The Troubled Court System Of India

India, like the United States, has a federal system based upon the English common law legal system. Both operated common law legal systems with mostly local lawyers for more than a century before gaining independence from the United Kingdom. The United States has had independent legal systems from the U.K. for 241 years; India's legal system has been independent for 72 years. 

Both countries endured a division of the country in between, although in the United States the feuding factions got back together after the Civil War, while in India, Pakistan remained separate and then had its own split between West Pakistan and East Pakistan.

Imagine that Colorado had the same number of lawyer and judges, proportionate to its population as India. 

India's population is roughly 1,200 million. The United States has a population of roughly 300 million. Both have about 1.2 million lawyers. The United States has roughly 32,000 judges at the state and federal levels combined. "The latest figures (as on 11 July 2016), as seen from the National Judicial Data Grid and Department of Justice data [in India], tell us that there are 16,438 judges at the subordinate judiciary level, 621 in high courts and 29 in the Supreme Court."

Both countries have more or less capitalist, mixed economies with enormous cities that participate in the global economy and have significant high technology, highly productive geographic centers that drive their economies. Both have states at quite different levels of development from each other with quite different regional cultures and demographics.

Colorado As India Statewide

The state would have about 9,000 lawyers instead of its current total closer to 36,000.

The Colorado Supreme Court (currently 7 judges) and Colorado Court of Appeals (currently with 22 judges) combined, would be replaced by three Colorado Supreme Court justices. 

There would be two U.S. District Court judges for the District of Colorado (currently with 6 judges, 9 magistrates and 6 senior judges) and one Bankruptcy Court judge for the District of Colorado (currently with 6 judges). There would be no 10th Circuit Court of Appeals (currently with 12 judges and 7 senior judges) and the federal trial courts would appeal directly to the U.S. Supreme Court.

Colorado As India In Denver's State Trial Courts

There would be four judges in the Second Judicial District (i.e. Denver County) in the Denver District Court (currently with 23 judges and 5 magistrates), the Denver Juvenile Court (currently 3 judges and 4 magistrates) and the Denver Probate Court (currently 1 judge and 1 magistrate) combined. Three judge would serve in Denver District Court, one judge would assume all of the combined duties of the Denver Juvenile Court and Denver Probate Court.

There would be four judges in Denver County Court (currently with 17 judges and 15 magistrates).

Colorado As India In State Trial Courts Outside Denver

State trial courts outside Denver would be reduced in staffing proportionately. There would be a total of roughly 55 trial court judges split between district, county and municipal courts statewide with most judges serving multiple counties. There would be perhaps 30 District Court judges, 20 County Court judges, and 5 municipal court judges serving outside of Denver (with county court and municipal judges serving in multiple courts on a part-time basis). A median judicial district would have one district court judge and one county/municipal court judge.

Analysis

How would this function?

Not well.

The case loads would be overwhelming.

To try even a decent fraction of the cases currently going to trial and contested hearings, trials and hearings would have to be much shorter. Court clerks would have to be more bold in handling default judgments, post-judgment process, and uncontested motions. The pressure to settle cases would be greater than the length of time needed to conclude cases would be longer.

Statutory deadlines in matters entitled to prompt hearings like evictions, claims to repossess personal property, and temporary restraining order hearings would be impossible to meet. Many criminal cases would have to be dismissed or plea bargained intensely to meet speedy trial deadlines.

India's court system absolutely shows this strain.

Courts swamped with far more pro se parties in divorces, foreclosures, and county court litigation would bog down the courts in categories of cases already struggling to manage with large volumes of pro se parties.

Ideally, the entire system would have to be redesigned to maximize the extent to which scarce judicial resources were devoted to the cases that needed those resources, while developing a system not involving legally trained judges or lawyers in cases where legal training wasn't as critical, along the lines of the historical justice of the peace system in much of the U.S., or perhaps involving law enforcement officials and pro se parties presenting cases informally to legally trained magistrates.

The truth is that even Colorado, while it enjoys far more lawyers and judges per capita than India, is itself has a somewhat understaffed judiciary.

India's official plan is to quadruple its number of judges to 60,000 or even to 70,000. It has more than enough qualified lawyers to fill those posts. The administrative costs would be a manageable share of state and federal budgets. And, if it did so, the result would be a dramatically better functioning legal system. Corruption would probably fall significantly. But, politicians in India, like those in Colorado, are reluctant to make such a bold change. Also India's political situation is even less healthy that ours.

