near East, Prepared by Ernst & Young, February 1991
• Organizing Multimission F/A-18D Squadrons: How To Neck Down Without Choking by Major Benny L. Adams United States Marine Corps Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1991] Even though there is no precedent to help us deal with necking down of aviation assets, we must consider alternatives to traditional squadron organization or face problems with availability and maintenance of equipment, availability and training of maintenance personnel, and training and proficiency of aircrew in our new multimission units.
• LCACs IN SUPPORT OF THE AMPHIBIOUS LANDING by LTCMDR. Ronald L. Aasland United States Navy Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1991] As the Marine Corps moves forward in implementing the Over-the-Horizon (OTH) amphibious assault, it will depend very heavily on the capability of the LCAC. With Department of Defense cutbacks in procurement of amphibious ships and LCACs, the ability of the Marine Corps to rapidly buildup its combat power ashore prior to an enemy counterattack is seriously in doubt.
• Reducing The Power Projection Gap: The Army Fast Sealift Maritime Prepositioning Ships (AFSMPS) Program by Major Steven M. Anderson, United States Army Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1991] The AFSMPS concept is an efficient and cost-effective means of greatly improving US heavy force combat power projection capability
• The M1A1 Tank: Its Role In The Marine Corps by Major Dennis W. Beal, United States Marine Corps Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1991] The truth be told, small and light equates to weak and dead. The Light Armored Vehicle (LAV) is being heralded as the Corps armored "answer" in future conflicts. The LAV is probably the worst made armored system the Marine Corps could adopt. The only answer to success on the battlefield is a system that has proven to be the best in the world, the M1A1 Tank.
• An Analysis Of The French Defeat At Dien Bien Phu by Major Harry D. Bloomer, United States Army. Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1991] At Dien Bien Phu the French violated nearly all of the principles of war at every level of war--strategic, operational, and tactical. These violations contributed significantly to the French defeat.
• The Declaration Of War: One For The History Books? by Major John L. Bacon, United States Marine Corps Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1991] The declaration of war, while originally thought of as the preferred option in justifying the use of U.S. forces, is, in reality, a seldom-used concept that will become increasingly difficult to enact with the passage of the War Powers Resolution (WPR) and our recent success in Southwest Asia.
• Maneuver Warfare Enhanced With Land Mine Warfare by Major Steven F. Barilich, United States Marine Corps Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1991] The Marine Corps combat engineers must take the lead and promote mine warfare in offensive operations. The combat engineers must write new doctrine to support FMFM-1 WARFIGHTING. The Marine Corps Engineer School must change the emphasis of mine fields from the defense to the offense.
• Too Many General Officers? by Major Stephen W. Baird, United States Marine Corps Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1991] The Commandant of the Marine Corps will have to carefully balance his internal general officer requirements with the requirement to adequately represent the Marine Corps in the joint arena.
• Military Force Restructure For The Future by Major Wayne E. Briggs, United States Marine Corps Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1991] America can maintain her military strength while reducing the Defense Budget simply by restructuring the Department of Defense.
• The Keys To Successful Coalition Warfare: 1990 And Beyond by Major Willie J. Brown, USMC Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1991] Coalition member bodies like the United Nations, as proven during Operation Desert Storm, have the international respect, political clout, and the experience to continue to forge ahead in shaping and ensuring peace throughout the world.
• Columbia: A Search For An Integrated U.S. Policy For Counternarcotics (CN) And Counterinsurgency (COIN) by Major Arnaldo Claudio, United States Army Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1991] The U.S. should link its counternarcotics (CN) and counterinsurgency (COIN) efforts. It has been proven that both programs need to be unified to properly address Host Nation (HN) national interest. By unifying CN/COIN efforts the U.S. will ensure HN support and U.S. policy success.
• A Wake-Up Call For Air Refueling by Major Andrew H. Cox, United States Air Force Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1991] Airpower's future responsiveness and the US ability to project its forces worldwide depends on air refueling. To insure insure responsiveness and global projection, the Air Force must expand its air refueling assets.
