Showing posts with label Codecs. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Codecs. Show all posts

Tuesday, October 18, 2022

OPPO gets second chance to defend itself against VoiceAge EVS patent in Munich, where OPPO, Xiaomi, Apple are facing NPE lawsuits over former Huawei codec patents

The Munich I Regional Court is the world's most popular patent injunction forum. Five years ago, standard-essential patent (SEP) cases were rarely filed in Munich. By now it's a major SEP venue, which increasingly also involves video and audio codecs as the Seventh Civil Chamber's Presiding Judge Dr. Matthias Zigann noted at a K.Mizra v. Niantic trial in July (that one was not a codec case, but there was an analogy).

I've been able to find out from the court's press office about some interesting developments in connection with EVS (Enhanced Voice Services) enforcement actions. OPPO has won a reopening of the record (a retrial before a decision even came down) in a case brought by VoiceAge EVS; meanwhile, they as well as Apple and Xiaomi are defending themselves in Munich against various infringement lawsuits filed by Crystal Clear Codec, a non-practicing entity (NPE) equipped with patents that originally belonged to Huawei.

Reopening of record in VoiceAge EVS v. OPPO case

Things were going smoothly--in fact, perfectly--for VoiceAge EVS in Germany: it had won every single one of half a dozen cases, which was amazing and possibly unprecedented, and it had licensed more than half of the global smartphone market, with Xiaomi apparently settling in the summer. Then came OPPO, which after its withdrawal from the German market is not going to come under pressure soon--a nightmare for patentees--and which is also giving Nokia's world-class in-house and outside litigators a hard time:

The first VoiceAge EVS v. OPPO decision resulted in a stay, as OPPO's challenge to the patent-in-suit succeeded to some degree in the Federal Patent Court.

The second VoiceAge EVS v. OPPO decision (case no. 7 O 9609/21 over EP2102619 on a "method and device for coding transition frames in speech signals"; HMD was enjoined over the same patent in May) came down on Thursday (October 13), and it's not an injunction either. Instead of rendering a final judgment at this stage, the Seventh Civil Chamber under Presiding Judge Dr. Zigann decided to reopen the record, with a new trial date to be determined at a later stage. The court will firstly await the written decision of the Federal Patent Court, which at the end of a June 30, 2022 nullity hearing upheld the patent in a modified form.

OPPO argued that the Federal Patent Court construed the patent-in-suit differently from the Munich I Regional Court's claim construction in the infringement proceedings. VoiceAge EVS didn't deny that divergence, but asserted that the patent was infringed either way. As the Munich I Regional Court has not heard oral argument from the parties on the basis of the allegedly divergent claim construction by the Federal Patent Court, it determined that a retrial (even prior to a judgment following the first trial) was warranted.

While I can't predict the final outcome, it's clear based on the information the court provided to me that there won't be a judgment too soon. It usually takes quite some time until the Federal Patent Court hands down its written reasons. Thereafter, the parties will be able to amend their pleadings accordingly. And sometime thereafter the court will conduct the retrial.

This is almost as good for OPPO as a stay.

Non-practicing entity Crystal Clear Codec asserting former Huawei patents in Munich against Apple, Xiaomi, and OPPO

A whole new enforcement campaign over EVS SEPs is pending in Munich, and the plaintiff is named Crystal Clear Codec (CCC). It has offices in the United States and in Poland (where the address is apparently a letterbox in a Sheraton hotel). Chinese website C114 reported in late August on post-grant challenges brought by OPPO and Xiaomi over six Chinese patents. Those six patents are from the same patent families as patents that CCC asserted against LG.

All of the patents listed on CCC's website were originally obtained by Huawei, and some of the assignments haven't even been recorded yet in certain patent databases. CCC notes that the founder of CCC, David Sewell, had previously set up another NPE named EVS Codec Technologies (ECT), which settled litigation with Huawei, a while after which Huawei assigned patents to CCC.

The Chinese report furthermore says that CCC is asserting patents in multiple jurisdictions. Today the Munich I Regional Court has confirmed the pendency of the following CCC lawsuits:

  • against Apple: cases no. 21 O 3789/22, 21 O 3790/22, and 21 O 3791/22 (with a different Apple entity being named as the defendant in each of those cases, so practically it's like a single case with multiple defendants) over EP2940685 on a "prediction method and decoding device for bandwidth expansion band signal"

  • against Xiaomi: case no. 21 O 11199/21 over the same patent (EP'685)

  • against OPPO: cases no. 21 O 11198/21 over EP2983170 on a "frequency domain envelope vector quantization method and apparatus" and no. 21 O 10517/22 over EP2352145 on a "transient speech signal encoding method and device, decoding method and device, processing system and computer-readable storage medium"

Xiaomi is conducting discovery of CCC in the United States for the purpose of using the information in the Munich proceedings. Here are a couple of related U.S. court documents:

Xiaomi's September 7, 2022 application to obtain discovery for use in foreign proceedings (28 U.S.C. § 1782)

September 19, 2022 order on report and recommendation

Presumably the companies defending against CCC's infringement actions are not licensed to Huawei's patents, or at minimum were not licensed at the time when those patents were assigned to CCC.

Huawei has been on the receiving end of NPE lawsuits involving patents formerly owned by operating companies, most famously Unwired Planet. That litigation reached the UK Supreme Court, which held that implementers may be enjoined in the UK market if they refuse to take a global portfolio license (at the time, just prior to Brexit taking effect, applying Huawei v. ZTE).

It is unfortunate for consumers in the Western hemisphere that--starting under the Trump Administration and continuing under President Biden--Huawei has been forced out of key network infrastructure markets and lost its competitiveness in Western smartphone markets (by not being able to distribute Google's Android apps such as the Google Play Store; a non-issue in China, but a huge disadvantage elsewhere). Huawei continues to be very innovative, but it must seek compensation for the use of its patented inventions more than ever. In July, Huawei was announced as an initial contributor to a WiFi 6 patent pool run by Sisvel. Huawei is not only a licensor, but continues to be a major implementer of the WiFi standard, even if no longer on a worldwide basis.

My recommendation to implementers is to take a license to Huawei's portfolio and to ensure that the license will travel with patents as they get assigned (normally that's the way license agreements work). But if some infringement lawsuits by assignees of Huawei patents--such as CCC--are already pending, they must be resolved separately.

Tuesday, July 26, 2022

Xiaomi apparently took codec patent license from VoiceAge EVS: Munich court confirms voluntary dismissals

Munich makes patent holders money.

The same apparently applies--credit where credit is due--to the Wildanger patent litigation boutique.

On May 25, the Munich I Regional Court's Seventh Civil Chamber (Presiding Judge: Dr. Matthias Zigann; side judges: Judge Dr. Hubertus Schacht and the rapporteur in these cases, Judge Benjamin Kuttenkeuler) heard two VoiceAge EVS v. Xiaomi standard-essential patent (SEP) infringement cases. Decisions were scheduled to be announced last Thursday (July 21) and in early August.

Yesterday evening a spokeswoman for the Munich I Regional Court informed me that both announcements had been canceled as a result of voluntary dismissals. There was a similar pattern last year in some VoiceAge EVS v. Apple cases. Just like then, there is no room for reasonable doubt that this means Xiaomi has taken a SEP license from VoiceAge EVS, as had eight other major smartphone makers before it. I believe that was the rational thing for Xiaomi to do. Well over half the market has a license to those patents.

On the two patents-in-suit, VoiceAge EVS had previously prevailed over HMD in what is an unprecedented winning streak (six out of six). There was no indication at the May trial that VoiceAge EVS wasn't going to win again, which would have extended the streak to eight out of eight, but they're in the licensing business and not competing for an entry in the Guinness Book of Records.

Next month, the Munich court is scheduled to announce at least one decision in a VoiceAge EVS v. OPPO case. We'll see whether history repeats itself.

HMD continues to hold out--and failed to dissuade the Seventh Civil Chamber from ordering another injunction by recently arguing that an injunction was disproportionate as it would cause irreparable harm while disputing that it needed to implement the patented techniques in the first place. How's that for some self-contradiction?

The fact that VoiceAge EVS has signed up another high-profile licensee is also a major success for the law firm I mentioned further above: Wildanger, which also won the Munich injunction against Ford that--based on the sequence of events--must have played a key role in the iconic U.S. car maker's decision to take an Avanci patent pool license. And this month, Wildanger effectively won a Munich non-SEP trial against Pokémon GO maker Niantic (a Google-Nintendo joint venture represented by Quinn Emanuel): Judge Dr. Zigann made it clear that the defendant was on the losing track and should take a license to conserve court and party resources. A decision in that case has been scheduled for August 18 (like the VoiceAge EVS v. OPPO case I mentioned before).

