China and Japan, Should the West Care?

In recent years, the People’s Republic of Chinese Sweatshops has been growing at a rapid rate in terms of the size of its economy and massively building up its military forces, particularly its oddly named People’s Liberation Army Navy. They are currently finishing up their first domestically produced aircraft carrier, having one already in service they purchased from Ukraine, an old Soviet vessel basically used as a starting point for Chinese naval engineers. Similarly, China is expanding its submarine fleet faster than any other power and gone are the days of the noisy death traps known as the Han-class boats and the Romeo-class Soviet relics, the Shang-class nuclear attack subs are no laughing matter and after purchasing and studying a number of very effective Russian Kilo-class diesel boats, the recent Chinese made Song and Yuan-class boats are of comparative quality. China has also been building artificial islands, complete with aircraft platforms and weapons systems in the South China Sea and establishing naval bases in places such as Ceylon, Pakistan and Djibouti. Obviously, this is an effort to secure control of the main trade route between East Asia and Europe.

Should the western world care about this? Before addressing that, it must be noted that one country which cares very much is Japan. Ignoring the leftist, mainstream, “fake news” media like NHK, I will point to a more rational news source, the conservative Sankei Shimbun and the new online outlet Japan Forward. I think this is particularly appropriate since Japan Forward is the effort to spread a conservative Japanese news source to a wider, international, audience, particularly the Anglosphere. For example, Japan Forward frequently carries articles warning about the threat posed by China, offering advice on what the United States, Japan and other countries can or should do about it and criticizing any hint of the U.S. or Japanese governments taking their ‘eyes off the ball’ that is Pseudo-Communist China. Japan Forward recently ran a special, three part series on countering the building of militarized, artificial islands by China in the South China Sea (read it here). Any of these articles, taken on their own, put forward a compelling case. However, it is when World War II enters the conversation, which is absolutely inevitable when dealing with Japan as *everything* revolves around World War II, that we start to have problems at least so far as the U.S. and the West are concerned.

To illustrate this, I point to an interview, also in Japan Forward, by YouTube personality Yoko Mada with Hidetoshi Ishii, “a Japanese expert on the politics and history of Asia” who has very definite ideas on what needs to happen in the region (see it or read it here). First of all, for those on the left or even moderate right anywhere in the western world, any Japanese talk of a “Greater Asia” is inevitably going to cause blowback over memories of Imperial Japan’s “Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere” and the “Greater East Asian War” (which is what Japan calls World War II, look for Hitler and Mussolini far under the bus). They bring up something I have written about before (here, a plug for me this time) which is the claim that Imperial Japan was really the “good guys” in World War II, in fact the *only* “good guys” (Adolf & Benito still under that bus) as Japan was fighting a righteous war for ‘Freedom’ to liberate Asia from the wicked, western, colonial powers, because colonialism is a western thing, it is racist, it is wrong, it is evil and before you even ask, no, Korea doesn’t count, because it’s not colonialism if Japan does it. Silly. It is also noteworthy that, in the interview, a great emphasis is placed on Hong Kong (the former British Crown Colony now languishing under mainland rule) and that everyone in Japan, and America and the western world should back the cause of Hong Kong independence from China.

Now is the time to pose the question, in light of the Japanese argument, as to why the USA, the wider Anglosphere or Europe should really care about this. Should they? Do any really have a vital interest in seeing China stopped? To be clear, I think the current bandit regime that sits in Peking is illegitimate and monstrous, I have been unhappy with every Chinese regime since 1912 but, from a purely pragmatic perspective, what business is it of anyone in North America or Western Europe? The Chinese government, based on their military buildup, their establishment of naval bases and the ongoing construction of a new “Silk Road” are clearly, in my view, trying to gain control of the trade route which is vital to their overwhelmingly export-dependent economy. This is certainly a threat to those in competition with China but, as things currently stand, that list would not include North America or Europe which rely almost as heavily on Chinese imports as the Chinese economy depends on exports to these parts of the world. In short, the only cause for concern for the west would be China shutting off this trade route which is the last thing the Chinese would want to do as they would suffer the most from it as North America and Western Europe in particular buy more from them than anyone else. As things stand now, the west does not produce, it consumes and China depends more on that consumption than the west does on Chinese production.

In the old days, prior to World War II, things were very different. Countries such as Great Britain, France, The Netherlands, Portugal and the United States had an interest in Asia because they had colonies there which were important parts of their economies. If you go back prior to World War I, Germany did as well (and to a much lesser extent, a few others too). This is not the case anymore obviously. The British started giving up their Asian colonies almost as soon as the war was over. The Dutch had to give up the East Indies in 1949, the French were forced out of Indochina in 1955, Portugal lost Goa to India in 1961 and handed over Macau in 1999, the United States had agreed to Filipino independence before World War II, delivered it in 1946 and was evicted from Subic Bay in 1992. All of this, according to the “Japan fought World War II to end western colonialism” narrative, is ultimately thanks to Japan and, as such, runs contrary to the Japanese argument that the western powers today have any real, vital, national interest in what happens in the region. Why should, for example, the British ultimately care if Hong Kong remains a part of China or becomes independent when Hong Kong stopped being a British concern in 1997? And, again, based on the point that the same country arguing that Britain should be concerned is also arguing that they ultimately deserve the “credit” for Britain losing her Asian colonies in the first place.

“Asia for the Asians” was the Japanese slogan in World War II, and now, that is truly the case. It is why some on the right in Japan have argued that they didn’t really lose the war at all, because the goal was to get the westerners out of Asia and now they are all gone. Why then should the USA or any western power continue to take an active interest in Asian affairs? I do not doubt that some might notice that, when Japan said “Asia for the Asians” in the 1930’s and 40’s, the Empire of Japan was the strongest power in East Asia whereas today, economically and militarily, China is once again the dominant force in the region. Could that have anything to do with the Japanese attitude of, ’give up your colonies and get out of here but then come back and do something about China’? For Japan, the effort to justify their last war is running contrary to their current desire for support against a powerful and zealously anti-Japanese neighbor.

This is not unique to Japan, it is only that Japan, because of the war, casts itself more broadly, taking “credit” for the end of the other empires touching East Asia. However, since the Chinese military buildup, The Philippines has now said some U.S. troops can come back to Subic Bay after all and even Vietnam, which bases so much of its current identity on anti-Americanism, has decided that the United States isn’t really all *that* bad and now allows American warships to visit Vietnamese ports. If they were in a position to help them at all, I don’t doubt they would take the same attitude toward the French. From the point of view of western civilization, how is any of this not seen as a case of trying to have your cake and eat it too? In other words, why should western powers protect eastern powers for nothing in return? The strength and potential threat of China is supposed to justify everything and yet, the west, thanks mostly to allowing China into the World Trade Organization and other similar acts, is economically invested in maintaining good relations with China. Whether a good decision or not (and I think it was not), this is nonetheless a fact.

