Chapter 12:
- From Munfordville to Perryville -- Bragg's situation at Munfordville -- embarrassing circumstances confronting him -- Criticisms on his strategy -- a review of the facts -- disappointment of the army in the character of the country and State of feeling -- absence of supplies -- necessity of Procuring them -- his movement to Bardstown for this purpose and for co -- operation with General Smith -- their Wide separation -- messages to Smith -- visit to Danville, Lexington and Frankfort -- inauguration of Governor Hawes -- Buell's arrival in Louisville and unexpected movement -- Sill's feint on Frankfort -- Bragg's sudden evacuation of Frankfort -- his fatal Misinterpretation of Buell's movement -- concentration of army Defective -- movements preceding battle of Perryville.
Thus far General Bragg's expedition had been a success. He had overcome obstacles of which few unacquainted with the character of the country and the inadequacy of his equipment in transportation and subsistence can form an accurate conception. Without a base, and chiefly dependent upon the country through which he had passed for his supplies, he had marched 200 miles upon the flank of a superbly equipped and veteran army of nearly double his strength and had thrown himself across General Buell's path, with Louisville less than seventy-five miles distant and Buell moving on him from Bowling Green.
The situation and General Bragg's strategy have been the subject of much commentary by military critics as [133] well as by those not expert in the art of war; and their criticism has been unfavorable to him. But how far this is due to his failure to secure success afterward, or to the merits of the argument, cannot be decided. Some argue that he should have turned on General Buell and fought a decisive battle for the State. A knowledge of the topography of the country and of other conditions would not sustain this suggestion. Had he gone out to meet General Buell he would have had a river at his back with banks like a cannon and only one ford. It would have been the battle of Fishing Creek reproduced. To fight in front of a defile, or with such a river in the rear, is condemned by the first principles of military strategy and by the common sense of good soldiers, whom it demoralizes. Then again if Buell had declined battle, and retired toward Bowling Green, Bragg could not have followed for the want of subsistence. The region about Munfordville is rough and only moderately productive. For a year previous it had been foraged and exhausted of its surplus, first by the Confederates on the south side and then by the Federals on both sides. On the other hand it would not have been wise to march to Louisville without a junction with Kirby Smith, whose force was scattered watching Gen. Geo. W. Morgan and threatening Cincinnati. He could not communicate in time to effect this speedily. The distance to Lexington was about one hundred and twenty-five miles, with neither telegraphic nor railroad communication. Even courier service was doubtful on account of bushwhacking home guards. He was confronted with a problem requiring prompt solution.
A study of the map will show to the military student, judging by abstract rules, and not by the light of after occurrences, that his movement to Bardstown, where he could obtain immediate supplies, be in position to effect early junction with Kirby Smith for advance upon Louisville, and to connect himself with his new line of communication south, via Cumberland Gap, was the best alternative. [134] He had been delayed by the Munfordville affair nearly a week in his direct movement toward Lexington, and had to make his plans conform to his necessities. That the morale of the army was, notwithstanding the capture of Munfordville, affected by this movement, which had some of the features of retreat, cannot be doubted; for there were, besides, other reasons of disappointment.
The reports which had reached the South represented that the people of Kentucky were eager to welcome an army of deliverance, and would flock with arms to join it. There was a belief that it was a land flowing with milk and honey. While both of these expectations had been fully realized by the army of General Smith, and the intelligence of it received by Bragg's army just before crossing the Tennessee line, their own experience had chilled them. Unfortunately they had traversed half the breadth of the State from north to south and encountered none of the typical rich and abounding soil or sympathetic co-operation pictured in their imagination, and experienced little of the enthusiasm which they had expected. Individual welcome was expressed, but cautiously and free from demonstration, for the Southern element, even in the localities where found in the majority, well knew that upon the coming of the Federal troops they would be persecuted and punished. The sympathy was divided, but in Hart and several contiguous counties the Union sentiment predominated and there had been many Federal troops raised there. There was no unfurling of the Confederate flag and cheering as in the Blue Grass region. Even the ladies, usually fearless of consequences, had learned caution, and if they waved their handkerchiefs, it was generally in a hall shut out from the view of their neighbors and visible only to the troops passing in front. At Bardstown it was somewhat better, but the division of sentiment was sufficient to put a restraint upon the Southern element, while those of Union [135] sympathies did not disguise their sentiments nor fail to express their confidence in speedy aid from the Federal army.
To the reasons already given for the absence of popular enthusiasm along the line of Bragg's march may be added the fact that there were no Kentucky troops with him, nor any of the political leaders whose presence might have inspired a different feeling. In fact, in summing up the situation, it might as well be stated that it was almost impossible to convince the most ardent Southern sympathizers anywhere in Kentucky that the presence of the army meant permanent occupation instead of merely a raid on a large scale. The writer is aware that in writing so frankly upon a phase which none could understand who did not witness it, and then only one sufficiently well acquainted with the people to comprehend it, he will excite surprise in some and dissent in others; but in undertaking to treat of an historic event of the magnitude of this campaign, it is necessary to its philosophic comprehension that such important factors should not be disregarded even at the expense of a suspension of the narrative.
General Bragg on the 18th of September sent the writer, one of his staff officers, to General Smith at Lexington, informing him of his purpose to move to Bardstown and directing him to send there a train of supplies, and while keeping an eye on Gen. Geo. W. Morgan, to dispose his forces with a view to early concentration at Bardstown for a movement on Louisville. The messages were delivered within forty-eight hours and immediate steps were taken accordingly. General Bragg, having attempted but failed to draw General Buell to an attack, and knowing that he could reach the Ohio river by a practical route further west, began his movement to Bardstown on the 20th and reached there on the 23rd. After a few days spent there, leaving General Polk in command of the army, he made a tour of inspection through Danville via Springfield and Perryville to Lexington, [136] and thence to Frankfort, where, on October 4th, Hon. Richard Hawes, who had been chosen by the council provisional governor to succeed Gov. George W. Johnson, killed at Shiloh, was inaugurated in form. The greater part of General Smith's army was then in the vicinity of the capital.