• The Marine Corps Reserve And Its Future by Major David R. Chevallier, United States Marine Corps Reserve Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1991] That the Marine Corps Reserve should be sustained at its current level of readiness with particular emphasis placed on maintenance of equipment compatibility and unit inter-operability with regular Marine Forces.
• Two Paths For MLR by Major Louis J. Cipriani, Jr., USMC Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1991] Current Medium Lift Replacement (MLR) issues remain unresolved due largely to political maneuvering and funding disputes. Shortages in Marine Corps helicopter assets are likely if serious decisions are not made soon.
• Mobile Mortars: Fire Support For Every Intensity Conflict by Major Patrick D. Connally, USMC Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1991] The time has come for the infantry regimental commander to have a reliable, responsive and lethal means of indirect fire support dedicated to him in battle. The tactical and logistical advantages of fielding an MPMS are apparent.
• The United States' Approach To El Salvador by Major Robert J. Coates, USMC Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1991] The war in El Salvador represents a long and massive experiment by the United States to defeat an insurgency through a policy of providing military advisors and materiel support without committing United States ground forces to combat.
• International Terrorism: The Poor Man's Warfare by Major Robert W. Cerney, USMC Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1991] Terrorism is a form of warfare and needs to be recognized as such.
• Taking The Navy-Marine Corps Team Into The 21st Century by LCDR Sean T. Cate, USN Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1991] The Navy-Marine Corps team must enter the 21st century with a new vision as to its role in the national defense system based on the dramatic changes in the threat to national security, the need for rapid, sustainable responses to crisis situations and the requirement for a strong, conventional deterrence.
• Maneuver Warfare: The Good, The Bad, And The Ugly by Major William A. Card, USMC Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1991] The basic tenets of maneuver warfare are sound, however the manner of their introduction has brought with it some very dangerous baggage
• LAV-AD: Mobile Air Defense For The Ground Maneuver Force by Major Charles R. Dickerson Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1991] The LAV-AD is being developed to provide the LAV battalion with a highly effective air defense system capable of supporting rapidly maneuvering, independent mechanized operations.
• Marine Fixed-Wing Aviation: First To Fight? by Major Michael F. Dolan, USMC Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1991] The combination of historical and doctrinal employment as well as the current employment and deployment of aviation assets will severely limit the use of Marine fixed-wing aviation in the initial stages of amphibious assault operations
• HMLA Aircraft: Present To 2010 by Major Robert G. Davis, USMC Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1991] The need exists for a multi-mission aircraft to perform all required missions of the Marine Light Attack (HMLA) and Marine Fixed Wing Observation (VMO) communities
• Desert Shield/Desert Storm Employment Of The Maritime Prepositioned Force: Triumph Or Mixed Success? by Major Stephen P. Dodd, USMC Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1991] Initial results of the strategic employment of the MPF unmistakably validated all conceptual thought, planning, and doctrine. However, operations and employment during and after offload offer some lessons for future doctrine, plans and procedures.
• The Ace Is Not A Maneuver Element: Yet! The Rhetoric Can Be Reality by Major William H. Dixon, Jr., USMC Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1991] The full combat potential of the ACE can achieve fruition on today's battlefield when the ACE is employed as a support element and a maneuver element.
• Future Of The North Atlantic Treaty Organization by Cmdr. Jose H. Elkfury, Brazil Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1991] NATO must continue to exist, the United States must remain in NATO, and flexible response is still a good strategy.
• Preparing For Future Sophisticated Warfare: Special Operations by Major Jimmy J. Elliott, USAF Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1991] Lingering world instability requires U.S. forces to be responsive, flexible, and credible. U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) are uniquely established to contemplate the nature of tomorrow's wars. While future U.S. policy mandates a decrease in defense spending SOF will continue to meet the force projection and security needs of this nation.
