Southern Historical Society Papers, Volume 10.
Reverend J. William Jones, Ed.

On June 20th I received a dispatch from general headquarters, directing that I should hold myself in readiness to move in the direction of the Potomac, with a view to crossing, &c. As I was ready and had been expecting an order to execute such purpose, I supposed the intimation meant other preparation; and knowing of nothing else that I could do to render my preparations complete, I supposed that it was desirable that I should cross the Shenandoah. I therefore passed the river, occupied the banks at the ferries opposite the gaps, and a road at an intermediate ford which was practicable for cavalry and infantry. On the following day the enemy advanced his cavalry in full force against General Stuart, and drove him into and nearly through Ashby's [338] Gap. I succeeded in passing part of McLaws's division across the river in time to occupy the gap before night, and upon advancing a line of sharpshooters the next morning at daylight, the enemy retired. I believe that he engaged the sharpshooters lightly. General Stuart reestablished his cavalry, and McLaws's division was withdrawn to the west bank of the Shenandoah before night.

On the 23d I received orders to march via Berryville, Martinsburg, and Williamsport, into Maryland. The command moved at early dawn the following day. 1st, Pickett's division; 2d, the reserve artillery battalions; 3d, Hood's division; 4th, McLaws's division. Pickett's division and the battalions of reserve artillery crossed the Potomac on the 25th, Hood's and McLaws's divisions on the day following.

The command reached Chambersburg, Pa., on the 27th, and a halt of two days was made for rest. On the night of the 28th one of my scouts came in with information that the enemy had passed the Potomac, and was probably in pursuit of us. The scout was sent to general headquarters with the suggestion that our army concentrate east of the mountains and bear down to meet the enemy.

I received orders on the following day to move part of my command and to encamp it at Greenwood. The command, except Pickett's division — which was left to guard our rear at Chambersburg — moved on the morning of the 30th, and the two divisions and battalions of reserve artillery got into camp at Greenwood about 2 o'clock in the afternoon. General Hood was ordered to put a brigade and a battery on picket at New Guilford, on the road leading to Emmetsburg. On the next day the troops set out for Gettysburg, except Pickett's division, not yet relieved from duty at Chambersburg, and Law's brigade, left on picket at New Guilford.

Our march was greatly delayed on this day by Johnson's division, of the Second corps, which came into the road from Shippensburg, and the long wagon-trains that followed him. McLaws's division, however, reached Marsh Creek, four miles from Gettysburg, a little after dark, and Hood's division got within nearly the same distance of the town about 12 o'clock at night. Law's brigade was ordered forward to his division during the day, and joined about noon on the 2d.

Previous to his joining, I received instructions from the Commanding-General to move, with the portion of my command that was up, around to gain the Emmetsburg road on the enemy's left. The enemy having been driven back by the corps of Lieutenant-Generals Ewell and A. P. Hill the day previous, had taken a strong position, extending from the hill at the cemetery along the Emmetsburg road. Fearing [339] that my force was too weak to venture to make an attack, I delayed until General Law's brigade joined its division. As soon after his arrival as we could make our preparations, the movement was begun. Engineers, sent out by the Commanding-General and myself, guided us by a road which would have completely disclosed the move. Some delay ensued in seeking a more concealed route. McLaws's division got into position opposite the enemy's left about 4 o'clock P. M. Hood's division was moved on further to our right and got into position, partially enveloping the enemy's left.

The enemy's first position along the Emmetsburg road was but little better in point of strength than the first position taken by these two divisions. Our batteries were opened upon this position; and Hood's division pressing upon his left and McLaws's upon his front, he was soon dislodged and driven back upon a commanding hill, which is so precipitous and rough as to render it difficult of ascent. Numerous stone-fences about its base added greatly to its strength. The enemy taking shelter behind these, held them, one after another, with great pertinacity. He was driven from point to point, however, until nearly night, when a strong force met the brigades of Major-General Anderson's division, which were cooperating upon my left, drove one of them back, and checking the support of the other, caused my left to be somewhat exposed and out-flanked. Wofford's brigade, of McLaws's division, was driven back at the same time. I thought it prudent not to push further until my other troops came up.

