Very brief note on the Brazilian real and the fiscal package

 

The Brazilian real depreciated last week (full meltdown might be a bit of a hyperbole), and in many quarters there has been a suggestion that it is now undervalued, and that would somehow be connected to the dangers associated with the fiscal position, and the willingness of the Lula government to push the spending cuts, and the tax changes, with cuts for those at the bottom of the income distribution and hikes at the other end (more on the fiscal story in a bit).

The obvious reason for this is that the Brazilian basic interest rate was coming down from its post-pandemic high, and probably, and in spite of all the pressure from progressives and heterodox economists, it was a bit too low. As it can be seen, as the SELIC rate came down, the exchange rate started, eventually, to depreciate. This will have some impact on inflation, but it is nothing that should be of any significant concern. A higher SELIC, and a few interventions by the Brazilian Central Bank (BCB) should be more than enough to stabilize the exchange rate.

The fiscal situation does not require any adjustment, and certainly not one for next year, and not at the expense of reducing government outlays on education and health. Brazil managed to grow more than predicted by markets since Lula's election, because the fiscal rules were taken with pragmatism and the adjustment has been delayed. If the government goes through with the spending cuts, expect growth to decelerate, and the fiscal accounts to worsen.

This is exactly what Dilma tried in her first government, then backtracked, and then adopted in the aftermath of her victory in 2015, leading to the worsening of the fiscal results, and the impeachment (not that this is on the table; but the political future certainly is if Lula cannot deliver growth and better income distribution). Btw, the changes in the taxes are a good thing.

The Federal Reserve Must Rethink How it Tightens Monetary Policy

Thomas I. Palley

After more than 7 years of economic recovery, the Federal Reserve is positioning itself to tighten monetary policy by raising interest rates. In light of the wobbly reaction in financial markets, an important question that must be asked is whether raising interest rates is the right tool.

It could well be that the world’s leading central bank is going about the process of tightening in the wrong way. Owing to the dollar’s preeminent standing, that could have severe global repercussions.

Just as the Fed has had to rethink how it combats recessions, so too it must rethink how it transitions from an easy monetary policy stance to a tighter stance.

Read rest here.

Why Negative Interest Rate Policy (NIRP) is Ineffective and Dangerous

By Thomas Palley

NIRP is quickly becoming a consensus policy within the economics establishment. This paper argues that consensus is dangerously wrong, resting on flawed theory and flawed policy assessment. Regarding theory, NIRP draws on fallacious pre-Keynesian economic logic that asserts interest rate adjustment can ensure full employment. That fallacious logic has been augmented by ZLB economics which claims times of severe demand shortage may require negative interest rates, which policy must deliver since the market cannot. Regarding policy assessment, NIRP turns a blind eye to the possibility that negative interest rates may reduce AD, cause financial fragility, create a macroeconomics of whiplash owing to contradictions between policy today and tomorrow, promote currency wars that undermine the international economy, and foster a political economy that spawns toxic politics. Worst of all, NIRP maintains and encourages the flawed model of growth, based on debt and asset price inflation, which has already done such harm.

Read more here.

On Eccles and QE in the 1930s

So last weekend I was at the Eastern Economic Association meetings, and I presented with Steve Bannister (on and off contributor to NK) a paper on Quantitative Easing in the 1930s. It's been a while since we looked at this work, which started long ago (4 years at least). One point worth noticing is that while most accounts of Eccles performance at the Fed suggest that he didn't do much (see Meltzer in his A History of the Federal Reserve), we suggest that he was crucial in pushing qualitative easing (the term first used by Buiter here), that is a shift in the composition of the Fed's balance sheet.

The figure shows that when Eccles assumed at the Fed, in 1934, QE, the increase of the balance sheet had already started, but the shift from short term government bills (blue ones) to long term bonds (green) had not. The dark line shows Eccles' policy, which had the objective of keeping long term interest rates at 2.5 percent, in order to allow for fiscal stimulus and sustainable expansion of public debt.

New Book: The Encyclopedia of Central Banking

New book on central banking, edited by L-P Rochon & Sergio Rossi, has recently been published. I have two chapters: 1. on Classical Dichotomy, & 2. on Dollar Hegemony.

