The Ace Is Not A Maneuver Element: Yet! The Rhetoric Can Be Reality
AUTHOR Major William H. Dixon, Jr., USMC
CSC 1991
SUBJECT AREA - Aviation
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
TITLE: THE ACE IS NOT A MANEUVER ELEMENT: YET!
THE RHETORIC CAN BE REALITY
I. Purpose: To achieve the full combat potential of the
Air Combat Element (ACE), it must function in both maneuver
and support roles within the Marine Air Ground Task Force
(MAGTF).
II. Problem: Historically, the ACE has functioned within
the context of the six functions of Marine aviation as a
supporting element of the Ground Combat Element (GCE).
III. Data: Due to the Marine Corps structure, the GCE lacks
the fire power potential of its Army counterpart. This void
is filled by ACE assets. In the joint environment of today,
the MAGTF can ill afford to lose critical portions of the
ACE to missions that do not support the MAGTF scheme of
maneuver. The GCE has in the past, and continues to
function as the maneuver element of the MAGTF. The result
is a MAGTF planning cycle driven by the GCE. The ACE is
relegated to supporting roles which can be fulfilled with
Air Force, Navy, and Army air assets. The ACE must be
assigned support and maneuver missions. History provides
excellent examples of aviation assets that have functioned
in various missions as a maneuver element with resounding
success. When the issues are clarified concerning methods
of employment and concepts of operation for the ACE (support
and maneuver missions), the MAGTF commander will enjoy
greater flexibility in fighting the battle of today and
shaping the battlefield for the fight tomorrow.
IV. Conclusion: The ACE is a supporting element of the
GCE, but is equally capable of fulfilling the mission of a
maneuver element. To use the ACE only in a supporting role
denies the entire MAGTF of a potential asset that can make
the difference between success and failure.
V. Recommendations: That the traditional barriers be laid
aside and that every opportunity be exploited to exchange
ideas and interact with Marines of all operational
backgrounds to better understand the basic concepts of
maneuver warfare. With that understanding, then the members
of the Marine Corps, through innovative thought, can exploit
the potential of not only the ACE but all supporting arms to
achieve the greatest impact upon the next battlefield.
THE ACE IS NOT A MANEUVER ELEMENT: YET!
THE RHETORIC CAN BE REALITY
OUTLINE
Thesis Statement. The full combat potential of the ACE can
achieve fruition on today's battlefield when the ACE is
employed as a support element and a maneuver element.
I. The Facts
A. Joint forces and the Omnibus Agreement
B. Marine Corps structure
C. Maneuver
D. The GCE is the maneuver element
E. The six functions of Marine aviation
1. Methods of employment
2. Concepts of operation
3. Support and maneuver operations
4. Apportionment and allocation
II. The Missions
A. Introduction
1. Not an innovative concept of today
2. Three premises for success
3. Missions tied to historical examples
B. Gain and maintain air superiority
C. Isolate enemy units on the battlefield
D. Shape the battlefield
E. Screen the GCE's left flank
F. Destroy the strong points bypassed by the GCE
G. During the offensive breakthrough, pursue and
destroy the enemy
H. Delay the enemy during the withdrawal
I. Provide rear area security for the CSSE
J. Provide a reserve force to the MAGTF commander
III. Laying The Foundation
A. The doctrinal renaissance
B. Assumptions
C. An example
D. Responsibilities of the MAGTF commander
E. Responsibilities of the ACE commander
IV. Conclusion
A. Traditional thought
B. Resistance to change
C. Building the bridges to close the gap
D. The opportunity to excel is now
THE ACE IS NOT A MANEUVER ELEMENT: YET!
THE RHETORIC CAN BE REALITY
THE FACTS
In today's environment, inter-service competition has
increased with the threat of military reductions. The
survival of the Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF), in
this environment, depends upon the incorporation of its
elements into a tightly knit fighting organization. Each
element must be well-schooled in the contributions and
methods of employment of the other elements. The reduction
of military forces will require the Marine Corps to fight as
a joint force. In that scenario Marine air assets become a
very precious commodity coveted by the other military
services. The Omnibus Agreement that has arisen from joint
operations states that excess air sorties of any service can
be used by the Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC)
where he perceives the need. Underutilization or
misutilization of Marine air assets by the MAGTF commander
can dilute the fighting ability of the MAGTF.