General Hood received a severe wound soon after getting under fire, and was obliged to leave the field. This misfortune occasioned some delay in our operations. Brigadier-General G. T. Anderson, of his division, was also severely wounded and obliged to leave the field. In the same attack General McLaws lost two of his Brigadiers--General Barksdale, mortally wounded, and General Semmes, severely wounded and since dead of his wounds. The command was finally so disposed as to hold the ground gained on the right, with my left with-drawn to the first position of the enemy, resting at the peach-orchard. During the combat of this day four pieces of artillery were captured and secured by the command, and two regimental standards.

On the following morning our arrangements were made for renewing the attack by my right, with a view to pass around the hill occupied by the enemy on his left, and to gain it by flank and reverse attack. This would have been a slow process probably, but I think not very difficult. A few moments after my orders for the execution of this plan were given, the Commanding-General joined me, and ordered a column of attack to be formed of Pickett's, Heth's, and part [340] of Pender's divisions; the assault to be made directly at the enemy's main position, the cemetery hill. The distance to be passed over, under the fire of the enemy's batteries and in plain view, seemed too great to insure great results, particularly as two-thirds of the troops to be engaged in the assault had been in a severe battle two days previous, Pickett's division alone being fresh. Orders were given to Major-General Pickett to form his line under the best cover he could get from the enemy's batteries, and so that the centre of the assaulting column would arrive at the salient of the enemy's position, General Pickett's line to be the guide, and to attack the line of the enemy's defences; and General Pettigrew, in command of Heth's division, moving on the same line as General Pickett, was to assault the salient at the same moment. Pickett's division was arranged two brigades in the front line, supported by his third brigade, and Wilcox's brigade was ordered to move in rear of his right flank, to protect it from any force that the enemy might attempt to move against it.

Heth's division, under the command of Brigadier-General Pettigrew, was arranged in two lines, and these supported by part of Major-General Pender's division, under Major-General Trimble. All of the batteries of the First and Third corps, and some of those of the Second, were put into the best positions for effective fire upon the point of attack, and the hill occupied by the enemy's left. Colonel Walton, chief of artillery, First corps, and Colonel Alexander, had posted our batteries, and agreed with the artillery officers of the other corps upon the signal for the batteries to open. About two o'clock P. M., General Pickett, who had been charged with the duty of arranging the lines behind our batteries, reported that the troops were in order and on the most sheltered ground. Colonel Walton was ordered to open the batteries, the signal-guns were fired, and the batteries opened very handsomely, and apparently with effective fire. The guns on the hill, at the enemy's left, were soon silenced. Those at the cemetery hill combatted us, however, very obstinately. Many of them were driven off, but fresh ones were brought up to replace them. Colonel Alexander was ordered to a point where he could best observe the effect of our fire, and give notice of the most opportune moment for our attack. Some time after our batteries opened fire I rode to Major Dearing's batteries. It appeared that the enemy put in fresh batteries about as rapidly as others were driven off. I concluded, therefore, that we must attack very soon if we hoped to accomplish anything before night. I gave orders for the batteries to refill their ammunition chests, and to be prepared to follow up the advance of the infantry. Upon riding over to Colonel Alexander's position, I found that he had advised [341] General Pickett that the time had arrived for the attack, and I gave the order to General Pickett to advance to the assault. I found then that our supply of ammunition was so short that the batteries could not re-open. The order for this attack, which I could not favor under better auspices, would have been revoked had I felt that I had that privilege.

