The Three Wounds of our Amphibious Navy

To see where we are and where we need to go, it is always helpful to remind ourselves how we got here.

First let's look where we are; the Navy telling Congress to bugger-off;

Via Caitlin Kenny at DefenseOne;

The Navy is proposing to drop its amphibious fleet below 31 ships, despite an agreement with the Marine Corps and a potential violation of last year’s defense policy law. 

Sent to Congress on Monday, the Navy’s proposed $255.8 billion 2024 budget aims to retire eight warships before the end of their intended service life, including three Whidbey Island-class dock landing ships, or LSDs, that it proposed to scrap last year but which were saved by the 2023 National Defense Authorization Act

There are a lot of people out there so far this week doing great work reading the entrails of the latest budget, so I won't try to replicate their fine work here. 

This did not happen by accident. This is not happening as a result only of a lack of funds. This did not happen because a black cat walked in front of the CNO.

No. This is the predictable result of three things Big Navy has control of, but by acts of commission and omission, consistently made the wrong decision.

Wound One: Material Condition:

(We) did a ship-by-ship review, to understand the material state of each of the ships. What we found on the LSDs is that they are challenged in terms of readiness.

As we have covered here for the better part of two decades, as have others, the Navy decided to take savings from maintenance, hide once UNCLAS INSURV behind a classified wall, and - like someone avoiding the dentist or a regular physical - more than willing make things easy by doing nothing now, knowing full well that it will only be worse later on. Unlike tooth pain or colon cancer though, the person making things easy now is not the same as the person who will take the pain later. Kind of like a programmatic/leadership "Narcissistic Personality Disorder with Sociopathic Tendencies." 

Leadership let their fleet rot, and then pretends as if it was something that happened to the Navy, not allowed by the Navy.

Wound Two: The Tiffany Amphib:

“What we are making sure that we are doing as we move forward with our budget plans, is making sure that we have the right capabilities at the right price aligned to not only meeting military requirements, but working with industry,” Raven said. “And for LPD, we're taking a look at the acquisition strategy moving forward, again, to make sure that we would have the right capabilities at the right price and working with industry partners to put together that plan moving forward.”

From the start of the LPD-17 program, our ongoing criticism was that this was way to expensive on a per-hull basis for the mission of a LPD. From the titanium firemain on, the entire design had no respect for budget challenges to buy the numbers needed so in a future conflict, we were not one or two ships sunk from being mission ineffective, but here we are. 

It took a lot of seabags full of money and Sailor sweat to fix the ship, but her cost remains a sea-anchor if you wanted more ships in 2024. If you need 10-ships, but price each unit such that you can only buy 7 ships - you own that 3 ship delta.

Would Three: Institutional Parochialism: 

Berger on Monday reiterated the reasoning behind the 31-ship requirement for amphibs.

“Anything less incurs risk to national defense by limiting the options for our combatant commanders,” he said in a statement to Defense One. “Per strategic guidance, the Marine Corps must be able to provide the nation with crisis response capabilities and build partnerships with allies and partners in support of integrated deterrence—difficult to achieve without the requisite number of amphibious warships.”

...

Buying amphibious ships tends to be the last priority for the Navy after spending shipbuilding funds on aircraft carriers, submarines, and destroyers, Hudson Institute Senior Fellow Bryan Clark said March 9 during Defense One’s State of the Navy event.

“Whatever gets left over is what can go towards the amphibious ships and the support ships. And when you do all the numbers for that, you always end up with you know maybe not quite enough for the amphibious ships, because if you're building one LHA every four or five years that you can incrementally fund, that's a chunk of money that's on the scale of you know, $500 million a year. And then you've got maybe $500 million or a billion dollars leftover for one more amphibious ship, which isn't quite an LPD,” Clark said.

From promotion rates to "prestige" - the Gator Navy has always been like that really good offensive lineman. They do their job and no one ever hears about them. Though they are paid less and don't get endorsements, without them no quarterback would be able to shine - no team achieve victory - and yet, the bias remains.

How exactly are we supposed to take and hold territory across the vast Pacific littoral? Who will do that, with what, and in how many places?

There are a lot of emoting going on about problems now that are directly the predicable results of decisions we've made.

As we review our budget, perhaps we also need to review our institutional system of incentives and disincentives that drive such decisions; the rewards and punishments that result in the selection of the leaders who make them.

VADM Brown; Remembering the Johnston's Turn

There are many fine traditions in the naval service, especially in the Anglosphere. One of the best was summarized by Admiral Nelson, RN.

When in doubt, attack. That bias for action in the face of a threat is an admirable trait, especially when contrasted with a more common human reaction – to freeze. 