I also must repeat something I have said before which is, when making an argument, it is important to remember who exactly you are trying to persuade. In the case of Japanese conservative outlets trying to make the case against China, their target audience would be western conservatives. Western leftists certainly have no desire to confront China, being largely in sympathy with them, however, by tying so much back to their justification of World War II as a righteous, anti-western, “holy war” against colonialism, I fail to see how the Japanese could convince those on the right in the west who either stand by their former empires, defend their memory and deplore that they were lost, or agree that Asia should be “for the Asians” and of no concern to the west at all, these being more concerned with issues such as terrorism, immigration and demography in western countries than with anything China is doing on the other side of the world. In my experience, these same westerners often see much to admire about Japan but nonetheless view Japan as “them” and nothing to do with “us” which the Japanese narrative actually encourages by casting themselves as the ‘anti-imperialist’ empire.

Personally, I would have preferred Japan and the Allies never went to war at all or would have preferred the Japanese to have attacked the Soviet Union rather than the British and Dutch in Southeast Asia. I prefer the days when the Empire of Japan was still around and one of the club. I would have also liked to see a revived Qing Empire in China as part of that club as well. In any confrontation between Communist China and the State of Japan, my own sympathies are certainly going to be with the Japanese and, in the event of such a calamity, my friends know I would do anything to help them. When taken up to the level of countries, however, national interest is the determining factor and since the end of the colonial period, commerce is the only way the west is involved with the East Asia. The Chinese army is not threatening to invade Europe or North America and if the Australians considered such a thing remotely possible, they would probably have taken care to maintain a navy that would actually pose a challenge.

Since the European colonies in Asia were lost, no European power is frankly able to intervene in the region as they have no bases there any longer. So, as some in Britain have admitted, when anyone in the west says “we” should do something, it actually means that the United States should do something. As it concerns China, the mainstream right is concerned about China, the left is not but it is the right which most runs counter to the Japanese narrative as they are the only ones in America willing to take America’s side in its wars and interventions. The only sizeable group which actually agrees with much of the Japanese narrative are the libertarians, however, they illustrate perfectly the problem with Japan’s argument since they point to the same things Japan points to, such as western colonialism, as precisely the evidence for America not being involved in Asia at all. Just as they condemn the sanctions placed on Imperial Japan in the past, so too do they oppose any disruption of trade between America and China today.

Given the current state of affairs, it could well be argued that China poses an existential threat to Japan, not only because of their military strength but because of the degree to which anti-Japanese hatred is used as a unifying force in China. What is more difficult to argue is that China poses an existential threat to America or western civilization in general. Most of the west is frankly unable to do anything even if it should and, as for the United States, the most potent threat posed by China is the possibility of China’s new currency system replacing the dollar as the international reserve currency. That, however, is something that will not and cannot be stopped by American bases in Japan, American troops in South Korea or by the elimination of artificial islands in the South China Sea. Western civilization is under threat, of that I am in no doubt. However, that China is such a threat seems dubious, though I am open to arguments on the subject. With no real stake in the region, since the end of western colonialism, it seems more like the west is being called upon to, once again, take the side of others in a fight that is not theirs.

Caught Between India and China

Recently, thousands of soldiers of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army held live fire war games in Tibet, taking part in a simulated invasion of India. As most are aware, India and China have had a less than friendly relationship ever since Indian independence. In 1959 Indian and Chinese forces clashed when the Chinese suppressed an uprising in occupied Tibet, at the same time as India granted asylum to the Dalai Lama of Tibet. The Himalayan border region between India and China was in dispute between the two countries, just as China has had border and territorial disputes with practically every neighboring country with some (Vietnam and Russia for example) simply conceding territory in order to improve relations with China. India, however, was less sanguine about doing so and was feeling particularly assertive after gaining independence. After many years of championing non-violent resistance and the peaceful resolution of disputes, in 1961 the Indian government demonstrated that it would resort to military force to solve such problems when India invaded and annexed the Portuguese coastal enclaves (principally Goa).

Communist China, while likewise viewing Portugal as an enemy and cheering the downfall of European colonial empires, was nonetheless quick to point to this expansion by India as proof that their territorial dispute was unlikely to be settled peacefully. The following year, in October of 1962, Chinese military forces launched a two-pronged offensive into the disputed territory. The Chinese overran the Indian border posts, inflicted heavy losses on the Indians and generally gained what they wanted. Their objectives having been achieved, in November the Chinese announced a cease-fire and the war ended with China retaining control of Aksai Chin which remains part of the Xinjiang Autonomous Region of China to this day. Later, in 1967, there were two minor skirmishes between Indian and Chinese forces in the Indian state of Sikkim and it was with an eye to Sikkim that the latest Chinese war games were held; a possible dress-rehearsal for war with India over this obscure province. Keep that in mind.

Indian monument to pro-Axis leader Bose

Tensions between India and China have also continued on numerous fronts. In economic terms, the two countries have for some time competed as the primary source of cheap labor for Western Europe and North America. India has been increasingly alarmed at Chinese naval expansion into the Indian Ocean and India is friendly with countries China is not very friendly with, particularly Japan. Famously, it was an Indian judge who was the sole dissenting vote in the Tokyo War Crimes Trials after World War II, basically agreeing that the Japanese were their would-be liberators from British rule and taking up, along with the right-wing in Japan, the vision of “Asia for the Asians” and cheering on the pledged Japanese war aim to eradicate the European presence in Asia. China, of course, takes an extremely different view of the war and probably despises Japan more than any other country on earth. Also, thanks to all the years of the “One Child” policy in China, India is set to soon overtake China as the most populous nation in the world which will undoubtedly help keep labor cheap in India and thus make India an increasingly more lucrative source of exports than China with its growing middle class.

Sikkim's last King & Queen

Because of all of this, conflict may be unavoidable, however, there is something that can be done to at least make such a thing more difficult or delay it and that involves the area under dispute itself. Some readers here may be aware but the general public is certainly not that Sikkim was, not so long ago, an independent country, it was the Kingdom of Sikkim. Like the nearby Kingdom of Bhutan, it was largely unknown to the outside world for most of history and it probably only briefly became known to the west in 1963 when the heir to the throne, Crown Prince Palden Thondup Namgyal, married a young American girl named Hope Cooke. She was his second wife, his first wife (a Tibetan) having died in 1957. This briefly made the Kingdom of Sikkim the talk of the town, at least in the United States, to see a young, well-to-do American girl from New York City becoming the Queen consort of this remote, hitherto unknown Himalayan kingdom. Her husband became the King (or Chogyal) of Sikkim shortly after their marriage upon the death of his father in 1963 and his coronation in 1965 attracted quite a bit of attention.

