Southern Historical Society Papers, Volume 10.
Reverend J. William Jones, Ed.

If General Hood knew that the Allatoona Pass was fortified and garrisoned and then sent troops there to fill up the cut with logs, brush, rails, etc., and did not inform the commander that it was so fortified and garrisoned, then he committed an almost criminal act. If he did not know it he should not be blamed for it, and I never have heard an individual complain of his not knowing it. Wherefore, then, did he attempt to pass it down to history that he gave certain orders, when, in truth, he did no such thing?

In my official report made to him one month after the battle, I said: “The General-in-Chief was not aware from these orders, that the pass was fortified and garrisoned that I was sent to have filled up.” I did not intend this as a reflection on him, because it would be unreasonable to expect a commander to know what disposition or all the dispositions an antagonist had made of his commands and stores many miles to the rear, and I am sorry General Hood undertook to make a record of his information, when that information possessed and not imparted to me was an act for which he would be condemned.

I, therefore, repeat that General Hood gave me no instructions about Allatoona except to fill up the cut, while he was profuse in details about the garrison at the bridge. And this is all very simple. He could infer, and it was natural to suppose, that the bridge over the Etowah was guarded, while he would not even conjecture that Allatoona was fortified. Further, if he knew of the garrison and vast stores, and wished them captured, why did he leave the command sent there isolated and unprotected?

The facts in the case are these: Hood, with the main army, moved [405] westerly toward Lost Mountain and New Hope church, while Stewart's corps struck the railroad near Big Shanty. Loring went to Ackunth, Walthall to Moon Station, and my command to Big Shanty to destroy the railroad. We continued at this labor all the evening of the 3d, all night, and the next day till noon. Now, while engaged at this work, commanding officers learned from citizens that Allatoona was fortified and garrisoned by about three and a half regiments, and that it was a great depot of provisions.

When General Stewart received the order that required me to move on Allatoona to fill up the cut, he handed it to me and said: “General Hood does not seem to be aware that the place is fortified, and now French, here is a fine opportunity for you;” and after talking the matter over he increased my artillery to twelve guns and sent Major Myrick to command them. And thus it was we knew that a garrison was there, and filling up that cut through the mountain became a very minor matter. But I am not disposed to fight the battle of Allatoona over again here, as a report of it was published in the annals of the Army of Tennessee.

But before I close, I will briefly allude to another error regarding myself, in Hood's Advance and Retreat. On page 326 it is written:

Just at this critical juncture, General French received information which he considered correct, but which subsequently proved false, that a large body of the enemy were moving to cut him off from the remainder of the army, and he immediately withdrew his command from the place without having accomplished the desired object.

On page 147, volume II. General W. T. Sherman says in his Memoirs:

I reached Kennesaw mountain about 8 A. M. of October 5: * * that I could plainly see the smoke of battle about Allatoona and hear the faint reverberation of the cannon.

From Kennesaw I ordered the Twenty-Third Corps (General Cox) to march due west on the Burnt Hickory road, and to burn houses and piles of brush as it progressed to indicate the head of the column, hoping to interpose this corps between Hood's main army at Dallas and the detachment then assailing Allatoona. The rest of the army was directed straight for Allatoona, northwest, distant eighteen miles. * * * I watched with painful suspense the indications of the battle raging there, and was dreadfully impatient at the slow progress of the relieving column, whose advance was marked by the smokes which were made according to orders; but about 2 P. M. I noticed with satisfaction that the smoke of battle about Allatoona grew less and less, and ceased [406] altogether about 4 P. M. For a time I attributed this result to the effect of General Cox's march, but later in the afternoon the signal-flag announced the welcome tidings that the attack had been fairly repulsed.

Now, at 12:10 P. M. I received from General Armstrong, Calvary Commander, a dispatch dated 9 A. M. informing me that the enemy had sent a column of infantry up the railroad, and I have that note before me. This infantry was General Cox's corps, moving, as he says, to intercept or interpose between the detachment then assailing Allatoona and Hood's main army. Wherein, then, was the information sent me by General Armstrong false?

In the History of the Army of the Cumberland, volume II, page 161, Van Horne says:

The gallant resistance of the garrison and the movement of General Cox to his left induced General French to withdraw entirely during the afternoon, having lost one thousand men.

I have now established that the information I received was true, and I repeat, it was this movement and nothing else that induced me to withdraw, after due deliberation, to save my command — left untirely unsupported by the army of General Hood.

One word more, and I will close. Did you ever know truth to overtake error? You carried my summons to surrender under a flag of truce. You returned to me without an answer, as you have stated in your article, and I never did receive any; yet history will record a reply that never was sent, because it reads very pretty.

Very respectfully yours,