Wednesday, February 23, 2022

Most Nokia-branded phones banned in Germany due to enforcement of patent injunction by Fortress-funded VoiceAge EVS

Nokia itself stopped making phones a while ago, but a company named HMD has a trademark license allowing it to sell Nokia-branded phones (running Android, not Symbian). In August I reported on a patent injunction secured by VoiceAge EVS, an audio codec patent licensing firm funded by Fortress Investment, in Mannheim against HMD. Today I learned that VoiceAge EVS went ahead and enforced the injunction, which requires some security (bond or deposit) during an appeal, and apparently moved for contempt-of-court sanctions against HMD. As a result, HMD had to stop selling most of its phones in Germany.

Heise online, Germany's leading information & communications technology new site, spoke with HMD, which blamed the removal of the vast majority of its products from its German online shop on a defeat in an enforcement proceeding. HMD appealed the decision (which may be an order of contempt sanctions). It sounds like the Mannheim Regional Court sided with VoiceAge EVS over an enforcement-related question, and HMD then appealed that order to the Karlsruhe Higher Regional Court.

EVS (Enhanced Voice Services) is a 3GPP audio codec standard (Wikipedia). Apparently HMD removed support for EVS from the products it most recently launched in Germany (Nokia G21 and G11; the latter is presently sold out). Some resellers such as Amazon and the MediaMarkt consumer electronics retail chain still have some older Nokia products on stock. VoiceAge EVS would have to sue those resellers as the injunction obtained against HMD does not apply to them.

While consumers generally don't know about EVS and the benefits it offers, there's a significant quality degradation (for the quality of voice communications) when phones don't support that standard any longer.

What VoiceAge EVS v. HMD shows is that German patent injunctions can be commercially impactful. Three years ago, Apple was unable to sell some older iPhone models in Germany because of an injunction Qualcomm had won in Munich. Shortly thereafter, the parties settled, but just because Apple needed Qualcomm's 5G chips. At that stage, Apple had resumed its German sales of certain older iPhone models by incorporating Qualcomm 4G chips into them. And last summer Apple settled with Fortress, which also resulted in the voluntary dismissal of all VoiceAge EVS lawsuits against Apple. Otherwise Apple would likely have been enjoined as well.

While we're on the subject of patent enforcement in Germany, there's a huge two-day trial taking place in Munich over the next couple of days in IP Bridge v. Ford (case no. 7 O 9572/21), IP Bridge v. Apple (case nos. 7 O 2395/21 and 7 O 2963/21), and IP Bridge v. OPPO (case no. 7 O 8133/21). All these cases will be decided by the Munich I Regional Court's Seventh Civil Chamber (Presiding Judge: Dr. Matthias Zigann).

The patent-in-suit (EP2294737 on "control channel signalling for triggering the independent transmission of a channel quality indicator") was originally obtained by Japanese electronics maker Panasonic, which declared it essential to 4G/LTE and later assigned it to Japan's national patent licensing firm IP Bridge. The patent was previously asserted against others, and an attempt to invalidate it went all the way up to the Federal Court of Justice, which upheld the patent.

Daimler would have had to defend itself against the same patent this week, but took an Avanci license late last year.

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Tuesday, February 19, 2019

Enforcement of German injunctions forces Huawei to take MPEG LA's AVC Patent Portfolio License

Qualcomm's enforcement of a likely invalid and most likely not infringed patent against Apple in Germany is a Pyrrhic victory that generates limited incremental chip sales but exacerbates its antitrust problems (instead of forcing Apple into a global settlement). But in another case, two German patent injunctions have brought about the desired result: MPEG LA, a patent pool company, "announced today that Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd., Huawei Device Co., Ltd and Huawei Device (Shenzhen) Co., Ltd ('Huawei') have become Licensees to MPEG LA's AVC Patent Portfolio License ('AVC License'). As a result of this agreement, all legal disputes related to patent enforcement actions brought by patent holders in MPEG LA's AVC License against Huawei have been resolved."

In November, MPEG LA announced that the Dusseldorf Regional Court ("Landgericht Düsseldorf" in Geman) ruled that Huawei and ZTE infringed patents of two contributors to its pool. In late December, MPEG LA announced that the Dusseldorf Higher Regional Court ("Oberlandesgericht Düsseldorf") denied Huawei's and ZTE's motions to stay the enforcement of injunctions over EP1773067 in Huawei's case and EP1750451 in ZTE's case. Both patents were filed for by Panasonic. But MPEG LA may have litigated over other patents as well (which would explain why they claimed that patents belonging to two pool contributors were enforced).

Presumably, ZTE will also settle in the near term. German injunctions can give a patent holder significant leverage, provided that they can't just be worked around.

MPEG LA appears to have a perfect litigation track record in Germany: whenever they sued someone there, MPEG LA prevailed on one or more patents. An MPEG LA press release states that "[a] team led by Axel Verhauwen of Krieger Mes & Graf v. der Groeben and Gottfried Schüll of Cohausz & Florack represented the plaintiffs." To the best of my knowledge, Mr. Verhauwen has represented MPEG LA in either all or at least the vast majority of its German lawsuits over the years.

It's unclear why Huawei and ZTE didn't just take a license, given that the cost of defending against a few patent infringement cases typically exceeds that of the annual royalty cap. It could be (and this is pure speculation) that those companies take issue with some non-monetary terms, such as a grant-back obligation.

In early December, 34 organizations signed an open letter calling for the application of the proportionality principle to patent infringement remedies in Europe. The list includes industry organizations such as CCIA and ip2innovate, major technology companies such as Samsung, Microsoft, SAP, Intel, HP, and Cisco, and automotive companies such as Volkswagen, Daimler, BMW, and Honda.

What makes Germany a particular hotbed for patent infringement lawsuits is the combination of speed, the enforcement gap (because it takes longer to invalidate a patent that should never have been granted than to obtain an infringement ruling) and, above all, access to injunctive relief as a legal remedy (as opposed to an equitable remedy involving an eBay-like analysis). In many cases, litigation watchers like me just have to look at the patent claims-in-suit to figure out that a plaintiff like BlackBerry (currently suing Facebook and its WhatsApp and Instagram subsidiaries) is simply playing the lottery with patents of dubious validity (software patents...), just because the grand prize is a Germany-wide injunction.

While I do agree with the above-mentioned open letter, the situation is more likely to get worse than to get better anytime soon.

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Friday, June 21, 2013

ITC institutes investigation of Nokia's second complaint against HTC -- VP8 also at issue

Late on Thursday the United States International Trade Commission ("USITC", or just "ITC") gave notice of its (expected) decision to investigate Nokia's second complaint against HTC, filed about four weeks ago.

In this new investigation Nokia is asserting six patents against HTC, one of which is allegedly infringed by HTC's implementation of Google's VP8 video codec (part of the WebM project). Two German VP8 cases have already gone to trial. In the first one an infringement (or at least a rather likely infringement) has apparently been identified, and while I doubt that Nokia will win the second one (except perhaps on appeal), it's again very close to an infringement finding as the decision hinges on the court's construction of a single claim limitation (whether "based on" can have the meaning of "depending on").

Google is an intervenor in the first Nokia-HTC ITC investigation and is presumably going to intervene again (it's also an intervenor in various German Nokia-HTC cases, including among other things the ones involving VP8).

All in all Nokia is asserting 50 (or more) different patents against HTC in the U.S., UK, and Germany.

The ITC investigation of Nokia's first complaint went to trial in late May/early June, and as a result of the case narrowing that is expected in ITC investigations in order to keep the case schedules (which are relatively fast by U.S. standards), there are now three patents remaining in the case. One of those patents covers tethering. The other two patents involve chipsets used by HTC, and HTC's patent exhaustion defense was dismissed by the Administrative Law Judge (the Commission, the six-member decision-making body at the top of the U.S. trade agency, declined to review that determination for the time being though patent exhaustion could be reviewed after a final initial determination by the judge on the overall case).