The advance was made in very handsome style, all the troops keeping their lines accurately, and taking the fire of the batteries with great coolness and determination. About half-way between our position and that of the enemy a ravine partially sheltered our troops from the enemy's fire, and a short halt was then made for rest. The advance was resumed after a moment's pause, all still in good order. The enemy's batteries soon opened upon our lines with canister, and the left seemed to stagger under it, but the advance was resumed, and with some degree of steadiness. Pickett's troops did not appear to be checked by the batteries, and only halted to deliver a fire when close under musket-range. Major-General Anderson's division was ordered forward to support and assist the wavering columns of Pettigrew and Trimble. Pickett's troops, after delivering fire, advanced to the charge and entered the enemy's lines, capturing some of his batteries, and gained his works. About the same moment, the troops that had before hesitated broke their ranks, and fell back in great disorder, many more falling under the enemy's fire in retreating than whilst they were attacking. This gave the enemy time to throw his entire force upon Pickett, with a strong prospect of being able to break up his lines, or destroy him before Anderson's division could reach him, which would in its turn have greatly exposed Anderson. He was, therefore, ordered to halt. In a few moments the enemy, marching against both flanks and the front of Pickett's division, overpowered it and drove it back, capturing about half of those of it who were not killed or wounded. General Wright, of Anderson's division, was ordered, with all of his officers, to rally and collect the scattered troops behind Anderson's division, and many of my-staff officers were sent to assist in the same service. Expecting an attack from the enemy, I rode forward to reconnoitre and superintend the operations of our batteries. The enemy threw forward forces at different times and from different points, but they were only feelers, and retired as soon as our batteries opened upon them. These little advances and checks were kept up till night, when the enemy retired to his stronghold, and my line was withdrawn to the Gettysburg road on the right, the left uniting with Lieutenant-General A. P. Hill's right.

After night I received orders to make all the needful arrangements [342] for our retreat. The orders for preparation were given, and the work was begun before daylight on the 4th. On the night of the 4th the troops were withdrawn from our line, and my command took up the line of march, following the corps of Lieutenant-General A. P. Hill. Our march was much impeded by heavy rains and excessively bad roads. We succeeded, however, in reaching the top of the mountain early in the night of the 5th. On the 6th, my command, passing to the front, marched for Hagerstown. As our exhausted men and animals were not in condition for rapid movements, I thought myself fortunate when I found that I could reach Hagerstown in time to relieve our trains at Williamsport, then seriously threatened.

Reaching Hagerstown about 5 o'clock P. M., our column moved down the Sharpsburg turnpike, and encamped about two miles from Hagerstown. The next day the command was put in camp on the best ground that could be found, and remained quiet until the 10th, when the enemy was reported to be advancing to meet us. It was supposed at first to be a cavalry force only, but I thought it prudent to move some of the infantry down on the Antietam at Funkstown. After reaching the Antietam, General Stuart asked for infantry supports for his batteries; and two brigades, Semmes', under Colonel Bryan, and Anderson's, under Colonel White, were sent across as he desired. For the report of their services I refer to the report of Major-General Stuart and the brigade commanders.

A line of battle was selected, extending from a point on the Potomac near Downsville to the Hagerstown and Williamsport turnpike, my command on the right. The troops were put to work, and in twenty-four hours our line was comfortably entrenched. A few of the enemy's sharpshooters came up on the Boonsboroa road and to within long range of our picket-line on the 12th. On the evening of the same day a light skirmish was brought on by an advance of a line of sharp-shooters at the St. James College.

That night our bridge was completed, and the day after I received orders to recross the Potomac after night. My trains were sent over before night, and the caissons of the batteries were started back about 5 o'clock in the afternoon. The troops marched as soon as it was dark, my command leading. Having but a single road to travel upon, our trains soon came to a halt. I rode on to the bridge to hasten the movements as much as possible, and sent my staff-officers to different points along the line to keep everything in motion. Details were made to keep up fires to light the road at the worst points, and Captain Manning with his signal-torches lighted us across the bridge.

The natural difficulties in making such movements were increased [343] by the darkness of the night, a heavy rain-storm flooding the road with mud and water, and finally by one of our wagons, loaded with wounded, running off the bridge, breaking it down and throwing our wounded headlong into the river. We were so fortunate, however, as to rescue them in a few moments; they were made somewhat comfortable in other vehicles and sent forward. Major Clarke and Captains Douglass and Johnston of the corps of engineers, applied themselves diligently to the work of repairing the bridge, and in two hours our line was again in motion. When the accident occurred at the bridge, I sent back orders for one of my divisions to occupy the redoubts that had been thrown up to protect the bridge, and also directed Colonel Alexander to place his batteries in position on the same line. As soon as the bridge was repaired I rode back to this line, but finding that the enemy was not pursuing, the troops were again put in motion. The rear of my column passed the bridge at 9 o'clock in the morning and camped for the night at Hanesville.

