Chapter 10:
Grant and Stanton
when Johnson discovered that in spite of all his opposition Reconstruction under Grant was becoming a reality, he remembered that he had still another weapon in his armory. It was in his power to remove the District Commanders and the Secretary of War—who were now all diligently engaged in the execution of the law.A wide difference of opinion had early become apparent in Johnson's Cabinet, the members of which were originally appointed by Lincoln, but had been retained by his successor. As soon as the new President betrayed his antagonism to those who had elected him, four out of his seven Ministers refused to second what they considered his apostacy. In July, 1866, the Postmaster-General and the Secretary of the Interior resigned, and in September they were followed by the Attorney-General, who was a Southern man, but unable to approve the President's policy. Three of those who remained supported Johnson and became abettors of all his devices and designs. Seward, the original Republican leader, fell away completely from his old associates; Welles, a bitter Democrat before the war, returned to his early allies; and McCulloch, who had never been prominent in politics or public life, decided to retain the place to which he had been elevated on the resignation of a superior.
But Stanton, the Secretary of War, the Minister who had been most important of all, both to Lincoln and the country, who by his position and ability and energy and [78] fidelity had done more than any other civilian except Lincoln to serve the State; without whose efforts indeed the State could hardly have been saved—this man remained in the Cabinet to oppose what he deemed the dangerous and treasonable projects of the President. The relations of Grant and Stanton had been peculiar. They had never met until after the battle of Chicamauga, when at Stanton's earnest desire Grant was placed in command of the Western armies. Then an interview of a day occurred when they traveled together from Indianapolis to Louisville and discussed the military situation. After Grant became General-in-Chief their intercourse was necessarily constant and confidential, though even then hardly intimate. In Washington Grant saw more of Lincoln than of the Secretary, and his official correspondence with the Government was always addressed to Halleck, the Chief-of-Staff of the army. They had no personal correspondence, and I doubt if they exchanged a dozen letters in their lives.
Lincoln gave Grant full liberty in all matters of strategy, and Stanton never interfered. When Grant started on the Wilderness campaign both of these official superiors assured him that they had no wish to become acquainted with his plans. But Stanton, as well as the President, promised Grant an absolute support; and he kept his word. He left nothing undone to uphold the hands of the General-in-Chief. He never indeed expressed great admiration for Grant nor pretended to any especial affection for him, but he was a stanch ally. The most, and so far as I can recollect, the last he ever said in praise of Grant was in his comments, published at the time, on the victory at Donelson. In his report of the final operations of the war there is not one word commending Grant. But he sent him all the men and arms and supplies he required; he made all the assignments of troops and commanders that Grant requested; he never thwarted one of his plans or interrupted one of his movements. [79] There were times when he probably did not concur with Grant, but he deliberately subordinated his own opinions to those of the soldier on all military points. Sometimes when Grant was too far away to be easily reached, Stanton, probably by Halleck's advice, made dispositions or appointments that Grant did not approve, but if subsequently Grant wished these steps reversed, Stanton never objected. During Early's invasion of Maryland telegraphic communication between Washington and City Point was interrupted for a while, and great confusion and alarm prevailed at the capital. Several movements were ordered without Grant's knowledge, all of which proved abortive. In this emergency Stanton finally appealed to Grant. He directed Charles A. Dana, then Assistant Secretary of War, to say to Grant that unless he gave positive directions and enforced them the result would be ‘deplorable and fatal.’ When Grant placed Sheridan in command in the Valley he did it knowing that his own confidence in that officer's capacity was not shared by the Government, but neither Lincoln nor Stanton interfered, and all this, though Stanton was an imperious man, fond of power, used to authority, and never doubting his own judgment in civil affairs. But he had made up his mind to intrust plenary authority to Grant, and he carried out his intention heartily and absolutely. Grant fully appreciated this course.
They had one little difference at Chattanooga when Stanton insisted on controlling the cipher operator at Grant's headquarters, but this was soon forgotten; and Stanton always directed Grant's telegraphic orders to subordinate commanders to be taken off the wires as they passed through Washington, so that he might inspect them. Grant sometimes would have preferred to withhold the information these dispatches contained, lest it should be made public too soon; but Stanton was within his rights, and the subject was never broached in their correspondence or conversation. At every serious point their harmony was undisturbed. [80]
This is the statement General Grant always made to me. Until the last year of his life he expected and intended my history of his campaigns to be the final authorized expression of his views, and whatever I wrote for that history was submitted to his inspection. In the winter of 1879 I sent him my account of his relations with Stanton which is similar to that now given; he found nothing to correct, but replied from Naples, December 18th: ‘Your chapter on Stanton is the best pen picture of a historical character I ever read. I venture to predict that it will be so considered by others when it comes before the public.’
