Chapter 7:
Congressional Reconstruction.
at the South Johnson's efforts prevailed. Although every Northern State had promptly ratified the Constitutional amendment, yet under Presidential pressure, persuasion, and advice, every Southern State rejected it.When this result became known Grant's predictions were speedily verified. Congress at once determined that the recusant States should return under very different conditions from those at first proposed. The whole territory that had revolted was divided into five military districts, and military rule was declared supreme in each. Commanders were to be appointed, with power and duty to protect all persons at the South, to suppress insurrection and disorder, and to punish all disturbers of the peace and criminals. These commanders were expressly authorized to supersede the civil courts by military tribunals, and all civil or State government whatever was declared provisional and subject to the paramount authority of the United States. This military rule was to continue till the colored population was allowed to vote, and the amendment already rejected should be ratified. Then, and not till then, would the seceded States be admitted to their former position in the Union, and the stern provisions now enacted be annulled. This measure passed both houses of Congress in March, 1867, by large majorities over the President's veto.
Grant was at this time completely in accord with the Legislature. The change in his opinion and in his feeling [58] had been brought about not only by his deference to the decision of the North, and his indignation at the chicanery of Johnson, but in a great degree by the action of the Southerners themselves. The President's course had aroused a temper at the South which Grant believed dangerous to the safety of the country. Acts had been committed and a disposition manifested which he considered should be repressed by stringent means. The population that had been subdued, he thought, was excited again. The reports from his subordinates assured him that the Union people at the South were not safe without Northern over-rule, that the blacks were massacred, in short that the results he had fought to secure were endangered; and believing as he now did that the clemency extended to the conquered had been abused, he approved of restraining those who had shown themselves unworthy of milder treatment. He agreed fully with Congress that the only practical means of securing what had been won in the field was in the extension of the suffrage to the freedmen.
Abstractly he did not favor this step, but he looked upon it, as he had regarded emancipation during the war, as rendered necessary by events. He was not a man much governed by sentiment, or apt to be led away by theories; he saw the unfitness of the freedmen at this time for the ballot; he recognized the danger of admitting them to the suffrage; but he felt that this danger was less than that of allowing those who had been the nation's enemies to return untrammelled to their former position, to provoke new dissensions and possibly arouse another war. He was gradually brought to the conviction that in order to secure the Union which he desired and which the Northern people had fought for, a voting population at the South friendly to the Union was indispensable, and that until the South was willing to concede the ballot to the blacks, it must be kept under military rule. The process of conversion was slow, and the convert unwilling—but [59] when once he accepted the new faith, he remained firm.
Six weeks before the passage of the reconstruction measures he wrote to General Howard, at that time in command of the Freedmen's Bureau:
On the 4th of March, two days after the passage of the Reconstruction bill, he wrote to his intimate friend Washburne, who was then abroad:
. . . Reconstruction measures have passed both houses of Congress over one of the most ridiculous veto messages that ever emanated from any President. Jerry Black is supposed to be the author of it. He has been about Washington for some time, and I am told has been a great deal about the White House. It is a fitting end to all our controversy (I believe this last measure to be a solution, unless the President proves an obstruction), that the man who tried to prove at the beginning of our domestic difficulties that the nation had no constitutional power to save itself, is now trying to prove that the nation has not now the power, after a victory, to demand security for the future. . .
Do not show what I have said on political matters to any [60] one. It is not proper that a subordinate should criticise the acts of his superiors in a public manner. I rely upon our personal relations, however, to speak to you freely as I feel upon all matters.
Grant's apprehensions in regard to the President were well founded. No sooner did the subordinate commanders begin in good faith to carry out the law than the Administration intervened to thwart them. Sheridan, who was in command at New Orleans, found it necessary to remove certain civil officers, and immediately Johnson claimed that district commanders had no power under the law to make such removals. In this he was supported by his Attorney-General. Grant telegraphed to Sheridan, approving his course, but advised that he should make no further removals unless they were indispensable. He was firmly of the opinion that the right existed, but was anxious to avoid a direct conflict between the President and the district commanders. A letter to Sheridan of the 5th of April, 1867, shows his anxiety to carry out the policy that Congress and the people had determined on; and yet to act with caution and subordination:
This letter marks what to me was a new development in Grant's character. He was becoming accustomed to the wiles that he found he must fight, and at this period displayed a greater degree of adroitness than I often noticed in him, before or afterward. The skill with which he points out to Sheridan how to avoid a premature conflict with the Executive; the nice point he makes that though the Attorney-General's opinion is entitled to weight, commanders are their own judges of the law and responsible to the country; [62] the prevision with which he asks for a statement of Sheridan's reasons, so as to be ready to meet a hostile demand, are all worthy of an experienced politician. The fact is that Grant was a close observer and an apt scholar; his experience with Andrew Johnson taught him that frankness with such an opponent was giving away the game, and he never liked to be beaten. He was always good at cards, and had learned to avoid showing his hand. I have heard men say that Grant was the profoundest dissembler of his time. I cannot concur in the opinion; nevertheless, though he never pretended, he concealed, or withheld, a great deal from friends as well as foes. He did not furnish a copy of this letter to Mr. Johnson.
At the same time that he wrote to Sheridan he sent the following letter to Washburne:
Everything is getting on well here now under the Congressional Reconstruction bill, and all will be well if Administration and Copperhead influence do not defeat the objects of that measure. So far there has been no absolute interference with the acts of district commanders, all of whom are carrying out the measures of Congress according to the spirit of their acts, but much dissatisfaction has been expressed at Sheridan's removal of the New Orleans civil officers. Sheridan has given public satisfaction, however. In his present capacity he shows himself the same fearless, true man he did in the field. He makes no mistakes.
I see no possible chance of getting abroad this year. I am not egotistical enough to suppose that my duties cannot be performed by others just as well as myself, but Congress has made it my duty to perform certain offices, and whilst there is an antagonism between the Executive and the legislative branches of the Government, I feel the same obligation to stand at my post that I did whilst there were rebel armies in the field to contend with . . .
During the contest between the President and Congress an incident occurred that illustrates one of the traits of Grant little known to the world at large—his regard for the [63] feelings of those whom he cared for. I was not converted so soon as he to the belief that harsh measures were necessary in the treatment of the South; and he was always willing to listen to the opinions of those about him on important affairs. I recollect discussing the situation with several other officers in his presence, and maintaining my views with fervor though they were contrary to his own. The controversy became excited, and Grant himself took part. At last he exclaimed: ‘Why, Badeau, I believe you are a Copperhead.’ I felt the blood mount to my forehead at the taunt, so unusual from him, and could hardly speak for a moment. Then I stammered that I thought my past might have saved me that reproach, at least from the head of the army. But the words were only half spoken when he interrupted, and retracted what he had said, with tones and glances that repaid me for all the pain he had inflicted. All that day he took care in a hundred little ways to do me kindnesses and to show that he was striving to make amends. For this stubborn, silent soldier was as considerate for the sensitiveness of a friend as ever he was anxious for the welfare of the State or for victory over a rebellious enemy.
