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Rebellion Record: a Diary of American Events: Documents and Narratives, Volume 7. (ed. Frank Moore)

over eighteen miles distant, with no roads of consequence opening our rear to the enemy, in case of an advance in that direction. The most feasible plan, then, presenting itself was to avoid the road the enemy had so carefully obstructed, and was so well prepared to defend, and by a detour to the left reach the Arkansas River below Little Rock, and, moving up, assault the enemy's works upon their extreme right, where they were known to be weaker than at the point or intersection with the Brownsville road. Accordingly General Steele placed his whole column in motion on the morning of the seventh, with the exception of one brigade of infantry and two of cavalry, which followed on the eighth. Bayou Metaire was reached and crossed the same day with much difficulty, and consequent delay, at Shallow Ford, some eight or ten miles to the left of the usual crossing at the bridge. On the following morning General Davidson, with a single brigade of his cavalry, was assigned the advance, and

vance behind intrenchments of the most formidable character, protected upon one flank by the Arkansas River, and upon the other by an impassable cypress swamp. The roads leading to the rebel positiony's left was not deemed practicable after this reconnoissance. Upon the enemy's right the Arkansas River inclined toward us, and could not be over eighteen miles distant, with no roads of consequenefully obstructed, and was so well prepared to defend, and by a detour to the left reach the Arkansas River below Little Rock, and, moving up, assault the enemy's works upon their extreme right, whereing on half-rations. And, had General Steele crossed his entire force to the south bank of the Arkansas, and left Price upon the north bank, with five or ten days supplies, he would not only have exps in the attack itself, to an enfilading fire from rebel batteries, along the south bank of the Arkansas. This new obstacle would probably make our advance along the north bank, unsupported by a colu

ary to consider some of the difficulties under which our forces labored. When General Steele concentrated his army at Brownsville, on the first of September, he ascertained definitely that General Price, with a force largely superior in numbers, haascertained that, by the detour our forces would be required to make, the Arkansas River was at least fifty miles from Brownsville, and that our line of march would cross the Searcy and Batesville roads, along either of which a section of six-poundesault of the rebel position with an inferior force, under such marked disadvantages, did not remain in his position at Brownsville until properly reenforced. To such I would say, that when General Steele left Helena on the fifteenth of August, he dt one thousand four hundred sick behind him, and a week later he left seven hundred more behind him, in advancing from Brownsville, besides a large number taken in moving by Davidson's cavalry. At this rate General Steele would soon have no army at

ng. The possibility of crossing the Arkansas, which would enable us to effectually turn Price's position, opened a new field to General Steele, of which he at once determined to take advantage. It was at first suggested to cross the entire army to the south bank of the river, and move with the whole force upon Little Rock at once. This plan was open to the very serious objections of exposing to inevitable interruption our communication with our base of supplies at Duvall's Bluffs, on White River, perhaps involving the capture of Duvall's Bluffs, with all its supplies of ammunition, quartermaster and commissary stores. We were, besides, with short supplies, the whole army being on half-rations. And, had General Steele crossed his entire force to the south bank of the Arkansas, and left Price upon the north bank, with five or ten days supplies, he would not only have exposed his communications to interruption, but he would have subjected himself to the necessity of recrossing t

Doc. 124.-battle near little Rock, Arkansas. A National account. little Rock, Arkansas, September 13. This city was captured by General Steele's forces on the evening of the tenth, and I avail myself of the departure of the first courier to send you the particulars. In order to properly appreciate the movement and the value of our success, it will be necessary to consider some of the difficulties under which our forces labored. When General Steele concentrated his army at BrownsvRock, Arkansas, September 13. This city was captured by General Steele's forces on the evening of the tenth, and I avail myself of the departure of the first courier to send you the particulars. In order to properly appreciate the movement and the value of our success, it will be necessary to consider some of the difficulties under which our forces labored. When General Steele concentrated his army at Brownsville, on the first of September, he ascertained definitely that General Price, with a force largely superior in numbers, had taken up a strong position four miles from Little Rock, and was awaiting his advance behind intrenchments of the most formidable character, protected upon one flank by the Arkansas River, and upon the other by an impassable cypress swamp. The roads leading to the rebel position from the front pursued a devious course through swamps crossed by narrow causeways, which had b

an open plain, where alone it had heretofore been considered effective, while an impassable river destroyed the most remote possibility of receiving the support of infantry, even in the most desperate emergency. There may be those who cannot see why Steele, instead of moving to an assault of the rebel position with an inferior force, under such marked disadvantages, did not remain in his position at Brownsville until properly reenforced. To such I would say, that when General Steele left Helena on the fifteenth of August, he did not have in his command a single sick man. When he left Duvall's Bluffs on the first of September, he left one thousand four hundred sick behind him, and a week later he left seven hundred more behind him, in advancing from Brownsville, besides a large number taken in moving by Davidson's cavalry. At this rate General Steele would soon have no army at all, and been driven ingloriously from the State by the foe he came to vanquish. Steele had loudly called