Titus Livius (Livy), The History of Rome, Book 32
Cyrus Evans, Ed.

21. Then the praetor, Aristaenus, again spoke as follows: —“Chiefs of Achaea, you are not more at a loss for advice, than you are for words; but every one is unwilling to promote the interest of the public at a risk of danger to himself. [2] Were I in a private character, perhaps I too should be silent; but, as praetor, it is my duty to declare, that I see evidently, either that an audience of the council ought not to have been accorded to the ambassadors, or that they ought not to be dismissed from it without an answer. Yet how can I give them an answer, unless by a decree of yours? [3] And, since not one of you who have been called to this assembly either chooses or dares to make known his sentiments, let us examine (as if they were opinions proposed to our consideration) the speeches of the ambassadors delivered yesterday; [4] supposing the speakers not to have required what was useful to themselves, but to have recommended what they thought most conducive to our advantage. [5] The Romans, the Rho- [p. 1417]dians, and Attalus, request an alliance and friendship with us; and they demand to be assisted by us in the war in which they are now engaged against Philip. Philip reminds us of our league with him, and of the obligation of our oath; he requires only, that we declare ourselves on his side; and says, he will be satisfied if we do not intermeddle in the operations of the war. [6] Does not the reason occur to the mind of any one of you, why those, who are not yet our allies, require more than he who is? [7] This arises not from modesty in Philip, nor from the want of it in the Romans. It is fortune, which, while it bestows confidence to requisitions on one side, precludes it on the other. We see nothing belonging to Philip but his ambassador: the Roman fleet lies at Cenchreae, exhibiting to our view the spoils of the cities of Eubœa. [8] We behold the consul and his legions, at the distance of a small tract of sea, overrunning Phocis and Locris. [9] You were surprised at Philip's ambassador, Cleomedon, showing such diffidence yesterday in his application to us to take arms on the side of the king against the Romans. But if we, in pursuance of the same treaty and oath, the sacredness of which he inculcated on us, were to ask of him, that Philip should protect us, both from Nabis and his Lacedaemonians, and also from the Romans, he would be utterly unable to find, not only a force with which to protect us, but even an answer to return. [10] As much so in truth as was Philip himself, who endeavoured, by promises of waging war against Nabis, to draw away our youth into Eubœa; [11] but finding that we would neither decree such assistance to him, nor choose to be embroiled in a war with Rome, forgot that alliance on which he now lays such stress, and left us to Nabis and the Lacedaemonians to be spoiled and plundered. Besides, to me the arguments of Cleomedon appeared utterly inconsistent. [12] He made light of the war with the Romans; and asserted, that the issue of it would be similar to that of the former, which they waged against Philip. [13] If such be the case, why does he, at a distance, solicit our assistance; rather than come hither in person, and defend us, his old allies, both from Nabis and from the Romans? Us, do I say? Why, on this showing, has he suffered Eretria and Carystus to be taken? Why so many cities of Thessaly? Why Locris and Phocis? Why does he at pre- [p. 1418]sent suffer Elatia to be besieged? [14] Did he, either through compulsion, or fear, or choice, quit the straits of Epirus, and those impregnable fastnesses on the river Aous; and why, abandoning the pass which he was occupying, did he retire altogether into his own kingdom? If of his own will he gave up so many allies to the ravages of the enemy, what objection can he make to these allies consulting for their own safety? [15] If through fear, he ought to pardon the like fear in us. If he retired defeated by force of arms, let me ask you, Cleomedon, shall we, Achaeans, be able to withstand the Roman arms, which you, Macedonians, have not withstood? Are we to give credit to your assertion, that the Romans do not employ, in the present war, greater forces or greater strength than they did in the former, rather than regard the facts themselves? [16] In the first instance, they aided the Aetolians with a fleet; they sent not to the war either a consul as commander, or a consular army. [17] The maritime cities of Philip's allies were in terror and confusion; but the inland places were so secure against the Roman arms, that Philip ravaged the country of the Aetolians, while they in vain implored succour from those arms. [18] Whereas, in the present case, the Romans, after bringing to a final conclusion the Punic war, which they had supported for sixteen years in the bowels, as it were, of Italy, sent not auxiliaries to the Aetolians in their quarrels, but, being themselves principals, made