Props To Chief Justice John Roberts

Last week, Chief Justice of the United States John Roberts (the title is not, "Chief of the United States Supreme Court," by the way), the highest ranking judge in the land, showed up for jury duty.

Unsurprisingly, the trial court judge and lawyers in the case did not select him to serve from the jury panel.  But, his example is inspiring.  If he shows up to jury duty, what excuse do I have not to show when I my date (in mid-May) comes up.  Sometimes, a leader has to lead by example, and in the case of jury duty, the right thing to do is all about showing up and Justice Roberts was a fine example for us all and doing just that.

This said, however, I would not feel the least bit immoral if I found I way to bypass the roughly two hour wait at my local DMV in Colorado, where I went last week with my eldest to replace a lost driver's permit.

In the case of the DMV, the federal equivalent function of passport applications, and the bureaucratically similar appellate courts, it seems to me that a very modest expenditure of public funds to increase staffing could dramatically improve the speed and quality of service.  Yet, our public servants aren't willing to spend the money.

Why?  I have no idea.  It would seem to be an easy and cheap political coup to have record quality and speed of service in these functions which really make a difference to a lot of people and shape their perceptions of the efficiency of the government, in general.

Thinking Like An American Judge

[The Judge] is known to be a rational man, one who loves logic and facts.  He can weigh murky, emotionally charged information - rage and love, for instance, divorce and hit and runs - and come up with a fitting legal solution.  Who gets the children, who keeps the house, how many years is enough time served, what constitutes a crime of passion.
 

- Alice Hoffman, "Here on Earth" (1997), Chapter 6.

The Trouble With The Uniform Commercial Code

The Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) is not the world's best drafted law, although it has been adopted in all fifty states and has better drafting than many laws. One of the key problems in using it is that, as commercial law professor Gregory E. Maggs explains (immediately preceeding footnote 202 in this article):

Many parts of the UCC are intelligible only if you already know more
or less what they are attempting to say.

In the American legal system, where only a minority of judges have any background in commercial law or practice, and judges are generally assigned to cases at random, this is often a problem that creates considerable uncertainty in American business law.

Judges Read Blogs

A judge's opinions on the legal impact of blogs and legal scholarship are recounted at this post. In his view, neither blogs nor law review articles are irrelevant.

The Jurisprudence Of Justice Thomas

A succinct description of originalism a la Justice Thomas:

Despite the vast differences between public education then and public education today, Justice Thomas evidently believes the question of whether students have free-speech rights should be answered by conducting an imaginary séance with 18th- and 19th-century Framers and ratifiers, who should be asked: Do you think public-school students have a constitutional right to free speech while in school? This line of inquiry is about as productive as asking an only child: Imagine you have a sister. Now, does she like cheese? . . . he asks how those alive at the relevant time would have applied that language to a set of facts different than we face today. This elevates the expectations of the ratifiers and Framers over the meaning of the text itself.

One more reason that Democrats need to take a hard line on ideological conservative justices, who seem to be the President's favorite kind, after all, he has specifically said that he wants to appoint Justices like Justice Thomas.

Details On Nevada Judge From Hell

A detailed interim suspension order of a horrible Nevada judge previously mentioned at this blog show in excruciating detail just how hopeless her case to retain her job should be if the Judicial Discipline board and Nevada Supreme Court continue to act with anything approaching normal conduct. (Hat Tip to How Appealing).

While she is currently suspended with pay, that seems certain to be a temporary condition.

Some reports have made clear that she is a smart person, but smart and wise don't always coincide. Colorado judges caught engaged in far less flagrant misconduct and derlictions of duty have mostly had the good sense to give up and quit.

Easy Case, Bad Law

Washington's State Supreme Court screwed up a really easy insurance coverage case today, reversing a Washington State intermediate court of appeals decision.

At issue: Does an insurance company have a duty to defend its insured under a professional liability or general insurance policy that excluded intentional actions, when the insured intentionally plays a nasty practical joke calculated to humiliate his employee and gets sued?

Easy answer: No. This is precisely the kind of case that insurance customers assume that their insurer is not going to cover under an intentional acts exclusion.

Washington State Supreme Court 5-4 majority answer: Yes. The insurer has to pay.