On the 19th of July, at Bunker's Hill, I received orders to march with my command for Millwood, in order to obtain possession of Ashby's Gap, with a view to covering our future movements. We marched early on the next day, part of the command reaching Millwood at night. The Shenandoah was found to be past fording, however, and the enemy had driven our cavalry from the Gap, and were in possession down to the river-bank. I reported this to the Commanding-General, and continued my march on the following day for Manassas and Chester Gaps. Arriving at the Shenandoah at Front Royal, it was found to be past fording, and the work of laying our bridges was hardly begun. Brigadier-General Corse, who had been hurried forward with his brigades to secure the Gaps, succeeded in passing the stream with his men and several batteries. Detaching a regiment to Manassas Gap, he marched his main force into Chester Gap, and succeeded in getting possession of it some few moments before the enemy appeared. The enemy was in possession of Manassas Gap, but Colonel Herbert of the Seventeenth Virginia regiment secured with his regiment a strong position, from which he held the enemy in check.

The rest of Pickett's division was hurried over by crossing the ammunition and arms in a flat-boat, the men wading. Reinforcements were sent to Colonel Herbert, when he drove back the enemy and secured as much of the Gap as was desirable. Reinforcements were also sent to General Corse, who was engaged in skirmishing with the enemy, and was threatened by a strong cavalry force. The cavalry withdrew about the time the reinforcements reached him. The bridges [344] were completed about 12 o'clock at night, and the passage by of our trains commenced.

The next day the enemy appeared in stronger force in Manassas Gap, but I had posted Hood's division there, under Brigadier-General E. M. Law, and he gave us but little trouble. He also reappeared at the foot of the mountain at Chester Gap. As soon as our men finished cooking their rations, General Wofford's brigade, of McLaws's division, was ordered to disperse the cavalry that was at the foot of the mountain and endeavor to capture his artillery. General Pickett was ordered to send a force down the mountain by a different route to get in rear of and intercept the cavalry. After a light skirmish with General Wofford, the enemy made a hasty retreat. Our march was continued, arriving at Culpeper Courthouse at noon on the 24th instant.

General Benning's brigade, which had been left on picket at Gaines Cross-Roads with the Fourth and Fifteenth regiments Alabama volunteers, to await the arrival of Lieutenant-General A. P. Hill's corps, were attacked by the enemy's cavalry whilst on the march, each having a smart skirmish.

I desire to mention the following named officers as among those most distinguished for the exhibition of great gallantry and skill, viz: Major-Generals Pickett, Hood and Trimble (the two latter severely wounded), Brigadier-Generals Armistead, severely wounded, Kemper, very severely wounded, Semmes, severely wounded and since dead of his wounds, Pettigrew (slightly wounded), Kershaw, Law, and G. T. Anderson, the last severely wounded. Brigadier-General Wm. Barksdale was mortally wounded in the attack on the evening of the 2d, while bravely leading his brigade in the assault. Brigadier-General P. B. Garnett was killed whilst gallantry leading his brigade in the assault upon the enemy's position upon the cemetery hill. Colonel Walton, chief of artillery, and Colonel Alexander, Major Dearing, Major Huger, Major Eshleman, and Captain Miller, of the corps of artillery, were noted for the courage, zeal and ability with which they discharged their duties.

The troops all exhibited great determination and courage on the battle-field, which, together with the fortitude and endurance subsequently shown by them under circumstances of great trial, justly entitles them to our hearty thanks and highest praise.

Major-General Pickett's division merits especial credit for the determined manner in which it assaulted the enemy's strong position upon the cemetery hill.

For valuable and meritorious services on the field, I desire to express my renewed obligations to the officers of my staff, Lieutenant-Colonel Sorrel, Lieutenant-Colonel Manning, Majors Fairfax, Latrobe, Clarke [345] and Walton, and Captains Goree, Reily and Rogers. Major Mitchell, chief quartermaster, Major Moses, chief commissary of subsistence, Surgeon Cullen, medical director, Surgeons Barksdale and Maury, and Captain Manning, signal-officer, discharged the duties of their respective departments with zeal and ability.

Statements of the casualties of the campaign, embracing the killed, wounded and missing, have been already forwarded.

I have the honor to be, Colonel,

Very respectfully your most obedient servant,

(Signed)