• Will The Marine Corps Get The V-22? by Major John T. Enoch, Jr., USMC Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1991] The probability of the Marine Corps acquiring the V-22 is favorable but not certain; several factors will determine the aircraft's fate
• Planning Considerations For Small Boat Over-The-Horizon Raids by Major Harold Heath Fox II, USMC Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1991] The evolution of over-the-horizon raid operations has generated a unique set of planning considerations for MAGTF commanders and their staffs who employ Rigid Raiding Craft (RRC) and Combat Rubber Raiding Craft (CRRC) forces.
• On Design Of A New Surface Force by LCDR Mark G. Fischer, USN Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1991] Low mix surface action groups, fully connected and augmented by enhanced capability replenishment ships can perform a very broad range of tasks, and fill in the gaps left by insufficient numbers of more capable units.
• Airlift's Role At Dien Bien Phu And Khe Sanh by Major Ryan F. Ferrell, Jr., USAF Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1991] The ability of U.S. airlift to keep the besieged U.S. Marines at Khe Sanh resupplied played a major role in preventing Khe Sanh from being a repeat of the French defeat at Dien Bien Phu.
• The Impending Gap In Naval Aviation by LCDR John P. Gilchrist, USN Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1991] By the year 2000, serious inventory shortfalls may occur in the Navy's carrier-based strike capability. As U.S. presence around the world is reduced in the post-Cold War era, naval aviation's role in deterring or quickly winning regional conflicts will become more and more critical. Will the Navy have the offensive punch to execute such a mission?
• Arms For Access: Success Or Failure by LCDR James R. Gilbert II, USN Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1991] Using arms sales to gain strategic access to vital areas of the world is a critical and successful element of U. S. foreign policy.
• Battlefield Automation: A Luddite's View by Major Steven J. Gaffney, USMC Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1991] Though automation promises to enhance battlefield capabilities, automated systems introduce new vulnerabilities as well.
• Gunboat Diplomacy: Does It Have A Place In The 1990's? by LCDR Thomas D. Goodall, USN Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1991] Some maritime strategists associate gunboat diplomacy with the bygone era of colonialism, concluding that it is an obsolete concept; however, gunboat diplomacy will be a vital element in the U.S. maritime posture of the 1990's.
• From Over-The-Horizon Comes The Osprey by Major Charles A. Hodges, USMC Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1991] The helicopter is not capable of supporting the over-the-horizon amphibious assault from distances much greater than 50 miles at sea; however, the V-22 Osprey can support our changing doctrine.
• Defense At A Price by Major Carl K. Hergesell, USAF Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1991] America's military involveent in the war with Iraq has brought up the issue of single parent; and dual-service couples in the military and what affects their deployments are causing for their children who are left behind.
• The Continuing Relevance Of Clausewitz: Illustrated Yesterday And Today With Application To The 1991 Persian Gulf War by Major Herbert T. Holden, USMC Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1991] The theories of Carl von Clausewitz can be applied to all wars, Napoleonic through the recently concluded Persian Gulf War.
• Underlying Causes For The Iraqi Debacle by Major Larry D. Huffman, USMC Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1991] An understanding of Iraq's political history, and its economic and religious structure, beginning just prior to the overthrow of the monarchy in 1958 and ending with Saddam Hussein's ascendance to the Presidency in 1979. will provide insight into the background which contributed to the recent invasion of Kuwait.
• Need For The B-2 Bomber by Major Lynn M. Harris, USAF Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1991] The B-2 is the most effective means of maintaining the contributions of the United States bomber force for the long term.
• FMFM-1 And Marine Aviation by Major Paul R. Hill, USMC Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1991] The current organization and command and control system for Marine Aviation is not structured in accordance with our philosophy of warfighting. To implement our warfighting philosophy and maximize the effectiveness of Marine Aviation, the Marine Air Wing and the Marine Air Command and Control System's organization must be changed.
• The MAGTF'S Decisive Blow: An ACE-Drawn Reserve by Major Jack R. Harkins, Jr., USMC Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1991] The MAGTF commander can select the ACE to constitute all or part of his reserve. Recognizing this potential and developing it should become a priority of doctrine-makers and MAGTF planners, and Marines should be taught that the potential exists.