As we have evolved as a species, other reactions developed past these Upper-Paleolithic instincts of Homo Sapiens. Indeed, in the modern evolution of Homo Bureaucraticus, scapegoating and blame-shifting have sadly become more common through natural selection. In Ottomanesque bureaucracies, game recognizes game, and such responses are rewarded and passed along generation after generation, eventually being a characteristic trait of a sub-species. 

Megan Eckstein kicks the work week off with a broad ranging, complicated, and important development in the story of the burning of the USS Bonhomme Richard (LHD-6), whose two-year anniversary will arrive at the end of next week.

I see it as two interrelated stories; our Navy’s institutional failure of the fundamentals (Part I), and a gentleman’s response to an attack on his honor (Part II).

We’ll do a “Part-I” and “Part-II” format.

Before we dive in to Part-I, let’s review a few entering arguments which have anchored many conversations here over the last 18-yrs that apply in this case.

1. The Navy’s investigatory and legal system is no longer fit for purpose. It is hopelessly compromised by a culture infected with undue influence, sloth, and self-focus.

2. No one can trust a “Big Navy” investigation. The smart will lawyer-up early with outside counsel, keep meticulous records with secure backups, trust few, and suspect anyone who directly or indirectly will benefit from their downfall. It isn’t always about right and wrong, the longer it goes on it brings out the worst aspects of our adversarial legal system – it is about what can be blamed on whom not in the service of justice, but in service to the career goals of those conducting the investigation and prosecution.

3. We have too many Flag Officers with too few real Flag Officer responsibilities. As such, we have a warped culture where large numbers of ambitious people are underemployed and seek authority yet wish to avoid responsibility as demanded by our present system of incentives and disincentives. 

Part I: C2 Matters

I hope Megan does not mind me pulling so much from her article, but especially for those who have served in staff positions, the core to this story is the C2 diagram (Figure 1) in para 6 of Enclosure (3) of OPNAVINST 3440.18 Dated 13 Nov 2018.

To start out, no, I have no idea what the doctrinally correct definition of a “Bridge Line Command” is. 

I spent 9-yrs of my 21-yr Navy career as a staff officer on USA and NATO staffs with untold hours working on C2 diagrams and relationships. I have never heard of that term, and a little googlefu cannot find it defined anywhere. I only see it referenced directly or indirectly to 3440.18. If you can find anything better, please let us know in comments. 

Additionally, para 6 ends with the phrase “command bridge line.” That is also a term I am not familiar with. I can only find one other Navy use of it in a NAVSEA document referring to communications. I will assume it is related to para. 3 of Encl.(3) but the list there is not fully congruent with the strange dashed box in Figure 1 of Encl.(3) … so, we’ll just put it to bad staff work.

So, yeah … how this ever got approved is beyond me, but it is what we had … and bad staff work usually manifests itself with poor results in the field … and here we are.

So, there is no definition of what the solid lines are in the diagram vs the dot-dash line … there are all sorts of inadequacies with the diagram itself and I’m not going to pick it apart anymore, but the important part is on the previous page in paras 1 and 2:

1. The chain of command is provided graphically in figure 1 of this enclosure. As the in-hull incident commander, the ship’s CO controls all damage control efforts on board the ship. The CO is assisted by a fire department senior fire chief or officer and naval supervising authority project superintendent (if applicable).

2. The area or unified area commander will remain in constant contact with the in-hull incident command. All requests for additional resources, special equipment, or technical expertise will be passed through the area commander. The area commander will man all bridge lines.

This is rather clear, “…the ship’s CO controls all damage control efforts on board the ship.” So is, “All requests for additional resources, special equipment, or technical expertise will be passed through the area commander.” … and the Area Commander reports to the Primary Commander (Fleet Commander).

So, I believe the “Area Commander” here would be CNRSW and the “Primary Commander” would be C3F.  BTW, why does Commander Navy Region Southwest hardly get any mention here? Seriously, I have no idea.

Now that we have this. Behold this mess;

The initial response to the July 2020 fire that destroyed the multibillion-dollar amphibious assault ship Bonhomme Richard was uncoordinated and hampered by confusion as to which admiral should cobble together Navy and civilian firefighters, according to new information from the then-head of Naval Surface Forces.

The discombobulation in those early hours meant sailors may have missed a small window to contain the fire in a storage area. One admiral who said he lacked authority to issue an order pleaded with the ship’s commanding officer to get back on the ship and fight the fire, when the CO and his crew were waiting on the pier. And when that admiral — now-retired Vice Adm. Rich Brown — found the situation so dire that he called on other another command to intervene, it refused, Brown said in an interview.

