International Terrorism: The Poor Man's Warfare
AUTHOR Major Robert W. Cerney, USMC
CSC 1991
SUBJECT AREA - Topical Issues
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
International Terrorism : The Poor Man's Warfare
Terrorism has no widely accepted Definition, and is
normally dependent upon your point of view, as well as
which side of the conflict you support. Western nations are
reluctant to recognize terrorism in any way that could be
construed as legitimate warfare.
The United States is facing growing international
terrorism, particularly from state and drug cartel
sponsored terrorist groups. International terrorism is
increasingly referred to as a form of warfare, placed at
the low end of the spectrum of warfare known in the United
States as Low Intensity Conflict. The Law of Armed Conflict
excludes many terrorists as lawful combatants, because
their targeting practices are not in compliance with the
law.
Terrorism is often described as mindless, senseless,
or irrational violence. However that is not the case,
terrorism is objective oriented and normally well
choreographed to obtain maximum media coverage. The
strategic objectives of international terrorism are to: (1)
Gain publicity and support for their cause, (2) Disrupt
social, political, and economic interaction among western
nations, (3) Force the polarization of society, (4) Punish
non-compliant civilians and government agents, (5)
Intimidate and harass authorities to force concessions, (6)
Provoke government overreaction, (7) Eliminate instrumental
targets, (8) Provide for organizational needs. The gross
inability of the international community to agree on even
the definition of terrorism is indicative of why terrorism
is so successful. The United States is as much to blame as
any nation with our continually oscillating policies of
support depending on what benefits us the most.
Terrorism is a form of successful warfare that is
growing because it is achieving it's goals. We may
disapprove of it, but terrorists can assemble plausible, if
not logical arguments in defense of their actions. Why
should they play by the systems rules, when those rules
were established to support the system they are fighting.
When the Law of War deprives them of exercising their right
to fight for what they believe in, the only way they can,
with any hope of survival till the eventual achievement of
their goal, they will never abide to it. Terrorism will not
conform to international standards, we must adapt to it.
Recognizing terrorism as warfare is the first step,
developing an ef fective doctrine to combat it is the
second.
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM : THE POOR MAN'S WARFARE
OUTLINE
Thesis Statement. Terrorism is a form of warfare and needs
to be recognized as such.
I. History of Terrorism
A. Greek / Roman
B. French Revolution
II. Definition of Terrorism
A. Zona Rosa Analogy
B. Vice President's Task Force Definition
III. Criminality of Terrorism
A. Inability of Law to Deal With Terrorism
B. Domestic Record of Law
C. Lack of International Judicial System
D. Extradition and Political Exemption
E. Asylum
F. Closing the Loopholes
IV. Growth of International Terrorism
A. Casualties
B. Targeting
C. Access to Media
D. Economical Warfare
E. Distribution of Attacks
V. Impact of International Terrorism
A. A Matter of Perception
B. Achievement of Psychological and Political Results
C. Strategic Objectives
D. Reasons For Success
VI. Growing Threat of International Terrorism
A. Spectrum of Warfare
B. Objective Oriented
International Terrorism: The Poor Man's Warfare
Terrorism is a form of warfare and needs to be
recognized as such. Terrorism has no widely accepted or
precise definition and the word is often used
disparagingly. Rebel forces do not refer to themselves as
terrorists, yet many governments declare violent acts by
their opponents as terrorism. The definition of terrorism
appears to depend on your point of view and the particular
side of the conflict you support. Recognizing terrorism as
warfare does not legitimize the criminality of terrorist
acts; it will provide the first step in realizing an
effective policy to counter terrorism.
Terrorism can be traced back to Greek and roman
periods, and found to some extent in every period of man's
history. Terrorism as we know it originated during the
French revolution and the Jacobin reign of terror.1 During
this void of enlightened reasoning terrorism became
institutionalized and if not legalized, sanctioned by the
revolutionary governments. Revolutionary fervor spread
rampant throughout Europe, accompanied by the violence and
terror methods so effective in social control and political
repression.
A universally accepted definition of terrorism simply
does not exist. The problem of defining terrorism has
effectively hampered the development of a comprehensive
counter-terrorist strategy at both the national and
international level.2 The Vice President's Task Force on
Combatting Terrorism called terrorism a phenomenon that is
easier to describe than define."3
For example the 1985 "Zona Rosa Massacre", a machine
gun killing of four U.S. Marines, two American Businessmen,
five Salvadorans, a Guatemalan, and a Chilean at a San
Salvador sidewalk cafe was labeled a "Terrorist Atrocity".