They explain this in a decision, but like so many decisions, it ultimately comes down to a judgment call. I still come away from it thinking, WTF were they thinking?

I hate stringy insurance companies as much as anybody does. There are plenty of legitimate bad faith cases out there, but this wasn't one of them. The dissent has it right when it notes that this kind of outrageous case fans the fires of the tort reform movement.

At Least She's Not Your Judge

Judge Elizabeth Halverson, in Nevada, is a poster child for the problems associated with electing judges, as opposed to using merit selection for judges as we do in Colorado. (UPDATE: She was suspended again today by the state judicial discipline commission).

Judicial Vacancies

Some Republicans are upset that the White House has nominated only 25 people to fill the 47 vacancies now on the federal judiciary.

From here.

There are about 800 Article III judges, so about 6% of judgeships are vacant, and about 3% of judgeships are both vacant and have no nominee. Bush has already nominated and confirmed 224 judges to district courts, 54 judges to the courts of appeal, and 2 U.S. Supreme Court Justices.

Immigration Judging Capricious

The New York Times has brought the nation's attention to an academic study which powerfully shows with hard numbers that the outcome of immigration asylum cases is intensely impacted by the judge appointed to handle the case, and that the role of the Board of Immigration Appeals in limiting this disparity has been eviscerated.

A couple of examples:

The study found that someone who has fled China in fear of persecution and asks for asylum in immigration court in Orlando, Fla., has an excellent — 76 percent — chance of success, while the same refugee would have a 7 percent chance in Atlanta. . . . In the Miami immigration court, one judge granted 3 percent of the asylum cases, while another granted 75 percent.

The cases from the same country, and cases in the same judicial district, are generally too similar to explain such a huge disparity with anything other than a difference in the attitudes of the judges involved. Asylum cases from a particular country involve a core of similar facts about the political regime's actions and intents, and within a judicial district, a roughly comparable mix of cases is assured by the random assignment of judges to particular cases.

All of these judges, of course, are applying the same portion of the same statute, which is purely a matter of federal law, and all of the cases are identified by the same federal agency, the immigration and customs enforcement division of the Department of Homeland Security, and prosecuted by the same Justice Department that appoints the judges. The substantive standard for granting asylum has not changed during the period of this study.

While there are disparities between judges in other parts of the law, such as sentencing, I can think of few studies that have identified such huge disparities in such similar cases, particularly in light of the fact that the legal standard applicable to asylum cases, on its face, does not afford vast discretion to the judge.

In asylum cases, it comes down to the luck of the draw, and that luck is politically influenced:

Justice Department officials said last week that the investigation of Monica M. Goodling, a former aide to Attorney General Alberto R. Gonzales, has been expanded to include her role in helping to appoint immigration judges.

Ms. Goodling testified last week that she had “crossed the line” in applying political considerations to candidates for nonpartisan legal jobs. Immigration judges are appointed by the attorney general, and 49 of 226 current judges were appointed during the tenure of Mr. Gonzales.

In other words, Congress has been frankly told that the administration illegally ignored civil service rules to make polical appointments. In Kentucky, that is enough to lead to indictments, but in the federal government, this is apparently tolerated.

With regard to appeals:

In 2002, Attorney General John Ashcroft made streamlined the work of the appeals board, reducing the number of board members to 11 from 23 and encouraging more decisions by single members and without explanation. . . . Asylum applicants who were represented by lawyers received favorable appeals decisions from the board in 43 percent of cases in 2001, the year before the changes took effect. By 2005, asylum seekers with lawyers won their appeals in 13 percent of cases.

This blog (here, here, here, here, here, here, and here) and public accounts generally (I can't blog them all), are replete with examples of bad immigration judges and judging, and even Attorney General Gonzales has acknowledged that there are serious problems.

Not surprisingly, the percentage of cases going onto the U.S. Courts of Appeal for further review has surged, and the number of people granted asylum is down 12%.

Justice Sleeps

There is an academic study on sleeping judges. Bottom line: The media is not nice to judges who fall asleep during court proceedings. Who knew?

Why Do Justice Stay On The Bench?

Empirical evidence collected and analyzed by political scientists demonstrates that judicial pensions are the most important factor in a Justice’s decision to retire, far more important than the party of the President or which political party has control of the Senate.