During the first year of the current wave of smartphone patent disputes the ITC was a very popular venue. Some litigants apparently thought that this forum provided them with the best chances of gaining leverage resulting in settlements. But the drop-out rate of patent assertions at the ITC has been extremely high, and certain German courts (particularly the ones in Mannheim and Munich) have become increasingly popular in disputes between global players because they adjudge patent infringement actions much faster than the ITC. Most of the original smartphone-related ITC complaints by large operating companies against their peers have been adjudged by now and are on appeal (just yesterday the Federal Circuit scheduled a hearing on the Microsoft-Google cross-appeal of the ITC ruling on Microsoft's complaint against Motorola, which resulted in an import ban). But there have still been some new complaints of this kind, including the ones Ericsson and Samsung lodged against each other.

If you'd like to be updated on the smartphone patent disputes and other intellectual property matters I cover, please subscribe to my RSS feed (in the right-hand column) and/or follow me on Twitter @FOSSpatents and Google+.

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Wednesday, June 19, 2013

Google refuses $7 million in patent royalties from Microsoft, prefers to keep $100 million bond

Microsoft and Google's Motorola are preparing for a breach-of-contract trial scheduled to commence in late August, but they also have some clean-up to do with respect to last year's anti-enforcement preliminary injunction that barred Motorola Mobility from enforcing a set of German permanent, provisionally-enforceable injunctions relating to two H.264 standard-essential patents (SEPs) and in late November 2012 was replaced by a summary judgment ruling denying injunctive relief.

In order to enforce the U.S. anti-enforcement injunction Microsoft had to post a $100 million bond to ensure that even in the (no matter how inconceivable) scenario of a Microsoft bankruptcy Google's Motorola would be made whole. Microsoft had even offered Motorola a $300 million bond and indicated a potential willingness to increase the amount, but Motorola wanted to ban Windows and the Xbox in Germany rather than receive security for royalties, so the court had to decide, and Judge James Robart felt that a $100 million bond was easily adequate. That bond was posted on April 13, 2012.

In the meantime, a FRAND royalty determination has been made, finding Google entitled to a few million (not several billion) dollars. A letter Microsoft filed with the court late on Tuesday shows that on June 5, 2013 Microsoft's counsel told Google's (Motorola's) counsel that "Microsoft is prepared to remit to Motorola immediately the approximately $6.8 million that represents the 'to date' sum that would be due under [F]RAND licenses at the royalty identified in the Court's April 19, 2013 ruling subject to Motorola releasing the [$100 million] bond currently in place" and politely asked to be advised as to Motorola's position. Yesterday's letter to the court now states that "Motorola did not accept the tender, and has indicated that it would oppose Microsoft's current request to release the bond".

The letter also says that Microsoft "has undertaken to make future royalty payments that arise based on the same [rate-setting] rulings".

From a purely commercial point of view it would actually make far more sense for Google to accept Microsoft's payments. It's better to physically receive money than to have merely a bond, especially when the debtor's ability to pay is beyond reasonable doubt anyway.

Having been unable to reach an agreement with Google, Microsoft now requests that the court order the release of the $100 million bond, which Microsoft says "is unnecessary to secure Microsoft's payment", given that its amount "far exceeds any sum that could ever be due to Motorola under [Judge Robart's rate-setting] Order". If Motorola still refuses to accept its royalty payment, "the bond should be reduced to reflect the actual sums due under the Court's April 19, 2013 [rate-setting] order".

It will be interesting to see how Google seeks to justify a $100 million bond under these circumstances. I guess it just wants to preserve the record for an appeal and avoid doing anything that looks like recognizing that it's entitled to only a small royalty amount. I don't want to speculate on other possible motives.

Microsoft presumably has to pay a considerable amount of ongoing bank charges for a bond of this magnitude. It's not a lot compared to the commercial implications of the wider patent dispute with Google, but too much for any responsible company to leave on the table. Microsoft routinely seeks adjustments of bonds. Last November the Munich Higher Regional Court brokered an agreement between Microsoft and Motorola, further to a Microsoft motion for reduction, that lowered a bond or deposit from 242 million euros ($308 million) to 18.5 million euros ($23.6 million), less than 8% of the original figure. That one related to Microsoft's enforcement of an injunction it had won in May 2012 over a multi-part text messaging layer patent. Tomorrow morning the same appeals court will hold a hearing on a Microsoft motion for reduction of a bond relating to its enforcement of another injunction it won against Motorola in Munich, based on a soft input panel patent.

If you're interested in the full text of Microsoft's letter to the Seattle-based court concerning the $100 million bond, you can view it here or on Scribd:

13-06-18 Microsoft Letter Re. Release of $100 Million Bond

Google (Motorola) will get to respond tomorrow, and Microsoft can reply to Google's answer on Monday. In parallel, Motorola raised a discovery issue, which is on the same briefing schedule. The court will hear argument on both issues over the phone on Tuesday (June 25, 2013).

If you'd like to be updated on the smartphone patent disputes and other intellectual property matters I cover, please subscribe to my RSS feed (in the right-hand column) and/or follow me on Twitter @FOSSpatents and Google+.

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Wednesday, June 23, 2010

MPEG LA's AVC/H.264 licensing terms: further analysis

There's still a lot of controversy over the video codec question, in connection with HTML 5 and generally. I have commented on this on several occasions, most recently on Google's announcement of the "free" WebM (VP8) codec (this posting) and the subsequent modification of the WebM license.

I have received some useful clarifications from MPEG LA concerning its AVC/H.264 licensing terms and would like to share that information and comment on it in this posting. Prior to doing so, let me explain my approach to the controversial subject.

Separating politics and economics

As a long-standing opponent of software patents, I'm all for patent-free formats but I want to understand from a pragmatic point of view what the risks and opportunities are for the average software developer (FOSS as well as non-FOSS) when adopting one video codec or another:
  • For WebM/VP8, there's a vague assurance by Google that its own patents, which are licensed on a royalty-free basis, are all you need. But Google doesn't publish a detailed analysis, nor do the license terms include indemnification. So it's pretty much a "trust us" story. I've seen opinions that agree with Google's view, and others who disagree. If Google offered indemnification, that would change the situation, but they don't.

  • For MPEG LA's AVC/H.264 codec, patent royalties are due unless one does something that falls under an exception (such as certain kinds of non-commercial use) or the number of units sold is below a certain threshold. The patent pool is huge and from many companies, mostly large ones. Since AVC/H.264 is already extremely widespread, third parties owning patents that read on it would likely have enforced them already, which makes it reasonably likely that MPEG LA controls all of the essential patents.
From a philosophical point of view, I wish there weren't any software patents. In that case, there wouldn't (have to) be an MPEG LA. But I try hard (and encourage everyone else to try equally hard) to separate my political/philosophical preference from practical/economic considerations under the circumstances we have to live with.

In that respect, the licensing terms for AVC/H.264 play a key role. If they are reasonable (under the circumstances), then one might accept them as a practical, totally unemotional choice. There are patent holders who don't make licenses to their patents available on any terms, or not on any reasonable terms. Those strategic patent holders with an exclusionary strategy are the biggest problem as I recently explained.

Further analysis suggests the AVC/H.264 royalty cap works the way it should

MPEG LA has a royalty cap so that companies selling high-volume products know beforehand the maximum amount of royalties they'll have to pay to MPEG LA in a given year. The current $5 million cap really isn't much for a big player possibly generating many billions of annual revenues with products that include an AVC/H.264 encoder and/or decoder.

More importantly, this makes it economically possible for entities like Mozilla and Opera to give away huge numbers of web browsers to end users on a free-of-charge basis (note that Mozilla, unlike Opera, offers truly free software -- free as in free speech, not just free beer).

Two weeks ago I attended an event at Google's Brussels office: a roundtable on open source business models. Its roughly 30 participants were from a diversity of companies as well as the European Commission. When the codec question came up, I mentioned the AVC/H.264 royalty cap, and someone at the event basically claimed that I shouldn't believe what MPEG LA's website says about it because MPEG LA could charge different fees for different types of products. According to the house rules of the event, I can quote what was said but without naming the person who made the statement. So I asked that person for permission to name the source when quoting that particular statement on my blog, but the person prefers not to be named and clarified that "for most companies, they probably don't see much more than one overall fee."

That was basically a retraction of the original claim. Nevertheless I wanted to know from MPEG LA, the licensing firm that manages the AVC/H.264 pool, whether the $5M per-customer per-year royalty cap has anything to do with product categories such as smartphones versus other devices.