Concurrent with the development of military aviation
technology, the Marine Corps through the years structured
itself with the Air Combat Element (ACE) as an integral part
of the task organization. Continually faced with an austere
budget, Marine Corps leaders have made deliberate sacrifices
to ensure that aviation remained a part of the Corp's
structure. The impact of these sacrifices is not clearly
apparent in the joint world, possibly not even by many
members of the Marine Corps. With less than a full
compliment of ACE assets, the MAGTF contains something less
than a Ground Combat Element (GCE) and a Combat Service
Support Element (CSSE). The GCE, be it a battalion,
regiment, or division, contains significantly less fire
power than a comparable Army unit. The ACE was designed to
satisfy those firepower requirements. The most notable
deficiencies are in numbers of tanks, artillery pieces, and
mechanized assets. In many scenarios, this leaves the GCE
with too little firepower to fight the battle without
firepower augmentation from the ACE.
The full combat potential of the ACE can achieve
fruition on today's battlefield when the ACE is employed as
a support element and a maneuver element. Military writers
have published numerous articles about the ACE as a maneuver
element. Maneuver is defined as the employment of force on
the battlefield through movement in combination with fire,
or fire potential, to gain a position of advantage in
respect to the enemy and to accomplish the mission. (1:220)
The MAGTF is touted as being a cohesive fighting force of
three distinctive maneuver elements: the GCE, the ACE, and
the CSSE.
Theoretically, the MAGTF is composed of three maneuver
elements, although the GCE remains the maneuver element,
doctrinally and traditionally. This fact is evident in the
MAGTF planning cycle. The MAGTF planning cycle is the
method used by the commander to transform an assigned
mission into the plans and orders necessary for mission
accomplishment. (4:49) Historically, the ACE and CSSE have
functioned as supporting elements of the GCE instead of
separate maneuver elements. Therefore, the MAGTF planning
cycle has evolved into its present form with the GCE
developing the possible courses of action for mission
accomplishment. The ACE and CSSE then provide the concepts
of employment and estimates of supportability. The ACE
subsequently becomes a reactive force rather than a
proactive force multiplier of the MAGTF. This situation can
present significant problems when the ACE is the focus of
effort for a particular phase of an operation, but is not
the driving force in the planning effort.
Current ACE employment is understood best in Marine
Aviation (FMFM 5-1), that contains a thorough discussion of
the six functions of Marine aviation. Unfortunately, this
document contains no information concerning concept of
operations. This document only addresses the support roles
of the ACE. From an ACE perspective this doctrinal void is
a stumbling block of maneuverist thinking.
The six functions of Marine aviation are: air
reconnaissance, air defense, assault support, offensive air
support, electronic warfare, and control of aircraft and
missiles. FMFM 5-1 clearly defines these functions and the
requisite capabilities and limitations of each function.
These functions are methods of employment. The ACE
commander uses the six functional areas of employment to
support the GCE in its ground maneuver. The ACE commander
uses conceits of operation to fight as a maneuver element
for the MAGTF commander. On the modern battlefield the ACE
can do both types of operations, support and maneuver, as
required by the situation.
If the ACE participates in both support and maneuver
operations, the MAGTF commander must determine the
apportionment and allocation of ACE resources to best
support his scheme of maneuver. Apportionment is the
determination and assignment of the total expected effort by
percentage and/or by priority that should be devoted to the
various air operations for a given period of time. (1:32)
Allocation is the translation of apportionment into total
number of sorties (missions) by aircraft type available for
each operation. (1:24) The assignment of ACE resources to
maneuver element type missions will reduce the number of
aircraft available to the rest of the force. The GCE and
CSSE need to know the availability of air support for their
planning considerations. The MAGTF commander must weigh the
support and maneuver asset requirements to attain the full
potential of the MAGTF as a fighting force.