In November, 1864, I accompanied Grant to Washington from City Point. It was at a time when Stanton's enemies and rivals were making every effort to procure his removal. Grant had a long interview with Lincoln in which they discussed the subject, and the same day he told me what had occurred. Lincoln, he said, introduced the subject, and promised that if a change took place he would consult Grant before appointing a new War Minister. But Grant at once advised the President to make no removal. He declared that no one could be found better fitted for the position; that the ability, energy, and patriotism of Stanton were undoubted, and as for himself he certainly desired no other superior. There can be no doubt that the urgency of Grant on this occasion strengthened Stanton's hold on the President.
In March, 1865, Grant felt a little sore at a sharp message he received through Stanton, forbidding him to hold any conference with Lee except on purely military matters, and there were those about him who attributed what they thought an implied rebuke to Stanton's influence. But they were wrong; for Lincoln wrote with his own hand and without suggestion the dispatch that Stanton forwarded. But even this produced no ill-feeling between the great patriots who felt that each in his sphere was doing indispensable service to the cause in which they were alike so interested. [81]
After the war, however, Stanton assumed all the authority of his office. When every one else was paying court to Grant he showed that he thought the Secretary of War the superior of the General of the Army. He gave Grant orders, as he had a right to do, and always sent for him when he wished to see him officially. This may have nettled Grant a little, as it certainly did some of his personal friends; but it never annoyed him as much as it did others. There was once, indeed, a question almost of authority. Stanton insisted that all orders by the General-in-Chief should be submitted to him before they were issued by the Adjutant-General of the Army. Sometimes he delayed giving the necessary authorization, but when Grant protested in writing the difficulty was obviated. It was an old question, and had arisen in the days of General Scott; it came up again, or something like it, after Grant had ceased to be General of the Army. Grant once had a letter written to the President appealing to him from Stanton's action in the matter, but he tore it up, and there was no rupture or open disagreement.
There was always, however, a sort of personal barrier between them. Grant respected profoundly the services Stanton had rendered the country, and I doubt not the sentiment was reciprocated. But Stanton was harsh and austere in manner, and apparently cared little for the feelings of others. He doubtless had his affections and his intimacies, but Grant was included in neither; and at times the harshness was extended even to him, probably without intent, perhaps unconsciously. But Grant was in reality one of the most sensitive of men. He regarded the feelings of others carefully, and it was always painful to him to inflict pain. Although few supposed so, he felt acutely all the censures and attacks and even the slights of which he was the object. He said nothing, perhaps, when he received them, but there was abundant evidence, which those who were with him closely could detect, that Grant was a thinskinned [82] man. Therefore these asperities of Stanton wounded him. He was in no way elated at his own success and his honors, but he was nevertheless conscious that he had done good service to the country; he knew that he occupied a dignified position before the world; and the attention and consideration he received were far from disagreeable to him. When in the midst of all this, one man roughly asserted or implied a superiority, sent for Grant as he would for a lieutenant, or allowed his orders as General-in-Chief to remain for days unapproved, Grant was touched, as any other human being would have been under the circumstances. He did not, indeed, resent what he disliked, for Stanton never transcended his technical rights—though he sometimes approached the verge—but the recollection remained and produced a permanent impression. Thus without any absolute variance ever occurring, and while on all important matters the two were in complete harmony, their personal intercourse was never familiar, and hardly agreeable. I do not believe either ever enjoyed the other's society. But they were true patriots and earnest men. The moment a question of duty to the country or to each other was involved, all this petty unrevealed sentiment was ignored or trampled on. To my mind their behavior to each other was finer than if they had been warmly and personally attached.
I must add one remark. As I look back upon these matters now, with all my partiality for my personal chief, I am convinced that while Stanton was undoubtedly lacking in delicacy and perhaps withheld some of the consideration to which Grant was entitled, he doubtless believed that he was asserting an important principle—the superiority of the civil over the military arm, the doctrine that even a victorious General-in-Chief is, under our institutions, the subordinate of the executive branch of the Government.
But these were absolutely the only points on which the soldier and the Secretary had ever differed. They would be [83] insignificant if their effect and importance had not been unduly magnified. They are to be mentioned only to be disposed of, brought forward only to be brushed away. Grant had a higher respect for the character and services of none of his compatriots than for Stanton. He had been a cordial co-worker with him in the War, and he was now as cordially working with him in a crisis which both considered was as important as any through which they had already passed.
Stanton's accord with Grant at this crisis is indicated in the following informal note written in pencil, which I preserved:
