A Portuguese Man of ... Curiosity?

OK, not really sure what to call this ... and I don't think the Portuguese do either.

It is a scientific ship, which will be a kind of base on the high seas, equipped with scientific laboratories, accommodation for 90 people permanently and another 100 if necessary, for example in a situation of emergency evacuation, ramps for boarding and disembarking of vehicles, heliport, runways for aerial drones, a stall for submarine drones and speedboats, various cranes 

In its candidacy for the PRR, the Navy stressed that "this ship, idealized under a new concept of operation, has no military requirements and is not armed. Its main functions are environmental monitoring, in particular in the fight against maritime pollution, the supervision of fisheries, the preservation of resources, the development of knowledge and research in the hydrographic and scientific field".

According to this text, "all its drones do not have weapons and the sensors used serve to monitor, monitor and control maritime spaces under national jurisdiction".

The ship, it was stressed, "will also serve for the eventual transport and evacuation of citizens in case of need. With the concept of double use, and being a technologically innovative and disruptive ship, it will allow you to test technological solutions in the robotic area, contributing to the development of national technology".

The counter-admiral said that this project represents a "stimulus for the entire community linked to the sea, industry and academia", with "very interesting challenges and tremendous opportunities".

And he stressed that it is intended to "involve the national industry as much as possible", reinforcing that "we should not, as a country, waste this opportunity".

In relation to this, criticism emerged from some of those present, already in the question and answer phase.

"The Navy did not know how to promote this project to society, academia and industry," lamented one of the actors, who did not identify himself, presenting himself as someone with business links to the sector.

This seems like a bit of an Offshore Patrol Vessel, a little bit of an Expeditionary Support Base, a funky T-AGOS or ... if squint a bit, butch her up, and will allow myself to say such a thing - a reimagining of the Littoral Combat Ship?

Yes, yes, yes ... I see that she is not armed and there's not a lot of information available. Well, that can be fixed if so needed. I have ideas ... but I like to think you can weaponize anything ... but what I'd like to do is spend a few drinks with a marine architect and the ship's blueprints to see what "white space" there would be to play with in this design. 

Heck, I'll start ... MIW mothership? Pocket destroyer tender? Repair and salvage ship? Forward VLS re-arming ship?

Whatever she is, I have to give a nod to the Portuguese Navy. They have my interest...though...I wonder how that thing rides on a bad North Atlantic winter day...

Once again we have a very small nation - 10.3 million souls, about 3% of the US population and 6% of our defense budget - coming up with some rather innovative ideas.

Also note this timeline;

According to this official, the forecast is that, "by the end of the month" (November), "the proposal will be delivered" and that "by the end of the year the contract will be signed". According to the calendar shown at this meeting, the construction of this platform is expected to take place between 2023 and 2025, delivered at the end of 2025, with 2026 being the "year of guarantees".

Huh.

h/t DPW.

Fullbore Friday

Since the start of this blog - and especially in the last few years - the topic comes up now and then about the complete lack of self defense our auxiliaries and merchant ships have that we plan to use in the next big war.

The usual suspects will make excuses - "war is different" "that won't happen" "we'll have escorts" "it is wired for XXX" - but what is really driving this waving-of-hands is something that has been in place since the dawn of the written record of war at sea; peace breeds complacency and cost savings.

Few who know their history have the levers of power to do what needs to be done now to give our auxiliary fleet what they need to at least provide their own point defense.

For the first time since I was a MIDN, the USN can no longer assume it will own the high seas. When the next big war comes, the constants of naval combat will return.

Your merchants/auxiliaries will need more weapons. Longer reach weapons. Escorts will be limited - if they are even there.

There is also a moral imperative to give people the ability to defend themselves when you know very well you can't.

I was thinking of that today when a FbF from 2018 came to mind. I think it's time to bring it back.

---

A war is winding down - but more work needs to be done.

The Henry Bacon was one of the thirty-eight merchant ships in convoy RA-64, which departed Kola Inlet, Murmansk, North Russia bound for Loch Ewe, Gourock, Scotland on Friday, 17 February 1945. The crew complement under Captain Alfred Carini was forty-one merchant seamen and twenty-six US Navy Armed Guard. The Henry Bacon was in ballast and carrying nineteen Norwegian civilian refugees, including women and children, as passengers.

Before the convoy set sail, news had been received of a German attack on Norwegian patriots living on the island of Sørøya, in the approaches to the former German naval anchorage at Altafjord. The British Royal Navy had sent four destroyers to the scene and had rescued 500 men, women and children. These refugees were distributed among the ships of the convoy for passage to England.

On the afternoon of the Saturday, 18 February, the weather deteriorated to force 8 on the Beaufort scale, and the escort carriers were unable to operate aircraft. That night the storm intensified with winds gusting up to sixty knots (110 km/h) with a heavy sea and swell. The convoy split up and began to disperse. The storm continued through Sunday, 19 February.

On 20 February, the storm abated and the escort vessels started to round up the scattered ships. At 4 am the convoy had been detected by aircraft, and by 9 am twenty-nine of the ships were back on station with four still straggling.

Then, on 22 February, the convoy ran into one of the worst storms ever recorded in the Barents Sea. Once again the convoy began to split up and was blown apart. The weather deteriorated to Beaufort scale force 12 with winds at 70 to 90 knots and temperatures 40 below zero. During this storm, one of the main springs on the Henry Bacon's steering gear was broken, and the retaining pin was sheared. This damage caused the Henry Bacon to drop out of the convoy to effect repairs.

Like the wounded Wildebeest - you can almost see this coming ...

Around 1500 GCT on 23 February 1945, the Henry Bacon was some 50 to 60 nautical miles astern of the main convoy when she was attacked by twenty-three Junkers Ju 88 and Ju 188's torpedo bombers of Luftwaffe Group KG26, out of Bardufoss, Norway, some 250 miles (400 km) away. The Germans were on their way to attack the main convoy, and thought they could finish the lone straggler easily.

One merch vs. 23 JU-88s .... so, who's taking bets?

The Henry Bacon was armed with eight 20 mm anti-aircraft guns, with a 5 inch (127 mm) gun aft and a 3 in (76 mm) gun forward. The ship’s Naval Armed Guard gunners fought the attacking planes for over an hour, shot down five planes, damaged at least four others and managed to defend against several torpedoes by causing their detonation before they reached the ship.

Over an hour under attack. An eternity ... and then;

At 1520 GCT, one torpedo struck the starboard side of the No.5 hold, and detonated the aft ammunition magazine. A large hole was torn in the hull. The rudder, propeller and steering engine were destroyed. The ship settled by the stern and sank within an hour. This action helped save the main convoy, as most of the German planes were forced to return to base owing to battle damage, low fuel, and low ammunition.

Mission.

The Henry Bacon was abandoned at 1600 GCT at 67.38N 05.00W. Lifeboats #1 and #2 were launched safely. The #3 boat capsized while being lowered, and because the davits to the #4 boat had been damaged in the storm, this boat was also lost. Three of the four life rafts had been released prematurely and had drifted away. The two surviving lifeboats were filled to capacity with all of the Norwegian passengers and some members of the crew.

