From Europe.
arrival of the Australasian.
Important debate in Parliament on intervention.
Mr. Lindsay's motion Quashed by Lord Palmerston.
The Cunard steamship Australasian, which left Liverpool on the 19th of July, and Queenstown on the 20th, arrived at New York on the morning of the 30th.
Her news is three days later than previous advices.
Debate in the House of Commons on intervention.
In the House of Commons, on the 18th of July, Mr. Clay made an appeal to Mr. Lindsey to postpone his motion with respect to mediation in the civil war in America. At any time it would be a question that should be cautiously dealt with, but especially when there was a rumor of the total defect of the Federal army.Mr. J. Ewart cordially seconded the appeal.
Mr. Lindsay said that he had so often postponed his motion that, at this late period of the session, he did not think that he should be doing his duty if he deferred it any longer. He then moved the following resolution:
‘ "That in the opinion of this House the States which have seceded from the Union of the republic of the United States have so long maintained themselves under a separate and established Government, and have given such proof of their determination and ability to support their independence, that the propriety of offering mediation, with a view of terminating hostilities between the contending parties, is worthy of the serious and immediate attention of her Majesty's Government."
’ He believed that the English public would expect that their representatives should not separate without expressing an opinion on this very serious question. He disclaimed any idea of giving offence to the people of the Northern States. If what was reported was true, their feeling towards England could not be made worse. But he believed the press did not represent the real opinion of the Americans.
He traced the causes of the Secession movement, which he attributed to severe and unjust taxation, owing to the selfish policy of the North, and contended that the first Southern States which seceded sent Commissioners to negotiate a peaceable separation, but that the Lincoln Government put them off, and was preparing a secret expedition which, as a matter of self-defence, compelled the seizure of Fort Sumter. He then reviewed the progress of the war, which must confirm every one in the opinion that the restoration of the Union was utterly impossible. In conclusion, he drew a fearful picture of the horrors of the war, and urged that for the sake of humanity they should be arrested, and that both politically and commercially a separation of the Union would be for the benefit of this country.
Mr. Lindsay Rebuked.
Mr. Taylor considered the course taken by the honorable member for Sunderland to be ill-judged, inopportune, and calculated to increase the feelings of bitterness and irritation which already prevailed in the Northern States towards Great Britain. He complained that the sympathy of the English public had been enlisted by the press in favor of the Confederate States, altogether ignoring the cause of slavery, which tainted those States and their institutions. The North, it was not to be denied, had recently met with considerable reverses, but, in his opinion, it was impossible, and contrary to all experience of the past, that twenty millions of people could be successfully resisted by five millions. The one was superior in every material resource, whilst the latter was encumbered with a servile population of four millions. He implored the House to abstain from giving its assent to the resolution which the honorable member for Sunderland had invited it to pass.
Lord A. Vane Tempest Supports Mr. Lindsay.
Lord A. Vane Tempest supported the motion of Mr. Lindsay. He considered that the restoration of the Union was impossible; but if it was it would confirm slavery, which separation would ameliorate; for the chief impediment to it was the fanaticism of the Northern abolitionists. He believed that the universal spirit of liberty which pervaded the Southern States would enable them to repel all the efforts of the North to subdue them, and expressed his astonishment that those who professed to abhor slavery could desire to see five millions of people reduced to a subjection which they detested, and would perish before they submitted to.After all our centrality, the Northern States hated us more bitterly than ever, and it was our duty and interest, on the grounds of humanity, to cultivate the alliance of the South. It had always been the policy of this country to recognize the de facte Government. We had recognized the rights of all nations to remodel their internal institutions. We had done so in the case of the South American colonies, of Spain, of Greece, and other countries, and we were bound by every consideration to treat in the same manner and recognize the Southern States of America.
Mr. Forster Defends the U. S. Government.
Mr. W. E. Forster said the noble Lord had asked him a variety of questions as to what the Northern Government would, could, might, or should do in certain contingencies. He begged to assure the noble Lord and the House that he did not stand here as the advocate and mouthpiece of the Northern Government. He looked at the question purely from an English point of view. No man more deeply deplored than himself the evils caused by the war, both here and in America, and no prepossession in favor of either party would prevent him from supporting any feasible mode of putting an end to them. He believed, however, that the motion of the honorable member from Sunderland, so far from staying the war, would rather aggravate and prolong it, and possibly drag us into it; and he earnestly trusted that we would persevere in the principle and policy of entire non-intervention.--(Hear, hear)* * * *Were we in the position of the Federal--take the case of the war in India — if an offer of mediation had been made, accompanied by a threat — if France had stood forward and said, this contest can end only in separation — should we not have considered it an insult, and, instead of bringing us to peace, would it not much more likely have tended to aggravate the war? If we wanted this war to be prosecuted by the men of the North with greater fury, we could not go to work more ingeniously to attain our end.