The Kingdom of Sikkim was also no backward state living in primitive isolation. Although very small and having few resources, King Namgyal was actually quite successful at improving his tiny country. During his rather brief reign, while most people still lived very modestly by western standards, Sikkim became relatively better off than its neighbors. The literacy rate and per capita income in the Kingdom of Sikkim was double that in India, Bhutan and Nepal. Things were improving, Sikkim was doing well and becoming more educated and more productive under its new monarch. King Namgyal had been the leader of those who negotiated the normalization of relations between India and Sikkim when India became independent. Previously, the British Empire had maintained the same sort of relationship it had with most of the other numerous kings, princes, rajas and so forth of the region. He knew that things would be different after Indian independence and he was not wrong about that.

King Palden Thondup Namgyal & Queen Hope

The Kingdom of Sikkim, of course, knew it could not defy India alone and so, in 1950, agreed to maintain essentially the same relationship with India as it had done with the British, in other words, Sikkim was officially independent but a protectorate of India. However, there was a pro-Indian faction in the country, backed by India of course, which sought to imitate India to the point of establishing a political movement known as the Sikkim National Congress (in imitation of the Indian National Congress). This Indian-backed movement gained power in the 1974 elections (something which may explain why Bhutan would have nothing to do with democracy until recently) and immediately began trying to liberalize the country. The King blocked them, and rightly so, after which this group drew up a new constitution which India all but forced the King to accept. Naturally, the next step was annexation. The King, powerless to resist, could only try to beat his enemies at their own game so he called for a referendum to settle the issue on September 8, 1974. He would get his referendum and in the usual way such referendums are traditionally held, which is to say unfairly.

On April 9, 1975 the Indian army, which was supposed to “protect” the tiny country, instead invaded Sikkim, which was powerless to resist them, and after his guard was overpowered and disarmed, the King was arrested and confined to his palace. The local pro-Indian government, backed by Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, unanimously voted to abolish the monarchy and for Sikkim to be annexed by India. It was only then, after the occupation of Sikkim by the Indian military, that a referendum was held the following month, at a time and with voting locations that would mean many locals would be unable to reach them. The result was a forgone conclusion, returning a result of over 97% in favor of annexation to the Indian republic. Bitter locals reported that the vast majority of those voting had been Indians and not natives of Sikkim at all. Within a matter of days Gandhi and the Indian government passed the appropriate measures to make Sikkim a state in India and abolishing the monarchy.

In happier days

China and Pakistan, no friends of India, criticized the move, the Soviet Union praised it and the United States did little more than shrug. King Namgyal rightly denounced the referendum as “illegal and unconstitutional”. The King had a sad life from then on, as tends to happen in such cases. He went into exile, was divorced from Queen Hope in 1980 and in 1982 died of cancer in New York. His son and heir, Prince Tobgyal Wangchuk Tenzing Namgyal, was allowed to use the title of king but, obviously, it is purely honorary and he has no official position or actual authority. Educated in England, he is now in his 60’s and is largely forgotten by the rest of the world though the loyal locals in Sikkim still know him as the man who should be king. I know nothing else about the man but what he represents does present at least a partial solution to the current problem. Rather than a war between India and China over Sikkim, which both claim they wish to avoid, surely a better answer, fair to both sides, would be to say that neither are entitled to the area and for it to be restored as the sovereign Kingdom of Sikkim under its rightful heir.

The last King of Sikkim

Personally, I do not think that the republicanization of the Himalayan region has been an accident, yet, at every step the rest of the world has looked the other way as the local monarchies have been overthrown and India and China have inched ever closer to each other and ever closer to confrontation. Simply look at the historical timeline: in 1950 the Chinese occupied Tibet, in 1959 the Dalai Lama was forced into exile in India. In 1975 the Kingdom of Sikkim was invaded and annexed by India. In 1996 a Maoist Communist insurgency began in the Kingdom of Nepal. In 2005 the King of Bhutan made his country a constitutional monarchy, embraced multi-party democracy and ended its policy of isolation, hoping, I think to strengthen itself through ties with major foreign powers. Finally, in 2008 the Nepalese monarchy was overthrown and Nepal became a republic with a Maoist becoming the first republican Prime Minister. This has left only little Bhutan as the last monarchial holdout in the entire Himalayan region. It broke my heart when Bhutan shifted to openness and democracy and, though it is only an opinion, the only reason I have been able to come up with to explain this change, which the people had not wanted or asked for, was because the King hoped to gain greater security from the international community.

As such, I would propose that the Kingdom of Sikkim should be restored. I would want the same for Nepal and even for Tibet though that is surely expecting too much. Let these places be restored and make them absolutely “hands off” to the military forces of China and India alike. A monarchical buffer to keep India and China at a distance might be of benefit, not only to those involved, but to the wider world, including those countries which might be drawn in to another, even more serious, Sino-Indian conflict.

Imperial China, Identity and Worldview

Most readers will have, perhaps, heard of the infamous Opium Wars in which Victorian Great Britain defeated the China of the Great Qing Empire. Contemporary observers and even fairly modern historians have said period of conflict can be seen in more ways than that of an undeniably shameful effort to force an entire country to become drug addicts. There were other issues involved but one which I think deserves some reflection is the attitude and overall worldview of Imperial China. It is still not one to totally vindicate the British by any means, at least not in my opinion as I hope to show, but rather reflects on how people even in the Victorian era may have been trying to enforce a sort of global norm or international order of a sort on an empire which was very much out of step with the rest of the world in how it interacted with others. For myself, I do not think the Sino-centric worldview of Imperial China was entirely worthy of condemnation, though it requires some context to fully explain.

Anglo-centric view of British mission to China

Regular readers will be aware that the old, traditional, monarchical, Imperial China or, as I like to refer to it, the *real* China dealt with the world beyond their borders in a very specific way in keeping with a very Sino-centric worldview. China has often been referred to as “the Middle Kingdom” and this was a term the Chinese often used to refer to their country. However, many mistakenly believe that this referred *only* to China whereas the Chinese applied it to the entire world. There was the Upper Kingdom in the heavens, the Low Kingdom in the underworld and the earth was the Middle Kingdom. They also believed that the most important person on earth was the Emperor and everything about traditional China emphasized this point. The Forbidden City, where the Emperor lived, was held to be the center of the world and no building was allowed to exist that was taller than the Hall of Supreme Harmony, the preeminent, central throne room of the Chinese Emperor. The Emperor of China, titled as the “Son of Heaven” was held to be the divinely ordained ruler of the world, not only China, it was simply that some inconsequential and unsophisticated people beyond the borders of China were too ignorant to understand this basic fact.