This left a number of crew members stranded aboard the Henry Bacon. When this situation became known to Chief Engineer Donald Haviland, he insisted that he would give his place in the lifeboat to a younger crew member and died with the ship. That crew member's name was Robert Tatosky. For his sacrifice, Chief Engineer Haviland was awarded the Distinguished Service Medal, the highest award for the men of the Merchant Marine.

The Bosun, Holcomb Lammon, collected dunnage from the deck and lashed it into a makeshift life-raft. Six Armed Guard and five merchant crew owe their lives to this raft. Lammon also died with the ship, and he was awarded the Meritorious Service Medal.

The survivors were rescued by crew members from three British destroyers, HMS Zambesi, HMS Oppotune and HMS Zelast. By this time the men in the water were so cold they were unable to help themselves, so the British sailors had to jump into the freezing sea with ropes tied around their waists to help them. When it was over, all of the Norwegian civilians had survived, nine Naval Armed Guard gunners, and two Navy signalmen were lost at sea. Captain Carini and fifteen fellow Merchant Marine crewmen were also lost.

Timing.

The Liberty ship SS Henry Bacon was the last allied ship sunk by the Luftwaffe in World War II.

Lessons on how to arm a ship for war, how to fight, how to win, and how to live.
Fullbore.

Hat tip E40.
First posted JAN2011.

How Many Fireboats Can You Buy for $1.2 Billion?

As we go through today's post, I'd like everyone to keep in mind an intangible that impacts not just our Navy in the eyes of the people we serve, but our government as a whole that our Navy is part of: most of our major naval bases are located in the heart of heavily populated urban areas.

The Tidewater Area around Norfolk, VA;

And on the West Coast, San Diego;

For good and bad, what our Navy does impacts the millions of people who are our neighbors, family, and friends who live cheek-to-jowl with the fleet.

When things go wrong, they are downwind.

There is the former USS Bonhomme Richard (LHD 6) burning two years ago and drenching the San Diego with at least two decades of trial lawyer cases.

Do you see it? See that little boat in the bottom right hand corner? That's the subject of today's post.

As one is getting used to, our friends over at gCaptain are bringing up important issues no one else is.

In this case something many assume the Navy has covered but doesn't; fireboats.

Over the past few decades, the United States Navy has increasingly abandoned the unsexy working ships it once mastered and deployed around the world. Previously, the Navy had a large fleet of salvage tugs, but now they only have two, and only two Hospital Ships, two Submarine Tenders, and two Ocean Tugs. Some ship classes have been scrapped altogether including Fireboats or, as the Secretary of the Navy Carlos Del Toro inaccurately called them in a letter to congress, “fire boats.” 

The Unsexy-but-Important™ strike again. This isn't some fancy, surplus, radical idea that only a military might do.

“Modern fireboats are impressive and so essential to protecting ships that Long Beach purchased them even though the next city north, Los Angeles, already had a state-of-the-art fireboat, and even though the construction cost for the two boats exceeded $50 million,” we wrote in July of last year. “Long Beach is not alone. Nearly every large commercial harbor worldwide now has state-of-the-art fireboats on duty, but the world’s largest US Naval Bases doesn’t own a single one.”

Our Admiralty keeps untold thousands of admin personnel burning countless hours processing North Korean levels of medal citations and inventing a new uniform every other POM cycle ... but ... I guess everyone must have priorities.

In the official report attached to Del Toro’s letter to Congress, the Navy states. “We assess that the lack of dedicated fire boats did not have an appreciable effect on the BHR incident or loss of this ship. And, in fact, waterborne firefighting capability, readily available on Navy tug boats, was brought to bear in this incident and has been formally accepted into Navy installation emergency response plans. The Navy does not intend to request or pursue dedicated fire boats at this time.”

As you may have guessed, John Konrad is about to drop a nuke;

The 600 words are not accurate. It contains blatant lies.

“And, in fact, waterborne firefighting capability,” says the report, “Readily available on Navy tug boats, was brought to bear in this incident.”

But Navy tugboats were neither readily available nor used in the BHR fire. Nothing was “brought to bear” in the critical early stage of the fire. Two hours into the incident, civilian captains aboard commercial tugboats owned by a private company, begged to help fight the fire but instead, the Navy brought in laughably small police boats with tiny water cannons built to fight small fires on recreational boats, not 844′ warships.

Read it all and figure out that when you need 50,000, SECNAV is happy to make you think 900 is adequate.

Either you are being lied to, or people are lying to the SECNAV.

As the Bonnie Dick is cut in to tiny pieces, place your bets.

Hot, Buggy, and the Stuff Wars are Won of

What is this jewel?

The future is often just an updated past.

Drop on by USNIBlog and see some of the smart things going on in WESTPAC.

The Ice Won't Break Itself

After yesterday's post, you might thing this is ice week ... and maybe it is.

Have you pondered lately the state of Russian, American, and ... yes ... Chinese icebreakers?

Of course you have ... so you'll want to run over to USNIBlog and ponder what bubbled up in the last month.

'Tis the season, dontchaknow.

The "Unsexy but Important" is Sexy to the Professional. Where are our Professionals?

This month when you say "tender" I am not thinking about a tender Turkey.

I am not thinking about tender mercies.

Nope.

If we are really concerned about winning the next great Pacific war ... we need to grow up and get ready.

Details over at USNIBlog.

Tell me where I'm wrong.

Nine Years is a Long Time

I think this is going to be tender week ... as my post tomorrow will be on the same topic.

I want you to think about 2012. Yes, it was nine years ago. Obama was running for re-election against Mitt Romney. 

The #1 song of that year was "Somebody That I Used to Know" by Gotye featuring Kimbra.

ISIS, in its present name, did not yet exist for another year.

It also was the last time...

The submarine tender USS Frank Cable (AS 40) completed a weapons handling exercise involving the transfer of a MK-48 inert training shape to a submarine, Oct. 22. This was the first expeditionary reload Frank Cable has conducted outside of Guam since 2012.

OK. Here is a question I hope someone in Congress askes next time a 4-star comes in front of them.

“This exercise was instrumental to developing the expeditionary combat capabilities that our submarine tenders and submarines bring to the Pacific theater,” said Capt. Albert Alarcon, Frank Cable's commanding officer. “Every training opportunity helps assure our readiness for any contingency.”

So, all that talk about a Pacific pivot. All that talk about the, correct, primacy of our SSN fleet in any engagement west of Wake ... all that ... talk ... 

...and yet we did not conduct an evolution that will be essential for any sustained war effort in the Western Pacific.

Why?

I know there is message traffic on this. I know there is a reason ... but as a profession we need a serious conversation on why this was not done until ... 1QFY22.

h/t the immortal Chris Cavas.

Fullbore Friday

You graduated from the Naval Academy with the world at war. While it seemed your nation’s politicians were saying they would do all they could to stay out of this war – you probably knew better. It was a big war, and one side was being fed and armed from our side of the ocean. 

After graduation you get assigned to a battleship – and within a year, your nation goes to war. Your battleship was not just any ship, she was the USS Connecticut (BB-18), the flagship for The Great White Fleet a decade earlier, and now flagship of the Fifth Battleship Division.

Yet, your war never really came. You spent the war never leaving the east coast. You spent the entire war on what you realized soon, was an obsolete hulk of another age best used for what it was used for, training of others.