A very similar 1985 shooting of underworld figures outside
a social club on a crowded New York street was simply
called murder. Newsweek reported that a tiny rebel faction
of the Central American Revolutionary Workers Party had
taken responsibility for the Salvadoran attack and quoted
the leaders as saying, "the Marines killed in the Zona Rosa
were not innocent; no Yankee invader is free of guilt."4
If someone would have claimed responsibility and stated
they were from a political party, would the New York
killings have been reclassified as a terrorist act?
Without getting bogged down in a search for a
definition that could please everyone, the definition found
in the 1986 public report of the Vice President's Task
Force on Combatting Terrorism will suffice. According to
the report, terrorism is:
The unlawful use or threat of violence
against persons or property to further
political or social objectives. It is
generally intended to intimidate or
coerce a government, individuals or
groups to modify their behavior or
policies.
This implies that terrorism is a criminal act, yet the
report recognizes that some experts see terrorism residing
at the lower end of the warfare spectrum and consequently,
referred to as war rather than criminal activity.5 The
approach taken by the task force clearly views terrorist
acts as unlawful and criminal, with no caveat to allow the
term terrorism to be defined in any other manner than as a
crime.
If we assume that a terrorist act is criminal, then
one method of dealing with the terrorist is with the law.
Abraham D. Sofaer, a legal advisor to the Department of
State stated that;
Americans are particularly attracted to the
law as a means of repressing violence, and
are committed domestically and internationally
to using law to control criminal conduct and
to resolve disputes. They invoke the law almost
instinctively, and repeatedly, assuming that
it regulates international conduct and in
particular provides a system for bringing
terrorists to justice.6
However, he also points out that the law has had a
poor record of dealing with international terrorism.
Dealing with internal or domestic criminals, less than
fifty percent of crimes committed are subsequently solved
with the capture and prosecution of the perpetrator.
Dealing with international terrorism is even more difficult
with no international police force to be called upon and if
by chance a terrorist is apprehended, there is no
international law or judicial system to ensure
prosecution. In this case, deterrence or elimination of
terrorism becomes a long term goal for governments which
can only be obtained through the proper formulation of
international laws.
The United States recently completed a new extradition
treaty in 1986 with Great Britain in an attempt to achieve
this goal by identifying specific crimes that can no longer
be exempted on political grounds.7 Prior to the
extradition treaty, the Political Offense Exemption did not
allow the extradition of members of a political
organization who committed murder, manslaughter,
kidnapping, or other violent crimes in connection with
struggles for self determination. The United States had
refused to extradite rebels of foreign governments for more
than one hundred forty years.
Between 1979 and 1986, U.S. courts denied four British
requests for the extradition of accused or convicted
members of the Provisional Irish Republican Army. All four
involved violent terrorist crimes, one case involved Joseph
Patrick Doherty, who blasted his way out of prison while
awaiting a British Court's decision on charges including
the murder of a British Army Officer. Great Britain
requested his extradition from the U.S. on charges of
murder, attempted murder, possession of firearms with
intent to endanger life, and charges related to his escape.
However, due to the "political conflict" existing at the
time and finding that the offenses were committed "in the
cause of and in furtherance of that struggle", the Judge
declared Doherty's offenses as political and denied the
extradition.8
In addition to refusing extradition, it has also been
custom since the nineteenth century for the detaining
nation to provide "Political Offenders" asylum. Terrorist
groups have exploited asylum granting and political
exemption to avoid extradition and prosecution not only in
this country, but throughout the civilized world. Judges
are not at fault, the law is the core problem, because it
has not been properly updated to reflect modern social
standards and technological advances.
Terrorists are the least likely criminal to be caught
and punished. If they are caught and not provided asylum
many governments immediately deport them to another country
that will grant asylum, because they are fearful of
retaliation from other terrorist groups.
Americans assume that others will agree that certain
aspects of international terrorism are unacceptable. The
blunt reality is that there are many fanatics, political,
religious,and otherwise who approve of terror. More
startling is that the acceptance of terrorism as an
extension of politics is far more widespread than is
usually recognized. These nations, in fact regard terrorism
as a legitimate means of warfare. For these nations that
accept terrorism as legitimate, they continually make their
arguments in the United Nations that the terrorist is a
soldier and therefore should be accorded treatment as a
soldier under the Geneva and Hague conventions.