See here.

PS: Posted here with an entry on Bretton Woods by Omar Hamouda.

Robin Hahnel on the Fed & the pressure to raise interest rates

From The Real News Network

Translating from Fed speak, Janet Yellen is doing everything within her power to slow down the pressure that she's under to start raising interest rates here in the United States. We actually have a news network that today sort of asked the question, is Janet Yellen too socialist? And I think that's actually a good way for people to sort of understand what's going on. As much as any chairperson of the Federal Reserve Bank of the United States can be, she is actually trying the best she can to act in the interests of the general public, which is quite unusual. And so she is trying to delay as long as possible raising interest rates in the United States, mostly because she doesn't want to derail the sort of slow and tepid recovery that's going on and she understands that raising interest rates prematurely and too rapidly would have the significant danger that it would slow our recovery. And she's pointing out that there is no sign that there is inflation on the horizon, that the only reason the Fed should have to be raising interest rates really is if there is inflationary pressure and if there is a danger of inflation. And the people trying to convince the Fed to raise interest rates keeps claiming that we need to do this to prevent inflation, but they have no evidence on that side.

Originally posted here, with full transcript. Video below.

More Jobs, Still Weak Wage Growth: The Federal Reserve Must Wait

By Thomas Palley

February’s employment report showed a gain of 295,000 jobs and a decline in the unemployment rate to 5.5%. The report is another in a string of strong employment reports, but it also contains depressingly familiar news about weak wage growth and millions of workers still short of work.

Job gains were spread widely across all sectors, with particularly strong gains in the service sector. Construction added another 29,000 jobs despite bad weather, and manufacturing added 8,000 jobs. The only significant weaknesses were in mining (down 8,000) and petroleum and coal products (down 6,000), reflecting lower energy commodity prices.

On the other side of the ledger, there continues to be abundant labor supply. Though the unemployment rate ticked down to 5.5%, there are still 8.7 million unemployed workers, another 6.6 million workers who are working part-time but want full-time work, and a further 6.5 million workers who would enter the labor force if a job were available. That totals 21.8 million workers who would like more work, which provides clear evidence we are still far from full employment.

Read rest here.

Gerald Epstein on the Fed Signaling a Possible Policy Shift

Jerry Epstein was interviewed by the Real News Network. Among other things he said that:

"Typically in the past the Federal Reserve has been inviting a lot of investment bankers and financial market economists to the Jackson Hole Conference. This year's a little different. Janet Yellen and the Fed people didn't invite so many investment bankers. Instead, they invited a bunch of labor economists, which was a big change. Nevertheless, despite signals of an apparent shift in attention towards bringing unemployment down, Fed policy still remains toothless in helping out working Americans."

Full transcripts here.

Kevin P. Gallagher On The Fed, Emerging Markets, & Role of The Dollar

By Kevin P. Gallagher

From Foreign Policy Magazine

Emerging-market and developing countries resented U.S. Federal Reserve Chair Ben Bernanke during his spell in office. In 2012, Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff scolded Bernanke and the Fed's loose monetary policy for creating a "tsunami" of financial flows to emerging markets that was appreciating currencies, causing asset bubbles, and exporting financial instability to the developing world. It may just turn out that they dislike Janet Yellen even more.Although it was Bernanke who started tapering the Fed's loose policy, Yellen will be the one to end quantitative easing and, eventually, raise short-term interest rates. And those could be an even bigger problem for emerging markets than the initial tsunami.Yellen's recent confirmation that quantitative easing (QE) will cease in October 2014 is the latest and firmest signal that U.S. monetary policy is reversing direction. The Fed began the year talking about the "tapering" of loose monetary policy, relaxing QE's bond-buying program and potentially raising interest rates. Now a concrete end to QE is on the horizon. The big question that emerging markets are now asking is how quickly and how suddenly interest rates will go up. Following the latest numbers that the United States' GDP grew by 4 percent during the second quarter, some monetary policy hawks are calling for interest-rate hikes soon to cool the economy. That's exactly what emerging markets are worried about....

Read rest here.

And for more on the role of the dollar in the world economy see here, here, and here

Chick & Tily on whatever happened to Keynes’s monetary theory?