The Air Force, Navy, and Army can provide some or all
the support necessary to fulfill the six functions of Marine
aviation. However, support of the GCE is only part of the
equation. The impact of the ACE as a maneuver element is
far reaching. The variety of missions the ACE can perform
as a maneuver element provides the MAGTF commander with a
significant increase in planning flexibility. A Commander
In Chief (CINC) will be very hesitant to take away a
maneuver element that is an integral part of a fighting
force. He will not be as hesitant to remove a portion of a
supporting arm (the ACE) to augment the focus of effort,
especially if the Marines are not that focus of effort.
THE MISSIONS
Maneuver missions assigned to the ACE are not an
innovative concept of modern warfare. Since air power has
evolved into a credible military asset, military leaders
with an appreciation for the potential of air assets have
prosecuted battles with great success. Historical examples
of the ACE functioning as a maneuver element are plentiful.
The words "ACE" and "maneuver element" may not have been
used, but the essence of maneuver was evident nonetheless.
To make the ACE an effective maneuver element,
commanders of the past have accepted three premises. (10:9)
1. The air component's primary mission may not be the
support of the rifleman.
2. Supporting relationships between the air component
and ground component cannot be one-way.
3. Aviation tasking need not be centralized to be
effective. Mission type orders from the force commander
enable air assets to be flexible and responsive.
The following missions are presented, not as an
inclusive list, but as a thought provoking exercise for
members of the ACE, GCE, and CSSE. Although some of the
following examples involve a major portion of a particular
aviation unit, there is not a requirement nor desire to
involve the entire ACE in maneuver. The competing needs of
the MAGTF elements must be considered. Whenever possible,
historical examples support the following proposed missions.
Each mission is preceded by an appropriate, concise mission
statement.
Gain and Maintain Air Superiority
Air superiority is a necessity on today's battlefield.
Since the German attack on Poland in 1939, the following
facts have been established. No country has won a war in
the face of enemy air superiority. (Vietnam is not an
exception. Air power, while maintaining air superiority,
was never allowed the freedom to engage the necessary ground
targets to aid in the achievement of victory). No major
offensive has succeeded against an opponent who controlled
the air. (The TET Offensive in Vietnam is an excellent
example of this fact). No defense has sustained itself
against an enemy who had air superiority. (The most recent
example of this is the Southwest Asia War.) (7:10)
Possibly the only air mission that has been treated
like maneuver warfare, to include mission type orders, is
air superiority. This mission is of vital importance to the
maneuver elements on the ground. Marine aviation
historically has been allowed the flexibility to achieve the
air superiority mission, permitting the ground forces to
concentrate on the destruction of the enemy ground forces.
Isolate Enemy Units On The Battlefield
One of the premises of maneuver warfare is to pit
strength against weakness. The MAGTF commander, in maneuver
warfare, attempts to mass his forces against weaker enemy
forces. Without the ability to isolate enemy units from
reinforcement and impede the maneuverability of enemy forces
already on the battlefield, the MAGTF commander may be
forced to fight on a battlefield shaped by the enemy.
Additionally, the MAGTF commander needs some method of
cutting the enemy's lines of communication (LOCs) into the
battlefield to deny force sustainment. Denying him avenues
of approach, the enemy loses the capability to reinforce and
shift forces, and sustain those forces. The ACE can achieve
this mission effectively day and night.
Shade The Battlefield
The ability to shape the battlefield enables the MAGTF
commander to ensure strength is placed against weakness at
the place and time of his choosing. There are many ways to
shape the battlefield. Denial of command and control
communication (C3) radio frequencies can destroy enemy
cohesion and adversely influence their tempo of operations.
Actual denial of terrain or LOCs can force the enemy to move
into preestablished kill zones or "fire sacks". ACE assets
can shape the battlefield by disrupting or shutting down the
enemy C3 abilities, channelizing enemy movement by denying
terrain, and establishing ambush sites. These actions can
force the enemy movement to conform to the MAGTF commander's
plan of destroying the enemy with minimum friendly losses.