Nations have and are continuing to close the political
offense exemption loophole, primarily through regional and
bilateral agreements. The twenty six member nations of the
Council of Europe outlined violent crimes that could not
be treated as political offenses in 1977. These offenses
included crimes such as murder, kidnapping, hostage taking,
and the use of explosives or firearms. Until a truly
international agreement is reached concerning terrorism and
the international enforcement net is established
international terrorism will continue to grow.
International terrorism is growing. From 1975 through
1985 more than six thousand two hundred terrorist acts were
recorded world wide. These attacks left four thousand seven
hundred dead and over nine thousand wounded. In 1985 alone,
the number of terrorist attacks reached a record annual
high of over eight hundred. This was a sixty percent
increase over the level of terrorism for the previous two
years. These eight hundred plus attacks resulted in two
thousand two hundred twenty three causalities, of which
twenty three of the dead were Americans. Since 1969,
terrorists have killed or injured over one thousand
Americans.9
Over the past fifteen years, terrorist attacks against
U.S. officials and installations have averaged one every
seventeen days. These attacks have resulted in the murder
of as many U.S. diplomats as were killed by terrorists in
the previous one hundred eighty years. Additionally, almost
fifty percent of the international terrorist incidents have
been directed at U.S. interests abroad. In the 1970's
eighty percent of the attacks were directed against
property and twenty percent against personnel. The current
targeting trend is fifty/fifty.
There are many reasons for this growth. Political
unrest and social economic problems create conditions of
turmoil in the world. The resultant frustration of these
continuing problems is easily expressed through acts of
terrorism. Additionally, frustrated splinter groups are
realizing they can make their own mark through acts of
violence. Advanced communications technology almost assures
instant publicity for terrorist acts. International travel
is much easier today and weapons are ever increasingly
available to terrorists. Most of all, some governments see
terrorist acts as a less costly way to strike a blow at
their enemies.
The most deadly groups continue to operate from the
middle east. Attacks from this area account for roughly
fifty percent of the total world wide terrorist incidents.
The terrorist's main targets are the governments and
citizens of Israel, United States, France, Italy, Great
Britain, and the moderate Arab countries of Egypt, Kuwait,
and Saudi Arabia.
Western Europe suffered two hundred of the over eight
hundred world wide terrorist attacks in 1985. There are
indications that terrorist groups such as the Italian Red
Brigade, French Direct Action, German Red Army Faction, and
the Provisional Irish Republican Army are beginning to
coordinate attacks throughout Europe.10
Social, economic, and political turmoil has prolonged
patterns of terrorism in Latin America. Countries
experiencing particularly high terrorist activity include
El Salvador, Colombia, Guatemala, Chile, and Peru. A
significant portion of this appears to be associated with
the drug trade in order to obtain financial support. Since
1985 more terrorist attacks were directed at U.S. citizens
in Latin America than any other area of the world. World
wide distribution of terrorist attacks for 1985 were:
Middle East 46.6%
Western Europe 25.6%
Latin America 16.3%
Asia 5.7%
Africa 5.1%
North America .5%
Eastern Europe .2% ,11
Is the impact of terrorism being overstated? From 1975
through 1985, a period of ten years, four thousand seven
hundred people were killed by terrorist actions around the
world.12 During the same period two hundred thousand
people were murdered in the united states alone.13 This
provides an important perspective, but we must remember
that terrorism is largely a matter of perception. A few
spectacular terrorist incidents may give the impression of
a serious terrorist problem which is bearable within it's
present limits.14 This does not mean that terrorism is
tolerable or will not increase in the future.
While casualty figures are numerically smaller than
domestic crime, terrorist casualties have a symbolic impact
and are politically significant. The real lasting effects
of terrorism can not be measured in property damage or body
count, but in the long term psychological impact and
political results achieved.15 Terrorism has altered U.S.
foreign policy, affected U.S. ability to implement policy,
demonstrated U.S. difficulty to respond to terrorism and
has compelled the U.S. to divert resources to protect
facilities and personnel. Terrorist groups have the
potential to force concessions normally unattainable
through diplomatic means. Allowing terrorist groups to
disrupt our decision making process, and erode confidence
in the accomplishment of our initiatives will continue to
seriously weaken our international credibility unless we
can effectively deal with terrorism.