• Supporting Arms In Amphibious Operations, Past And Present by Major Samuel J. Head, USMC Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1991] The capability of supporting arms, naval gunfire artillery, and aviation, has been reduced to a level that puts the mission of amphibious operations at risk.
• Operational Airpower: A Common Sense Approach by Major Stephen L. Hoog, USAF Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1991] The acronym ACE-CG-TSL provides the air commander with a framework to approach the operational employment of airpower. This common sense approach will help air commanders in determining the most effective use of airpower at the operational level of war.
• Air As A Maneuver Element: An Idea Whose Time Has Come? by Major Thomas X. Hammes, USMC Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1991] Air should be used as a maneuver element. For the immediate future, the MAGTF commander should directly control air when it is used as such. This is a feasible, logical solution today and a natural step to the full use of the ACE as a maneuver element.
• The United States Military Confronts The "New World Order" by Major William A. Hingston, USMC Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1991] The United States military must have a renaissance, realigning its strategic and operational thinking in order to respond effectively as the "New World Order" sweeps the globe.
• Incorporating LAAD Into The Ground Combat Element by Major Dennis Judge, USMC Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1991] To deal with the increased air threat and to provide the MAGTF Commander and his subordinate ground commanders the freedom to maneuver, the Marine Corps needs to rethink its employment of Low Altitude Air Defense (LAAD) missiles and incorporate some "Stinger"/LAAD units in the Ground Combat Element (GCE).
• Organizing Fleet Marine Force (FMF) Supply For Combat by Major William F. Johnson, USMC Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1991] FMF retail supply activities should be structured primarily for combat effectiveness and secondarily for peacetime efficiency in accordance with Marine Corps Doctrine.
• In The Dark Of The Night: Night Vision Goggles (NVG) Mishaps Lessons Learned by Major George H. Keating, USMC Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1991] An analysis of helicopter NVG mishaps can provide valuable lessons learned that can contribute to the operational safety and overall combat readiness of the Marine Corps.
• Keeping The "Gunfire" In Naval Gunfire Support by LCdr. Mark C. Kelsey, USN Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1991] The currect inventory of Naval Surface Fire Support (NSFS) platforms is inadequate to support Marine Corps requirements due to primary dependence on 5-inch guns.
• Procurement Of Tactical Aircraft by Major Mark W. Kurtzhalts, USMC Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1991] A number of definite changes with the development and procurement process throughout the Department of Defense (DoD) will be required if the armed services are going to acquire aircraft with the best available technology with in a decreasing defense budget.
• Maritime Strategy Into The Twenty-First Century by LCDR Alton A. Lovvorn, USN Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1991] Public debate of our national goals and policies is necessary for the maintenance of a strong, informed republic; however, the current maritime strategy requires not a scrapping so much as it does a review and refocusing.
• Helicopters In Support: Marine Air Or Army Aviation? by Major David L. Leftwich, USA Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1991] The helicopter unit must support the ground unit and around this basic cornerstone the organization must be framed, staffed, trained, and equipped for combat.
• Close Air Support: Where Do We Go From Here? by Major Robert A. Lodge, USMC Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1991] In this era of high technology, CAS procedures perfected in previous wars will become increasingly less effective and eventually cease to be of value unless the Marine Corps uses foresight in planning and instituting necessary changes.
• SINCGARS Needs Maneuver Communications by Major Robert R. Logan, USMC Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1991] Apart from the rapid application of precepts for communications derived from FMFM 1, the doctrinal standard of Marine Corps maneuver warfare, the benefits to the commander from new "Digital Revolution" communications systems presently being fielded, particularly the Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System (SINCGARS), will be endangered if not lost entirely.
• MAGTF (SOC): Making Our Primary Force Development Objective A Reality by Major Victor D. Lance, USMC Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1991] The Marine Corps' goal of making all MAGTFs "Special Operational Capable" is logical and farsighted; however, we must decide specifically "how" to implement this concept before our goal can be achieved.