Le Emperor of Vietnam before Chinese officials

In keeping with this view, the Chinese (which is to say the Han people) believed that they were the most advanced and civilized people on earth. Others, if they recognized their place within this Sino-centric world view, could also be considered civilized but any who did not were barbarians, unworthy of serious consideration. It is also for this reason that the Chinese refused to deal with anyone who did not, at the outset, recognize the total supremacy of the Chinese Emperor and adopt or at least make a show of adopting their worldview. The Emperor of China was the only emperor, the rulers of Korea, Vietnam, Thailand, and so on had only kings. One reason for the longstanding antagonism between China and Japan was that, while there were periods when the Japanese played along and sent tribute to the Chinese Emperor, they never totally went along with this system and tended to insist on referring to their ruler as the Emperor of Japan and would not tolerate the notion that he could be a vassal or in any way subordinate to the Emperor of China.

Of course, not everyone went along with this way of thinking. The Vietnamese in particular were well known for referring to their ruler as “king” when dealing with the Chinese but using the title of “emperor” among themselves. They were ruled by the Vietnamese Emperor and everyone knew it but, for the sake of peace and stability, they would pay court to the Emperor of China since that was what was required to keep the Chinese happy. The Europeans were a more mixed bag. Some went along with this local custom, while others refused, first by insisting on meeting the Emperor face-to-face as any ambassador would do with a European monarch and then refusing to get down on both knees and bow down in front of him. They did not show such obeisance to their own monarchs, much less a foreign one. This, of course, inevitably led to problems.

Barbarians on the rampage

This, however, was a mentality that was actually very common and certainly not unknown to Europe. The English word, “barbarian” comes from the Greek word “barbaros” and was used to refer to pretty much anyone who was not Greek and even among the Greek city-states themselves as an insult. The Romans, likewise, referred to almost everyone who was not Roman as a barbarian. In America, many Indian tribes, such as the Navajo with “Dineh”, referred to themselves as ‘the people’ or ‘the humans’ which made the other tribes they encountered non-humans. The traditional worldview of the Jews is that they are the chosen people of God, favored above all others and that all other people in the world, the gentiles, are unclean and to be shunned for fear of contamination. It is not hard to imagine this mentality leading to trouble, yet, I also think this mentality is a major part of why the Jews have survived for so long, even without a nation-state of their own. If you are no better, which is to say no different, than any other people, there is no reason why you should survive. You are not needed, you may even be a hindrance, so why bother trying?

The despicable talking shop of the world

In the west, all of this was supposed to have been done away with after the adoption of the Westphalian system (named for the Treaty of Westphalia), following the horrific Thirty Years War in central Europe (mostly Germany). It was that system which said that every nation-state is sovereign within its own borders, should not interfere in the internal affairs of other states and that all are equal in terms of their sovereignty. However, after World War I with the League of Nations, the west seemed to disregard the Westphalian system and it would be hard to argue that it was not abandoned completely after World War II with the establishment of the United Nations, International Monetary Fund, World Bank, World Trade Organization and the increasing use of economic pressure to reward or punish countries who do not follow along with the prevailing international order. China, of course, is one of the five “ruling” members of the United Nations, China is a member of the International Monetary Fund, the World Trade Organization and the World Bank. Yet, China never seems to have fully ‘bought in’ to any of these organizations and many explain this by saying that the old Sino-centric worldview has not completely disappeared from China.

After all, the People’s Bandit Republic of Chinese Sweatshops has certainly not embraced the liberalism and human rights called for by the United Nations. It deals with countries that the UN says are to be shunned, it has engaged in currency manipulation to give its own economy an advantage and has even begun trying to establish a “World Bank” of its own. In effect, they have adopted the forms but not the substance of these new internationalist organizations. They use them to their own advantage but never adhere to anything they say which would, in their view, be detrimental to the current Chinese ruling class and political system. It may be that the Sino-centric mentality does survive in Peking and I would say it proves that the mentality was not all that bad in the first place. Obviously, if you are not Chinese, you are not going to agree with it but if you are Chinese, it has helped them remain more independent than other countries that no longer feel that they are anything unique or special.

Emperor Tongzhi of the Great Qing Empire

The point, in my view, where Imperial China began to go down the wrong path was with the death of the Tongzhi Emperor, the tenth ruler of the Great Qing Empire and one not generally considered very exceptional at all. However, his personal qualities are rather beside the point, what mattered was that his reign saw the attempt at what was called the “Tongzhi Restoration” in which traditional, Imperial China tried to begin the process of modernization while retaining their traditional values, traditional culture, mindset and, of course, their imperial monarchy. This came after China had been defeated by Britain, then Britain and France in the Opium Wars, most of the Chinese coast had become dominated by the ‘foreign devils’ and China had been forced to sign the “Unequal Treaties” with numerous foreign powers. This greatly disturbed the Chinese and quite rightly so. They should have been disturbed because what happened to them was completely unjust. At the same time, they looked over at Japan which, after the “Meiji Restoration”, was growing more advanced, more prosperous and more powerful with each passing year. Traditionally, the Chinese had always viewed the Japanese with contempt, calling them “dwarfs” and a nest of pirates, but now saw them becoming more advanced and not being pushed around by the Europeans the way that China was.

As absurd as giant portraits of Karl Marx?

Since the Tonghzi Restoration did not work out, there are of course a horde of historians who can explain why it was doomed to failure after the fact. However, I remain obstinately unconvinced. The basic idea was good, the only problem was in how it was implemented and the considerable opposition that existed at court to any change whatsoever. It probably did not help that, whereas the Meiji Restoration returned political power to the Meiji Emperor of Japan, the Tongzhi Restoration did not bring about a similar empowerment of the Tongzhi Emperor of China. He was still capable of being thwarted by powerful factions at court, particularly the clique around the powerful Empress-Dowager Cixi. She came around to the need for reform eventually but by that time the situation had deteriorated considerably and the reserves of public patience had been largely depleted. The result was the Xinhai Revolution and the end of traditional China with the resulting republic proving unworkable and ultimately falling victim to a new absolutist ideology, one dreamed up by a Jew in Germany in the 19th Century. Yet, despite being foreign in every way, even under Communism, the Chinese remained confident in their own identity and Chairman Mao invoked the traditional Sino-centric worldview on his day of triumph, when he stood on the Tiananmen Gate and proclaimed the “People’s Republic of China” saying that, with his victory, “the world has stood up”.