...

Brown, as the type commander for surface ships, said he should have played a supporting role the morning the fire broke out.

...

So Brown called ship commanding officer, Capt. Gregory Scott Thoroman, who said he and the crew had left the ship and were on the pier. The investigation into the fire noted the crew pulled out of the ship twice during the firefight that morning.

Thoroman should have been coordinating with the base’s Federal Fire Department and the Southwest Regional Maintenance Center, collectively forming the incident command team, according to a 2018 Navy instruction laying out fire prevention and fire response responsibilities for ships in maintenance.

...

With the Navy’s organization falling apart, he called the Expeditionary Strike Group 3 commander, Rear Adm. Phil Sobeck, around 11 a.m.

“Phil, you can tell me to eff off, because I’m not in your chain of command, but you have to get down to that pier and provide leadership and guidance because they’re all sitting at the end of the pier watching the ship burn,” Brown said he told Sobeck. “And he goes, ‘Admiral, I’m getting in the car, I’m on my way.’”

...

Brown directed his staff to contact U.S. 3rd Fleet around 12:30 p.m., but 3rd Fleet’s position was, “The ship’s in maintenance, it’s not our problem.”

Who accepts responsibility? Who avoids it and why? As a friend mentioned earlier today to me, “Quite sure Kimmel did not say “not my job.””

After the staff-level call failed, Brown set up a call with 3rd Fleet Commander Vice Adm. Scott Conn, for the two three-stars to hash it out directly.

“I said, hey, Phil’s down there, but we have to formally establish a new command structure. And he told me he wasn’t going to do it because the ship was in maintenance and it’s not his problem. And I said fine.”

...

He then called the then-Pacific Fleet commander, Adm. John Aquilino.

“I told him what I had done, what I was seeing: the C2 degrading on the pier, there’s no focus of effort, people are off doing their own things. And I told him that I had asked Scott to take command and he said no. And I said ... ‘Phil now works for me, and I’ve got it.’”

“Absolutely, Rich, you got it, put the fire out,” the admiral replied, according to Brown.

At the time we were all wondering what was going on. Chaos, that's what.

A bias for action, again one of our better traditions. In times of crisis, often those who should be responsible do not rise to the occasion, endangering not just themselves and their command, but everyone around them. It is not unheard of for this to be part of a cascading set of failures to act. Below the primary failure no one will do anything absent that direction as they either lack confidence or perspective to see the failure, and those above who should take charge don’t for similar reasons or just plain ignorance.

What did VADM Brown do here as CNSF? No, he was not in the chain of command, but he was a leader who saw a failure to lead and he stepped up to try to get those who are responsible to act, and absent their actions, fill the gap as best he could as a supporting entity outside the chain of command.

Did anything he did make things worse? Did they make them better? Was any other leader showing what we ask our leaders to show – a bias for action? What does our Navy reward? What does it punish?

Part II: Honor Demands

Let’s look a bit at how I framed Part-II at the start of the post, “a gentleman’s response to an attack on his honor.” It should go without saying, but as we live in a tender and reactive age, “gentlemen” can be seen as non-gender specific, but also very specific to men. Interpret that as you wish.

Duty. As an officer in the United States Navy, who do you owe your duty to? There is both a simple and a complicated answer to that. Let’s start with the Oath;

The Oath of Office (for officers): "I, _____ (SSAN), having been appointed an officer in the _____ (Military Branch) of the United States, as indicated above in the grade of _____ do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign or domestic, that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that I take this obligation freely, without any mental reservations or purpose of evasion; and that I will well and faithfully discharge the duties of the office upon which I am about to enter; So help me God."

The Constitution first of all, that is pretty much a “Ref. A” answer. We have that document and rafts of judges up to SCOTUS to give us the “Ref. B.” Serious, yet complicated in its simplicity. That is the easy part. Then “the duties of the office.” There is that concept again, “duty.”

In the military context, that definition is rather broad and open to interpretation, but I like the definition the State of Connecticut uses;

…the performance of military service by a member of the armed forces of the state pursuant to competent state military orders, whether paid or unpaid for such military service, including training, performance of emergency response missions and traveling directly to or returning directly from the location of such military service.

In practice, things get complicated from there. Loyalty is talked about a lot, yet abused more often. Are you loyal to people, or institutions? Yourself? Your family? “Ship, Shipmate, Self” is something we throw around a lot, and is a useful entering argument, but it is not a one-way relationship. As in all well-functioning systems, the relationship is interlocked and multi-relational. 

