Benson J. Lossing, Pictorial Field Book of the Civil War. Volume 3.

[27] before he could successfully resist the furious onset of Jackson, Hooker ordered its withdrawal behind his works at Chancellorsville. The retreat was made in good order, the Confederates following close upon the rear of the Nationals. That night the respective chief commanders held councils of war, Hooker at his Headquarters in Chancellor's house, and Lee at his head. quarters under some pine trees where the Confederate line crossed the plank road.

Hooker's position for defense was a strong one. Around the Chancellor House was a small clearing, within a dense wood, filled, as we have observed, with a tangled undergrowth. In the woods he had constructed breastworks of logs, with trees felled in front so as to form a strong abatis. His cannon commanded these woods, and swept the approaching roads. The question at the council was, Shall we contract and strengthen our lines, and wait for an attack? or, Shall we assail the Confederate position in full force in the morning? General Warren, Hooker's senior engineer officer, and others, were in favor of the offensive. Hooker preferred the defensive attitude, and the latter was chosen. Preparations for a struggle in the morning were then made. The National line extended from the Rappahannock to the Wilderness Church, two miles west of Chancellorsville. Meade's corps, with a division of Couch's, formed the left; Slocum's and a division of Sickles's the center, and Howard's the right, with Pleasanton's cavalry near. The Confederate line extended from the Mine road on their right to the Catharine Furnace on the left, having the Virginian cavalry of Owen and Wickham on the right, and Stuart's and a part of Fitzhugh Lee's on the left, at the Furnace. McLaws's forces occupied the ridge on the east of the Big Meadow Swamp, and Anderson continued the line to the left of McLaws. Such was, the general disposition of the opposing forces on the morning of the 2d of May.

1863.

Lee was satisfied that his situation was a perilous one, and he was unwilling to risk the danger of making a direct attack upon Hooker. His chief counselor was the bold Jackson, who proposed a secret flank movement with his entire corps present, on the National right, so as to fall upon Hooker's rear. Lee hesitated because he would have only the divisions of Anderson and McLaw s left to oppose both Hooker and Sedgwick, should the latter cross the river and attack. To thus divide his army in the

Aldrich's Rouse1

presence of superior numbers might imperil its existence; yet, so much did Lee lean upon Jackson as adviser and executor, that he consented and the bold movement was at once begun. With full twenty-five thousand men,