You will notice that he said, “the world” and not simply that China or that, “the Chinese have stood up”. The pertinent point is that the Chinese do not view themselves as no different from any other people, they do not view themselves as replaceable or interchangeable in the way that western Europeans seem to. They do not ‘go along to get along’ but, on the contrary, insist that others ‘go along’ with their point of view in order to ‘get along’ with them. The most obvious example of this is their insistence on being recognized as the one and only legitimate government of China and refusal to maintain formal relations with anyone who continues to maintain formal relations with the Republic of China on Taiwan.

Once a sacred ritual, now empty play acting

Obviously, holding yourself superior to all others and insisting on groveling submission to all you deal with is not a recipe for good will and friendly interaction with foreign powers. However, the traditional Chinese worldview has served China well once they were able to moderate a bit and be more realistic about it. They have not been swallowed up by the internationalist machine but have rather used it to their own advantage, though even in China there are inroads being made by the mindset of the global elite that must be pushed back against. The biggest tragedy, however, is that the regime in China which is doing this is itself not truly Chinese in any political, cultural or traditional sense. With the overthrow of the monarchy, starting with the original Republic of China and the abdication of the last emperor, China effectively cut out its own heart, the centerpiece of all they once were, the apex of the mountain of history and heritage that ultimately defined them as a people. In that regard, they have much yet to learn and must fully restore their traditional and truly Chinese society. However, in terms of identity, how they view themselves and how they view the world, the rest of the world could learn a thing or two from China.

Clash of Monarchies: The Imjin War

The Imjin War (one of many names for the conflict, chosen here for its brevity) is not very well known outside of northeast Asia, yet it was a massive and significant conflict in world history. It represented a major challenge to the prevailing world order in East Asia, marked a shift in the history of Japan and the still tense relationship even today between the Japanese and Koreans. It principally involved three powers; the Empire of Japan, the Joseon Kingdom of Korea and the Empire of the Great Ming or China. Had it ended differently, the entire history of Asia would likely have been vastly different and building on that the history of the rest of the world would have unfolded differently as well. Of the three participants, Japan was a newly united country, forged in fierce civil conflicts, proud and ambitious. Korea was under relatively new leadership, still trying to assert its own place in East Asian politics and the Ming Empire of China was at its apex and the beginning of its decline. For the initial background, we must first look to Japan.

Emperor Go-Yozei (left), Emperor Wanli and the standard
of the King of Korea

The reunification of Japan, at the end of the “Warring States Period” is often helpfully described in terms of a house. Oda Nobunaga laid the foundation, Toyotomi Hideyoshi built the house and Ieyasu Tokugawa lived in the house. The famous warrior Oda Nobunaga had made the initial steps towards the reunification of Japan. Following his assassination, his cause was taken up by Toyotomi Hideyoshi, a man western historians would later nickname “the Napoleon of Japan”. He succeeded in uniting the warring states under his leadership though, being a self-made man of humble origins, he could never become Shogun. Nevertheless, he was given a title, sometimes translated as “Chancellor” or something similar, and he looked abroad to pursue his destiny. His dream was to conquer China and then India, taking control of the Silk Road and its lucrative trade, leading the Empire of Japan to dominate Asia. If this seems fantastic, remember that this was after Genghis Khan had taken the disparate tribes of Mongolia, united them into a single nation-state and led them to conquer China and then a larger empire that stretched from the Korean peninsula to Eastern Europe. Lord Hideyoshi, an ambitious man with many armies of samurai hardened by fierce battles among themselves, may well have thought to himself that if Genghis Khan of the Mongols could accomplish such a thing, so too could Toyotomi Hideyoshi of the Japanese.

Toyotomi Hideyoshi

For Japan to invade China, the only possible invasion route was the Korean peninsula where, not too long before, the Joseon Dynasty had seized power and had compensated for their lack of ancestral legitimacy by obtaining the recognition of the Ming Emperor in China as a vassal state. For the Chinese, this meant that Korea belonged to them but for the Koreans it meant nothing of the sort. They ruled their own country but, as with other neighbors of China, would pay tribute to the Ming court in exchange for trade and recognition. When the war came, Korea was ruled by King Seonjo, a man who worked to improve education and government in his kingdom. However, a diplomatic exchange of gifts with Hideyoshi gave the Japanese ruler the mistaken impression that the Koreans had voluntarily become vassals of Japan, which had not been the Korean intention. When he prepared to embark on his war against China, he invited and expected the Koreans to join him in this grand enterprise. Hideyoshi would be disappointed on this subject but King Seonjo also had other problems to deal with. Not only were there rival factions at court vying for power but the country was also divided north and south with the north worrying about the gathering strength of the Manchus and the south worrying about the growing power of Japan.

Japanese landing at Busan

On April 13, 1592 the first elements of the Japanese invasion landed at Busan with their commander, Konishi Yukinaga, sending a subordinate ashore first to ask one last time for Korean cooperation in their war with China. He was refused and the war began with the siege of Busan. Having obtained firearms from the Portuguese some time before and with an army of veterans of the fierce fighting of the “Warring States Period” the Japanese forces were far superior to the Korean defenders. Busan, Fort Dadaejin and the city of Dongnae fell to the Japanese in quick succession. More reinforcements followed and, though this is not often remembered, the Japanese invasion of Korea represented the largest amphibious assault in world history up to that time. The other Japanese divisions spread out and soon occupied Gyeongsang Province. The Koreans mobilized to meet the invasion with an army under General Yi Il, however, his archers proved no match for the ranks of Japanese musketeers and he was outmaneuvered as well. The resulting Battle of Sangju was a crushing defeat for the Koreans. They tried to regroup and stop the Japanese at the Battle of Chungju but again, Japanese firepower was devastating and the Koreans were defeated.

Konishi Yukinaga

The only major problem for the Japanese was that their victorious troops were advancing farther and faster than planned, causing some dissent among their commanders who accused the leaders of the initial wave of being glory hounds. King Seonjo fled from the capital of Hanseong (Seoul), which was soon captured by the Japanese and some Korean commanders, such as those charged with defending the Han River, retreated without resistance. The Koreans were forced into a massive retreat, doing their best to simply hamper and delay the Japanese as they fled north. At the Imjin River, which slowed the Japanese advance, the Japanese again called on the Koreans to stop resisting and join them in an attack on China but, once again, the Koreans refused. The King retreated to Pyongyang with the Japanese First Division pushing north behind him while other divisions fanned out to secure control of the rest of the Korean peninsula as they advanced. As city after city fell to Konishi Yukinaga of the First Division, he was joined for his advance on the northern Korean capital by the Third Division under Kuroda Nagamasa.