• The Falkland Islands War: Winning With Infantry by Major Vincent R. Leone, Jr., USMC Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1991] In an age of electronic warfare, missiles, high performance aircraft, and nuclear submarines, the decisive battles of the Falkland Islands war were determined, not by modern technology, but by infantry closing with and destroying the enemy with rifle and bayonet.
• The Myth Of The MAGTF by Major Jacob M. McFerren, USA Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1991] In fact, the Marine Air Ground Task Force may be more an organization of convenience, never twice the same, put together under Naval constraints, and organized contrary to implementing its own manuever warfare doctrine.
• Reconnaissance Personnel Shortfalls by Major James P. McIntyre, USMC Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1991] In order to ensure it has the requisite reconnaissance skills to perform all assigned tasks, the Marine Corps must initiate new assignment policies and restructure its present reconnaissance architecture.
• The Deception Of Detente' by LCDR James R. McMillan, Jr., USN Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1991] Although pro-Western trends in the Soviet Union appear to be bringing the Cold War to an end, a prudent Western Alliance should maintain its military strength until reality can be distinguished from the rhetoric of Soviet reforms.
• The Amphibious Fleet Of Tomorrow by LCDR Pat G. McCartney, USN Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1991] A revolutionary new design concept in shipbuilding is needed so that the amphibious fleet of the future will be operationally effective against a wide spectrum of new missions including offensive operations and self defense.
• Insurgency: The Unsolved Mystery by Major Eric N. Nyberg, USMC Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1991] Military leaders must begin their education for operating against the insurgency threat by gaining a basic understanding of the nature of an insurgency.
• Marines In Panama: 1988 - 1990 by Major Robert B. Neller, USMC Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1991] The performance of Marine Forces Panama during the Panama Crisis, displayed the utility and flexibility of Marine forces in low intensity conflict.
• Way War? by Major Chuck Oltman Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1991] This paper examines the reasons why the United States has waged major wars during the twentieth century. We will then look for any common themes in these conflicts that will help us answer the question: "Why war?"
• Fire Support Coordination By The MAGTF Command Element--What Is Its Real Role? by Major David N. Penman, USMC Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1991] Before the command element of a Marine Air-Ground Task Force can achieve its maximum warfighting potential, its fire support coordination responsibilities must be more clearly delineated.
• Over-The-Horizon Amphibious Operation: Do We Have The Mobility? by Major John H. Parker, USMC Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1991] Over-the-horizon is the future of amphibious operations but without an improved triad we are advertising the capability prematurely.
• The Maneuver Warfare Dilemma: What It Will Take To Make It Work by Major Jeffrey J. Patterson, USMC Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1991] The Marine Corps has adopted maneuver warfare as its warfighting doctrine, but it will take much more than rhetoric to put this concept into practice. Our challenge, therefore, is to identify needed changes in existing policies in order to bridge the gap between concept and reality.
• Weapons Acquisition: Products And Their Problems by Major Maxie W. Phillips, USMC Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1991] The problems created by the current acquisition process, coupled with the complexity of future weapons systems, must be resolved in order to get the most out of a dwindling Defense budget.
• Deception- The Missing Tool by Major Robert R. Parker Jr., USMC Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1991] Successful employment of deception is a product of historical analysis, practical exercise, and realistic training.
• The Roots Of Terrorism In Northern Ireland by Major Alexander C. Roy, United Kingdom Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1991] Understanding the historical background, and the different perceptions of the people of Northern Ireland, will lead to an appreciation of Irish Nationalism and its recent exploitation by terrorists in pursuit of their anti-democratic goals.
• Khe Sanh And Dienbienphu: Different Wars -- Similar Battles by Major Dennis W. Reilly, USMC Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1991] The turning point for the French in the French-Indochina War was the battle of Dienbienphu in 1954. The battle at Khe Sanh in 1968 was the turning point for U.S. forces in the Vietnam War. These two battles were different in many respects, but these conflicts also had many similarities.