-- U.S. Supreme Court scholar David Stras, writing at SCOTUS Blog.

He suggests that the best way to reduce judicial tenure short of a constitutional amendment, would be to restructure judicial pensions, creating a better "Golden Parachute" for judges.

Judicial Partisanship Is Modest

It is easy in the throes of partisan battles of the most extremist judicial nominations to forget that a lot of consensus middle ground actually exists. While the courts are not immune to politics, the notion that judges are little more than political actors is overrated.

Limited Partisanship

Judges, particularly appellate judges, do have significant power to make decisions on a partisan basis. This does happen. The United States Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit (which includes California), for example, consistently rules more liberally than the United States Court of Appeals for the 5th Circuit (which includes Texas).

But, it is worth remembering that there are real limits to this tendency (and yes, I'm basically citing myself from dkospedia in this link, although the entry does have links backing this up):

[R]oughly 84% of [U.S.] Court of Appeal decisions (a sample year) are unanimous. This is consistent with a finding that 71% of U.S. Supreme Court decisions were unanimous from 1889 to 1959, that in a recent sample year 87% of California intermediate court of appeals decisions were unanimous, and that in the Missouri Supreme Court unanimous decisions are reached 98.5% of the time. Thus, while partisanship matters and influences results even in non-unanimous decisions, there is wide consensus on many legal issues.

About 91% of cases in the Colorado Court of Appeals are resolved with unpublished opinions or dismissals, which are generally unanimous. In addition, a large share of the 9% of Colorado Court of Appeals cases that are decided with published opinions are unanimous. Good statistics on the exact number of non-unanimouos published opinions are unavailable, but it is safe to say that the number probably less than a third of all cases. In other words, less than 3% of cases appealed to the Colorado Court of Appeals are decided on a non-unanimous basis.

Somewhere between 65%-75% of Colorado Supreme Court decisions are unanimous (it is hard to provide an exact percentage with certainty, as the only statistics that are easily available on the total number of dissenting opinions and some cases have more than one dissenting opinion), which is not too surprising because the state supreme court handles only the hardest cases.

Unlike the U.S. Supreme Court, which is fairly evenly divided on a partisan basis with a swing vote, however, the way cases resolved in the Colorado Supreme Court rarely unpredictable on a partisan basis, because the vast majority of dissents involve the same couple of judges (Coates and Eids, the more conservative judges on the Court, usually). You can count in the fingers of one hand number of non-unanimous cases in the Colorado Supreme Court each year, in which both Coates and Eids are in the majority.

Colorado Statistics cited in this post are found here.

The Last Word

It is also worth noting, given the natural tendency to focus on the U.S. Supreme Court and state supreme courts, just how powerful intermediate appellate courts are, while we are at it. The normal three judge panel that considers a federal appeal is almost always the last word on the matter (bracketed material and emphasis added below, plus one change in a percentage figure).

Appealling parties may ask the entire Court of Appeals in a circuit to second guess the decision of an individual panel (or in the 9th Circuit, a much larger panel of the court rather than the entire court). This is called an "en banc" review of a decision. Thus, a case can be appealled from a trial court to a three judge panel of the Court of Appeals, and then receive "en banc" review, and then go to the U.S. Supreme Court. [The en banc review step is optional.] En banc review, like U.S. Supreme Court review of a Court of Appeals decision, is discretionary and rarely granted. . . .

In 2002 in the 9th Circuit, for example, 801 published opinions were issued out of the thousands of cases that came before the court, of which about 40 were considered for en banc review, and 18 received en banc review (which in the 9th Circuit is actually a large panel of the court rather than the entire court). This was just 2% of cases heard on the merits.

En banc review is less frequent in absolute numbers, since the overall caseload is smaller, in other circuits. In 1999, a fairly typical year, only 94 cases in the entire federal system receive en banc review, which makes this level of review similar in frequency to, if not less common than, U.S. Supreme Court review. The vast majority of Court of Appeals cases decided on the merits (probably about 95% nationwide) are never even considered for en banc review.

Less than one case in a thousand filed in a U.S. Court of Appeals is reversed in en banc review or in review by the U.S. Supreme Court.