The Koreans tried to even the odds against them by launching a surprise night attack on the Japanese camp which was initially successful but which also exposed their position, allowing the Japanese to swing around and attack them from the rear. The escapade ended in chaos and as the Koreans retreated, the Japanese paid close attention to how they crossed the Taedong River, so they would know where to take their own forces across. When they made their advance on Pyongyang on July 20, 1592, they found that the King and remaining Korean forces had already retreated, leaving behind huge stockpiles of food and supplies. Meanwhile, the other Japanese divisions consolidated their hold on the Korean provinces, eliminating local resistance and establishing Japanese governors and administrators. Before the year was out, most of Korea had been conquered and the Japanese could look forward to their invasion of China, by way of the Jurchen territory, later known as Manchuria.

Yi Sun-Sin

All in all, 1592 had been a year of swift and decisive victories for Japan on the Korean peninsula. The Japanese armies had totally dominated the battlefield with superior weapons, superior tactics and greater skill. However, the Koreans were not without some victories of their own, it was only that these would not be won on land. Admiral Yi Sun-sin proved to be the most brilliant naval commander of his age in East Asia and in numerous battles totally defeated the Japanese whose ship designs and tactics were not as advanced as the Koreans. This had a major long-term impact on the conflict as it severely complicated the logistical situation for the Japanese armies. Things would, at one point in particular, get very bad for the Korean navy as the force was often cannibalized to make up for losses by the army, however, the Japanese were never able to defeat Admiral Yi Sun-sin. The one thing Admiral Yi Sun-sin is most famous for, certainly beyond Korea where he is a celebrated national hero to this day, is his innovative design known as the “Turtle Ship” (or Geobukseon).

Korean Turtle Ship

Today, any Korean will proudly tell you that the Turtle Ship was the first armored warship in the world. That, however, is an arguable point. The Japanese, namely Oda Nobunaga, had Tekkosen or “iron ships” in his naval arsenal, though these were more like armor plated floating fortresses rather than sea-going naval vessels. Before that, the Italian sailors of the Republic of Venice also had an armor plated flagship for their fleet. However, people can argue over bragging rights all they like but the armor was only one aspect of what made the Turtle Ships unstoppable. They were also completely enclosed and covered with spikes to repel borders. This was something that the Koreans had in common with the English ships who repelled the Spanish Armada. Admiral Yi Sun-sin designed his vessels to fight from a distance with naval cannon whereas other ships in those days were basically floating castles filled with soldiers which would ram each other and allow the warriors to fight for control of the vessel. The Japanese, more experienced at man-to-man combat, excelled at this and so, Admiral Yi Sun-sin wisely appreciated the strength of his enemy and had his ships fight with cannon rather than up close with swords. He would only go in for close combat against the Japanese when he had them severely outnumbered. As a result, the Koreans won battle after battle on the naval front.

Korean fleet

On September 1, 1592 Admiral Yi and his Korean fleet launched a surprise attack on the Japanese at Busan Bay in an effort to completely cut off from the Japanese armies in Korea from their home islands. It was an overwhelming tactical victory for the Koreans but did not change the strategic situation. The Korean fleet could not sustain itself in the area and had to withdraw, leaving Japan still in control of Busan. However, it did mean that the Japanese could not use the waterways to their advantage and this basically eliminated their plan of sending over more men and supplies for a full scale invasion of China and march on Peking. The Koreans also organized a highly effective guerilla warfare movement known as the “Righteous Army” which won a number of tactical victories against the occupying Japanese forces.

By the end of 1592 the Koreans had lost their country and King Seonjo was at the northern border seriously contemplating simply handing his entire kingdom over to China if only they would come to his rescue. The Ming Emperor Wanli, for his part, was rather overwhelmed by the news and shocked that the Japanese, a people the Chinese had always despised and looked down upon, could have conquered Korea so quickly. There had been some local assistance but it was not until January of 1593 that Emperor Wanli dispatched a major army to invade Korea and push the Japanese out. The King of Siam, another tributary of China, offered to attack the Japanese home islands but the Ming court refused the offer, not wanting to complicate the situation. On January 5, 1592 a Ming army of over 40,000, including a Korean contingent, arrived to besiege the 18,000 Japanese warriors garrisoning Pyongyang. Using a massive artillery and rocket bombardment, the Chinese inflicted over a thousand casualties on the Japanese but had purposely neglected to completely encircle the city so as to allow the Japanese the chance to escape rather than fight to the death. Under cover of darkness, the Japanese finally withdrew and Pyongyang was retaken.

Tachibana Muneshige, Japanese commander at
the Battle of Byeokjegwan (1 of 3)

This made the Chinese rather overconfident and they continued their offensive south only to be met with a stinging defeat at the hands of the Japanese at the Battle of Byeokjegwan. Despite having a near 2-to-1 superiority in numbers, the Chinese were defeated and suffered heavy casualties, proving to them for the first time just how formidable a foe the Japanese were and, perhaps, making them understand why the Koreans had had so much trouble. The Japanese tried to follow this up but were themselves defeated by the Koreans at the Battle of Haengju on February 12, 1593. This was significant even if only as a morale-booster for the Koreans, proving, under the leadership of General Kwan Yul, that they could beat the Japanese in a defensive battle with carefully prepared fortifications and the proper weaponry. Later, as the Ming and Korean armies moved, more slowly and cautiously this time, south toward Seoul, a team of saboteurs were sent in who destroyed much of Japan’s military stockpiles in the city. This, combined with Korean naval pressure on their supply lines, convinced the Japanese to withdraw from Seoul and agree to negotiate for peace. The Chinese, after their bloody loss at Byeokjegwan, were also eager to end the war.

Unfortunately, each side thought the other was suing for peace and basically trying to surrender and this, naturally, was not conducive to ending the war. The Chinese thought that the Japanese had agreed to withdraw and submit again to the Ming Emperor as their overlord (Hideyoshi having previously stopped paying tribute to the court in Peking) while Hideyoshi thought that the Chinese were surrendering to him and demanded territorial concessions as well as a Ming princess to be married to the Japanese Emperor Go-Yozei. Neither was true and when each side refused the demands of the other, hostilities resumed after several years of back and forth between the two sides. However, with the resumption of hostilities, the overall strategy and goals of the war, at least for Japan, would be dramatically different than they had been originally. With the huge numbers of Chinese troops moving east, Hideyoshi realized that the conquest of the Ming Empire was hopeless, at least for the moment and so would instead focus on simply retaking and holding the Kingdom of Korea as a Japanese foothold on the Asian mainland, a tributary state and a possible base for future, more ambitious operations.