New Cambridge Journal of Eeconomics paper by Victoria Chick and Geoff Tily.

From the abstract:

Some see a return to Keynes’s ideas in response to the crisis that began in 2007, but we argue that the resurrected ideas belong to that betrayal of Keynes’s thought known as ‘Keynesian’ economics. What happened is almost a reversal of the Whig history view of economics, in which past knowledge is embodied in later theory: Keynes has been made a pre-Keynesian. We trace this transformation mainly through his monetary theory, though we range more widely where necessary. We state what we consider to be his monetary theory, then identify and summarize the key contributions to its destruction. Then, in a speculative section, we suggest a variety of motivations for this subversion of his ideas. We end by assessing what has been lost, in particular his monetary policy, and suggest social and political pressures that may have been partly responsible.

Read the rest here (subscription required).

Is Venezuala's SICAD II Resolving Exchange Rate Problems?

 By Mark Weisbrot

All economies have major structural and policy problems, but some problems are more important and urgent than others at particular times. In Venezuela, the most important economic problem is in the exchange rate system. A fixed exchange rate system with periodic devaluations tends to be more crisis-prone than other exchange rate regimes, especially in a country like Venezuela where inflation has historically been higher than that of its trading partners. This is particularly important right now because opposition leaders who have called for the overthrow of the government have pointed to 57 percent inflation and widespread shortages of consumer goods as justification for (often violent) street protests over the past two months. Although the protests have failed to attract the working and poorer people who are most hurt by the shortages, they are still a major complaint – as is inflation – for most Venezuelans.

Read rest here

Dean Baker on The Checkered Past of Ben Bernanke

By Dean Baker

The retrospectives of Ben Bernanke on his leaving the Fed seem to be coming in overly positive. While there is much that is positive about his tenure as Fed chair, many of these accounts have a rather selective view of history.
The part that is clearly wrong is treating Bernanke as a bookish academic who got plucked down in the middle of a financial crisis that was not his making. While Bernanke had a distinguished academic career, he had been in the middle of the action in Washington since 2002. That was when he was selected to be a governor of the Fed. He served as a governor at Greenspan’s side until he went to serve as head of President Bush’s Council of Economic Advisers in June of 2005. After a brief stint as the chief economist in the Bush administration he returned to take over as chair of the Fed in January of 2006.
It was during the period that Bernanke was at the Fed and his tenure in the Bush administration that the housing bubble grew to such dangerous levels. While Bernanke does not deserve as much blame for this as Greenspan, there were few people better positioned to try to deflate the housing bubble before it posed such a large risk to the economy. During this time Bernanke was dismissive of suggestions that the unprecedented run-up in house prices posed any problem. There is no evidence that he dissented in any important way from Greenspan’s view that the Fed need not be concerned about the housing bubble or the innovations in the financial industry that was supporting it.

Read rest here

Gerald Epstein on why the Fed is pushing interest rates higher

Gerald Epstein

The quantitative easing is when the Federal Reserve essentially prints money and then buys Treasury bills and mortgage-backed securities and other things like that. And they've been doing about $85 billion a month and are now tapering--what they call tapering it down to $65 billion a month. And by doing that, they're putting less money and credit into the economy. And when there's less money and credit in the economy, that tends to raise interest rates. And hence you've seen a big shift in financial markets here in the U.S. and all over the world as a result of this expectation that both short-term and long-term interest rates are going to go up.

European Amnesia: Lithuania Considers Euro Adoption

 

Well, it is quite apparent that the euro crisis had done little to transform the sociology of knowledge concerning inherent problems related to common currencies; Lithuania is on track towards adopting the Euro. Read here. A related post on the issue can be seen here.

PS: Euroization is similar (wrt consequences for countries in the periphery) to the process of dollarization - see here.

Art Laffer: "I Was Wrong About Inflation." No Kidding!

Arthur Laffer said that: "Usually when you find the model this far off, you've probably got something wrong with the model, not that the world has changed... inflation does not appear to be monetary base driven." For the whole story go here.

PS: For an heterodox analysis of money and inflation, see here.

