Chapter 16:
The impeachment of Andrew Johnson.
Grant had originally been very much averse to the proposition to impeach the President. Suggestions of this proceeding had been made as early as 1866, and in May of that year Grant wrote to Washburne, who was then in Europe: ‘But little is heard now about impeachment. It is sincerely to be hoped that we will not, unless something occurs hereafter to fully justify it.’ It was not until Johnson's removal of Stanton and the appointment of Lorenzo Thomas as Secretary of War, and after his own violent differences with the President, that Grant looked with favor on this extreme measure. But when the motion for impeachment was finally passed he heartily approved it. He took the liveliest interest in the proceedings, and though he preserved a proper reticence in his public utterances, he did not scruple with those in his confidence to express his opinion that the action of Congress was entirely justified. He refused, however, to visit the Senate during the trial, and did nothing inconsistent with the dignity of his position.But the election for President was now only a few months off, and from the time of the publication of his final correspondence with Johnson it was evident that Grant must be the candidate of the Republicans. He no longer declined to acknowledge this probability, or to converse on the subject; and the leaders of the party continually consulted him during the progress of the trial. Before its conclusion he was formally nominated for the Presidency, and he would have [135] been untrue to his implied obligations had he failed to sympathize with his supporters in a matter so momentous as their battle with the President.
His political convictions, as I have shown, had been forming and crystallizing for several years, amid the changing circumstances and contingencies of the time; but the action of Johnson undoubtedly precipitated his conclusions. For Grant was subject to all the ordinary feelings and even passions of a man, and the long series of attempts first to beguile and cajole him, and afterward to entrap and misrepresent him, had their natural effect. They went hand in hand with what he thought the President's endeavors to thwart and frustrate the law, and the will of the loyal North. Finally, when Johnson at the same juncture assailed Grant's personal honor and defied the authority of Congress, the soldier resented one action while the citizen condemned the other. Doubtless the imputations on his character sharpened his appreciation of the public misconduct of his enemy; no one is proof against inducements and influences like these; but the fact did not lessen the purity of his conduct or the integrity of his motives. Christianity itself mingles personal considerations with those of abstract right and wrong; and a man who has been struck in a righteous cause is hardly to be blamed if he returns the blow with increased and indignant zeal. Grant, I repeat, was very human; tempted in all points like other men; he was made neither of wood nor stone, but of flesh and blood; and at this juncture the fervor of his public spirit was certainly intensified by his indignation at Johnson's behavior toward himself.
But he committed no injustice. He resented his own wrongs, yet he made no display of rancor and descended to no unworthy wiles. He was at one time summoned before Congress, but he rigidly confined his testimony to what he had seen and known, and refused to exaggerate either the language or acts of the President or his own impressions of [136] them; although he was certain that this very moderation would be an argument in Johnson's favor.
Nevertheless, when he thought it his duty to take an important step, he did not hesitate. At the crisis of the trial it became evident that some of the Republican Senators were uncertain as to their judgment or their course, and Grant was urged to use his influence with them. The Senators were judges, it is true, but this was a political trial, and Grant believed that he had a right to support the weak and confirm the strong in so grave an emergency. He not only conversed with those whose action he thought he could affect, arguing in favor of the conviction of Johnson and demonstrating his guilt, but he visited at least one Senator at his house with this purpose. This was Mr. Frelinghuysen. Grant told me of his intention before he paid the visit, and returned greatly gratified, for though Frelinghuysen had not disclosed his intention he had said enough to assure Grant of his views. Two or three days afterward Frelinghuysen voted in favor of conviction.