Again, if any disturbance arose in Ireland — if a contest were going on there, and if another power stepped in, saying to us, ‘"Let Irishmen alone, and let them govern themselves,"’ should we be prepared to submit to dictation in such a matter? It might be said that this was a war so suicidal, so foolish, so wicked, that we must simply consider how to put a stop to it. But this was not the opinion of the vast majority of the twenty millions of the North, and it would not be our opinion if we were in the same position. The courage and endurance of the South were beyond all praise, but let us threaten them with foreign interference, and the result would be the same.
On the other hand, if we let them alone it was possible the parties might themselves find out that they had undertaken a task too hard for them.--(Hear, hear,) President Lincoln had called for three hundred thousand more troops. He could not help thinking there was a little more difficulty in getting these three hundred thousand than there was before. (Hear, hear,) The sick and wounded men going home were not good recruiting sergeants; but if we wished to find President Lincoln his three hundred thousand men, we had only to send out by the next mail the statement that England, in concert with other powers, threatened interference if she did not put a stop to the war.--(Hear, hear,) Some went still further, and were ready to assume the character mentioned by the noble Lord at the end of his speech — of peacemakers — rather a curious interpretation of the language of Scripture: ‘"Blessed are the peacemakers"’--who do not stand aloof from the contest.
But there might be those who would say, "Better a war with America than a continuance of the present state of things. Now, surely, if we had no occus belli against America, where would be the justification of our going to war with her? Were we to go to war with any country because we happened to be in disaster on account of what was occurring in that country? Not only would such a war be wicked and unjust, but foolish to the greatest possible degree. It was said that our population was starving, and he believed that the cotton famine at this moment was likely to get worse.
But we could keep the working population of Lancashire in luxury for less than the price it would cost us to interfere as the noble Lord opposite suggested. We had a cotton famine now, but if we did that we should stand in danger of a corn famine. Even if we were to enter into such a war, and to break all the rules of international law, on the ground of mere interest, because we could not get a certain commodity, then we ought to take our material interest in all its bearings, and see whether we should not lose more than we should gain by it.
He believed that, considered in a mere selfish and economical point of view, such a war would be the worse alternative.
Precedent.
Mr. Whiteside was willing to admit that the question on which the House was invited to pass an opinion was one which must be treated with great delicacy, but that was no reason why the House of Commons should not discuss it. He could not go so far as to say the South were wrong, or the North right, but he did not believe that slavery, and not conquest, was the cause of the war. The conflicting interests of the North and South rendered the desire of the latter to secede extremely profitable, but that was not the question. The South had seceded for reasons which were perfectly justifiable. It had established and maintained a de facts government, and it had been the practice of this Government to recognize de facts governments.In less than twelve months a Whig Government, because it had suited its purpose, had recognized Belgium, and it would not do to say that the civil war was still raging in America for the were on the point of subduing the brave Red-
gians, and we did more than recognize that Kingdom. In strict conformity with our practice and international law, Lord Castlereagh and Mr. Canning recognized Greece and Spanish Colonies in America, and they were supported by Sir James Macintosh, at that recognition was not inconsistent, but in accordance with a strict centrality.
The United States recognized the Spanish Republic some time before England did, because, as alleged, their interest, of which they were the safe judges, dictated it, and they also fiercely threatened any power that should presume to assist Spain --The Federal Government was not, therefore, entitled to resent a recognition of the Confederate States, which he contended, precedent, practice, international law, and every political and commercial interest required at our hands, in a spirit, not of intervention, but of impartial neutrality.
Mr. Gregory warmly supported the course of the Confederate States. He alleged that every pretext with which the North commenced the war had utterly failed, whilst the South had shown its determination to maintain its independence.
Speech of Lord Palmerston against the motion.