Here's the answer I got from an MPEG LA spokesperson:
The royalty cap for AVC Product in our AVC License includes the combined sales of all of a Licensee’s AVC Product (encoders, decoders or combination device equals one unit) in that calendar year. Therefore, a Licensee would not pay more than $5 million in royalties for any combination or amount of AVC Product it sells in 2010, regardless of what type of device it is. It should be noted that caps and royalties are subject to possible increases to be determined for the renewal term 2011-2015.
I'd like to add that MPEG LA made a commitment to keep those increases within a specified limit (see the last item on this FAQ page).

That answer suggested the cap works the way it should. I still wanted to know more about the cap: Are there any customers who for whatever reason may have to pay more than $5M in a given year? And if so, why?

And this is what MPEG LA told me:
Caps apply to each of AVC Product, OEM AVC Product distributed through a PC operating system incorporated in the end PC product of another party, and AVC Video. While rare, there are instances of a Licensee and its affiliates being subject to caps for both AVC Product as well as AVC Video in a given year. There is also instance of a Licensee being subject to caps for both AVC Product and OEM AVC Product for PC operating system product.
To avoid a misunderstanding, that doesn't mean there's a cap for each product (in which case a company with 20 products could pay up to $100 million). The term "AVC Product" means a license type. MPEG LA has three types of licenses that are relevant here and I'm quoting from the license agreement, which was provided to me on a confidential basis with permission to quote these definitions:
  • AVC Product(s): "any product or thing in whatever form which constitutes or contains one or more fully functioning AVC Decoder(s), AVC Encoder(s) or AVC Codec(s). AVC Product(s) shall not include OEM AVC Products."

  • OEM AVC Product(s): "AVC Product(s) sold to an OEM Licensee Customer."

  • AVC Video: "video encoded in compliance with the AVC Standard"
Let me put it in more colloquial terms: If you obtain an "AVC Product(s)" license, it covers the products you build that include an H.264 codec in some form. The "OEM AVC Product license" category is a special case for companies selling a PC operating system to OEM customers (computer manufacturers who then bundle the product). And "AVC Video" is a license for those offering H.264 video content. All licenses relate to the same patent pool but to different business models.

In terms of the cap, there can be cases where companies need more than one of those three licenses. Most companies won't, but those who do may pay, for an example, twice the cap. But that doesn't mean that their costs are totally unlimited. They simply have more than one license fee account and each account has a cap.

I asked a third question about the cap: Is it true that if companies infringe your patents and have to pay back-royalties, the cap doesn't apply but they may have to pay more?

MPEG LA answered:
That is not correct. The caps applicable to any given year in which a new Licensee owes Back Royalties (with applicable interest, if any) still applies. For example, a new Licensee owes AVC Product royalties for 2007 would be subject to the cap of $4,250,000 for that year.
All things considered, the royalty cap appears reliable to me and I don't have the impression that MPEG LA tries to mislead anyone about it.

Patent enforcement: are licensees protected against infringing competitors?

I recently talked to someone who said that MPEG LA goes after some but not necessarily all patent infringers, which means that if you're a company in a given market that is forced to pay royalties and you have competitors that are not, you may be at a strategic disadvantage with others undercutting your prices. Therefore, my fourth and final question to MPEG LA was: Is it true that if a company pays royalties to you and faces significant competition from an infringer of your patents in its core market(s), the legitimate licensee has no contractual basis to require MPEG LA to go after the infringer?

MPEG LA answered:
It is correct that there is no requirement in the AVC License for litigation to be brought against an unlicensed, infringing company or organization. We actively pursue unlicensed companies or organizations that may be using the AVC standard to offer them the license, but, any litigation against a non-Licensee would brought by patent rights holders, not by MPEG LA.
The first part confirms that a licensee doesn't have a guarantee that his infringing competitors will be pursued. The second part is a legally technical thing: MPEG LA collects royalties on behalf of the actual patent holders but can't assert those patents against infringers in court. That's why litigation would have to be brought by the actual patent holders. I understand, but nevertheless I think it would be good for MPEG LA's licensees to have a legal commitment from the patent holders that they will either collect royalties from all significant players in a given market or from none of them.

One might assume that MPEG LA's obvious desire to maximize its royalty income would practically guarantee that all significant companies infringing its patents would be pursued. But the worldwide market is huge and if you have a country that's only medium-sized, then MPEG LA may decide for efficiency reasons to collect royalties only from the market leader. That one would face a risk of litigation if refusing to pay, but if that licensee's competitors don't pay because MPEG LA doesn't go after them for the time being, then that's an awkward situation for the licensee.

So while I'm (for now) satisfied with MPEG LA's answers on the royalty cap, I would like them to give some real protection to licensees in the scenario I just described, for the sake of undistorted competition. Even though litigation would be the prerogative of the actual patent holders, the license agreement could alternatively waive the obligation to pay if a licensee faces significant competition from infringers who don't pay.

I will keep following the codec debate and continue to look at licensing terms and practices.

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Saturday, June 5, 2010

WebM (VP8): a license update and the gift horse fallacy

I have reported repeatedly on the topic of "patent-free" multimedia codecs, such as in this roundup describing the WebM situation about two weeks ago. In discussions (such as on slashdot) there's always a lot of confusion about the subject and, unfortunately, about the intentions of those who issue Cassandra warnings.

License update

Since my last post on this subject, the only significant news has been that Google modified the WebM licensing terms so as to make the WebM license consistent and compatible with existing FOSS licenses. This has been welcomed by the Free Software Foundation as well as Simon Phipps, a board member of the Open Source Initiative.

However, Google hasn't changed a thing about the risk that allegations of the infringement of third-party patents (Google's own patents have never been a problem here) by WebM represents to its adopters. There still isn't any hold-harmless or indemnification clause.

We must look every gift horse in the mouth

I think there are many people in the FOSS community who would benefit from a more differentiated approach toward anything that appears to be a generous donation. At the end of the day, the Trojan Horse was a gift horse, too (just to avoid any misunderstanding: I don't mean to liken WebM to the Trojan Horse; this was only meant to point out that refusing to look in the mouth is a dangerous approach).

The more realistic perspective -- still not a cynical one -- is that companies don't give for the sake of giving. If they give, they expect some kind of benefit in return. In some cases, the "free" deal can be very beneficial and fair. I use some Free Software that gives me great value and I can't see a risk. But at the other end of the spectrum there are "freebies" that are indeed modern variations of the Trojan Horse, such as those "open source patent pledges" by IBM and others.

When IBM first made that (in)famous pledge in early 2005, there were only a few people who understood that what seemed to be an act of generosity was a bad thing on the bottom line. Unfortunately, even an open-innovation luminary like Professor Lawrence Lessig got it wrong. He said: "This is exciting. It is IBM making good on its commitment to encourage a different kind of software development and recognizing the burden that patents can impose." Five years later, IBM proved him completely wrong on this. IBM continued to be just the same patent bully it's always been.

Google's WebM initiative is somewhere in the middle between a true act of generosity and an IBM-style scheme:
  • There's no reason to assume that Google wants to hurt the FOSS cause in any way with WebM, especially not in any IBM-like way. I don't put it past Google to have that intention elsewhere: they might do anything, including the use of patents, to destroy an open source search technology that could adversely affect their core business. However, in this particular context of video codecs, I don't think they intend to cause harm. I do believe them that they want more competition in this case.

  • What Google does do -- and what I believe the FOSS community must approach cautiously -- is to shift most of the risk to others while keeping most of the benefits to itself. Businesses like to do that, but FOSS developers and users shouldn't lose sight of the risks just out of excitement over the idea of getting a seemingly "unencumbered" codec.

Google will retain control over WebM despite open-sourcing program code and publishing specifications

A common misconception about open source and "free" specifications is that this would make something such as the WebM project independent from a single vendor or a group of vendors. Some think this puts "the community" in charge.

Theoretically, it's true because it would be legally possible. Practically, it's just wrong because we live in a dynamic world as opposed to a static one.

If any WebM code is released on FOSS terms, that doesn't guarantee that all future versions will be, too. The original copyright holder has every right to release future versions under different licenses.

Some will argue: well, if they do that, someone can still fork it and continue it as a FOSS project. That's not forbidden but it's rarely practical. If you do that, you have to compete against the steward of the original project. You have to give your fork a new name because you won't own any rights to the trademark of the original trademark. So the odds are long against you at the outset. Chances of a fork even being tried in any serious way are therefore quite limited; chances of such an effort succeeding are extremely low.