Colorado Appellate Courts often get the last word, as well. In the most recent fiscal year for which figures are available (2005-2006) there were 2622 appeals concluded in the Colorado Court of Appeals. In that same year 868 petitions in certioriari (i.e. appeals from Colorado Court of Appeals cases) where made to the Colorado Supreme Court, and 78 cases were decided on the merits with written opinions (a few of which would be in original proceedings direct from trial courts, such as water law cases).

A small number of cases may have been decided on the merits without a written opinion, and in a small number of cases, more than one petition for certiorari was resolved in a single opinion. Of course, some Colorado Supreme court cases affirm Court of Appeals rulings.

Thus, about a third of Colorado Court of Appeals cases are appealled to the Colorado Supreme Court, but the Colorado Supreme Court actually considers on the merits only about 3% of Colorado Court of Appeals cases, and probably reverses no more than 2% of those decisions.

The percentage of Colorado Supreme Court cases considered on the merits by the U.S. Supreme Court is on the order of 1%. Fewer than one in five thousand cases filed in the Colorado Court of Appeals will ultimately be reversed in the U.S. Supreme Court.

Posner on Our Quaint Constitution

William Roper: So, now you give the Devil the benefit of law!
Sir Thomas More: Yes! What would you do? Cut a great road through the law to get after the Devil?
William Roper: Yes, I'd cut down every law in England to do that!
Sir Thomas More: Oh? And when the last law was down, and the Devil turned 'round on you, where would you hide, Roper, the laws all being flat? This country is planted thick with laws, from coast to coast, Man's laws, not God's! And if you cut them down, and you're just the man to do it, do you really think you could stand upright in the winds that would blow then? Yes, I'd give the Devil benefit of law, for my own safety's sake!

From here.

I can understand when someone with very little understanding of the law, or a populist politician, fails to understand the importance of following the law, including the United States Constitution. I have considerably less patience for senior U.S. Court of Appeals judges, such as Judge Posner, he fail to grasp this point and show contempt for the institution of the judiciary of which they are a part, when it is their job to enforce that Constitution, particularly in the context of a very public Wall Street Journal op-ed piece.

Indeed, as a sitting judge before whom these issues are likely to appear, it really isn't proper for him to be discussing these points at all. His opening disclaimer notwithstanding, he has gone far beyond what is appropraite for a judge. What did he say?

I can remark on the strangeness of confiding so momentous an issue of national security to a randomly selected member of the federal judiciary's corps of almost 700 district judges, subject to review by appellate and Supreme Court judges also not chosen for their knowledge of national security. . . . We are boxed in by our revered 18th-century Constitution as interpreted by the Supreme Court. The Hamdan decision suggests that a majority, albeit a bare majority, of the court is unsympathetic to arguments that our understanding of certain provisions of the Constitution needs to be revised to meet contemporary needs.

With all due respect he is simply wrong when he states that:

Monitoring, even when it takes the form of wiretapping or other electronic interceptions, need not be conducted under a warrant.

He implies that it might be a good idea for the Congress to strip the courts of jurisdiction over such matters. The full editorial is here.

Posner has outed himself. He is no originalist. Indeed, he doesn't really believe in the rule of law at all. No one is asking judges to formula battle plans, to decide with whom we ought to go to war, or decide which weapons we ought to buy. Cases like Hamdan and the NSA case just decided by a U.S. District Judge in Detroit, are enforcing recently enacted statutes placing specific limitations on the executive branch which the judicial branch is enforcing.

There is nothing new under the sun (Ecclesiastes 1:9). The tyranny of political leaders intent of ignoring the law was around in the 18th Century, and our Constitution's Bill of Rights and separation of powers were designed to address that issue. Call me quaint, but I'll keep our constitution, for my own safety's sake.

All Judges Earn Retain Recommendation

All 106 judges facing retention this year received a "retain" recommendation to voters from the relevant commissions on judicial performance, although in eight cases there was some dissent. Retention votes will take place at the November general election.

Court of Appeals Judge José D. L. Márquez won a retain recommendation by a mere 6-4 vote of the 10 person judicial performance panel because "several commissioners were disappointed with the variable quality of some of his opinions and sporadic departures from controlling law, especially given the length of time he has been on the bench."

Colorado's merit system.

In Colorado, we have, since 1966, used a system commonly know as the Missouri plan, where it was invented, to select and retain judges. Judges are appointed (by the Governor, except for Denver judges who are appointed by the Mayor of Denver) from lists drawn up by a blue ribbon commission.