Lord Palmerston said: I hope the House will come to a decision to-night. The question is one of such importance and delicacy that I cannot think a postponement will be at all beneficial, and I confess that I regret very much that my honorable friend has thought it to be his duty to bring it under the notice of the House in the present state of things. There can be but one wish on the part of any man in this country with respect to this war, and that is, that it should end; but I very much doubt whether the only end which can be satisfactorily looked for, namely, an amicable separation, is likely to be accelerated by angry discussion in this House, where the war has been enacted by the champions of either side. It is true that many things have been said gratifying to the feelings of both parties, and on the other hand, in the warmth of debate, likely to be offensive, and it is more of human nature to think of that which is offensive rather than that which is gratifying. (Hear.)I regret that this debate has been brought on, and I earnestly hope the House will leave the future in the hands of the Government, content, as I believe the country is, with the past. I do not ask this as a matter of confidence in the Government of the day, because I think that whatever party be in office a question of such delicacy and immense importance should be left in the hands of the Executive to deal with. For it is not one which the House by a resolution pointing out a specific cause can take upon itself a responsibility which properly belongs to the Government. The motion points to two things — the mediation and acknowledgment. --The right honorable gentleman has laid it down and I do not dispute that we should be perfectly justified if we saw fit to acknowledge the independence of the Southern States, provided only that independence had been, in the words which he used, firmly and permanently established.
I quite concur that the fact of our acknowledging that independence would give to the Northern States no cause of offence towards this country; but the case of the South American Republics was very different to this. These were not acknowledged until the lapse of fifteen years, although they had practically achieved their independence, and it was quite clear Spain could not re-establish her dominion over them; but is this the case now? Only a fortnight ago it was doubtful whether the Federal or Confederates had possession of Richmond. It was but a few days ago that the whole course of the Mississippi was believed to be in the hands of the Federal.
I know that New Orleans was, and that Charleston possibly might be, captured; and I contend that whatever opinion we may have of the recent battles, and of the determination of the South to fight to the last for its independence, that practically the contest has not yet assumed a character to justify this country in assuming that the independence of the South is fully established. Some imagine that the acknowledgment of the South would establish a different position between it and this country. It would do no such thing, unless followed up by active interference, although centrality is perfectly compatible with acknowledgment.
The right honorable gentleman opposite said that the concession of belligerent rights was a step towards acknowledgment. I cannot admit that. No one can be insensible for a moment to the vast importance to this country of a speedy termination of the war. We all know the privations and sufferings which a large portion of the people now are undergoing in consequence of this unfortunate war; but, on the other hand, it has been well said by the honorable member for Bradford that any attempt to put an end to the war by active and violent interference would only produce still greater privations. There is no instance in history of a contest of such magnitude as that now going on betweed two nations of the same people. There is said to be nearly a million men in arms on one side and the other, and their mutual irritation and exasperation is admitted by all; and is this a moment at which a successful offer of mediation is likely to be made to either party?
I wish to guard myself against any expression of opinion as to the future. This war has been so contrary to every experience, that he would be a bold man who would venture to prophesy the state of affairs a month in advance. The country, I believe, is of opinion that the conduct of the Government has been wise and prudent. We shall be happy at any time, if an opportunity presents a reasonable prospect of doing so with success, to assist in putting an end to this desolating war. I think it had better be left in the hands of the Government to judge of the occasion as it arises. It is on this account that I do not enter into the discussion as to the right of either side; for if at any time we shall be able to offer our good offices, it can only be as impartial parties committed to no opinion in favor of either side, but only anxious to promote a settlement as consistent as possible with the interest and the feelings of both parties." He therefore hoped that the motion would be withdrawn.
S. Fitzgerald said that Mr. Lindsay had incurred great responsibility in bringing on the motion, and if it was persevered with he should support it. The Government were, however, incurring the most serious responsibility from the manner in which they were dealing with this question.
After a few words from Mr. Hopewood the motion for the adjournment was withdrawn, and Mr. Lindsay withdraw the resolution.
Comments of the London journals.
the times before the debate.
In its issue of the 18th, the London Times announces that ‘"to- night Mr. Lindsay is to attempt to persuade our Government to interfere between the warring States of America,"’ but declares that ‘"it is a very perilous problem, which many able men have shrunk from the attempt to solve."’ The Times proceeds to argue that all of what it calls ‘"the selfish interests"’ of England are against Mr. Lindsay's motion, and puts the case as follows: ‘ "America, while shaking her sword at us, is, at the same time, opening her own veins. The old school of diplomacy would ask, why should we interfere with our tourniquets and bandages? Perhaps it may be answered as the Federal of all ranks answer us, and exult while they do so, that our own population are suffering, and that by putting an end to that war we shall be putting an end to our own distress. Undoubtedly they are suffering. But if peace in America means only, as they boast, war with England, how should we be benefited by helping on a peace? As it stands, if we choose to avail ourselves of it, we have an easy way out of the whole difficulty. If we were to put a differential duty of 6d. a pound on American cotton, and help on our cotton industry until India, thus stimulated and guaranteed, had produced her stores, that would be our ultimate possibility of loss.