The bottom line is that Google will have all of the expertise in-house to develop WebM further, and this will give Google a lot of control over the future direction of the project from a practical point of view. That's perfectly legitimate, but it does have to be considered. Google is a powerful player and can steer WebM in whatever direction best benefits its business interests (search, Chrome, Android, YouTube, whatever else).

Some may be more comfortable with Google in charge of such a codec than with the backers of MPEG LA's H.264. I can see why many people feel that way but one could also argue that a single player as powerful as Google is a greater long-term risk than a consortium of many companies with a diversity of strategic interests. I don't want to support the former or the latter position: I just want to stress that hoping for Google to do away with MPEG LA -- if possible at all -- means to trade in one set of issues for another.

Google won't be just another WebM adopter

Some argue that by adopting WebM itself (by using it in and for Android, Chrome, YouTube etc.) Google will become a large-scale adopter and therefore has a fair share in the patent-related risk.

Unfortunately, third-party patent holders can go after whichever infringer(s) they want to. On the one hand, there's a huge reward out there for them if they succeed and force Google to pay. On the other hand, Google will defend itself vigorously when it's attacked directly. Smaller adopters of WebM may represent lower-hanging fruit to a patent holder. Typically the first ones to suffer from patent hold-up are those who are big enough to be able to pay significant amounts but not so big that fighting them would be a huge challenge. Then over time the targets will get bigger.

In WebM's case, patent holders would be particularly likely to prey on other adopters than Google initially: Google is also standing on the sidelines as some commercial adopters of Android are being approached by patent holders, such as HTC being sued by Apple and having felt forced to agree to pay royalties to Microsoft. So a patent holder might assume that Google would also leave WebM adopters in the lurch.

Another important difference between Google and large parts of the FOSS community is that Google does like software patents a lot. Just like most patent holders, they like their own patents and dislike those held by the rest of the world, which is human (but often misguided). It would be great if one day they could change their position and oppose all software patents, but so far they've been very much in favor of patents especially in connection with their search engine. So the WebM initiative shouldn't be confused for a crusade against software patents that one might want to support as a matter of principle, "for the cause".

In my opinion, no company that favors software patents can claim to be a reliable ally of FOSS. It can at best be a business partner for the community. And that's the perspective to take on WebM: is it a good deal? Is it a fair deal?

Don't count on Google's idealism or solidarity. You'd wind up disillusioned.

The argument that MPEG LA doesn't offer indemnification for third-party patent claims either

I have the utmost sympathy for those who say that Google shouldn't be held to a higher standard than MPEG LA in terms of indemnification for third-party patent infringement claims. Yes, I know why some think it's unfair. But there's always a higher hurdle for late entrants than for incumbents. Economists refer to that phenomenon as "barriers to entry". In this case, what comes with it is a significant burden of proof.

I fully agree that it would be desirable for MPEG LA to protect licensees of its patents against third-party infringement claims. Right now, a license from MPEG LA means that they won't sue you as a licensee over the patents you've licensed from them, but if anyone else has patents that read (or are claimed to read) on the same codec, then you're exposed to that risk anyway. In other words, you don't have a legal guarantee that MPEG LA is really a one-stop shop.

So some say that if MPEG LA doesn't provide a guarantee that you don't need any patents other than theirs to implement a certain codec, then Google (which unlike MPEG LA doesn't charge but makes WebM available on FOSS terms) shouldn't be required to do so either.

The part about "Google doesn't charge" was already addressed further above. Google has chosen a business model that is FOSS-based. All of us FOSS advocates like it, but we have to understand that they're doing this for commercial reasons, not for idealism. I think their responsibility shouldn't be less just because we like their business model better. Business is business. Free or non-free. Using their search engine is also free, still there are consumer rights advocates who insist on data privacy.

The late-entrant problem here is that H.264 is already in extremely widespread commercial use. Frankly, there aren't many digital video devices out there in the worldwide marketplace right now that don't implement it. That doesn't represent a guarantee that there aren't patents outside the MPEG LA pool that could be asserted against H.264, but I haven't found any indication that anyone has ever tried. Given that it's already so ubiquitous, it's hard to see why any "trolls" wouldn't have come out in the meantime.

By contrast, VP8 is only now beginning to take off big-time and I don't think it's responsible to simply discount as "FUD" MPEG LA's recent statement concerning the possible creation of a related patent pool (another way of saying that they believe some of their patents are infringed). I don't doubt that MPEG LA has strategic motivations that would make "FUD" potentially conducive to its purposes. I just oppose the approach of dismissing it as "FUD" without further analysis.

I mentioned before (in the context of control) the fact that Google's VP8 is a one-company effort. It was started by On2, which was acquired by Google earlier this year. It was only one company, and a rather small one compared to the long list of big companies supporting MPEG LA, which represent a very large part of all of the research and development that happened in recent years (even decades) in connection with multimedia technologies. That combined power simply makes them far more likely to have a "complete" patent pool (meaning that if you license something from them, you may indeed be fine for the relevant codec without much of a risk of third-party claims) than Google. This is like a whole bunch of long-standing Goliaths versus the one and relatively young David that On2 was before Google bought it (and Google itself wasn't even active in the codec field before it acquired On2).

All's well that ends well -- but what if it doesn't?

Given my background of promoting Free Software and Open Source and opposing software patents, it should go without saying that I'd be extremely happy to see a truly free and unencumbered video codec succeed.

Most people understand that this is my attitude. A very few have accused me of spreading or supporting "FUD". Again: There's no problem here if this works out well. But that doesn't mean we should turn a blind eye to the risks involved.

I mentioned in connection with IBM's patent pool the example of Professor Lessig, who was misguided by his dream of open innovation to the extent that he believed IBM's "pledge" of 500 patents meant a commitment to a good cause. I now see some tendencies on the part of various FOSS leaders to embrace WebM in a way that doesn't take into sufficient consideration the risks to which its adopters may be exposed.

I can see why: Yes, the whole idea of Free and Open Source Software is indeed going to be in real trouble if patents prevent the creation of a truly free and unencumbered codec. When I wrote that patent problems in connection with such technologies could even result in the World Wide Web Consortium having to rethink its patent-free/royalty-free standards requirement, I didn't like that notion at all (nor did I mean to ignore structural differences between today's W3C and the way proprietary standards like GSM are set). I just described a risk of how things could evolve over time.

Let's hope for the best but not forget to prevent the worst. The worst outcome here would be if various WebM adopters ended up being sued as a consequence of their undue reliance upon vague and unsubstantiated assurances made by Google. If the wider FOSS community takes most of the risk while Google would get most of the reward, then that's not fair in a scenario where things go wrong.

I continue to believe that a detailed analysis of the patent situation should be made available by Google to the public, and that holding WebM adopters harmless in the event of third-party patent infringement claims would be the only reliable way with which Google could practically eliminate the related concerns. If that isn't provided, it doesn't mean WebM is a bad thing or that it will necessarily fail. But it does suggest that we should continue to monitor the situation, and that it's reasonable to ask tough questions, even the ones we'd rather not have to ask in the first place.

No matter how much we want free, open and unencumbered standards, we must realize that the price of ignorant pigheadedness can be very high when patents are involved. Those are costly lawsuits that can have major consequences.

If after a year or two no one has brought up patent infringement assertions against WebM, then it will be much easier to recommend it to everyone. There would always be a risk, but in that case the risk may indeed be closer to the normal patent-related risk all software developers and distributors face all the time. For now, there are reasons to fear that the risk might be considerably higher.

Always think of your own risk. Google won't protect you based on the current license terms. Free Software and open source advocates won't protect you either. They have their agenda, so you should have yours.

If you're interested in reading more about the issue of patents on standards, I would like to recommend this article on another blog ("Video Networker"), covering standards in general and discussing the WebM situation in particular (under the "Skype and Google" subhead).

If you'd like to be updated on patent issues affecting free software and open source, please subscribe to my RSS feed (in the right-hand column) and/or follow me on Twitter @FOSSpatents.

Tuesday, May 25, 2010

WebM (VP8): safe and royalty-free?

Last week, Google and a couple of strategic allies announced the WebM project, "an open web media project" including the VP8 video codec Google acquired earlier this year.

I provided comments to journalists reporting on the announcement, stressing the need for a well-documented patent clearance. eWeek, Dr.Dobb's and The Register were among the websites that picked up some of those comments, which are consistent with what I wrote on this blog two weeks ago in a broader context that also included Theora.