Most will find themselves in situations small and large where they find out that their assumptions about the systems they are a part of are no longer valid. The agreements, spoken and unspoken, that enabled decades of hard work and success, are broken. They are not working. Perhaps they never did.

Then what does one do? Where one may have spent decades taking the burdens of an organization you love on to yourself personally, when does that act of love become more of an acceptance of abuse? When does a man reach a point where the honor of love is replaced by the dishonor of accepted abuse?

Part-II is about a man who found himself in a place many have found themselves in before. An organization he invested his life in, built his reputation on, and most likely loved – turned on him. He sees if not an upcoming assault on his honor, then at least an injustice, a bearing of false witness, and at a minimum an attempt to make flesh an untruth hewn from the body of his reputation.

Some will advise a man to take such things as part of the job, to not make a fuss for … the sake of the institution. Some will counsel to appeal within the system, that regardless of its malperformance to date, one must trust the system regardless and work within it. 

There is another school of thought that forces an answer to a hard question; what do you owe to an institution if that institution breaks its bond with you? What honor is there to give the gift of trust to an untrustworthy organization? If one party breaks spoken and unspoken agreements, what rule under heaven obliges the other party to act as if the break never occurred?

There is a time to accept that you are in a place you never desired to be. That even though you did all you could possibly do in the scope of your authority and responsibility, other entities are shaping your reality. They are stronger, larger, and on paper at least, more powerful. When they have you bracketed you can simply carry on as before in the knowledge that this is the fate you have been dealt, or you can decide that fate is what she is, but there is a way to embrace it with a higher honor based on a higher ethic to embrace that fate on your own terms. 

Call flank-speed, full left rudder, and engage the attacking force head on.

That, in a fashion, is how I read the strange Kafkaesque place Vice Admiral Rich Brown, USN (Ret.) finds himself in. 

Brown said he is sharing his story with Defense News now as he faces a secretarial letter of censure. He was named in the investigation as contributing to the loss of the ship, but was cleared by what’s known as a Consolidated Disposition Authority in December. He said he was not interviewed for the investigation into the fire.

Capt. J.D. Dorsey, a spokesman for Secretary of the Navy Carlos Del Toro, told Defense News “the secretary is still in the process of reviewing the command investigation and has not yet made any final decisions on actions beyond what the CDA has imposed.”

...

Brown didn’t dispute the Navy’s accounting of the rest of the five days of firefighting as laid out in the investigation, but said the investigation’s accounting of how the command and control fell apart during a crisis is incomplete and the investigation itself was “fatally defective” without interviewing him or including a full picture of what will be a key lesson learned.

...

The retired three-star said one of the reasons he wanted to share his perspective about the fire is because the same command and control flaw played a role in the 2017 collisions of destroyers Fitzgerald and McCain and the 2020 fire on Bonhomme Richard. Brown led the McCain investigation and participated in the Fitzgerald investigation, and he said one of the recommendations he made at the time was to reinstate a Cold War-era command structure that had two chains of command: one for ships in maintenance and the basic phase, led by a one-star admiral focused on ensuring they built up their readiness, and one for ships in advanced training and deployments, led by a one-star focused on employing their warfighting capability.

Brown said this setup could have prevented the Fitzgerald and McCain tragedies, and that he had urged the Navy to revamp the command and control setup in 2017.

“I was told, ‘It’s not going to happen; there’s one chain of command.’ That’s what they all kept saying to me, there’s one chain of command, and that’s the operational chain of command, which the [type commanders] are not in.”

...

Had the Navy made Brown’s recommended change in 2017, Bonhomme Richard would have been clearly under Brown’s control in 2020 and he could have taken more aggressive measures when the fire broke out.

Brown said the Navy must learn from this disaster and make the proper reforms to prevent another ship from being destroyed — and the right lessons can’t be learned or the right reforms made if the Navy is working off an incomplete and inaccurate investigation.

...

Brown said, despite the major role he played while the ship was on fire, he was never interviewed. Conn emailed him about a potential interview and to ask five specific questions related to the roles and functions of the type commander. Brown answered the questions, but said Conn never followed up to arrange a formal interview.

Brown said he had no indication he would be named as contributing to the loss of the ship until the report came out.

“I am convinced that there was undue command influence on that investigation at the end, because when you look at the findings of facts, in the findings of facts behind my name, they just don’t make any sense. And why won’t they talk to me?” he added.

...

Pacific Fleet Commander Adm. Sam Paparo serves as the consolidated disposition authority for this incident and sent Brown a short letter in December stating that “I have determined your case warrants no action.”

