[538] flowed from their wounds and stained the ground. In a few short hours of morning the enemy had lost between four and five thousand men, and had accomplished nothing.
“This miserable affair,” as Gen. Grant himself was forced to entitle it appears to have been sufficient to satisfy him that he could not hope for the capture of Petersburg from expedients, partial efforts and coups de main, and that the task was one of magnitude far beyond his original comprehension. His last spasmodic effort went far to persuade the Northern public that his whole campaign was a failure, and that they had miscalculated the importance of his mere vicinity to the Confederate capital, when Gen. Lee had been able to hold Petersburg against an attack combining so many elements of success, and that too after he had detached an important column into the valley of Virginia, and sent five of his divisions to the north side of the James. The commentary of the New York Times was logical and significant. It said: “Under the most favourable circumstances, with the rebel force reduced by two great detachments, we failed to carry their lines. Will they not conclude that the twenty-five thousand men that held Grant in check are sufficient to garrison the works of Petersburg Will they not conclude that, if they were able thus to hold their own with the force of from eighteen to twenty thousand men sent to the north side of the James River neutralized, this force is available for active operations elsewhere”