The day before the verdict was rendered a remarkable scene occurred at Grant's headquarters. Benjamin F. Wade, the presiding officer of the Senate, would in case of the deposition of Johnson immediately become President. Naturally he was considering this possibility. He was an ardent Republican, and a friend and supporter of General Grant. He came to Grant's office while I was present and said: ‘General, I am here to consult with you about my Cabinet, in case Mr. Johnson is found guilty.’ I was allowed to remain during the interview. Mr. Wade then went on to say that as Grant was the candidate of the Republican party and would undoubtedly be elected, he wished to make no temporary appointments that would be unacceptable to his probable successor. Grant listened attentively but offered no suggestions of his own. The matter was profoundly delicate, and yet it was not improper for these two men, who [137] might each in turn and so soon become the Head of the State, to compare their plans. Wade mentioned several names for Cabinet positions, and ascertained that Grant would not object to them. Stanton's, of course, was one of these. But Grant made no revelation of his own purposes, if indeed they were formed, and there was no discussion of policy; about that they would doubtless be in accord. The interview lasted perhaps half an hour. But the next day Johnson was acquitted, and Wade never made a Cabinet. He got very close to greatness; the vote of one man in the Senate excluded him.
Grant was at first very much disappointed at the result of the trial, and said so to some of his intimates; but he was discreet, and forebore to make his feeling public or its expression in any way indecorous. After a while his judgment changed, and he thought on the whole it was better for the country that the President should not have been removed. He believed that Johnson had been taught a lesson which he would not forget, and that the precedent of a successful impeachment would have been a greater misfortune to the State than any evil that Johnson might still have been able to accomplish. In addition to this I heard him say that a fear of Wade's well-known bitterness and lack of restraint reconciled him more easily to enduring Johnson a little longer. He even suggested that a similar apprehension might have influenced some of the Republican Senators who had voted for acquittal.
As years went by Grant's judgment changed on several points in regard to which at this time he was very decided. He found the Tenure of Office act a great obstruction to his own authority as President, and was anxious for a much greater modification of its provisions than Congress was willing to concede. Yet he had been strongly in favor of curtailing Johnson's powers. He justified this apparent inconsistency by declaring that the times had been unusual, [138] the man exceptional; and that what was indispensable immediately after a great civil convulsion in order to prevent further commotions and possibly revolution, was unnecessary and indefensible in the ordinary years of peace. Grant indeed was never willing to let constitutional restrictions bind the State so that it could not save itself. He was full of reverence for law, but that the Sabbath was made for man, and not man for the Sabbath, was a doctrine to which in all things he subscribed.
He was heartily glad when the turmoil of the impeachment was over, and was entirely satisfied to have a prominent Republican like Evarts accept a seat in Johnson's Cabinet. There were many in his party who disapproved the course of Evarts at this juncture. They were indignant even that he should defend the President professionally, and still more so when he consented to become a member of Johnson's Government. But Grant himself had set the precedent, and could not condemn the man who followed it. Both he and Stanton had held places in the same Cabinet while disapproving the policy of its chief; and he thought and said that Evarts, especially as the legal adviser of the Administration, might be able to act as a useful check, and thus do the country important service. He was glad also to have one man in the Cabinet with whom in most matters he could sympathize.
The result of the trial was a crushing and intolerable blow to Stanton, from which he never recovered. Although there lacked but one vote of the two-thirds of the Senate necessary to convict the President, the verdict was in some sort a condemnation of the Secretary. It implied that he should not have remained in the Cabinet against the will of his chief, and it made it imperative on him immediately to resign.
General Schofield was at once nominated by the President for the position of Secretary of War. Grant still retained some of the heat of the contest and wrote to Schofield, [139] who was then in command at Richmond: ‘Under the circumstances I advise you to decline the Secretaryship in advance.’ But Schofield started for Washington and went at once to visit Grant, who revised his opinion, and Schofield entered the Cabinet with the full concurrence of the General-in-Chief. He displayed rare ability in his difficult position. He was able to perform his duties with efficiency, so as to satisfy the President, and at the same time not offend the Legislature nor the party that had sought to overthrow his chief. A subordinate of Grant in the army and his personal friend, owing indeed to Grant much of his advancement, he behaved to his great inferior with consummate tact and delicacy, deferring to him whenever this was proper, and nevertheless maintaining the dignity of his own position. Their relations were always extremely cordial. With Evarts and Schofield in the Cabinet, Grant was able, even as the candidate of the party that was so hostile to the President, to retain something like concord with the Government.