Benjamin Netanyahu is the former Israeli Deputy
Ambassador to the United States and representative to the
United Nations. He stated that the major damage from
international terrorism is not personal or physical damage.
Instead he maintained it is the "shaken confidence in
Government", the questioning of it's "abilities and
competence to insure a world subject to the rule of law.
Terrorists have become increasingly successful and it
appears their goals are expanding. The strategic objectives
of international terrorism are to:
1. Gain publicity and support for their cause.
2. Disrupt social, political, and economic interaction
among western nations.
3. Force the polarization of society by dividing the
populace and fostering a breakdown of the status quo.
4. Punish non-compliant civilians and government
agents in areas that terrorists control or influence.
5. Intimidate and harass authorities to force
concessions.
6. Provoke government overreaction.
7. Eliminate instrumental targets.
8. Provide for their own organizational needs by
forcing governments to free prisoners and pay ransoms.16
Terrorism has grown because it has been able to
fulfill these objectives. Terrorists have achieved
political gains from their activities. They have enjoyed
crucial support from many states and believe they can
spread fear in the general public of governments they
perceive as hesitant to respond to their challenges.
International terrorists are succeeding because:
1. There is no universal agreement within the
international community about who is or is not a terrorist.
2. The media assures terrorists of an almost immediate
and extensive world wide audience.
3. The world's tolerance and sympathy has often
permitted terrorist organizations to employ religious
symbols, terms, and ideas to support secular goals.
4. Some states tolerate, appease, and often glorify
terrorists as heros.
5. Liberal democracies have often lost the resolve to
deal with terrorists, despite the fact that they are aware
of the threat.
6. A history of weak response has made terrorism a low
risk venture.17
The threat of international terrorism is growing in
impact. It captures world attention with violent and
spectacular attacks, targeting U.S. foreign interests and
the ability to execute international policy. The future
challenges are increasing and the ability to respond
internationally is not keeping pace.
In the spectrum of warfare, terrorism is placed at the
lower end of what the United States refers to as Low
Intensity Conflict. It may occur at all levels of warfare
and assigning it a specific level may by default grant a
degree of legitimacy. Quotes and statements from numerous
civilian, military and governmental leaders can be brought
forward such as, Secretary of State George Shultz in a
statement before the House Foreign Affairs Committee on 5
February 1986 stated, "Terrorism is a form of warfare waged
by political forces --- including some foreign states."18
to further substantiate terrorism as a form of warfare.
Terrorism is often described as mindless, senseless, or
irrational violence, but if that was the case it would not
continue to affect national and international policies.
Terrorism is not an end unto itself, it is the means to an
end, the achievement of an objective.
Terrorism is violence against the "system", waged
outside the "system" , and therefore the rules of the
"system" do not always apply. Most other forms of warfare,
at least in theory, recognize several categories of non-
combatants and do not target them. Terrorists recognize far
fewer non-combatants and apply little effort to limit
subsidiary damage. Terrorists may regard a person as an
enemy, a combatant and therefore a target, solely on the
basis of nationality, ethnicity, or religion. This is not
to say that people we call terrorists are always
indiscriminate killers, or that groups we call armies are
scrupulously discriminating; it does compel us to
recognize that soldiers may sometimes be terrorists.
As you have read terrorism can be documented as a form
of successful warfare that is growing. We may disapprove of
it, but terrorists can assemble plausible, if not logical
arguments in defense of their actions. Why should they play
by the systems rules, when those rules were established to
support the system they are fighting. When the Law of War
deprives them of exercising their right to fight for what
they believe in, the only way they can, with any hope of
survival till the eventual achievement of their goal, they
will never abide to it. Terrorism will not conform to
international standards, we must adapt to it. Recognizing
terrorism as warfare is the first step, developing an
effective doctrine to combat it is the second.