With the war over, you knew naval war was in a new age – an age where the submarine and the aircraft would change forever how power is brought from the sea.

You went to sub school and spent the next 12 years in the submarine service. A select group of select officers still trying to understand how to make these exciting new platforms work.

Big Navy was not through with you though, and back you went to battleships, the 15-yr old USS New York (BB-34). Your nation by now was in the grips of a nightmarish depression and the world was quiet.

You had a great tour and as a LCDR was given command of the USS Evans (DD-78). The 4-stack destroyer had been in the Navy as long as you had and was just a few years from being sent to mothballs, but she was your ship. 

You did well in command and post-command shore duty. As the world started to heat up again in 1937 you make Commander and your Navy sent you back to submarines with the honor of commanding Submarine Division Seven in Groton.

Again, the world headed to war yet you had aged out of operational units. Command is command though … and as an East Coast Sailor, your friends at BUPERS had something interesting – a 32-yr old former collier converted into a repair ship based out of Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. The USS Vestal (AR-4).

You’ve been in the Navy 25 years, almost 30 if you include your time at Annapolis. Maybe we’ll stay out of this war, maybe not … but command of a ship – any ship – in Hawaii, well, there are worse sunset tours for a Commander.

Then came one December Sunday halfway through your command tour; Commander Cassin Young, USN – history is finally calling, and you’re on her short list:

...Sunday in port was shattered shortly before 08:00 as Japanese carrier-based aircraft swept down upon Pearl Harbor. At 07:55, Vestal went to general quarters, manning every gun from the 5-inch (127 mm) broadside battery to the .30 cal. Lewis machine guns on the bridge wings. At about 08:05, her 3-inch (76 mm) gun commenced firing.

At about the same time, two bombs – intended for the more valuable battleship inboard on Battleship Row – hit the repair ship. One struck the port side, penetrated three decks, passed through a crew's space, and exploded in a stores hold, starting fires that necessitated flooding the forward magazines. The second hit the starboard side, passed through the carpenter shop and the shipfitter shop, and left an irregular hole about five feet in diameter in the bottom of the ship.

Maintaining anti-aircraft fire became secondary to the ship's fight for survival. The 3-inch (76 mm) gun jammed after three rounds, and the crew was working to clear the jam when an explosion blew Vestal's gunners overboard.

At about 08:10, a bomb penetrated Arizona's deck near the starboard side of number 2 turret and exploded in the powder magazine below. The resultant explosion touched off adjacent main battery magazines. Almost as if in a volcanic eruption, the forward part of the battleship exploded, and the concussion from the explosion literally cleared Vestal's deck.

Among the men blown off Vestal was her commanding officer, Commander Cassin Young. The captain swam back to the ship, however, and countermanded an abandon ship order that someone had given, coolly saying, "Lads, we're getting this ship underway." Fortunately, the engineer officer had anticipated just such an order and already had the "black gang" hard at work getting up steam.

The explosion touched off oil from the ruptured tanks of the Arizona which in turn caused fires on board Vestal, aft and amidships. At 08:45 men forward cut Vestal's mooring lines with axes, freeing her from Arizona, and she got underway, steering by engines alone. The naval tug Hoga, whose tugmaster had served aboard Vestal just a few months before the attack, pulled Vestal's bow away from the inferno engulfing Arizona and the repair ship, and the latter began to creep out of danger, although she was slowly assuming a list to starboard and settling by the stern. At 09:10, Vestal anchored in 35 feet (11 m) of water off McGrew's Point.

With the draft aft increasing to 27 feet (8 m) and the list to six and one-half degrees, Commander Young decided upon another course of action. "Because of the unstable condition of the ship", Young explained in his after-action report, "(the) ship being on fire in several places and the possibility of further attacks, it was decided to ground the ship." Underway at 09:50, less than an hour after the Japanese attack ended, Vestal grounded on 'Aiea Bay soon thereafter. Commander Young was awarded the Medal of Honor for his actions that day.

Many of you may recognize that name. He was promoted to Captain, given command of the USS San Francisco (CA-38) and was killed in action 13 NOV 42 during the Naval Battle of Guadalcanal leading his ship against the Imperial Japanese Navy’s Battleship Hiei.

Captain Young – fullbore.

Drydocks Matter

We've spent a long time here and on Midrats discussing the almost criminal neglect of the "unsexy but important" parts of our maritime national security infrastructure by our uniformed and civilian leadership over the last three decades.

It goes beyond the wholesale destruction of our base, shipyard, and repair facilities. Over and above our under-resourced auxiliaries from ice breakers to command ships. We have a moribund merchant marine, almost non-existent war reserve, and our repair facilities are so incredibly delicate they cannot meet the well planned peace time repairs, much less any realistic wartime requirements.

And yet ... we continue to mindless drift in history's currents - making  no effort to look for shoals, obstructions, or even what direction we are going in - though we fully know we have a place to go and the path there is full of hazards. 

Over at Forbes, Craig Hooper has an incredibly important peace about the story the USS Connecticut (SSN-22) is about to lay out over the coming weeks.

We may not get many more clear warnings than what CONNECTICUT is giving us. We should listen.

Perhaps this will be a clear call to those who still refuse to hear all the warnings about the fragility of our support infrastructure.

Perhaps;

 In 1995, the Base Realignment and Closure Commission, reflecting Department of Defense disinterest in basing ships in the Marianas Islands, ripped the heart out of the U.S. Navy’s shoreside establishment at Guam. Along with closure of Guam’s Ship Repair Facility, the Fleet and Industrial Supply Center and Naval Activities were shuttered in 1997—and in an ironic sense of timing, the repair yard the USS Connecticut desperately needs was closed 24 years ago, the very same month the powerful sub was launched. 

The Navy’s shore establishment on Guam has failed to keep pace with America’s focus on the Pacific. Naval ships are back. The Marinas Islands are now home to an Expeditionary Sea Base, two sub tenders, four nuclear submarines and a host of ten or so Military Sealift Command Vessels associated primarily with U.S. Marine Corps or Army prepositioning programs. 

Even as new ships arrived, the shore maintenance support has dwindled.

Once Guam’s Ship Repair Operations Facility was privatized, the Military Sealift Command—the yard’s primary customer back then—shifted a good amount of refit work to more cost-effective foreign yards. 

The green eye-shade cult of efficiency is, more than any other movement, damning our navy's ability to operate and setting the nation up for strategic failure.

From domestic supply chains, to selling finite STEM research positions to foreign nationals, to having a repair infrastructure needed to fight and win wars - the MBAs and CPAs - and the leaders who listen to them, are a greater threat than any foreign power.

Guam’s two aged dry docks are gone. The World War II-era floating dry dock Richland (YFD-64) was sold off in 2016 to a Philippine maritime service provider. The Machinist (AFDB-8), a large auxiliary floating dry dock known locally as the “Big Blue,” was a relatively young platform, delivered to the United States in 1980. Damaged after a 2011 hurricane, the dry dock was sent to China for modernization in 2016, and is, apparently, still there. 

Workers have drifted away, too. The original pool of 800 workers that supported the shipyard in the early 1990’s has shrunk down to a few hundred at most. 

In 2018, with naval activity at Guam at a post-Cold War high, the Navy inexplicably mothballed the repair facility, with no apparent plan to recapitalize it. 