"We could count that loss at a few millions, and at that easy cost we might look on without pecuniary interest in the matter while America went back to jungle. We say this is what we might do if we looked with a hard, selfish, and unsympathizing eye upon the horrors which this frantic people are now enduring. It would cost us, comparatively, a mere nothing. There is honey enough in this English hive to keep us all fat for some years to come, and upon a profit and loss estimate it would cost us less to call India into existence as a cotton-producing country, and to pay for waiting, than it would to garrison Canada and destroy the American fleet. We shall not do this.
"So far from any such policy as this being debated among us, the feeling is universal that if by mediation we can do any good to both parties, we ought, at any risk of possible insult, to do it.--Failing this, there is a feeling, which is now becoming very general, that if we cannot stop the effusion of blood by mediation, we ought to give our whole moral weight to our own English kith and kin, who have so gallantly striven so long for their liberties against a mongrel race of plunderers and oppressors. This is how our public put it. This is what is said, not only in London, but in Manchester and Liverpool, in Yorkshire, and in Leicester and Sussex,
What was a sentiment of sorrow at the madness of a great nation is now rapidly changing its character into admiration at the gallant defence which brave men are making for their liberties, and into indignation at the robbery and oppression they are suffering from alien hirelings and from infamous men like General Buder. This is, as we believe, the general feeling of this country; not a calculating or selfish policy, but a generous instinct to stay this waste of life, for the sake of both parties, if we can, or, failing that, to save the weaker party from annihilation.
* * * The people of the North are at once so arrogant and so ignorant that they are not incapable even of throwing down the gauge to Europe combined, and thus rendering a step taken in the interests of peace an occasion of extending the war. If baulked of their prey, the Federal States would almost certainly threaten to do this. We confess that we have no very great hope from more mediation, and we should be sorry to see this country go into any such enterprise, unless in the company of the great European powers. An insulting answer gives to Europe thus combined might be fitly passed over with disclaim, but, if we are Quixotically to go alone into such a matter, mediation would be even more dangerous than intervention.
’
After the debate.
On the day after the debates the Times remarked that ‘"every man can see that the time draws night when our Government will be bound to express its own opinions and the opinions of the public on this struggle."’ It adds:‘ "We are but uttering the thoughts of nine Eng-
lishmen out of ten when we say that should it appear that the army of McClellan has been totally defeated, so as to be totally incapable of resuming offensive operations, then the propriety of treating the Confederates as an independent people may be justly discussed by the British Cabinet."
’ The Daily News applauds the views of the Prime Minister, which are in substance that the time for mediation has not yet come, and that mediation, to be free from danger, must be asked for by those who will accept it, and removed from all taint or prejudice and partiality by those who offered it.
The Morning Star says that ‘"nothing short of another Navarino would break the blockades or deliver Richmond, and therefore we have unabated confidence in the preservation of that strict centrality which is required alike by English honor and international justice."’
During the debate on the Colonial Military Expenditures, in the House of Lords, the Canadians were reproached for negligence in providing a strong military force.
The English journals all ask the Orleans Princes for an explanation of the course they have pursued with the Northern army.
The Princess Clothilde gave birth to a Prince on the 18th.
The Paris Bourse was dull; Rents 68 36s. The Continental political news is unimportant.
It was reported in London that the Confederates had intimated to the English Charge d'affaires at Washington that any offer of mediation by England would meet with respectful attention.
The Paris Patris says that the United States Government has offered to purchase the province of Sonora for $6,000,000.
The "Thunderer's" last canard.
The London Times, of Friday, published a third edition, containing the following canard:‘ "Baltimore, July 3.--A communication from Fortress Monroe, dated the 2d, states that Generals Gorman and Meade had arrived there wounded.--They state that the divisions of Generals McCati and Reynolds had surrendered to the Confederate.
"General McClellan was on board the Galena.--General Jackson was in the rear of the Federal, and Price in front. General Lee refuses to grant any terms of capitulation, and demands their unconditional surrender. The Federal flags have been taken down from the newspaper offices in Baltimore."
’ The above was brought by the Glasgow at Cork. The arrival of the Arabia on the 19th, with the regular dispatches from the agency of the New York Associated Press, completely upset this canard, which was from unquestionable Secesh quarters.
The latest.
The Paris correspondent of the London Herald again asserts that the Emperor is about to offer mediation to America, and says that the drift of public opinion is in favor of such a course.
The Monitear publishes an account of the battle before Richmond, and says: ‘"One thing is certain; the army of the North is crushed on the field by overwhelming numbers; that it had to give up foot by foot several miles of ground; that it has lost guns, prisoners, and stores; and that for the present Richmond is disengaged."’