Lessons Unlearned: Latvia Adopts Euro

Latvia officially adopted the euro to start off the new year. The prime minister has noted that although this is not necessarily a guarantee towards economic prosperity, it's an opportunity...I deem it a death sentence - For more on the sinking ship that is the euro, see here.

Gennaro Zezza: Fiscal and Debt Policies for Sustainable U.S. Growth

New paper by Gennaro Zezza

From the abstract:

In our interpretation, the Great Recession which started in the United States in 2007, and propagated to the rest of the world, was the inevitable outcome of a growth trajectory based on fragile pillars. The concentration of income and wealth, which started rising in the 1980s, along with the stagnation in real wages made it more difficult for the middle class to defend its standard of living, relative to the top decile of the income distribution. This process increased the demand for credit from the household sector, while deregulation of financial markets increased the supply, and the U.S. economy experienced a long period of debt-fueled growth, which broke down first in 2001 with a stock market crash, but at the time fiscal and monetary policy managed to sustain the economy, but without addressing the fundamentals problem, so that private (and foreign) debt kept increasing up to 2006, when a more serious recession started. At present, the long period of low household spending, along with personal bankruptcies, has been effective in reducing private debt relative to income, and, given that the problems we highlight have not been properly addressed yet, growth could start again on the same fragile basis as in the 1990-2006 period. In this paper, adopting the stock-flow consistent approach pioneered by Wynne Godley, we stress the need for fiscal policy to play an active role in (1) modifying the post-tax distribution of income, which along with new regulations of financial markets should reduce the risk of private debt getting out of control again; (2) stimulate environment-friendly investment and technological progress; (3) take action to reduce the U.S. external imbalance, and (4) provide stimulus for sufficient employment growth.

Read the rest here.

Don't Believe The Hype!

 

The latest news is that the U.S. unemployment rate slipped to to a five-year low of 7 percent in November, apparently an encouraging sign for the American economy.

The US Labor Department notes that employers added 203,000 jobs, nearly matching October’s revised gain of 200,000; this supposed strengthening of the job market is likely to fuel speculation that the Fed may start to scale back bond purchases when it meets later this month (according to Mark Weisbrot, however, this would not necessarily be a good idea - see here)

Before we get swindled, let's look at some data; according to the Economic Policy Institute, millions of potential workers are still sidelined and if we were to count those who have fallen out of the labor force due to discouragement, the real picture is as follows:

• Total missing workers, October 2013: 5,660,000;
• Unemployment rate if missing workers were looking for work: 10.3%;
• Official unemployment rate: 7.0%.

For tables & charts: see here; for info on methodology: see here.

Larry Summers as Ineffectual Regulator: Tall Tales From the White House

From Dean Baker:

The Obama administration push to get Larry Summers as Federal Reserve Board Chair is moving into overdrive, as they pull out all the stops. Last week they gave the public the story of Larry Summers as a prescient but frustrated regulator. Summers saw the problems in the subprime housing market way back in 2000, but couldn’t get anything through an obstructionist Republican Congress.

Exhibit A in this story is a joint report on predatory lending by the Treasury Department and the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) that was issued in June of 2000, back when Larry Summers was Treasury Secretary. The report lists many of the abuses that underlie the explosion of bad loans in the housing bubble years.  Unfortunately the report’s recommendations were blocked...

Read Rest here.

Heterodox central bankers II

"At the present time we are still in the depths of a depression and, beyond creating an easy money situation, there is very little, if anything, that the Reserve organization can do toward bringing about recovery. One cannot push a string. I believe, however, that if a condition of great business activity were developing to a point of credit inflation, monetary action could be very effective in curbing undue expansion. That would be pulling a string."

Marriner S. Eccles

Chairman, Federal Reserve Board

March 4-20, 1935.

"The factor of unutilized capacity appears to furnish the decisive answer to the argument that if the budget had been balanced the resulting restoration of confidence would in itself have led to recovery. There is nothing in balancing the budget that would lead to an absorption of excess capacity and hence make it profitable for business to increase its disbursements for plant and equipment. On the contrary, balancing the budget, by curtailing the incomes of people receiving money from the Government and by reducing buying power through increased taxes, would heve been expected to decrease demand and hence increase excess capacity."

Marriner S. Eccles

Chairman, Federal Reserve Board

June 8, 1936