Yes, let's pull that out again;

 ...the dry dock was sent to China for modernization in 2016, and is, apparently, still there. 

We can't fire everyone - but I understand the emotion to do so.

If the damage to the sub is severe, it will be a real struggle to patch up the USS Connecticut enough so it can make a safe transit to the Navy shipyards in either Hawaii or Puget Sound—over 6,500 miles away. 

It is almost criminal what has been done to what was at one time the world's greatest maritime power.

Read it all. Get angry. Ask hard questions. Demand action.

We can start by building some new floating dry docks. 

Want More VLS Cells West of Wake Before 2030? This is the Way.

I joke now and then about “Make Auxiliary Cruisers Great Again” – but I am only partially joking.

What were Auxiliary Cruisers? On the surface, they were somewhere between pirates and commerce raiders, but they were also a way to get more armed ships with your flag on them in the mind of your enemy's planners, disrupting their Sea Lines of Communication (SLOC) (aka supply chains), and complicating their attempts to secure their seas.

Turning merchant ships in to warships is an imperfect act, but until your enemy achieves complete sea control, they have a good to acceptable track record of bringing more capability to the fight from the South Pacific to the Indian Ocean and other places they could make a nuisance of themselves. Also, they are better underway today, than waiting 24-months for a warship to displace water.

When we look at the challenge west of Wake, one thing most navalists have sobered up to is that we simply do not have enough VLS cells to cover the needs of area defense, ballistic missile defense, strike, and even ASW. We are not producing enough multi-purpose warships that carry enough VLS cells – or enough VLS cell carrying warships – to both bring the firepower we need or distribute risk to an acceptable level.

The USAF has a parallel challenge. Since I was a kid and people had plans to convert 747 in to flying cruise missile carrying aircraft throwing out ALCM like a Pez Dispenser does candy, they’ve been looking at better ways to launch stand off weapons without requiring such high demand/low density/high-cost platforms such as heavy bombers. Sure, they can butch up Strike Eagles … but what about their fleet of cargo aircraft?

In partnership with the U.S. Air Force (USAF), Lockheed Martin has deployed Rapid Dragon munition pallets from C-17 and EC‑130 aircraft and released surrogate JASSM-ERs in system-level flights conducted over White Sands Missile Range, New Mexico. 

Rapid Dragon is a fast-paced USAF Strategic Development Planning and Experimentation (SDPE) program that has moved from concept to surrogate missile deployment in just 10 months.

The Rapid Dragon team conducted an airdrop from a C-17A Globemaster III and another from an EC-130SJ Commando Solo. In both flights, aircrews deployed a pallet at an operationally relevant altitude. Once stabilized by parachutes, the pallets released surrogate missiles in quick succession, each aerodynamically identical to a JASSM-ER.

If for no other reason than good old inter-service rivalry … can we iterate past the SA-6 on a USV to, well, looking at what existing cargo ships can be converted in to …. VLS farms.

Work with me here. Yes, I understand people who want unmanned surface vessels to operate like “loyal wingmen” with our surface fleet as VLS farms, but we are a long way from having the machinery, communications, laws, code, etc to make them a reality anytime in the next decade. I'll take them when they come, but they are not coming fast enough.

We cannot wait that long. We need a gap filler. We need to experiment like the USAF … but better.

Let me be modest here: what kind of merchant ship can we purchase right now that I can fit 256 VLS cells, bolt on a SeaRAM or two, a couple of 30mm, can cruise effectively at 20 kts but can also make 25kts at a minimum sustained maximum speed. 

Can you think of a better way to give the USNR some warships?  

Just imagine; six on each coast ready to get underway, fully loaded, in 2-weeks.

How Will Your Division Replace its Equipment?

How many ships can a US Army division afford to lose when crossing the Pacific? You know, the ships that will carry their equipment and munitions? 

Have we thought this through?

I'm pondering over at USNIBlog. 

Come on over and give it a read.

LCS Makes Bad Talking Points

There is a lot going on in Megan Eckstein and Mallory Shelborne’s article on the discussions last week at the Surface Navy Association Symposium, so I’m going to try to focus on two things; LCS talk and talk in general. 

I think we need a public speaking safety standdown for Flag Officers. Seriously. We continue to over promise and under deliver. We say things that simply do not survive the follow on question … but don’t take those kind of questions and get away with it. It degrades credibility and makes everyone look like a bad used car salesman. 

Why do we talk like we are spokesmen for the defense industry as opposed to a customer? Anyway, here we go. 

Surface warfare leaders throughout the Navy last week mused about how to employ new classes of ships such as the Littoral Combat Ship and Expeditionary Sea Base …

Again, for the 1,000th time, LCS is not a new ship. LCS-1 was commissioned over 12 years ago. 

Stop it.

Commander of Naval Surface Forces Vice Adm. Roy Kitchener … “I talk a lot with [U.S. 7th Fleet Commander Vice Adm. Bill Merz] out here, a big fan of LCS. If you look at the things we want to do in the 7th Fleet warfight, and you look at LOCE (Littoral Operations in a Contested Environment) and EABO and things like that, that’s what he wants to use them for,” Kitchener said.

Who here remembers when we had the most senior leaders discuss the need to keep LCS out of any kind of peer conflict? Now, we want them up close and personal? OK. 

For the last decade when it became clear we would never execute PLAN SALAMANDER, I said we would eventually have to find some way with lots of money and Sailor sweat to make something useful of these ships. 

Good people in hard jobs will have to grab all the welding torches, extension cords, and duct tape they can and kludge something together. We are … but don’t oversell what we have here. Don't get me wrong, we are making progress, but there is only so much marginal utility you can squeeze out of LCS. More the LCS-2 Class than the LCS-1 Class ... but not all that much.

In general, this CONOPS is sub-optimal, though I do like the neo-LSTs – but the LCS oversell here is comical;

The new Light Amphibious Warships will be the primary ships conducting EABO, carrying groups of about 75 Marines as they maneuver around island chains and shorelines, stopping to conduct missions ashore and then heading back out to sea to evade targeting by the adversary. Though the Marines will carry some land-based anti-ship missiles with them, integrating LCS into that mission set would provide a sea-based strike capability for the Marines as they move around and conduct their missions.

Who is giving you air and submarine protection? It ain’t LCS. 

Remember many moons ago I told you the LCS CONOPS was garbage because they will be asked to do things they were never designed to do because they would wind up being the only thing in the toolbox? Commanders would have to put Sailors in sub-optimal platforms with a greater risk of death and mission failure? People said all sorts of things in the comments section telling us how wrong we were. Well, kiss my grits.

In the coming years, the LCSs will only grow more lethal and survivable to take on whatever mission fleet commanders ask of them. … Kitchener said in his speech that the LCSs would be “on the front lines” in the Pacific and that the fleet would keep pushing to make them as lethal and as reliable as possible for any future fight.

All of it is coming to pass. All of it.

Moton added that the package included upgrading the Independence-variant ships to an Aegis-based common combat system, adding the Nulka decoy system and the SEWIP Lite electronic warfare package to all the LCSs in the fleet, along with other upgrades.

Note no mention of FREEDOM Class upgrades. 

In summary, they/we are trying to make LCS something like a light frigate … something like one. Close as you can given the limitations. Bookmark that. 