In favor of open-sourcing

In this particular case, since Google uses a newly created license (based on a part of the BSD license), it isn't a FOSS license in the formal sense until the Free Software Foundation declares it a free software license and the Open Source Initiative declares it an open source license, but let's optimistically assume that it will at least receive OSI approval.

Open-sourcing useful program code is great. But it also requires a very responsible approach. That's why I issued my comments. Let's face it: Google didn't take the WebM initiative purely out of generosity. Google is a business and has strategic interests involved. That's legitimate, and if such business interests benefit open source, that's wonderful. However, concerning the need to proceed responsibly, the one thing I don't want to see happen is that FOSS developers run into big and economically disastrous problems in undue reliance upon Google's vague assurances concerning patents.

Patent litigation can cost millions. Having to rewrite a piece of software later, due to patent problems, can be prohibitive and turn all of the development effort put into a project into an irrecoverable loss (in the worst case). Those are serious risks, especially in such a patent minefield as codecs.

Technical similarities suggest high risk of patent infringement

Jason Garrett-Glaser, the developer of an open-source H.264 player (meaning one can use his code per se on open-source terms but based on the type of use may need an H.264 license from MPEG LA), obtained the VP8 specs beforehand and commented on them in great detail (understandable only with in-depth technical knowledge about codecs).

Jason's analysis discusses technical limitations of VP8, the quality of the documentation (which doesn't seem to impress him), and concerning potential patent issues he concludes that " this is a patent time-bomb waiting to happen."

He "simply cannot believe that they will be able to get away with this, especially in today’s overly litigious day and age. Even VC-1 differed more from H.264 than VP8 does, and even VC-1 didn’t manage to escape the clutches of software patents." (VC-1 is a different format)

[Update] Carlo Daffara posted an analysis that disagrees with Jason's assessment in some ways. Carlo believes that the developers of VP8 made a lot of effort to steer clear of patent infringement. However, Carlo also points out that no one can guarantee that no third-party patents are infringed. I think Carlo made an important contribution to the debate, and his analysis is yet another reason (not a substitute) for asking Google for explaining in detail its position concerning patents.

No indemnification, no holding harmless

Jason also points out that Google doesn't provide any indemnification of developers adopting VP8 as part of WebM, while Sun did so in case of its OMS. I absolutely agree with Jason that the fact that Google doesn't offer any indemnification -- and I actually think they should go beyond mere indemnification and even have a hold-harmless clause in favor of adopters of WebM. To hold harmless means that a vendor also takes care of legal fees, which can be so massive in case of patent litigation that individual developers and smaller companies can't afford them, while Google could.

Google's refusal to indemnify (let alone to hold harmless) calls into question that Google is really certain that there's no potential problem with patents. Developers who believe Google's vague statements that they've looked into this are neither provided with any details of that analysis nor with legal protection. It comes down to a "trust us" kind of message.

Google wouldn't be able to solve the problem with its own patents

Some believe that if all else failed, Google might step in and use some its own patents against third parties going after WebM adopters. There's that perception out there of Google being incredibly powerful. In some ways Google is indeed massively powerful, but as far as patents are concerned, it is small compared to Apple and even Apple isn't one of the biggest patent holders. There are far bigger ones out there.

Starting patent disputes with multiple major patent holders wouldn't be an option for Google. In such a situation, those large patent holders would be able to point to all sorts of patents they own and that Google infringes, and they could so on a hugely greater scale than the other way round.

There's already empirical evidence that Google is neither willing nor able to use its patents. HTC, a maker of smartphones based on (among other operating systems) Android, is currently being sued by Apple over patent infringement. Apple's lawsuit places particular emphasis on patent infringement by Android, Google's smartphone operating system. So far Google hasn't come to the aid of HTC or other Android adopters. Also, HTC agreed to pay patent royalties to Microsoft, and there was no indication of Google doing anything to enable HTC to avoid paying those fees.

Steve Jobs pointed to the patent risk again

Jason's aforementioned analysis received a high-profile endorsement from Steve Jobs, who replied to someone asking him about VP8 (the video part of WebM) with only a link to Jason's blog.

Given that Steve Jobs previously said that a patent pool was being assembled to go after Theora and other "open source" codecs, his linking to an analysis that estimates the patent risk to be very substantial can be seen as a reaffirmation of his assumption that WebM/VP8 won't be the patent-free solution the FOSS movement would like it to be.

MPEG LA contemplating the creation of a patent pool for WebM

On Thursday, AllThingsD reported that MPEG LA, the patent pool firm behind H.264 and other patented codecs, is considering the creation of a patent pool for WebM.

MPEG LA wouldn't be saying so if the firm didn't believe that it holds patents that read on WebM and, I presume, especially on VP8 (the video part of WebM).

MPEG LA's business is all about aggregating patents: they create pools to which multiple patent holders can contribute, and they then offer everyone (contributors as well as everyone else) licenses to an entire pool, such as the H.264 pool. Those licenses aren't royalty-free the way Google would like WebM to be.

That explains AllThingsD's headline: Google’s "Royalty-Free" WebM Video May Not Be Royalty-Free for Long

The Register also contacted MPEG LA and received an answer consistent with the one given to AllThingsD.

That article quotes me as saying that I applaud Google for open-sourcing the codec but that I consider more assurances to be necessary.

More concern among responsible open-source advocates

Simon Phipps, previously Sun's chief open source officer and still a board member of the Open Source Initiative, takes a very similar position in a blog post published yesterday. He states (toward the end of his post) that he has "heard from many thoughtful people who like [Simon] want to cheer loudly yet also want these issues addressed."

So this isn't a question of being for or against open source, or for or against Google. It's a question of how to assess a risk. I use and like a lot of what Google offers. I support open source all the way. But I'd hate to see developers adopting an open-source technology exposed to patent-related risks. This could be ruinous for some.

There are some who believe that everyone should just support WebM and take his chances. That's a defiant attitude. I'm sympathetic to the cause of having a "free" codec, but it will only be free if there are no problems with third-party patents. It's not enough for Google to make its own patents available. The problem is that there may indeed be other patents that are not available on a royalty-free basis anytime soon.

It's also a question of a fair allocation of risks and opportunities:
  • Should WebM become a big success, then Google will reap more benefits than any other company on this planet. It can make use of a free codec in many ways, including Android and YouTube. Google could afford to pay royalties, but it would boost their profits to avoid it and it would give them strategic leverage to control an important codec.

  • Should anything go wrong with patents, Google could stand on the sidelines while the adopters of the technology it put out might pay dearly for their reliance upon Google's assurances and possibly their false hopes of Google being willing and able to use its own patents to bail them out.
For the time being, I believe it's best to wait until there are news, either positive ones from Google (concerning its patent clearance and/or its indemnification policy) or negative ones from other patent holders. One way or the other, this situation should be clarified before anyone takes a risk.

If you'd like to be updated on patent issues affecting free software and open source, please subscribe to my RSS feed (in the right-hand column) and/or follow me on Twitter @FOSSpatents.

Monday, May 10, 2010

{Video codecs} Food for thought

This post is the third (and last one) in a three-part series on video codecs. Click here for the first post in the sequence, "The HTML 5 dimension", or here for the second post in the sequence, "Accusations flying in the aftermath of Steve Jobs' email".

The patent thicket problem

A couple of weeks ago I stated my conviction that there's no such thing as an open video codec that can be guaranteed to be unencumbered by patents. I regret to say this, but like I wrote then, the field of multimedia formats is a true patent thicket. Ed Bott, a ZDNet blogger, counted 1,135 patents from 26 companies just in the H.264 pool. That is only one of the multimedia standards MPEG LA commercializes, and there are patent holders who don't work with MPEG LA but who may also have rights that are relevant to Theora (or VP8, for that matter).

Those 1,135 patents refer to registrations in a total of 44 different countries (with different numbers in each country). So there are certainly many duplicates in terms of the scope of the patent claims. Nevertheless, even just a fraction of 1,135 is still a huge number considering that it's about a single codec.

Contrary to popular misbelief, patent law doesn't stipulate a 1-to-1 relationship between patents and products. In the pharma sector there is sometimes only one new patent on a given product, or maybe two or three. In software, every little step of the way is, at least potentially, patentable. That's why even a codec like Theora or VP8 might, although it has a different background, infringe on some MPEG LA patents.