In the meantime General Buell, whose army had all arrived at Louisville on the 29th of September, being fully equipped and reinforced by a large body of troops there, moved on the 1st of October in the direction of Bardstown on five roads, the Shelbyville, Taylorsville, Bardstown, Shepherdsville, and Lebanon turnpikes; McCook's corps on the left, Gilbert's in the center and Crittenden's on the right. General Sill's division of McCook's corps marched on the Shelbyville pike, advancing on the 3rd as far as Clay Village, 16 miles from Frankfort, as a feint on the latter place.
General Polk—who had been directed in case of an advance in force to fall back in the direction of Danville, with a view of covering Camp Dick Robinson (renamed by the Confederates Camp Breckinridge), where had been gathered a large quantity of stores—upon being satisfied that General Buell's army was approaching, fell back to Perryville, ten miles equidistant from Harrodsburg and Danville. General Bragg mistook the movement of Sill's division to mean that Frankfort was the objective point of Buell's army, and this was the fatal error of the campaign. Several circumstances tended to mislead him. In the first place it was the direct route to the capital and to Lexington, and the most central point in that division of Kentucky against which a Federal force from Cincinnati also could operate. In the next place, while he could readily get information of Sill's movements, the nature of the other routes taken by General Buell's army forbade the prompt receipt of intelligence as to their line of march. There was no telegraphic communication by which he could be advised, and the movement of each [137] corps was covered by that upon the left, veiling their advance from the ordinary means of observation or communication. General Buell's movement had in fact been made with a promptitude which took Bragg by surprise, and with a judgment which could not have been excelled, for neither of which he received proper credit at the hands of his government. Acting under this misconception of the true situation, General Bragg instructed General Polk to move all his available force via Bloomfield to Frankfort, to strike the enemy, which would have been but one division, in the flank. It was an order from the nature of the roads impractical to execute and, considering the actual situation, altogether unwise. General Polk received the order at Bardstown on the 3rd, but consulting his corps and division commanders, in view of his better information as to Buell's real movements, fell back upon Perryville.
Had General Bragg then, treating Sill's movement as secondary, concentrated his army at Perryville, the history of this campaign thence forward might have been different. He had, however, countermanded his order before he heard from General Polk, and on the 4th, upon the approach of Sill's cavalry, retreated from Frankfort to Versailles. The effect of the sound of the Federal artillery was similar to that of the artillery of Waterloo upon the gay throng at Brussels. The capital was full, not only of soldiers, but of civilians who had come to witness the gubernatorial inauguration and to attend a grad ball that night, the beauty of the Blue Grass having come to grace the occasion. The movement to Versailles began at 4 o'clock p. m. without preliminary warning.
And there were sudden partings, such as press
The life from out young hearts, and choking sighs
Which ne'er might be repeated; who could guess
If ever more should meet those mutual eyes.[138] And there was mounting in hot haste; the steed,
The mustering squadron and the clattering car
Went pouring forward with impetuous speed
And swiftly forming in the ranks of war.
General Bragg on the 5th crossed the Kentucky river in the direction of Harrodsburg, where he made his headquarters on the 6th, and disposed his forces with a view to concentration at the point against which should be directed the enemy's greatest force. Unfortunately he did not discern this in time. The presence of Sill's division, which had turned in the direction of Lawrenceburg and Salvisa, led him and some others to believe that one of those points, probably the latter, was aimed at. Another circumstance added to this belief. General Buell, who did not think Bragg would make a stand at Perryville, and was moving toward Danville with a view to flank Bragg and get in his rear, as had been done with him by Bragg, had directed General McCook to move from Bloomfield by way of Mackville and Harrodsburg to Danville, expecting Sill's division to rejoin the corps at Harrodsburg. The appearance of Sill near Lawrenceburg and of McCook at Mackville, where he camped on the night of the 7th, seemed to confirm Bragg in his belief that Buell's objective point was Lexington and induced him to select Salvisa as the point upon which to concentrate his troops, with a view of crossing the Kentucky river near that point and giving Buell battle near Versailles.
Accordingly on the 7th of October Bragg directed General Smith to move his command next day to Versailles, and Cheatham's and Withers' divisions of Polk's corps to follow. Later, however, he suspended these orders, in consequence of notification from Hardee at Perryville that the enemy was in force in his front, and sent General Polk from Harrodsburg to Perryville with Cheatham's division to the support of General Hardee, instructing him [139] to ‘give the enemy battle immediately, rout him and then move to our support at Versailles.’ As the order was not issued until 5:40p. m., it was understood that the attack would be made at daylight, October 8th, and that Bragg would start to Versailles early, and have Polk follow after defeating the Federal force at Perryville. His idea evidently was that neither Crittenden's nor Mc-Cook's corps was in supporting distance of Gilbert's corps, and that he could crush that fraction of Buell's army by a sudden attack and then concentrate for a general engagement. But in this he was mistaken, as the official publications show that on the night of the 7th McCook's corps was ordered by General Buell to march from Mackville at 3 a. m. on the 8th for Perryville and form on the left of Gilbert, who was in position facing east about three and a half miles west of Perryville. Had the attack on Gilbert been made as contemplated, it is not improbable that it would have been successful; but even then Bragg would have been beyond the support of Smith, and the force under General Polk would have been little better off than it afterwards proved to be. [140]