…and here we have our friend Rear Admiral Casey Morton, USN PEO for Unmanned and Small Combatants … I think he is trolling me here.

“I see it as a fairly youthful platform, and I think we’ve learned a lot with these deployments, and we’re figuring out how to make them more lethal, and we think we’ve figured out what missions we want them to do out there, and so I think it’s going to be kind of exciting,” he said.

It is 2021. Again, LCS-1 was commissioned 12 years ago with all the missions identified. All those mission modules … you know the drill. We are in the land Salamander promised you we would be in … and yet … and yet … we don’t learn.

“Talking to the Woody Williams skipper and the other ESB skippers, they are not at all fearful of mines because it’s highly survivable,” he said. “We’re going to get surprised – even though we want to keep the man out of the minefield, if you’re going to get close to a minefield, it’s probably best to be in an ESB because she can take a hit and keep on ticking.”

This quote has nothing to do with LCS per se, but it is unalloyed LCS mindset. Bullshit. 

We need to stop with the happy talk. “…not at all fearful of mines…”? Even if you hit one of the relatively small MN103 MANTA mines like Tripoli and Princeton did, you are at least mission killed. 

Something larger? 

I don’t want CO’s “…not at all fearful of mines…” You can call it “guarded respect” instead of fear if you wish, but I want someone in charge of such a high demand, low density asset as an ESB to have a healthy bit of it. We only have two commissioned, two under construction and one more ordered. 

How is that LCS mission module going anyway?

Crossposted to substack.

Fullbore Friday

I put this FbF up every few years, last time was 2016, because it simply is a great story that makes you think anew every time you read it. Enjoy...and ponder

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Training. Drills. PMS. PQS. Attention to detail.

Do you do just the minimum, or do you ask for extra time to get it better and better? Do you train and inspect hard? How many times have you gone through different scenarios with your crew?

Do all your watch standers know how critical their position and responsibility is? From the OOD to the YN3 on the 50cal.; do they appreciate that they are as important as the Commanding Officer?

Discipline. Discipline and obedience in the time of stress, strain, and unimaginable threat to life an honor. Have you and your crew's training been built to refine and demonstrate those qualities? How do you address shortcomings? Are your Chiefs and First Class focused, demanding, masters of their team and duties?

As the Sydney approached the starboard beam of the larger Kormoran, the cruiser used a daytime searchlight to flash the signal “NNJ,” the maritime code ordering the merchant ship to identify herself. After a delay, the Kormoran ran up the signal flags of the Dutch vessel Straat Malaaka, although their location ahead of the freighter’s single large funnel purposefully made it difficult for the Sydney’s spotters to read. The warship requested the freighter to re-position the flags, and as German crew slowly complied, the distance between the two ships, still sailing due west, shrank to a mile.

“Where bound” came the second signal flashed by the Sydney. “Batavia” was the reply from the Kormoran, indicating the capital of the Dutch colony of Java lying over a thousand miles to the north.

Aboard the German raider, Detmers and the bridge staff watched the exchange of signals anxiously and urged the enemy cruiser to sail away and leave them alone. Their fear rose when they saw the Sydney’s crew prepare to launch the spotter plane from the amidships catapult. The plane, once airborne, would easily spot the hundreds of naval mines strewn about the Kormoran’s high deck, giving away its identity as a raider. But the launch crew apparently received new orders and returned the plane to its storage position.

According to the recollections of Heinz Messerschmidt, a 26-year-old lieutenant commander aboard the Kormoran at the time, Detmers turned to his officers and reassured them again, “Ah, it's tea time on board. They'll probably just ask us where we are going and what cargo and then let us go on.”

By luck and guile the Kormoran had survived for almost a year by preying on isolated Allied merchant ships. But this was its first encounter with a warship brandishing guns of equal firepower. Still playing on its disguise as a helpless merchantman, the Kormoran’s radio operator began broadcasting the alert signal “QQQQ” meaning “suspicious ship sighted.” The anxious signal likely confused the Sydney, whose radio operator would have received the transmission, as did a wireless station 150-miles away in the Australian coastal town of Geraldton.

As the parley continued, the distance between the two ships shrank to less than a mile. Lookouts on the Sydney scanned the freighter for suspicious markings or signs of weapons.

But carefully concealed behind special screens and tarps on the Kormoran’s decks was an arsenal of naval guns, torpedo tubes, and anti-tank guns, all manned, loaded, and trained on the unaware cruiser. Later investigations would attempt to determine why Captain Burnett approached so closely to the Kormoran, or if he was lured into false sense of security.

Although both ships possessed guns of similar caliber, the Sydney’s fire control system and experienced turret crews only would be an advantage at longer ranges. Whether by inexperience or trickery, the Sydney’s vulnerable position would soon turn perilous. Over an hour after the cruiser first sighted the freighter on the horizon and gave chase, Burnett ordered the Sydney to flash the signal “1K”–one half of the secret Allied call sign for the Straat Maalaka—across the short gap between the ships. The actual Dutch freighter of that name had a codebook with the corresponding two-letter response. The Kormoran did not. Detmers realized that the time for hiding was over. He ordered the Dutch flag taken down and the German naval ensign run up the mast as the camouflage screens fell away to reveal the line of gun barrels trained on the Sydney. The Kormoran’s 5.9-inch guns fired first, while the rapid-fire anti-tank and machine guns opened up on the officers visible on the cruiser’s bridge. It was shortly after half past five in the afternoon.

The first two 5.9-inch salvos from the Kormoran missed the Sydney, according to reports from the German gunners. But the third volley crashed into the bridge and gun director tower, crippling the cruiser’s ability to return accurate fire just seconds into the battle.

Meanwhile, the raider’s anti-tank and machine guns raked the Sydney’s bridge, presumably killing or wounding many of the officers standing there. Other guns sprayed the exposed portside 4-inch gun mounts and torpedo tubes, preventing their crews from manning them. According to German witnesses, the gap between the two ships was between 1,000 and 1,500 yards—a distance more appropriate for the muzzle-loading cannons of Trafalgar than the rapid-fire guns and high explosive shells of the Second World War.

The Sydney’s first response was a salvo of 6-inch rounds that passed over the now exposed raider. However, the next shells from the Kormoran smashed into the cruiser’s forward “A” and “B” turrets and put them out of action. Another German shell exploded the spotter plane amidships, spilling burning aviation fuel over the decks and black smoke billowing into the sky. Sydney’s “X” and “Y” turrets located in the rear of the ship continued to fire under local control for a few more minutes, but only the crew of “X” achieved hits, sending three rounds into the high-sided freighter. One shell struck amidships, and another punched into the engine room. But the third shell tore through the raider’s funnel, severing the oil warming lines and sending burning fluids cascading down into the motor room to ignite a major fire.

At about this time the Kormoran reportedly launched two torpedoes; at least one struck the Sydney between the mangled “A” and “B” turrets tearing a huge gash in the bow and igniting even more fires. Locked together like two wavering boxers, the warships exchanged constant blows that crippled them both within a few minutes. A storm of shells swept across the water as impacting rounds blossomed into fireballs and pillars of smoke from burning fuel climbed into the evening sky.