• The V-22: Is It An Asset We Can Do Without? by Major John M. Reed, USMC Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1991] With the needs of the military in mind, this paper reviews the development process from its conception to where the program is today. It reviews the programmatics involved, reviews the advanced technology and capabilities of the aircraft, and addresses the political implications that the program has encountered.
• "My Kingdom For A Horse" - Problem Of War Termination And Modern Military Strategy by LCdr Mary K. Rich, USN Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1991] "Simple old soldiers" must not press for complete military victory; similarly, political leaders must not abdicate policy to strategy.
• Yom Kippur War: Grand Deception Or Intelligence Blunder by Major Rodney C. Richardson, USMC Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1991] The blinding self-confidence that permeated the Israeli Intelligence community and military hierarchy ideally set the stage for the Arab invasion of 6 October, 1973.
• Civilianizing Fleet Support by LCdr Suzanne Roberts, USN Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1991] Imminent drawdowns and cutbacks will force the Navy to choose between across-the-board reduced capability, or retention of a strong combatant posture to meet an expanding variety of geographic and threat scenarios. One possible and partial solution to the problem is to use an alternative method of fleet support that provides consistent effectiveness, but relieves pressure on Congressionally mandated end-strength and budget reductions. The only proven alternative is civilianization through the Merchant Marine and the Military Sealift Command.
• The Air Naval Gunfire Liaison Company: An Untapped Resource For The Low Intensity Conflict Environment by Major Timothy M. Riley, USMC Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1991] As the Marine Corps reviews its current capabilities for employment in the low intensity conflict environment, examination of the existing structure and capabilities of the Air Naval Gunfire Liaison Company shows a potential to provide for a broadened role and mission.
• A New World Order--Again? by Major Dennis C. Thompson, USMC Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1991] An analysis of Bismarck's use of military force and the alliance system he created will reveal whether or not his techniques and practices have relevance for U.S. leaders in the impending new world order.
• The Nature Of War And The Realities Of The Modern Battlefield by Major Andrew D. Walker, USMC Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1991] Although maneuver warfare is valid under certain circumstances, the nature of war and the realities of the modern battlefield call for a much more flexible doctrine of warfare.
• Douhet: Still Relevant Today by Major Gregory C. Winn, USAF Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1991] The principle tenets of strategic airpower doctrine proposed by Guilio Douhet in 1921 are still relevant to the Air Force today.
• Amphibious Shipping: Do We Have Enough? by Major Michael L. Warren, USMC Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1991] The Navy has 65 amphibious ships now that provide a little over one MEF(AE) of sealift. The latest version of the plan is to have 2.5 MEBs. This is not enough amphibious lift to meet the commitments and potential contingencies that this country's national strategy of forward presence requires now.
• "Maneuver Warfare" And The MAGTF by Major Thomas F. Western, USMC Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1991] The doctrine of "Maneuver Warfare", as expounded in FMFM-l and expanded by B. H. Liddell Hart's indirect approach, establishes the foundation for future operations. Acceptance of these concepts and application of them to our MAGTF doctrine is essential for continued success.
• Fighting At Night by Major Walter J. Wierzbicki, USMC Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1991] Unlike tacticians of old, today's tactician has no choice. Modern armies can and will fight effectively at night, and the force that cannot cope with darkness will lose the battle. Given the unquestioned validity of these circumstances, our current doctrine for the conduct of an infantry ground night attack is outdated.
• Helicopter Survival: Fly or Die? by Major Jordan D. Yankov, USMC Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1991] Helicopter design must take into account the requirement to survive and to continue to operate as an effective combat platform in a hostile environment.
• Mozambique's Sixteen-Year Bloody Civil War by Major Lance S. Young, USAF Marine Corps University Command and Staff College [1991] Our exploration of the background and development of Mozambique, including the current status of its brutal Civil War, demonstrates that it is in our national interest economically and militarily to continue to support the nation's evolution.