Kobayakawa Hideaki

This would impact how the war was fought as previously the Japanese had made at least some effort to win over the Koreans to their side. They hoped all along that the Koreans would simply accept Japan as their new overlord and join them in the conquest of China. Now that the conquest of China was off the table and control of Korea was the only immediate goal, Japanese forces became rather less considerate, to put it mildly, toward the Koreans. It also made a difference that during the years of diplomatic exchanges between Japan and China, the Koreans worked feverishly to rebuild and improve their military capabilities. As a result, when the war resumed, the Japanese found them a much more capable opponent and a dangerous enemy is much less likely to receive mercy than an easily beaten foe. Though more limited, the fighting would often be even more intense. Unlike the first invasion force which, though estimates vary, numbered over 200,000 Japanese troops, the second invasion force would number just over 100,000 under the overall command of Kobayakawa Hideaki, the nephew and adopted son of Hideyoshi.

This invasion force, carried by a fleet of 200 ships, landed in southern Korea unopposed in 1597 and began taking control of Gyeongsang Province. The Ming Emperor Wanli gathered a relatively modest force by Chinese standards with naval support to send to Korea under the command of General Yang Hao, who would have a less than upstanding career. Along with his 75,000 Chinese troops, the Koreans would muster about 30,000 in four armies plus the naval forces. The great Admiral Yi Sun-sin was available but his success aroused jealously at court and a smear campaign of sorts was launched against him until he was dismissed by King Seonjo and replaced by Won Gyun. The new admiral immediately sought out the Japanese fleet and attacked them at the Battle of Chilcheollyang. The result was possibly the biggest and most decisive Japanese naval victory of the entire war. Won Gyun was totally defeated, was himself killed in the battle and the Korean flagship was captured. The Japanese won complete mastery of the area and were able to continue landing men and supplies for the invasion force unimpeded.

The Battle of Myeongnyang

Korean morale was wounded by this disaster and their defenses began to crumble as the Japanese launched a determined offensive northward. The fortress of Namwon fell, then Hwangseoksan fortress fell with the defenders retreating almost immediately. Ming Emperor Wanli was furious that the Japanese were again advancing on Seoul, reshuffled his military high command and sent General Yang Hao to take charge of Korea. However, the situation was beginning to turn around. At the Battle of Jiksan on September 7, 1597, although the Japanese won something of a tactical victory, the Ming army was able to block their advance. Also, after the disastrous loss at Chilcheollyang, King Seonjo of Korea stopped listening to the critics and restored Admiral Yi Sun-sin to his old command and the result was a swift turnaround. At the Battle of Myeongnyang he defeated a massive Japanese fleet in what is certainly his most famous and celebrated victory. The scale of the success was incredible and was due almost entirely to the Admiral’s skillful placement of his ships and his knowledge of the local waters.

Attack on Ulsan castle

With their supply lines imperiled and the Ming armies blocking their path north, the Japanese began to fall back, almost always under harassing attacks by Chinese and Korean forces. The Japanese would give battle when necessary and were never beaten in these attacks but were steadily pushed back by them. A really decisive battle seemed in place at the Siege of Ulsan which lasted from December 23, 1597 to January 4, 1598. The Chinese and Korean forces numbered  around 55,500 men whereas the Japanese garrison was only 10,000 with only 13,000 more troops near enough to come to their aid. The Japanese held off these superior forces, despite being nearly starved to death for lack of supplies due to Korean naval dominance of the coast but at the approach of the Japanese reinforcements the Ming General Yang Hao completely lost his nerve and ordered a retreat. Seeing an opportunity, the Japanese forces in Ulsan castle burst out from their fortifications to attack and the result was a humiliating panicked retreat by the Sino-Korean forces. In the disastrous battle the Chinese and Koreans had lost 20,000 men killed while the Japanese dead numbered only a little over 1,000. Later, another Sino-Korean force would try to take Ulsan castle and would again be defeated in September though there was at least no panic and the retreat was orderly.

This resulted in a prolonged period of stalemate and an ‘America in Vietnam’ type situation for Japan. Despite winning the major land battles, their loss at sea meant that supplying men and material for an offensive or even a large defensive force was simply impossible and Japanese forces began to be withdrawn from Korea. A renewed Sino-Korean offensive failed to achieve a major breakthrough but nonetheless kept up an unrelenting pressure on the Japanese whose logistics were extremely strained. At the Battle of Sacheon the Sino-Korean offensive was defeated and the Japanese again launched a successful counter-attack and likewise at the Siege of Suncheon a little under 14,000 Japanese troops under Konishi Yukinaga successfully repelled a Sino-Korean attack by 50,000 men with heavy losses, yet these victories did not change the overall strategic situation. The stalemate simply dragged on until September 18, 1598 when Lord Hideyoshi in Japan died. Everyone knew, despite his efforts to secure the succession of his son to his position, that all the daimyo would soon be fighting for power in Japan and so the ruling council ordered a total withdrawal from Korea while keeping the news of the death of Hideyoshi secret in order to preserve Japanese morale.

Japanese fleet

The only major subsequent engagement was the Battle of Noryang Point which was a tactical victory for Korea but a strategic victory for Japan in that they were still able to continue their evacuation. Worse for Korea was the death of Admiral Yi Sun-sin in this battle along with the Ming commander Deng Zilong. Negotiations for the final peace settlement would drag on for some time, long after the power struggle in Japan had been ended with the famous Tokugawa Ieyasu becoming Shogun and establishing the reign of the Tokugawa shogunate which would survive until the Meiji Restoration. Both sides were so entrenched that it took an act of deception, making the Koreans believe the Japanese had submitted to their demands when, in fact, they had not, to formally end the war and reestablish normal relations between the two countries.

In retrospect, the Imjin War was extremely significant for the course of the history of northeast Asia and beyond. It weakened the Toyotomi clan of Hideyoshi and helped enable the Tokugawa in seizing power in Japan. It solidified the place of Korea as a vassal of China and reaffirmed prejudices against Japan in their regard that would prove disastrously mistaken over the course of history. Had the war gone differently, had Hideyoshi been satisfied in his ambition to conquer the Ming empire, India and control of the Silk Road, the entirety of Asian history would have been drastically changed. All sides came away feeling rather justified in their own sense of accomplishment. The Empire of the Great Ming had retained the Sino-centric status quo of the existing international order. The Koreans had expelled the invaders of their country after a long and bitter struggle and even the Japanese could boast of having dominated their enemies on the land and withdrawn from the conflict without suffering a major, decisive defeat on the battlefield. All of these sentiments would have an impact on how these countries developed in the centuries to come.

Communist China Just Lengthened World War II

Recently, the People’s Republic of China announced that they are officially changing the date for the start of World War II. They did this, they openly said, to highlight the role of the Communist Party in fighting the Japanese and as part of an overall campaign to instill patriotic fervor, and some would say xenophobia, in the Chinese youth of today. Which, in itself, only makes sense if one takes into account the amount of deception already in place when it comes to how the Chinese Communist Party uses history as a political tool. This has also meant that they have had to adjust their official name for World War II in East Asia from, “The Eight-Year War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression” to, “The Fourteen-Year War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression”. Hardly rolls off the tongue but maybe it sounds better in Chinese. Some commentators, such as Michael Peck at “The National Interest” have said that the Chinese are doing the right thing but for the wrong reason. Actually, they are doing the wrong thing for the wrong reason. Nothing about this is right or remotely accurate.