Fifteen minutes after firing began, the stricken Sydney made a sudden turn to port, passing close behind the Kormoran and allowing the raider’s rear guns to engage the previously sheltered starboard side of the cruiser. But the Sydney’s turn also permitted her crew to launch a spread of four torpedoes at the raider, all of which missed.

By this time the fires in the Kormoran’s engine room had spread to destroy the machinery, causing the freighter to stop in the water. The Sydney limped slowly away to the south still under fire, down severely at the bow and burning ferociously. Around six o’clock the now immobile Kormoran loosed a final torpedo from an underwater tube at the fleeing Sydney that apparently missed. The 5.9-inch guns on the raider continued to engage the cruiser for another half hour as the range increased and darkness fell. The Germans’ last view of the Sydney came a few hours after sunset—a burning glow on the distant southern horizon that slowly flickered and faded away.

Detmers soon realized that the Kormoran’s uncontrollable fires threatened the hundreds of volatile mines stored on the deck. He ordered his crew to set scuttling charges and abandon ship. Without panicking, the German crew launched lifeboats and watched as the charges detonated along the ship’s keel shortly after midnight, sinking the Kormoran on her 352nd continuous day at sea.

Of the raiders crew of 397 officers and men, 317 survivors reached the Australian coast over the next few days. And in an outcome that has fueled controversy ever since, neither the Sydney, nor her crew of 645 officers and men, were ever seen again.

That is why we have standards. That is why we have qualifications. That is why we should demand excellence and discipline. Are your standards and expectation focused for the same reasons as Fregattenkapitän (Commander) Theodor Detmers? An epic story.

BZ to ewok40k for pointing out that KORMORAN has been found, and as Matt tells us, the SYDNEY has been found as well.

Saving the US Merchant Industry with Captain John Konrad - on Midrats

 

The neglected American merchant fleet and industry is a problem long standing. The realization of the growing challenge on the other side of the Pacific, and the knowledge of what is needed to support it, has brought the problem in sharp relief. 

Like most long neglected problems, the causes are many and deep. Ships, personnel, legal, regulatory, and the latest punch from COVID-19 have all intensified an already gathering storm. 

Returning to Midrats this Sunday from 5-6pm to discuss this critical foundation of maritime power will be Captain John Konrad. 

John is the founder and CEO of the maritime news site gCaptain.com and author of the book Fire On The Horizon. He is licensed to captain the world's largest ships and has sailed from ports around the world. John is an adviser at MassChallenge, SeaAhead, and the MIT startup blkSAIL. He is a distinguished alumnus of New York Maritime College. 

If you use iTunes, you can add Midrats to your podcast list simply by clicking the iTunes button at the main showpage - or you can just click here.

Mini Hospital Ships and Influence Squadrons

The end of July brought us this little nugget that I have not pulled out of draft yet;

Republican senators want to include $2.2 billion for Navy shipbuilding in the latest round of relief funds meant to combat the coronavirus pandemic.

According to the text of the bill, lawmakers would allot $1.45 billion of that money so the service could buy four “expeditionary medical ships.”

The proposed funds for medical vessels come after the Navy dispatched its two hospital ships, USNS Mercy (T-AH-19) and USNS Comfort (T-AH-20), earlier this year to aid in pandemic relief efforts. Austal USA, which builds the Expeditionary Fast Transport (EPF) vessels in Mobile, Ala., has evaluated the potential to use the EPF hull for missions like hospital ships.

Here and over on Midrats we've asked for more hospital ship and for more "unsexy but important."

From both a manning and utility point of view - there is a whole lot of potential for presence, public relations, and info ops with these vessels inline with Jerry Hendrix's "Influence Squadrons" concept from the previous decade.

It is as correct now as it was then. Many of the naysayers when it comes to hospital ships touch on the fact our existing hospital ships are hard to man, have obsolete engineering plants, etc, etc.

These are smaller, more flexible, easier to ... well ... as VADM Merz said more professionally;

“The problem with those [hospital] ships is, there’s only two of them, and they’re big, and we’re moving to a more distributed maritime operations construct,” Merz explained at the April 2018 hearing. “There’s no lack of commitment [to this medical capability]; matter of fact, we’re taking a broader look at the capabilities on whether or not they are aligned with the way we plan to fight our future battles. So you’re going to see that requirement surface probably this year, and then we’ll start the process on how we’re going to fill that requirement.”

I think we should at least experiment with a variation of Jerry Hendrix's influence squadrons with these at the core.

Hospital Ships: Build, Buy, or Convert to Them Now

Here and on Midrats we have been calling for new and more hospital ships for over a decade. In a crisis, needs and utility come in to clear focus.

The argument should be over. I give you Rep. Jim Banks R-IN;

We need a fleet of a dozen or more hospital ships, says Navy reservist and Indiana Congressman Jim Banks.

Good people can hold different opinions on things, but good people can be wrong. Those who don’t support something between new hospital ships to replace the ancient MERCY and COMFORT on one end of the scale to taking up Banks’s idea on the other are, well, just wrong.

While there are many more, here are the Top-3 Reasons hospital ships are critical to our Navy:

1. Presence, morale and reassurance are missions. When citizens of LA & NYC see these CVN sized which ships sail in to view, they will know that their government cares and is there to serve.

2. Mobility is a multiplier. A mobile, self-supporting 1,000 bed hospital would be science fiction if it didn’t already exist. Look at the recent videos of hospitals in Spain and Italy with patients laying down on floors in hallways. Tell those people they don’t need a 1,000 bed hospital to help take even the non-COVID load.

3. Nice in peace and war. When not needed for war, pandemics, or natural disasters – imagine the positive effects to our nation of our hospital ships and other ships visiting ports of nations who have limited to no medical care for their citizens. Just ponder what a fleet of 4, 6, or 12 could do? Imagine the training our people will get seeing things they never would in the USA.

That is enough. I’ve read and digested all the reasons not to have hospital ships, and to be frank, they are weak arguments made by myopic minds.

If they can’t change their minds now, then they are just bullheaded.

Executive Director Gene Seroka: “Port of Los Angeles stands ready to partner with the @USNavy and the federal government as it prepares to bring the USNS Mercy to the Port of Los Angeles. The welfare of our residents is the top priority during this public health crisis.” #COVID19 pic.twitter.com/4p28o9TBL6

— Port of Los Angeles (@PortofLA) March 22, 2020

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UPDATE: BEHOLD!

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UPDATE:

The City of LA is thrilled to welcome #USNSMercy to the our hospital overflow strategy. Mercy will help attend to patients requiring acute care and in doing so will open up capacity in LA regional hospitals to address COVID-19 patients. #LAStrong #GoNavy https://t.co/eftVLtoKJt

— 𝐉eff 𝐆orell (@JeffGorell) March 25, 2020

Cruise Ships and the USNR: a COVID-19 Public-Private Partnership we Need Today

This will require nimble, flexible, and imaginative leadership who are willing to adjust and improvise on the fly. 

Leadership that will accept the OK CONOPS today for a good one tomorrow and be willing to make mistakes and correct them quickly. 

We have great people in the Navy Reserve who are underemployed for the skills they have, but know how to work in a disciplined manner on a ship. They don't need to be from a medical field; engineering, deck, admin, security, culinary, and the ability to stand watch are all that would be needed to bulk up and support such efforts as this.

There can be a quick turnaround if the right people with the right top-cover move now.