Screen The GCE's Left Flank
During World War II both sides used the screening
mission with great effect. In 1940 the Luftwaffe covered
the flanks of the army's deep armor penetration into France.
The Luftwaffe played a key role in the summer of 1943 by
turning back a massive Russian attack on the right flank of
the 4th Panzer Army as they moved north for an offensive
against the Kursk salient. (7:91)
The Allies used air to screen their flanks in both the
European and Pacific theaters. General Patton assigned the
XIX Tactical Air Command the mission of protecting his
exposed flank along the Loire River as he raced to the east.
During September of 1944, General MacArthur used General
Kenney's air force to guard his flanks as he moved to Leyte.
On this occasion, General Kenney's air force protected the
flank of one of history's longest operational penetrations.
(7:92)
Since the acquisition of the Light Assault Vehicle
(LAV), the Light Assault Infantry (LAI) battalion routinely
has been assigned the screening mission. The mobility of
the LAV adds an increased capability but carries an inherent
firepower liability as evidenced in Operation Desert Storm
when the LAI unit encountered an enemy force that possessed
superior firepower.
The ACE adds a new dimension to the screening mission
with speed and lethality. Supported by the LAI battalion,
the ACE can provide a highly effective screening force for
the MAGTF commander. This mission can be expanded into
guarding and cover missions by adding heavier ground forces
such as tank and mechanized assets. The superior speed,
visibility and communication abilities of the ACE make it
the ideal candidate for coordination and control of the
ground attachments.
Destroy The Strong Points Bypassed By The GCE
During World War II, General Doolittle's 8th Air Force
provided air support over the spreading battlefield of the
Soar campaign. The bombers assaulted the obstinate Metz
forts and attacked crucial targets across the front. (6:688)
Maneuver warfare, unlike linear warfare, emphasizes
mass against the enemy's weaknesses. Maintaining the
offensive tempo requires bypassing enemy strong points.
Those strong points must be addressed. Stripping firepower
assets, armor or artillery, away from the GCE has the
potential of defusing the offensive. ACE assets, fixed wing
or helicopter, possess the firepower potential to deal with
strong points swiftly and decisively.
During The Offensive Breakthrough. Pursue, and Destroy The
Enemy
As General Patton overwhelmed the enemy during the
Eifel campaign of World War II, General "Opie" Weyland's XIX
Tactical Air Command pursued the retreating enemy. The
fighter bombers attacked relentlessly and dealt the enemy
devastating blows. (6:758)
Many times in military history the full fruits of
victory were lost because the offensive was unable to pursue
and destroy a retreating enemy. Many times this same enemy
would be faced again on another field of battle. Reasons
for this failure to pursue include terrain, lack of mobility
assets, logistics, and fatigue. ACE assets are ideal for
the pursuit mission. Speed, firepower potential, and
observation enable the ACE to complete the enemy
destruction. Observers of the aftermath from the Iraqi
retreat from Kuwait could not believe the absolute
devastation of the enemy that friendly air had achieved.
This ACE mission has an added advantage. It serves to
push the offensive culminating point into the future by
relieving the GCE of part of its traditional offensive
responsibilities. With ACE assistance, the GCE is not
forced to continue the pursuit alone. This assistance
allows the ground forces time to reconstitute. As the
offensive is continued, the ACE can maintain pressure on the
enemy while elements of the GCE refuel, rearm, and possibly
relocate by vertical assault.
Delay The Enemy During The Withdrawal
During the fall of 1950, the Chinese forces surrounded
the American forces at the Chosin Reservoir in Korea. The
American retreat, better described as an orderly withdrawal,
was successful in large part due to the delaying action of
American air power. General MacArthur's armies escaped the
trap almost intact with less than 13,000 killed or wounded.
