Titus Livius (Livy), The History of Rome, Book 32
Cyrus Evans, Ed.

18. As none of his attempts met any success, the consul was very unwilling to allow such a comparison to be exhibited between the two classes of soldiery and their respective weapons; [2] at the same time, he could neither see any prospect [p. 1414]of reducing the place speedily, nor any means of subsisting in winter, at such a distance from the sea, and in regions desolated by the calamities of war. [3] He therefore raised the siege; and as, along the whole coast of Acarnania and Aetolia, there was no port capable of containing all the transports that brought supplies to the army, nor any place which afforded lodgings to the [4??] legions, he pitched on Anticyra, in Phocis, on the Corinthian gulf, as most commodiously situated for his purpose. [5] There the legions would be at no great distance from Thessaly, and the places belonging to the enemy; while they would have in front Peloponnesus, separated from them by a narrow sea; on their rear, Aetolia and Acarnania; and on their sides, Locris and Bœotia. [6] Phanotea in Phocis he took without resistance at the first assault. The siege of Anticyra gave him not much delay. Then Ambrysus and Hyampolis were taken. [7] Daulis, being situated on a lofty eminence, could not be reduced either by scalade or works: he therefore provoked the garrison, by missile weapons, to make sallies from out the town. [8] Then by flying at one time, pursuing at another, and engaging in slight skirmishes, he led them into such a degree of carelessness, and such a contempt of him, that at length the Romans, mixing with them as they ran back, entered by the gates, and stormed the town. [9] Six other fortresses in Phocis, of little consequence, came into his hands, through fear rather than by force of arms. Elatia shut its gates, and the inhabitants seemed determined not to admit within their walls either the army or the general of the Romans, unless compelled by force.