This is a great offer the USNR can help make better, faster, more effective.

Carnival Corporation has issued an official press release confirming its ships are available to take pressure of land-based healthcare options globally.

The company said that governments and health authorities should consider using cruise ships as temporary healthcare facilities to treat non-COVID-19 patients, freeing up additional space and expanding capacity in land-based hospitals to treat cases of COVID-19, the company said.

As part of the offer, interested parties will be asked to cover only the essential costs of the ship's operations while in port, Carnival announced.

Governments or health authorities with interest can contact Monica Puello by email at MPuello@Carnival.com or by phone at (305) 406-8656.

According to Carnival, if needed, cruise ships are capable of being quickly provisioned to serve as hospitals with up to 1,000 hospital rooms that can treat patients suffering from less critical, non-COVID-19 conditions. These temporary cruise ship hospital rooms can be quickly converted to install and connect remote patient monitoring devices over the ship's high-speed network – providing cardiac, respiratory, oxygen saturation and video monitoring capabilities. The rooms also have bathroom facilities, private balconies with access to sun and fresh air, as well as isolation capabilities, as needed.

All You Need to Know About the Sealift Crisis in One Picture

There really is no additional commentary required on my part.

BEHOLD!

Hat tip CharlieB & The Other Sal.

Stress Tested a Sealift Surge? How'd it go?

We just stress tested our Strategic Sealift. We'll discuss what we can learn from it this Sunday from 5-6pm Eastern with returning guest, Salvatore Mercogliano.

Sal sailed with MSC from 1989 to 1992, and worked MSC HQ as Operations Officer for the Afloat Prepositioning Force 1992-1996.

He has a BS Marine Transportation from SUNY Maritime College, a MA Maritime History and Nautical Archaeology from East Carolina University, and received his Ph.D. in Military and Naval History from University of Alabama.

He's taught at East Carolina University, Methodist University, UNC-Chapel Hill, & the U.S. Military Academy.

Currently an adjunct professor at the US Merchant Marine Academy and an Associate Professor of History at Campbell University in Buies Creek, NC.

Recently published “We Built Her to Bring Them Over There: The Cruiser and Transport Force in the Great War,” in the Winter 2017-18 issue of Sea History; author of Fourth Arm of Defense: Sealift and Maritime Logistics in the Vietnam War, published by the Naval History and Heritage Command in 2017, and 2nd Prize winner in the 2015 US Naval Institute Naval History Contest with Semper Sealift: The U.S. Marine Corps, Merchant Marine, and Maritime Prepositioning. 

You can listen to the show at this link or below, but remember, if you don't already, subscribe to the podcast at Spreaker or any of the other podcast aggregators.

If you use iTunes, you can add Midrats to your podcast list simply by clicking the iTunes button at the main showpage - or you can just click here.

Fullbore Friday

War wages all around you, and yet, you have your modest ship.

The motor vessel Ondina was a modern Dutch tanker of the Petroleum Company La Corona and had been delivered by the Dutch Dry Dock Company in Amsterdam [Amsterdamse Droogdok Maatschappij ADM]. The tanker had an overall length of 130 meters and a standard displacement of 6,341 ton and was equipped with a 6 cylinder Werkspoor diesel engine with a modest power supply of 2,800 shp. The maximum speed of the Ondina therefor was only 12 knots.

Each day brings harder news, yet you have a mission. 

The enemy is all around, and escorts are few. Who will protect you from the enemy?

...the new Bathurst-class corvette HMIS Bengal, which was destined for the British Indian Navy. During the Second World War 60 of these ships were constructed after an Australian design. Four of these corvettes, often called minesweepers as they were equipped with minesweeping equipment, had been built in the framework of the ’Commonwealth’s Shipbuilding Programme’ for the Indian Navy. British India at that time was still a British colony and therefore automatically a member of the Commonwealth. The four ships built for India were HMIS Madras, HMIS Punjab, HMIS Bombay and HMIS Bengal. This last ship was taken into service on 8 August, 1942, by Lieutenant Commander W.J. Wilson of the Royal Navy Reserve (RNR).

The corvettes of the Bathurst-class originally had a standard displacement of 650 ton but during the war the vessels were loaded with masses of extra equipment, ammunition and depth charges; so fully equipped they had a displacement of over 1,000 ton. The ships were provided with a triple expansion steam engine which supplied 2,000 shp. The max speed of the corvettes was designed to be 15 knots, but because of the larger displacement most of them did not go faster than 13 knots. On HMIS Bengal a 7.6cm gun (twelve pounder) had been installed as the foreseen 10.2cm guns were no longer in stock. The secondary armament of the ship consisted of a 40mm Bofors and two 20mm Oerlikon machine guns as anti-aircraft weapons. For the anti-submarine warfare the multi-purpose vessel was equipped with a type 38 Asdic (fore runner of the sonar) and 40 depth charges.

As the Bengal had only a capacity of 186 tons of heavy liquid fuel oil she could not reach India in one go from the Australian mainland. But sailing together, the ships would serve each other: the Ondina received an escort for part of the trip and HMIS Bengal could obtain fuel from the Dutch tank ship. It was scheduled that the Ondina and the Bengal would split up at Diego Garcia on the Chagos Archipellago south of the Maldives. On 5 November, 1942, the two allied ships departed from Fremantle. With an average speed of 10 knots it promised to be a long and dull crossing.

Dull? No. That was not to be.

In the morning of 11 November, 1942, HMIS Bengal and the Ondina sailed in line ahead, heading west-north-west. It was a nice and sunny day with a flat sea and excellent visibility. Around 11:30 a lookout of the Ondina saw two ships appear over the horizon at 90 degrees over port at a distance of approximately 12,000 meters. A little bit later the ships were also sighted from the Bengal. Because of the high deckhouses the strange ships for a moment were taken to be aircraft carriers. Because there had been no mentioning at all about allied ships being in the neighborhood, both Ondina and Bengal sounded the alarm and both ships turned 90 degrees to starboard, away from the suspected enemy ships. Around 11:50 Bengal signaled to Ondina to maintain her heading. The Bengal herself turned into the opposite direction in order to catch up head on with the enemy ships and to create time for Ondina to escape.