American air attacks accounted for 30,000 Chinese killed or
wounded. More importantly, air power stopped a major enemy
offensive, denying the enemy a repeat performance of their
offensive drive earlier in the summer. (7:72-73)
The Marine Corps does not like to think about a
friendly force withdrawal and the word retreat is simply not
tolerated. The withdrawal mission, however, must be
considered from a practical standpoint and the Corps
tradition of readiness in any "clime or place". Sometimes
to retire and regroup, even if it involves only a small
unit, provides the opportunity to fight another day. The
inherent advantages of aviation make this force ideal for
the delaying action. The firepower is rapidly available to
blunt the enemy drive. Aviation reconnaissance assets can
prevent a surprise envelopment or major ambush. Most
importantly, the morale factor, if a withdrawal is
necessary, is critical for successful accomplishment of the
mission. The reassuring feeling of aviation assets on
station can enable the Marines to repeat their much touted
performance of the Chosin reservoir. When they walked out,
it was with all their people and equipment.
Provide Rear Area Security For The CSSE
Rear area security has been the topic of numerous
discussions and debates. The area occupied by the CSSE is a
troublesome vital area for the MAGTF commander for two
reasons: the amount of terrain involved and the personnel
requirements. Enemy LOCs and logistical units are key
targets for the MAGTF commander. Conversely, the CSSE is a
key target for the enemy. Both sides realize the obvious
implications of losing logistical sustainment, whether in
the defense or offense.
The CSSE can provide some limited security, but the
paucity of personnel and firepower assets render these
forces almost impotent in the face of an enemy surprise
attack. Without a fire support coordination center (FSCC),
the CSSE lacks the assets to coordinate and control
supporting arms, even if the CSSE owned the assets. Rear
area security on the linear battlefield did not merit the
amount of concern that it does on the nonlinear battlefield.
With forces spread out on a broad front, the ability of an
enemy flanking movement was far more difficult than today
where the areas of the battlefield are not defined as
clearly.
The GCE does not favor the rear area security mission
because of manpower assets. In the current reduction of
forces, each battalion is projected to lose the manpower
equivalence of a company. The GCE cannot afford to give up
personnel, armor, mechanized, or fire support assets and
continue to retain confidence in mission accomplishment.
The ACE, with some ground forces under its operational
control, is far better suited to deal with rear area
security. A task organized strike package to counter the
perceived enemy threat possesses the kind of responsiveness
the mission demands. If an LAI unit was operationally
controlled by the ACE, the necessary supporting arms
controllers would be available, when necessary, to direct
air strikes close to friendly forces. The strike force with
a command and control aircraft would direct the action
against the penetrating enemy force.
Provide A Reserve Force To The MAGTF
The reserve force exists to exploit friendly success or
to dissolve an enemy advantage. Historically, the GCE has
provided the reserve force from within its own structure.
Usually, a third of the force at each unit level is
dedicated to the reserve mission. However, at times the GCE
cannot provide a viable reserve force without weakening the
strength of the main effort. A prime example is the initial
stages of an amphibious operation when the buildup of forces
ashore may not have reached the point of introducing the
reserve forces. Supporting arms such as artillery, tanks,
and mechanized assets may not yet be ashore, leaving the GCE
in a vulnerable position. An ACE strike package task
organized to counter the enemy threat can fill the void
during those critical periods when the GCE needs the added
muscle.
LAYING THE FOUNDATION
The Marine Corps is currently experiencing a doctrinal
renaissance with maneuver warfare as the center of gravity.
It naturally follows that many unresolved issues remain,
particularly the essence of the MAGTF commander. Three
assumptions are a mandatory requirement if there is to be
any validity to the ACE as a maneuver element.
First, the MAGTF commander is a warfighter.
Currently, two schools of thought exist concerning the role
of the MAGTF commander. The MAGTF commander is either a
warfighter or an administrator. The interpretation of the
MAGTF commander's role as either a warfighter or an
administrator is critical to understanding the issues
surrounding the controversy. The school of thought
supporting the MAGTF commander as an administrator envisions
his role as that of planning the battle 72 to 96 hours into
the future. He does not direct maneuver units but instead
relies upon the maneuver element commanders to fight today's
battle. On the other hand, the MAGTF commander who
functions as a warfighter reserves the right to maneuver
forces on today's battlefield, shaping the battlefield of
tomorrow.