The Xiph.Org Foundation's president, Christopher 'Monty' Montgomery, wrote that if Steve Jobs' email was real, it would "strengthen the pushback against software patents". I'm afraid there isn't enough of a pushback out there that would really be needed to bring about political change in that regard (because small and medium-sized IT companies aren't truly committed to the cause), but now that more and more people do look into the threat that patents pose to FOSS (and other software), there will be greater awareness for the patent thicket problem and for the fact that patent law creates huge numbers of little monopolies as opposed to serving to protect completely functional products or technologies.

The question of relative safety in patent terms

I agree with the FSFE's president, Karsten Gerloff, that "[j]ust because a standard calls for licensing fees does not mean that the users are safe from legal risk". It's true that there might even be patents that could be asserted against H.264 but aren't under the control of MPEG LA, for reasons such as the ones I outlined recently.

However, given the extremely widespread commercial use of H.264, including some of the prime targets of patent trolls, the fact that no such patents have been asserted against H.264 licensees so far is a fact that certainly makes a number of people reasonably comfortable. While there is also significant use of Theora (and related technologies), its adopters aren't nearly as attractive targets for patent trolls as the users of H.264. Besides patent trolls, there are those large commercial holders, and as I explained before, the MPEG LA pool is so big that problems for Theora are in my opinion not outside the realm of plausibility.

The question isn't how attractive a target Theora has been so far. If it was elevated from its current status to a part of the HTML 5 standard, we'd be talking about a commercial relevance that is easily 100 times greater.

The need for consensus in the HTML 5 standard-setting discussion

HTML 5 is an extremely important leap forward and the W3C certainly wants to achieve consensus that results in consistent support by the major browser makers. This is also in the interest of web developers and website operators. If the W3C imposed Theora as the standard video format against the concerns the leading proprietary browser makers voice, this could result in inconsistent implementations of what should become a common basis for all browsers. That, in turn, would mean a lot of potential hassle for the web community.

The market relevance of Apple and Microsoft is significant enough that even without the patent uncertainty argument the preferences and positions of those vendors must be taken into account by the W3C. Their support for H.264 doesn't mean they leverage their relevance as platform companies in order to push another product of their own. H.264 is a multi-vendor patent pool, and of the 1,135 patents in the H.264 pool, Apple contributed only one and Microsoft only 65 (less than 6% of the total), according to Ed Bott's count. Both companies are also H.264 licensees and, quite plausibly, net payers (getting charged more license fees for their own use than the share of MPEG LA income that they receive). They may very well have strategic reasons for which they favor H.264, but that would be another story.

The burden of proof in the HTML 5 standard-setting discussion

I can understand the frustration of FOSS advocates and, especially, the Xiph.Org Foundation that some companies make references to uncertainty surrounding patents Theora may infringe without telling the public which those patents are. At the same time, I don't think anyone could have expected Steve Jobs to include a list of patents in that email about open-source codecs, which was just a high-level explanation of his views.

Unfortunately for Theora's developers and other supporters, there is no such thing as a burden of proof on browser makers saying they're uncomfortable with Theora because of patent-related uncertainties.

If the proponents of Theora want to disprove the "uncertainty" argument, they can't just refer to the fact that nothing has happened yet. If Theora was elevated to a part of the HTML 5 standard, the resulting adoption would represent a fundamental change of the situation.

Unfortunately, it's easier to make the case for than against a possible infringement of patents by a given piece of software. If a patent holder wants to document an infringement, there are different formats, the most popular one being a so-called claim chart. If the Xiph.Org Foundation and its allies now wanted to show that Theora doesn't infringe on any patents, they'd have to theoretically look at every patent out there.

That wouldn't be possible, but how much of an effort would be reasonable?

Under normal circumstances I believe one couldn't expect an open-source project to undertake any patent clearance of this scale. However, if companies such as Google and Opera and a formal non-profit with very deep pockets such as the Mozilla Foundation push for a standards decision with far-reaching implications for the whole industry, then I don't think it would be unreasonable to expect that they should at least look at the patents in the MPEG LA pool and perform patent clearance for Theora with respect to those.

As long as they don't make that kind of reasonable best effort, their argument about Theora being patent-safe amounts to "trust us". I said that I agree with the FSFE that the availability of a patent pool doesn't guarantee that the pool is complete. Nor does the opposite situation (developers electing not to take out patents) guarantee anything.

I don't know what Theora's proponents and opponents laid on the table in internal discussions at the W3C level. What I just wrote is based on the public debate. Also, what I wrote about Theora would equally apply to VP8 if Google proposed its inclusion in HTML 5 (after possibly open-sourcing it).

Is H.264 licensing a practical alternative for FOSS?

I asked MPEG LA, the patent pool firm that manages H.264 and other codecs, whether it would -- hypothetically speaking -- be possible for Mozilla (the maker of Firefox) to license H.264 and then make it available to everyone on Free and Open Source Software terms including the right for users to include the code in derived works. This is the answer MPEG LA gave me:
MPEG LA’s purpose is to provide voluntary licenses of convenience to users enabling them to have coverage under the essential patents of many different patent holders as an alternative to negotiating separate licenses with each. The licenses are nonexclusive and limited to coverage in connection with the applicable standard (e.g., AVC/H.264) being licensed. Therefore, although MPEG LA does not regulate this space directly, as you point out, users are not authorized to use the licensed technology beyond these limitations without payment of applicable royalties or other licenses from patent holders permitting such use.

Under our AVC License, the Licensee is the party providing the AVC end product in hardware or software. Therefore, for products where Mozilla is the Licensee, it would be responsible for paying the royalties and notifying users of the License coverage, and where other parties are Licensees, those responsibilities will fall upon them. In normal usage such as personal use, no additional License or royalty is necessary because applicable royalties are paid by the end product supplier, but additional License rights may be required where the codec is used for other purposes such as subscription or title-by-title sale of AVC video.
That answer doesn't mention Free Software or open source, but it clearly reaffirms that "users are not authorized to use the licensed technology beyond [certain] limitations without payment of applicable royalties or other licenses [...]", and such limitations aren't compatible with FOSS licenses. They go clearly against both the Free Software Definition and the Open Source Definition with their respective prohibition of discrimination against certain types of use and the requirement to allow such use free of charge.

While it's clear that code made available under a FOSS license couldn't practically implement H.264, the alternative approach would be for a FOSS browser maker such as Mozilla to include a proprietary plugin in a distribution to end users. The proprietary plug-in would be installed automatically but the license terms would make it clear that, unlike the FOSS code that is part of the same distribution, that part can't be incorporated into derived works without obtaining a license to the H.264 patent pool from MPEG LA.

Canonical (Ubuntu) and OpenOffice are comfortable with proprietary extensions to free software

Ubuntu maker Canonical has chosen that mixed free-unfree software approach. This caused some outrage by parts of the community (since it gave the impression of a FOSS company supporting H.264 against Theora), and Canonical had to justify its approach. I interpret Canonical's "clarifications" as a recognition of the fact that H.264 is commercially extremely relevant, but they try to maintain their FOSS image as much as they can.

There's a similar debate now concerning OpenOffice, for which there are free as well as unfree plug-ins and certain FOSS advocates would like unfree ones to be excluded from the project's official list of extensions. Bradley Kuhn, a Free Software Foundation board member, expressed his personal views in a blog post, "Beware of proprietary drift". It seems the Free Software Foundation lost this argument and the OpenOffice project will continue to welcome extensions that aren't Free Software.

While patents aren't explicitly discussed in the OpenOffice context, this is clearly an example of where things may be heading, contrary to the FOSS purism some people advocate. Proprietary extensions to OpenOffice could also contain patented elements.

Will the W3C at some point have to depart from its royalty-free standards policy?

My prediction is that there won't be a solution for an HTML 5 video codec that proprietary and FOSS-oriented vendors can reach consensus on. The current diversity of codecs and plug-ins is suboptimal but acceptable: it certainly hasn't prevented web video from becoming extremely popular. So there isn't really a pressing need to converge on a single standard for now.

In the long run it remains to be seen whether the W3C can maintain is royalty-free standards policy. That approach has been key to the success that web technologies have had so far, but it could, as the situation concerning codecs demonstrates, increasingly impede progress.

In the early days of web technology development, there wasn't much attention by big industry, nor by patent trolls. Hence it was possible to create patent-free standards.

The kind of technology created at that time was also far simpler than today's advances in online media. The field has become very sophisticated, which has many implications including the consequence that patent thickets related to new web technologies will reach previously unseen heights in terms of size and density.

