Titus Livius (Livy), The History of Rome, Book 36
Cyrus Evans, Ed.

41. While this passed in Italy, Antiochus was at Ephesus, divested of all concern respecting the war with Rome, as supposing that the Romans had no intention of coming into Asia; which state of security was occasioned by the erroneous opinions or the flattering representations of the greater part of his friends. [2] Hannibal alone, whose judgment was, at that time, the most highly respected by the king, declared, that “he rather wondered the Romans were not already in Asia, than entertained a doubt of their coming. [3] The passage was [p. 1650]easier from Greece to Asia, than from Italy to Greece, and Antiochus constituted a much more important object than the Aetolians. For the Roman arms were not less powerful on sea than on land. Their fleet had long been at Malea, and he had heard that a reinforcement of ships and a new commander had lately come from Italy, with intent to enter on action. [4] He therefore advised Antiochus not to form to himself vain hopes of peace. [5] He must necessarily in a short time maintain a contest with the Romans both by sea and land, in Asia, and for Asia itself; and must either wrest the power from those who grasped at the empire of the world, or lose his own dominions.” He seemed to be the only person who could foresee, and honestly foretell, what was to happen. [6] The king, therefore, with the ships which were equipped and in readiness, sailed to the Chersonesus, in order to strengthen the places there with garrisons, lest the Romans should happen to come by land. [7] He left orders with Polyxenidas to fit out the rest of the fleet, and put to sea; and sent out advice-boats among the islands to procure intelligence of every thing that was passing.