Second, the MAGTF commander requires some form of a
FSCC to function as a warfighter. Monitoring the progress
of the battle from the FSCC would enable the MAGTF commander
to introduce forces under his control at a critical time to
influence the outcome of the battle. For example, with
information from the FSCC the MAGTF commander could commit a
reserve force comprised of ACE assets to diffuse an enemy
offensive.
Finally, the entire ACE does not function as a maneuver
element. Only those assets required to do a maneuver
element mission would be committed. The MAGTF commander
must decide which maneuver element can accomplish the
mission most effectively during each phase of the operation.
The intent of the first two assumptions is not to make
the MAGTF commander a glorified GCE commander. The intent
is to enable the MAGTF commander to fight the MAGTF in that
grey area between the operational and tactical levels of war
and influence the battle, when necessary, for the benefit of
the MAGTF as a whole.
The ACE can be used as both a maneuver and a support
element in the same operation. As an example, the MAGTF is
assigned a mission that involves an amphibious assault to
capture an airfield and port facility for follow-on forces.
The ACE is assigned the mission of the airfield and the GCE
is responsible for capturing the port facility. In Phase I
the ACE may be the focus of effort as air superiority is
established and the force beach head line (FBHL) is isolated
from the enemy. The ACE and GCE may share the focus of
effort in Phase II as they secure the airfield and port
facility. Supporting requirements would have to be
established since the GCE will require air support and the
ACE may require ground forces for air field security. The
CSSE could be the focus of effort in Phase III as logistical
support is established ashore.
In the above scenario, the MAGTF commander must issue a
clear commander's intent to the three maneuver elements
indicating what he intends to do to the enemy. The
commander's intent must include guidance regarding centers
of gravity, significant strengths, and critical
vulnerabilities of both the enemy and the friendly forces.
He has to then issue mission-type orders as they pertain to
each of the maneuver elements. GCE monopolization of the
planning cycle must be eliminated. The focus of effort must
be identified. The maneuver element identified as the focus
of effort for a particular phase of the operation must
formulate the courses of action for its portion of the
overall plan.
The ACE commander must be a maneuver force commander
and not just a distributor of resources. The six functions
of Marine aviation are concepts of employment, not courses
of action. It is imperative that the ACE commander
comprehend that. The six functions are tools for
determining how to employ ACE assets in a supporting role.
(5:5) Task organization is the ACE commander's tool for
developing courses of action to prosecute a maneuver element
mission. With this realization, the ACE commander, after
receiving the MAGTF commander's intent and mission
statement, must issue his own intent and mission statement
to enable the ACE staff to fulfill its function, completion
of the ACE commander's planning cycle. Apportionment and
allocation of ACE assets must be formulated to satisfy the
support and maneuver missions and assist the MAGTF commander
in his decision making process.
CONCLUSION
The requirement for doctrinal changes, starting with
Command and Staff Action (FMFM 3-1), is only the beginning
of the process to make the ACE maneuver element a reality.
The Professional Military Education (PME) program, at all
levels, is an appropriate place for introducing these new
concepts. Continual cross-training among all three MAGTF
elements can break down many preconceived notions. However,
traditional thought and resistance to change are two very
stubborn barriers in the Corps that impede acceptance of the
ACE as a maneuver element.
Traditionally, the ACE has been nothing more than a
supporting element of the Marine rifleman. Everything in
the Corps has supported the rifleman. Given that, then the
GCE to some extent, as the practice has been, should control
all supporting assets to ensure that the needs of the
rifleman are met efficiently and effectively. Marine
officers of all ranks accept the preceding statements
without question, hence the resistance to the ACE in a
maneuver role. Many Marines generally believe "a force that
cannot hold real estate on the battlefield is not a maneuver
element." However, the definition of maneuver is defined as
the employment of force on the battlefield through movement
in combination with fire, or fire potential, to gain a
position of advantage in respect to the enemy and to
accomplish the mission. (1:220)
The standard air request methods allow the ACE to
function only as a supporting element. The air request
system is centralized and time consuming. Many times the
results of requested air support are not adequate to fulfill
the needs of the GCE. The maneuver element concept is not
intended to eliminate the support missions. Those missions
are critical to the Marine on the ground. But, if a
maneuver element of the ACE can defuse, delay, or destroy
portions of the enemy prior to the ground forces reaching
the GCE battle area, then the Marine rifleman's burden has
been lightened.