In this earlier blog post I wrote, under the subhead "The FOSS way of innovation exposes all FOSS to patent attacks", that patents reward the first to patent a new idea, while FOSS innovation is usually of a different kind (with a few exceptions). That's also an important kind of innovation, but it's not favored by the patent system and may therefore not be a sufficient basis for future web innovation.

HTML may become like GSM, at some point requiring licenses to large numbers of patents

As the web advances in technological terms, and given that software patents are extremely unlikely to be abolished in the largest markets anytime soon, the W3C may in a matter of only a few years feel forced to revisit its standards policy.

It takes licenses to thousands of patents in order to build a GSM phone, and at some point it may be required to license large numbers of patents to build a fully functional HTML web browser. I'm afraid it's only a question of when, not if it will happen.

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{Video codecs} Accusations flying in the aftermath of Steve Jobs' email

This post is the second in a three-part series on video codecs. Click here for the previous post in the sequence, "The HTML 5 dimension", or here for the next and final post in the sequence, "Food for thought".

After Steve Jobs made a thinly-veiled threat of patent enforcement against Theora and other open-source codecs, two key players from the Xiph.Org Foundation (the organization behind Theora) responded publicly. Its founder, Christopher 'Monty' Montgomery, sent his quick comments to the media (I also received them from him directly when emailing him after seeing Steve Jobs' email). His colleague Gregory Maxwell, the Theora project leader, sent his reaction to a public mailing list. A few days later, Karsten Gerloff, the president of the FSFE, stated his opinion on his blog.

The two Xiph leaders and the FSFE president took different angles but all of them doubted that Steve Jobs' threat had any substance. They used different terminology ranging from "blackmail" to (in a semi-hypothetical context) "jackbooted thugs". Those are hard words, but are they backed up by hard facts? Let's look at them one by one.

Are those patents holders dogs that bark but don't bite?

The official Xiph.Org statement starts by mentioning a long history of veiled patent threats against Ogg multimedia formats, ten years ago with respect to Ogg Vorbis (the audio format) and in recent years against Theora (the video format from the same family). Monty then concedes that this time it might "actually come to something", but he won't worry until "the lawyers" tell him to.

If the veiled threats Monty refers to appeared vain in the past (since no legal action against those open-source codecs was actually undertaken), I can understand the Xiph.Org Foundation's wait-and-see approach. However, a famous Spanish proverb says (in a literal translation) that "the pitcher goes to the well so often that it ultimately breaks."

For whatever reasons, one of which may be the fact that suing open source over patents hurts a company's popularity among software developers, certain patent holders may have refrained from legal action in the past but we may now have reached (or be nearing) a point where at least some of the relevant patent holders may indeed be prepared to strike. A reluctance to do so need not be an impediment forever. When weighing off pro's and con's (of legal action), patent holders may come down on the "no" side in one year and on the "yes" side a few years later under different circumstances in the market.

One field that is very litigious -- and for which HTML 5 and video are going to be fairly relevant -- is the mobile communications sector. Apple and Nokia are suing each other in different courts in parallel. Apple is suing HTC. Those actions are real and giving cause for concern that the concept of the mobile web may also bring mobile sector-like litigiousness with it.

The representation that patent holders -- especially some of those who have contributed to MPEG LA's H.264 pool -- only make unspecified threats and are too afraid of actually taking their patents to court (which could result in invalidation of patents for prior art or a court opinion that interprets a patent claim more narrowly than its owner) was voiced by FSFE president Karsten Gerloff in an effort to question the substance of Steve Jobs' infringement assertion. I understand his motives and they are good, but I have a different impression of how far Apple is willing to go. Just in its litigation with HTC, which is not the only one to which Apple is a party as we speak, Apple is asserting 20 patents.

Karsten makes a similar claim about Microsoft and the possible infringement of some of its patents by the Linux kernel. But it's not hard for me to imagine that there may be (easily) hundreds of Microsoft patents that have the potential to read on the Linux kernel. The ones that are most frequently heard of, the FAT patents, have survived various patent busting attempts due to the way patent law unfortunately works, a fact on which I reported recently.

I strongly doubt that companies of the nature and stature of an Amazon or HTC would pay Microsoft patent royalties without substance just on the basis Karsten speculates about. There's nothing to gain for those companies by doing a press release in which they confirm (even without specifying details, which simply isn't usually done) royalty payments to one major patent holder. That can actually result in others who believe they have patents reading on GNU/Linux trying to collect royalties from the same licensee.

All right holders will prefer to achieve their objectives without suing, which is always just a last resort, but that doesn't necessarily make it a safe assumption that they aren't prepared to sue, especially if they have already proven so or are, like Apple, proving it right now.

Is there an antitrust problem?

Monty and Gregory (both of the Xiph.Org Foundation) allude to antitrust issues in their statements while I can't see any problems in that regard.

Monty says about MPEG LA that "they assert they have a monopoly on all digital video compression technology, period, and it is illegal to even attempt to compete with them." Monty notes they don't say exactly that, but it appears to be how he interprets their past statements on these kinds of issues.

Assuming -- just for the sake of the argument -- that MPEG LA's patent pool indeed does cover so many codec-related techniques that no one can build a competitive codec at this stage without infringing on at least some of those patents, that would (in case it's true) constitute a monopoly. However, in that case the only obligation that regulatory authorities could impose on MPEG LA under competition rules would be to make its IP available on a RAND (reasonable and non-discriminatory) basis. In other words, they can charge something (there's no way that competition law could justify an expropriation without compensation), but they aren't allowed to overcharge.

When Steve Jobs wrote that a patent pool was being assembled to "go after Theora" and other open-source codecs, he didn't say that the objective would be to shut everyone else down. this could also simply mean to collect royalties from those using that technology. As long as those royalties are RAND, there wouldn't be any anticompetitive behavior, but Theora would lose its royalty-free status. It could still compete, but the playing field would look different than the way Theora's proponents describe it as of now.

Gregory's email statement quotes a US Department of Justice statement on licensing schemes premised on invalid or expired intellectual property rights not being able to withstand antitrust scrutiny. I can't see that this reduces in any way the legal risk for Theora and its proponents. I assume that there are, unfortunately, large quantities of valid and non-expired patents related to codecs.

I also can't think of any legal theory based on which patent holders forming a pool to assert rights against Theora would have to contact the Xiph.Org Foundation beforehand. Not only is there no legal obligation but also do I think that in case there are patent holders who (unfortunately) own patents that read on Theora, they are free to coordinate their efforts and present a united front to Theora's supporters.

The term "anti-competitive collusion", which appears in Gregory's email as one of the possible explanations for what's going on, is unclear to me. While my sympathy is with an open-source project, this is just about what would or would not be legal if undertaken, a question on which I reach, to my own dismay, a somewhat different conclusion.

Is there a risk of H.264 becoming too expensive?

Karsten (FSFE) is afraid of a future H.264 "lock-in" and the cost increases this could result in:
It hardly takes economic genius to determine that when enough people and works are locked into H.264, the MPEG-LA will have every incentive to start charging any fee they please. (Oh, and don’t you dare use that expensive camera for professional purposes. Your H.264 license is purely for non-commercial use.)
Lock-ins can indeed come with a hefty and ever-increasing price. The mainframe hardware market, in which IBM has a monopoly, is a good example: for a given amount of RAM, the cutthroat price is 60 times of what it is for an Intel-based PC.

However, in the specific case of H.264 and the license fees charged by MPEG LA now and in the future, there are assurances that a scenario of "charging any fee they please" (as Karsten wrote) won't happen.

Like I explained further above, if MPEG LA had a monopoly because any video codec (at least any codec that would be competitive in today's market) needs at least some their patents, then antitrust rules would require RAND pricing. Otherwise, if those patents don't cover the entire field, there could and would be competition, which would gain traction in the market especially in the event of price hikes.

One must also consider that MPEG LA's current pricing is very far from "any fee they please" (even though in a perfect, software-patent-free world the price would be zero), and they have promised to keep future price increases within certain limits. To those who are interested in those pricing questions, I can strongly recommend Ed Bott's ZDNet blog post, "H.264 patents: how much do they really cost?" His analysis contains a number of good points that are consistent with my own analysis of the information available on MPEG LA's website. While controversial (starting with its headline), his blog post "Ogg versus the world: don't fall for open-source FUD" is also quite interesting.

Having analyzed in this post some of what's been said in the debate, I will outline some of my own thoughts in the following post, including what I believe the W3C may have to consider at some point.