END NOTES
1. Walter Laquer, "The Anatomy of Terrorism," in Ten Years
of Terrorism : Collected Views, et al, Jennifer Shaw, 8
2. Anthony C. E. Quainton, "Moral and Ethical
Considerations in Defining a Counter-terrorist
Policy," in David C. Rapoport and Yonah Alexander,
ed., The Rationalization of Terrorism (1982) : 40
3. Public Report of the Vice President's Task Force on
Combatting Terrorism (February 1986) : 1
4. Martha F. Brady, "The Zona Rosa Massacre," Marine Corps
Gazette (March 1991) : 39
5. Public Report of the Vice President's Task Force on
Combatting Terrorism (February 1986) : 1
6. Abraham G. Sofaer, "Terrorism and the Law," Foreign
Affairs (Summer 1986) : 901
7. Christopher H. Pyle, "Defining Terrorism," Foreign
Policy (Fall 1986) : 63
8. Edward H. Houle, Maj. USAF, "The Use of Force to
Counter International Terrorism - A Diplomacy
Dilemma," Defense Technical Information Center Report
(November 1987) : 61
9. Casper Weinberger, "Framing an Appropriate Response to
Terrorism," R.O.A. National Security Report (August
1986) : 8 U.S. Department of State, International
Terrorism - Selected Document Number 24 (1986) : 2
10. Public Report of the Vice President's Task Force on
Combatting Terrorism (February 1986) : 1
11. Ibid
12. Casper Weinberger, "Framing an Appropriate Response to
Terrorism," R.O.A. National Security Report (August
1986) : 8; U.S. Department of State, International
Terrorism - Selected Document Number 24 (1986) : 2
13. Brian Jenkins, International Terrorism : The Other
World War (1985) : 20
14. Brian Jenkins, "Terrorism - Prone Countries and
Conditions," in Ariel Merari, ed, On Terrorism and
Combatting Terrorism : Proceedings of an International
Seminar Tel-Aviv. 1979 (1985) : 28
15. George Bush, "Prelude to Retaliation : Building a
Governmental Consensus on Terrorism," SAIS Review
(Winter-Spring 1987) : 7
16. William Waugh, International Terrorism - How Nations
Respond to Terrorists (1982) : 130
17. Ray S. Cline and Yonah Alexander, Terrorism as State
Sponsored Covert Warfare (1986) : 9-10
18. U.S. Department of State, State Department Bulletin
(April 1986) : 41
BIBLIOGRAPHY
1. Brady, Martha F., "The Zona Rosa Massacre," Marine
Corps Gazette (March)
2. Brusitus, J.M., LtCol USA, "Terrorism : Crime or War?"
Defense Technical Information Center Report (June
1987)
3. Bush, George, "Prelude to Retaliation : Building a
Governmental Consensus on Terrorism," SAIS Review
(Winter-Spring 1987)
4. Cline, Ray S. and Alexander, Yonah, Terrorism as a
State Sponsored Covert Warfare (1986)
5. Elson, Stephen J., "Terrorism : Some Answers to Some
Difficult Problems," Defense Technical Information
Center Report (March 1982)
6. Houle, Edward H., Maj. USAF, "The Use of Force to
Counter International Terrorism - A Diplomacy
Dilemma," Defense Technical Information Center Report
(November 1987)
7. Humphries, John G., Maj. USAF, "International Terrorism
as a Lawful Form of Warfare : an Idea Whose Time
Should Not Arrive," Defense Technical Information
Center Report (April 1986)
8. Jenkins, Brian M., "International Terrorism : A New
Kind Of Warfare," Rand Corporation Paper (June 1974)
9. Jenkins, Brian M., "International Terrorism : The Other
World War," Rand Corporation Paper (1985)
10. Jenkins, Brian M., "Terrorism - Prone Countries And
Conditions," in Ariel Merari, ed, On Terrorism and
Combatting Terrorism : Proceedings of an International
Seminar, Tel-Aviv 1979 (1985)
11. Laquer, Walter, "The Anatomy of Terrorism," in Ten
Years Of Terrorism : Collected Views , et al, Jennifer
Shaw (1979)
12. Pyle, Christopher H., "Defining Terrorism," Foreign
Policy (Fall 1986)
13. Public Report of The Vice President's Task Force On
Combatting Terrorism (February 1986)
14. Quainton, Anthony C.E., "Moral and Ethical
Considerations in Defining a Counter-terrorist
Policy," in David C. Rapoport and Yonah Alexander,
ed., The Rationalization of Terrorism (1982)
15. Sloan, Stephen, "Beating International Terrorism"
(December 1986)
16. Sofaer, Abraham G. ,"Terrorism And The Law," Foreign
Affairs (Summer 1986)
17. U.S. Department of State, State Department Bulletin
(April 1986)
18. Waugh, William, "International Terrorism - How Nations
Respond To Terrorists" (1982)
19. Weinberger, Casper, "Framing An Appropriate Response to
Terrorism," R.0.A. National Security Report Aug 1986,
U.S. Department of State, International Terrorism -
Selected Document Number 24 (1986)
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