Resistance to change is a typical reaction from
professionals in any occupation. The "if it isn't broken"
mentality seems to apply here and many Marines believe it
really is not broken. However, to fight the ACE only as a
supporting element is to fight with one hand tied behind the
back. When most people cannot articulate clearly the
changes involved in maneuvering the ACE, the natural
tendency is to discount those proposed changes. An element
of fear may exist that the ACE could have too much voice in
what occurs on the battlefield. Would a ground commander
have problems taking tactical orders from an aviator? Would
an aviator have problems being placed in a maneuver element
role and forced to understand the scheme of maneuver as well
as his ground counterpart? These issues are delicate and
cross many boundaries, some of which are considered almost
sacred.
The rhetoric of the ACE as a maneuver element in
addition to a support element can become reality. Bridges
of understanding will have to be built to close the gaps
between the GCE, ACE, and CSSE. Receptive attitudes to new
ideas must be cultivated. Most importantly, every
opportunity must be exploited to exchange ideas and interact
with Marines of all operational backgrounds to understand
better the basic concepts of maneuver warfare.
The Marine Corps is preparing to turn a page in
history. The Corps will be reduced to a smaller size than
is enjoyed presently. Equipment and training assets will be
harder to obtain. The future is going to be more austere in
all areas. As professionals, Marines can approach the
future with apprehension or with audacity. This time can be
turned into an opportunity to excel by fine-tuning the
Corps' structure, employing the assets presently owned with
innovative thought, and beginning a new page in the Corps'
history as a more capable, leaner, and more potent fighting
force than ever before.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Published Official Documents
1. Department of Defense. Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Dictionary of Military Terms, JCS Pub l.
Washington, D.C., 1987.
2. U.S. Marine Corps. Assault Support, FMFM 5-3.
Quantico, 1979.
3. U.S. Marine Corps. Close Air Support and Close-In Fire
Support, FMFM 5-4A. Quantico, 1988.
4. U.S. Marine Corps. Command and Staff Action, FMFM 3-I.
Quantico, 1979.
5. U.S. Marine Corps. Marine Aviation, FMFM 5-1.
Quantico, 1979.
Published Books
6. Farago, Ladislas. Patton: Ordeal and Triumph. New
York: Ivan Obolensky, Inc., 1963.
7. Warden III, Col. John A., USAF. The Air Campaign,
Planning For Combat. Pergamon-Brassey's
International Defense Publishers, 1989.
Published Periodical Articles
8. Lanis, Captain Howard G., USMC(Ret). "A More
Traditional View". Marine Corps Gazette, February
1988, pp. 49.
9. Lind, William S. "Maneuver Warfare and Marine
Aviation". Marine Corps Gazette, May 1989, pp. 57-
64.
10. Moore, Major R. Scott, USMC. "The Art of MAGTF
Warfare". Marine Corps Gazette, April 1989, pp. 24-
29.
11. Saxman, Major John B., USAF. "The Role of Marine
Aviation in Maneuver Warfare". Marine Corps
Gazette, August 1989, pp. 58-63.
12. Sayen, Major John J., JR., USMCR. "Countering the Rear
Area Threat, Part II". Marine Corps Gazette,
February 1988, pp. 32-37.
Theses
13. Astrzk, Major Lawrence W., USMC. "Marine Corps
Doctrine: Can The Ace Support It?". U.S. Marine
Corps Command and Staff College. Class of 1989-
1990. March 29, 1990.
14. Donnell, Major Steven B., USMC. "The Ace As A Maneuver
Element". U.S. Marine Corps Command and Staff
College. Class of 1989-1990. March 28, 1990.
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