a hostile invasion on Macedonia with land and sea forces at once. Their third consul is now pushing forward the war with the utmost vigour. [19] Sulpicius, engaging the king within the territory of Macedonia itself, has overthrown and put him to flight; and afterwards despoiled the most opulent part of his kingdom. [20] Then, again, when he was in possession of the strait of Epirus, where, from the nature of the ground, his fortifications, and the strength of his army, he thought himself secure, Quinctius drove him out of his camp; pursued him, as he fled into Thessaly; and, almost in the view of Philip himself, stormed the royal garrisons and the cities of his allies. [21] Supposing that there were no truth in what the Athenian ambassadors mentioned yesterday, respecting the cruelty, avarice, and lust of the king; supposing the crimes committed, in the country of Attica, against the gods, celestial and infernal, concerned [p. 1419]us not all; [22] that we had less to complain of than what the people of Cius and Abydos, who are far distant from us, have endured: let us then, if you please, forget even our own wounds; [23] let the murders and ravages committed at Messena, and in the heart of Peloponnesus, the killing of his host Garitenes, at Cyparissia, almost in the very midst of a feast, in contempt of laws divine and human; the murder of the two Aratuses of Sicyon, father and son, though he was wont to call the unfortunate old man his parent; his carrying away the son's wife into Macedonia for the gratification of his vicious appetites, and all his violations of virgins and matrons; [24] —let all these, I say, be consigned to oblivion. [25] Let us suppose our business were not with Philip, through dread of whose cruelty you are all thus struck dumb; for what other cause could keep you silent, when you have been summoned to a council? Let us imagine that we are treating with Antigonus, a prince of the greatest mildness and equity, to whose kindness we have all been highly indebted; would he require us to perform what at the time was impossible? [26] Peloponnesus is a peninsula, united to the continent by the narrow passage of an isthmus particularly exposed and open to the attacks of naval armaments. Now, if a hundred decked ships, and fifty lighter open ones, and thirty Issean barks, shall begin to lay waste our coasts, and attack the cities which stand exposed, almost on the very shore; shall we then retreat into the inland towns, as if we were not afflicted with an intestine war, though in truth it is rankling in our very bowels? [27] When Nabis and the Lacedaemonians by land, and the Roman fleet by sea, shall press us, whence must I implore the support due from the king's alliance, whence the succours of the Macedonians? [28] Shall we ourselves, with our own arms, defend, against the Roman forces, the cities that will be attacked? Truly, in the former war, we defended Dymae excellently well! The calamities of others afford us abundant examples; let us not seek how we may render ourselves an example to others. [29] Do not, because the Romans voluntarily desire your friendship, contemn that which you ought to have prayed for, nay, laboured with all your might to obtain. [30] But, it is insinuated, that they are impelled by fear, in a country to which they are strangers; and that, wishing to shelter themselves under your assistance, they have recourse to your alliance in [p. 1420]the hope of being admitted into your harbours, and of there finding supplies of provisions. [31] Now, at sea they are absolute masters; and instantly reduce to subjection every place at which they land. What they request, they have power to enforce. [32] Because they wish to treat you with tenderness, they do not allow you to take steps that must lead you to ruin. Cleomedon lately pointed out, as the middle and safest way, to remain inactive, and abstain from taking up arms. [33] But that is not a middle way; it is no way at all. For, besides the necessity of either embracing or rejecting the Roman alliance, what other consequence can ensue from such conduct, than that, while we show no steady attachment to either side, as if we waited the event with design to adapt our counsels to fortune, we shall become the prey of the conqueror? [34] Contemn not then, when it is spontaneously offered to your acceptance, what you ought to have solicited with your warmest prayers. The free option between the two, which you have this day, you will not always have. [35] The same opportunity will not last long, nor will it frequently recur. You have long wished to deliver yourselves out of the hands of Philip, although you have not dared to make the attempt. Those have now crossed the sea, with large fleets and armies, who are able to rescue you to a state of freedom, without any trouble or danger to yourselves. [36] If you reject such persons as allies, you can scarcely be of sane mind; but you must unavoidably have to deal with them, either as allies or as enemies.”