Ernst & Young and Lehman Case is Still Cooking

Fox News published a short article about litigation involving Lehman and its executives and mentioned that the lawsuit against EY is still progressing. The article says that testimony may be recorded in the near future about the motivation for Lehman's extensive use of Repo 105 transactions. Here are a few quotes:

An Update on Lehman and EY

According to an article in the Wall Street Journal:

A lawsuit contending that Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc.'s former officials, underwriters and auditors are responsible for investor losses should go forward for the most part, a federal judge ruled Wednesday.

According to the article, the judge ruled that:

Lehman Update

A few days ago my dad and I were wondering when we were going to hear additional news about the status of the Lehman Bros Repo 105 case.  It turns out we missed a Bloomberg article about the issue a few weeks ago.  According to the article the SEC is having a hard time finding sufficient evidence to sue Lehman for their use of Repo 105 transactions.  Here is an excerpt from the article:

More on Ernst and Young and Lehman Brothers (links)

Going Concern recently interviewed us about E&Y and Lehman--check it out here.  The accounting news source also has a great roundup of other thoughts and opinions on the case from around the blogosphere.  I would also encourage readers to check out David Zaring's thoughts on the matter over at The Conglomerate.

Ernst & Young and Lehman: A Not-So-Happy New Year is in Store

The Wall Street Journal and other news sources are reporting today that Ernst and Young is about to be hit with a civil lawsuit for its dealings with Lehman Brothers before the investment bank filed the largest bankruptcy in history ($691 Billion). We posted a few times earlier in the year on Lehman's use of Repo 105 and 108 transactions (hereafter Repo transactions) and how EY will be perceived in these transactions but it's been quiet for some time now and I was starting to wonder what would become of it. The lawsuit will certainly claim that EY was helping Lehman be obscure in their financial reporting by allowing them to hide debt through the Repo transactions. Here is an excerpt from the Wall Street Journal article:

Lehman not the only firm using the repo markets to obscure risk levels

According to the WSJ, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York has released data showing that several major banks masked their risk levels over the past five quarters.  How did they do it?  Perhaps unsurprisingly, the banks were using repo transactions.

A group of 18 banks—which includes Goldman Sachs Group Inc., Morgan Stanley, J.P. Morgan Chase & Co., Bank of America Corp. and Citigroup Inc.—understated the debt levels used to fund securities trades by lowering them an average of 42% at the end of each of the past five quarterly periods, the data show. The banks, which publicly release debt data each quarter, then boosted the debt levels in the middle of successive quarters.

...

The data highlight the banks' levels of short-term financing in the repurchase, or "repo," market. Financial firms use cash from the loans to buy securities, then use the purchased securities as collateral for other loans, and buy more securities. The loans boost the firms' trading power, or "leverage," allowing them to make big trades without putting up big money. This amplifies gains—and losses, which were disastrous in 2008.

I am interested in seeing how disclosure of the repo transactions varied across these firms.  Assuming some firms were forthright in the effect that the repo transactions were having on their financial statements, did investors punish firms for being honest?  I wonder if industry analysts were aware of the practice, and if so, did they expect most/all firms in the industry to engage in such transactions, regardless of whether or not the transactions were disclosed?

More on Repo 105

This article in the Economist has a very interesting note about the questionable Repo 105 transactions that Lehman used to improve its balance sheet (thanks, Brian White, for the link):

Mr Valukas marshals plenty of evidence to back up his claim that “Lehman painted a misleading picture of its financial condition”. The effect of Repo 105 was material: the firm temporarily removed around $50 billion-worth of assets at the end of the first and second quarters of 2008, a time when market jitters about its leverage were pervasive (see table below). Mr Valukas can see no legitimate business reason to undertake the transaction, which was more expensive than a normal repo financing and had to be done through its London-based arm because Lehman was unable to get an American lawyer to agree that Repo 105 involved a true sale of assets. [emphasis added]

This doesn't necessarily mean the transactions were in violation of U.S. GAAP, but it definitely makes the Repo 105 transactions look even more shady (I am not an expert on SFAS 140, the accounting rule Lehman used to justify the reclassification of Repo 105 transactions as a "true sale of assets", but it is very possible that the transactions only needed to qualify as a sale of assets in the country where they were being conducted).