[335] son), with about three thousand; Rosecrans at Corinth, with about fifteen thousand, together with the following outposts, viz.: Rienzi, twenty-five hundred; Burnsville, Jacinto, and Iuka, about six thousand; at important bridges, and on garrison duty, about two or three thousand, making in the aggregate about forty-two thousand (42,000) men in West Tennessee. Memphis, Jackson, Bolivar, and Corinth were fortified, the works mounting siege guns, the outposts slightly fortified, having field pieces. Memphis, Bolivar, and Corinth are in the arc of a circle, the chord of which, from Memphis to Corinth, makes an angle with a due east line about fifteen degrees south. Bolivar is about equi-distant from Memphis and Corinth, somewhat nearer the latter, and is at the intersection of the Hatchie River and the Mississippi Central and Ohio Railroad.
It was a situation in which the enemy could scarcely determine at what point the Confederates would make their principal attack. In the event of operations being conducted against Bolivar, Rosecrans was prepared to fall on the Confederate right. rear, whilst if Corinth should be attacked, a similar duty would devolve on the garrison of Bolivar.
Gen. Van Dorn determined to attempt Corinth. He had a reasonable hope of success. Field returns at Ripley showed his strength to be about twenty-two thousand men. Rosecrans at Corinth had about fifteen thousand, with about eight thousand additional men at outposts, from twelve to fifteen miles distant. He might surprise him, and carry the place before these troops could be brought in. Van Dorn therefore marched towards Pocahontas, threatening Bolivar, then turned suddenly across the Hatchie and Tuscumbia, and on the morning of the 3d October, attacked Corinth without hesitation, and did surprise that place before the outpost garrisons were called in.
Rosecrans' forces occupied a position outside the defences of the town, three divisions forming the first two lines, and one division slightly in rear as a reserve. He was anxious to retire slowly within the inner line of works, and gave orders to that effect; but Price's troops, flushed with the excitement of an attack, and anxious to wipe out the recollection of their repulse at Iuka, advanced rapidly, and pressed hard on the Federal centre, capturing two guns from Davies' division, and driving the Federals within their inner line of redoubts.
Gen. Van Dorn anticipated an easy success on the following morning, and telegraphed to Richmond the announcement of a great victory. It would seem that he was entirely unaware of the strength of the enemy's works at Corinth, and of the trial which yet remained for the courage and devotion of his troops.
The Confederate plan of battle for the next day was, that Price should open with a large battery of artillery, and then attack in force with his left, and that while thus engaged, Lovell's division should press forward,