Traditionally, historians have dated the start of the Second Sino-Japanese War or World War II in East Asia (or the “Greater East Asian War” if you’re in Japan) to the Marco Polo Bridge Incident of July 7, 1937. This is because it was from that point onward, increasing in intensity, that large-scale combat occurred between Chinese and Japanese military forces. So, that makes sense. The Republic of China did not actually declare war on the Empire of Japan until after the attack on Pearl Harbor when the United States, Great Britain, The Netherlands, Australia and others became involved. This was mostly because the leader of the Republic of China, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, was, in my opinion, leaving himself room for maneuver in case the persistent communist threat became a greater concern to him than the Japanese, so that he could negotiate a settlement with Japan in order to focus on fighting Mao Zedong and his communist bandits. Clearly, a war was being fought between Chinese and Japanese forces long before 1941 so taking into account declarations of war is rather meaningless.

Now, the Chinese Communist Party is changing its history books to say that the war actually began at the time of the Mukden Incident on September 18, 1931 when, after a small bomb was exploded on the Japanese-owned South Manchurian Railway, troops of the Imperial Japanese Army rushed in and quickly took control of the region, occupying Manchuria and later established the State (and finally Empire) of Manchukuo under the titular leadership of the last Qing Dynasty Emperor. This, they say, is when the Japanese first invaded China, first engaged in hostile action against China and thus that this was really when World War II in East Asia began. However, while it may make for a nice narrative, this is simply misleading. The war did not start in 1931, plain and simple. That is not what happened and no amount of word play can change the actual facts. The reason some people are buying into this narrative is because they have already swallowed a previous falsehood that has been allowed to take root. The preliminary falsehood is that the Republic of China had any legitimate right to claim ownership of Manchuria in the first place.

That is what this whole farce is based on, that “Japan invaded China” in 1931 and so the war can be said to have started then. Some, like Peter Harmsen, who writes about Japanese atrocities, say that the invasion of Manchuria was, “a full-scale Japanese invasion of territory that had been part of China for centuries” which sounds dramatic and is easy for people to believe, looking at maps seems to verify it, but this is totally untrue. Manchuria had not been part of China for centuries, the Manchu Imperial Family ruled over China for centuries. As I have said before, this would be like saying that prior to 1783 the British Isles had been part of America for centuries. Manchuria was a separate, independent country. The rulers of that country were the Qing Dynasty emperors. They ruled Manchuria and the Ming Dynasty ruled China. Then the Qing Emperor became the Great Khan of Mongolia also. So Manchuria and Mongolia had the same Emperor. Then the Ming Dynasty was overthrown, chaos ensued, the Qing Emperor from Manchuria invaded China and became the accepted, recognized Emperor. You will notice that at no point do the Chinese invade and conquer or buy or annex Manchuria. The ruler of Manchuria became the ruler of China.

Then, centuries later, the Chinese rose up against the Manchu Emperor, he abdicated and the Republic of China was established. The Republic of China, however, claimed ownership over all countries besides their own that had also been ruled by the Manchu Emperors such as Tibet, Mongolia and Manchuria. A certain White Russian general expelled them from Mongolia but the rest were eventually taken and remain part of China to this day, though at least in the case of Tibet some people do recognize the injustice of it. However, Manchuria should be no different. Which is why I have long said, and will go on saying no matter how unpopular it is, that the Japanese occupation of Manchuria and the restoration of the last Qing Emperor to the throne of “Manchukuo” (which is simply how you say Manchuria in Chinese) was the correction of an historical injustice. You can agree or disagree on whether the actions of the Japanese in Manchuria were positive or negative but they had put back on the throne the one man who had the only legitimate right to be there. They restored, officially (whether ‘genuinely’ or not people can debate) the independence of a country that had been independent before and had never been “a part of China”.

That is the basis of this issue and the one the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) most wishes to cover up because it is, so to speak, the root of their entire tree of lies on this issue. The more obvious falsehood is that, as U.S. General William T. Sherman said, “War means fighting and fighting means killing” and not much of that happened in 1931. It is perfectly obvious that the war did not start with the Japanese occupation of Manchuria in 1931 because, on the whole, the Chinese did not resist. There was little to fighting in the whole process. China made no effort to defend Manchuria and this was a matter of official policy. It also makes the current tactic of the CCP trying to take credit for resisting the Japanese all the more laughable. Republic of China president Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek had ordered a policy of non-resistance to the Japanese in order to focus on the threat posed by the communist insurgency, which he regarded as more serious. The Chinese Northeastern Army under General Zhang Xueliang was vastly largely than the Japanese forces that moved into Manchuria and yet no significant resistance was offered.

It takes some severe twisting of the facts to insist that a war started in 1931 when there was little to no fighting rather than in 1937 when the armies of two nations became engaged in increasingly large scale combat. Common sense would seem to indicate that a war starts when two sides begin fighting but common sense is often unfashionable and doesn’t always fit with political narratives. The Chinese government decided, as a matter of policy, not to oppose the Japanese and that did not change until 1937 when both sides were drawn into conflict after the Marco Polo Bridge Incident. The Chinese communists, you may note, had little to do with any of this other than, perhaps, doing their best to instigate a clash between the Japanese and the Chinese nationalists, knowing it would be to their benefit (in certain cases Mao openly stated this). That, however, also goes against their current narrative. Getting into the details also, ultimately, only serves to bolster the case of Japan since doing that tends to reveal how chaotic China was during this period and what a loose claim to any actual authority the republican government had.

The Japanese have voiced some disapproval over what the Chinese communist government is doing with this re-working of the World War II timeline but they are likely the only ones who will. Encouraging anti-Japanese hatred over historical events has become a mainstay of the CCP’s program to unite the people and divert their frustrations away from the government and toward a foreign power that is not allowed to go to war anymore. One could say that it does reveal how insecure they are about their own national narrative and how shaky the ground is that it rests on. What is alarming is that so many people in other parts of the world have bought into their false narrative, usually because of anti-Japanese sentiment on their own part because of World War II which allows them to easily slip from, “the Japanese are guilty of this” to “the Japanese are guilty of everything”. It is not, however, factual, it is not real history and it should not go unanswered. The effort of the CCP to take credit for everything the nationalists did and to erase from the history books any traces of the Qing Dynasty and the Manchurian nation should be resisted.