The enemy ships were recognized to be Japanese auxiliary cruisers and the Bengal steamed straight forward towards the one in front. First they thought that they were facing Hokoku Maru and the smaller Kunikawa Maru. Captain Horsman understood that he would never be able to pick up sufficient speed with his slow tanker to escape from the faster Japanese vessels and decided to face the battle and to support the Bengal with his 10.2cm gun. Just before 12:00 Hokoku Maru opened fire at HMIS Bengal and at 11:58 the corvette send an SOS signal to Fremantle with the message that they and the Ondina were under fire of two Japanese raiders in the position of 19.38 degrees southern latitude and 93.5 degrees eastern longitude, about half way Fremantle and the Chagos Archipellago. HMIS Bengal answered the fire of the Hokoku Maru with her twelve pounder. Second mate Bakker of the Ondina, who was the artillery commander of the tanker and was standing on the poop deck next to the gun, asked permission from captain Horsman to open fire. Steaming away from the approaching Japanese auxiliary cruisers, the captain of the Ondina granted permission. The artillery crew consisted of merchant seaman Visser, Able Seaman B.A. Hammond of the Royal Australian Navy and the Acting Able Bodied Seamen R.H. Bayliss, H.C. Boyce and H.A. Brooklyn of the Royal Navy. The Ondina opened fire when the Hokoku Maru had approached till about 8.000 meters, around 12:05. While the Dutch tanker received her first 14cm hit, which splintered the mast, the first 10.2cm shell of the Ondina went wide and the second hit just in front of the bow of the Japanese auxiliary cruiser. Therewith Second Mate Bakker could adjust his fire and the third grenade hit the deckhouse of the enemy ship. This was an extra ordinary achievement as the Ondina was not equipped with distance measuring equipment nor with fire-guidance. Bakker now diverted his fire to the stern of the Hokoku Maru. Whilst both HMIS Bengal as the Hokoku Maru continued to shoot at each other the fifth or sixth shot of the Ondina caused an enormous explosion on the Japanese auxiliary cruiser. A giant yellowish flame erupted and soon thereafter part of the stern broke off while the wrecked float planes shattered into the sea. The broken part of the rear of the ship sank and wild fires broke out in various places onboard the ship. Thereafter the ship listed heavily to starboard which caused ammunition to roll over and even more explosions erupted.

Aboard the Ondina they could not believe their ears and eyes The artillery crew danced for joy in spite of the fact that some enemy shells hit which damaged the radio antenna and one of the starboard life boats. The Chinese crew members who were not on duty, had sought a safe refuge below deck and AB Seaman Henry did his utmost to keep them composed. The Aikoku Maru now took aim on both ships and placed several hits on both ships that caused little damage though. When the Bengal ran out of ammunition the corvette put up a smoke screen and turned away from the battle around 12:40. One minute later the Bengal was hit again; this time in the rear which caused a fire to start. The crew of the corvette however succeeded to control the fire. The last they saw of the Ondina aboard the Bengal was that the tanker received a hit on the bridge at 13:08 and desperately tried to prevent further hits by changing course all the time a little bit. The corvette after having seen this, sent a coded message with the information that one of the auxiliary cruisers as well as the tanker had been sunk.

Aboard the Hokoku Maru the crew could not control the heavy fires and Commander Hiroshi could do nothing else but to issue the order to abandon ship. In the meantime on board all electrical power had failed and the engine rooms were ablaze. Because the Hokoku Maru was a converted merchant ship she did not have many watertight compartments; consequently the vessel made quickly a lot of water and after another heavy explosion the auxiliary cruiser foundered at 13:12. Of the 354 crew 76 lost their lives amongst whom Captain Hiroshi. 

 

In the meantime Ondina had fired her last 10.2cm shells whilst the Aikoku Maru had closed in on the tanker up to approximately 3.500 meters. Captain Horsman ordered white flags to be hoisted and ordered to abandon ship. The engines had stopped and the crew disembarked the ship in three life boats and two life rafts. The hit that struck the Ondina at 13:08 on her bridge, the last to be seen by the Bengal, killed captain Horsman. The remaining Japanese raider approached the Ondina up till 400 yards and launched two torpedoes towards the abandoned ship that both hit. Large holes were blasted in the starboard side of tanks number 1 and 2. This caused the Ondina to list to about thirty degrees, but remained floating on the other tanks. Thereafter the auxiliary cruiser maneuvered along the bow of the tanker, of which the Japanese thought that its fate had been sealed and started to machine gun the life boats and rafts. This war crime was probably committed out of frustration about the sinking of the Hokoku Maru and the escape of the Bengal. By this machine gunning three Chinese stokers were killed and the chief engineer J.J. Niekerk and ABS Henry were severely wounded. Chief engineer Niekerk died an hour afterwards from his wounds.

At 15:00 the Aikoku Maru had picked up the survivors of her sister ship and returned to the Dutch tanker. The Japanese fired another torpedo but missed. Convinced that the tanker had been lost, the Japanese auxiliary cruiser left the battle scene and sailed away in northerly direction without any further concern about the drowning crew of the Ondina.

Salvage of the Ondina
After the first mate Rehwinkel had provided a seaman’s grave to the chief engineer, he wanted to return to the Ondina. Of the crewmembers that were with him in the life boat only sailor Visser was prepared to accompany him. The others, Chinese crew members refused to come along as they feared that the Ondina would sink as yet. Second mate Bakker in the meantime, with the motor launch in which he was commander, had returned to the tanker. Together with third engineer Leys, the Australian gunner Hammond and the British artillerist Ryan he boarded the ship which was still on fire in several places. Bakker and the gunners started to pump water into several of the port tanks which slowly righted the Ondina. Leys inspected the engine room and established that the diesel engine was still in working condition. The motor launch was sent to collect the other life boats and rafts and Leys and Bakker went to the bridge where a fire was still burning. The fire was extinguished by both men after which they carried the body of the captain to his cabin. The tanker had in the meantime been righted and the outboard valves could be closed. Around 19:00 all life boats were alongside the tanker and the crews from the rafts had been taken aboard the life boats. The life boats were hoisted on board as good and as bad as this was possible and secured. The stokers and engineers went to work and a few hours later first officer Rehwinkel could give the order ”slow ahead”. And somewhat later even “full ahead”. The heavily damaged tanker set her heading for Fremantle while the crew extinguished the last fires in the forecastle.

The next day captain Horsman received a dignified seaman’s burial. The wounded were cause for serious worry. Especially ABS Henry was in serious condition. He had a crushed leg and had lost a lot of blood and was in urgent need of professional care. After two days the crew of the Ondina was of the opinion to be safe enough to send a radio message and to ask for medical assistance. This message was sent in clear language as, after the order to abandon ship, all secret documents and also the code book had been thrown overboard. The surprising and unexpected message was being received by the allied authorities in Colombo on Ceylon and in Fremantle with disbelieve and mistrust. As the Bengal had indeed reported the Ondina to be sunk and a trap, created by the Japanese in order to lure a ship towards them, was suspected. From Fremantle a signal was sent to inquire about her position. Rehwinkel did not dare to provide this because his clear language message could also be read by the enemy. Therefore medical assistance remained lacking for the time being.

It was not until 17 November before the damaged tanker was reconnoitered by an Australian Catalina flying boat, over 220 nm north-west of Fremantle. Onboard the Ondina shortly before, a ship had been spotted and with signal lamp the Catalina was asked to contact that ship and to ask for the presence of a doctor. The relevant ship turned out to be the Australian hospital ship HMAS Wanganella and it was directed quickly towards the Ondina. By quick handling of the doctors the life of ABS Henry could be saved. The next day the Dutch tanker entered the port of Fremantle after a trip that had not proceeded according to expectations and which had cost the lives of five crew. The day before HMIS Bengal had safely made the harbor of Diego Garcia. The last days the corvette had to sail at slow speed to safe fuel, but there had been no further problems.

Note, both ships ran out of ammo.

You never have enough ammo.

The accountants and supply people are always wrong. Take what they say you need, and add at least 30% more.

Always.

Also, when the next war comes, and it will - what are our plans to give our auxiliaries teeth? They will need it - regardless what the peacetime theorists say.

They always have during every war with a maritime component. From the dawn of time. It won't be different next time either.




Nice video here a year later of the Bengal.


H/t MR.