After two years in office, and again after each term in office (4 years in county court, 6 years in district court, 8 years in the court of appeals and 10 years in the state supreme court), judges are placed on the ballot for a retention election. Mandatory retirement is at age 72.

Commissions on Judical Performance (different from the nominating commissions) provide voters with a retain, do not retain, or no opinion recommendation for each judge facing a retention election, and voters can vote to retain or not retain a judge. If a majority of citizens at the polls vote to not retain, the seat is vacant. If a majority vote to retain, the judge stays in office. Six judges, all trial judges immersed in some form of controversy or another, have not been retained in the past forty years, during which more than 700 retention elections have been held.

Trial Court Judge Evaluations

Most trial court judges received unanimous recommendations for retention. A few, however, received recommendations with some dissent. The concerns expressed about each of the judges for whom some dissent was expressed by a commission member are set forth below.

Munch

In Jefferson County, one commission member dissented from a retain recommendation for District Court Judge Munch because " the judge seemed too concerned with moving the business of court along at a brisk pace, rather than giving adequate time for all people to be heard completely on their day in court."

Iuppa

A dissent was cast in the case of El Paso County Judge Iuppa as well. In that case the commission noted that: "Many survey responses from attorneys noted Judge Iuppa was moody and rude at times. These concerns regarding his demeanor were evident in the 2002 survey."

Marshall

District Judge Julie G. Marshall, who serves Chaffee, Custer, Fremont, and Park counties, won her retain recommendation by a 5-2 vote. In that case:

The Commission has concerns over Judge Marshall’s administrative and oral communication abilities. Judge Marshall makes efforts to address issues called to her attention. However, it appears that Judge Marshall may minimize or fail to recognize the extent to which she may have control over correcting these issues.

Smith

Logan County Judge Judge Robert B. Smith also received two dissenting votes.

The area where he scored the lowest on both surveys was his courtroom demeanor. . . .
Of the attorneys responding to the questionnaires, 36% recommended not retaining Judge Smith while 63% recommended retaining Judge Smith. Of the non-attorneys, 79% recommended that Judge Smith be retained, and 21% recommended non-retention.

Marker

Another judge who received two "no opinion votes" was Douglas County Judge Michelle Ann Marker:

Of those attorneys surveyed 57% felt Judge Marker should be retained while 88% of non-attorneys felt that she should be retained.

The Commission is urging Judge Marker to undertake a series of steps designed to help her complete the transition from a District Attorney to a fair and impartial judge, including mentoring with more experienced judges and classes in judicial demeanor.

Her support from the practicing bar was among the lowest in the state.

Glowinsky

One commission member expressed no opinion about District Judge Carol Glowinsky in Boulder. It noted that:

Glowinsky had one of the highest survey retention results the Commission has seen over the past decade and even improved over her excellent survey results in 2000 when the Commission voted to unanimously recommend retention. Attorney survey results and two Commission Members had some concerns regarding bias toward the defense and leniency in sentencing. Non-attorney survey results and the other Commission Members did not share these concerns. Comments from the survey and public input noted relative weaknesses related to case management issues and Judge Glowinsky acknowledged that she could improve in this area. One Commission Member felt very strongly that Judge Glowinsky, at times, does not follow the law, but clouds her decisions with interpretations.

Blum

Boulder County Judge Blum was recommended for retention by only a 6-3 vote, the second closest vote of all judges facing retention elections this year.

The Commission is very concerned by the survey responses about Judge Blum’s courtroom manner. The attorneys indicated that Judge Blum does not manage the courtroom in a way that establishes neutrality, and he does not appear to be neutral himself. They also indicated that he is not respectful or polite to the people appearing before him and can be condescending. . . . Judge Blum also appears to some of the attorneys surveyed to be unwilling to consider errors of fact and law in matters before him. . . . Survey results indicated that 56% of attorneys and 75% of non-attorneys recommended “strongly” or “somewhat” that Judge Blum be retained.

None of the other 106 judges considered statewide this year had less support from the practicing bar.


Of attorneys surveyed 73% felt that Blum had a prosecution bias (far in excess of the state average of 44%), and 71% felt that his sentences were harsh (compared to a statewide average of 35%). About 25% rated him in the highest category for the harshness of his sentences compared to an average of 2% for judges statewide.

Cross Posted at Colorado Confidential.