Brown said he thought the issue was resolved until his lawyer in early June warned him Navy Secretary Carlos Del Toro would be sending a letter of censure.

“I just don’t know what facts changed in the last six months,” he said.

...

Asked what he hoped would happen by talking to the media, Brown said the Navy has a pattern of punishing three-stars for political expediency without examining root causes and making reforms.

Though he planned to let it go before, “now I don’t think I can, because I think the Navy is destined just to make the same mistakes again and again, especially the surface navy, because we don’t have the [command and control] right.”

The more I think about this story, the more it becomes clear that VADM Brown is taking the only possible path honor, at least as I see it, demands. However, in defending his honor, he is creating a greater good for our Navy and the nation it serves.

The Navy bureaucracy and Admiralty of the last few decades continues to fail its Navy and nation. There are exceptional individuals in both, but as a body the system of incentives and disincentives as they have developed are not just underperforming in selection in aggregate, they are damaging the institution, ill-serving its Sailors, and as a result providing an sub-optimal force to defend the maritime and aerospace requirements of the republic.

The Bonnie Dick burned two years ago. In 53% of the time we took to fight WWII, Where are we? We have arrested a junior Sailor who still has not gone to trial. We still do not know what happened and if the Navy has taken pro-active steps to ensure it does not happen again.

Justice delayed is justice denied. Bad investigations protect the guilty, hide the truth, and poison the future. Accountability thrown on the innocent reeks of the vilest institutional decadence. 

Bravo Zulu Vice Admiral Brown. Bravo Zulu.

Combined Amphibious Operations in the Indo-Pacific With Maj. Zach Ota, USMC - on Midrats

 

Along the spectrum from peacetime exercises to wartime combined operations, successfully integrating multinational forces is not a pick-up game. To do it right requires leaders and institutions years of practice, trust, and demonstrated ability.

This is true of all military operations, but especially true when moving forces ashore during amphibious operations.

In our constellation of allies, partners and friends along the shores of the Indo-Pacific theater, since 2015 the United States Marine Forces Pacific has led the multi-national Pacific Amphibious Leaders Symposium.

Today we are going to dive in to not just the symposium itself to the broader topic of combined amphibious operations in the Indo-Pacific with our guest, Major Evan “Zach” Ota, USMC from the International Affairs Branch, U. S. Marine Corps Forces, Pacific.

You can get the podcast here or at the player below.

If you use iTunes, you can add Midrats to your podcast list simply by clicking the iTunes button at the main showpage - or you can just click here. You can find us on almost all your most popular podcast aggregators as well.

Scratch One Russian Navy Alligator LST

No one really knows for sure what caused the explosion this AM on the Russian Navy's 54-yr old Alligator Class LST Orsk in the Port of Berdyansk. What we do know was the accident/attack was livestreamed.

This video captures it best.

Time-lapse video showing the events at the port of Berdyansk this morning. Two LSTs left the port, one of them was on fire.

pic.twitter.com/5HljSBOhbQ

— C O U P S U R E (@COUPSURE) March 24, 2022

Just as a professional side note: BZ to the crews of the two Ropucha Class LSD for getting underway and out of the way - both of which seems to have fires of their own to fight.

What we do know is that the Russians liked to store a lot of things on the deck of an Alligator, as you can see in this pic of the Orsk's sister ship Saratov going through the Dardanelles. 

In this still, it appears that the explosion took place on or under the after portion of the deck storage area.

I'm not sure how long it takes to unload those ships, but the Russians put out this video two days ago showing the unload going rather well with most of the gear already gone;

#Russian large landing ship #Orsk and escorts occupy & unload at captured port of #Berdyansk, #ZaporizhzhiaOblast, southeast #Ukraine.#RussianArmy claim thousands #UkrainianArmy and sailors abandoned the port without a fight, leaving all infrastructure and facilities intact pic.twitter.com/jVCWy74lks

— Faith Reporters (@FaithReporters) March 22, 2022

There was, and continues to be, a lot of speculation as to the cause of this incident being some kind of attack by the Ukrainians via one of their few remaining SRBM or other weapons.  I have no more information than anyone else, but that isn't my bet. 

Heck, some are even blaming the video above as some PAO mistake in giving targeting data, etc. No. 

Everyone knew the ship was there and the unloading areas of the pier are easy to enter in to any precision targeting software from a paper map even decades old as they DON'T MOVE and thousands of people can see what is there from their apartment balcony.

No, my bet is - like the burning of our large-deck amphib the Bonnie Dick in San Diego almost two years ago - this was not caused by an attack. Probably an accident or something else internal to the ship. Perhaps sabotage, but that is low probability as well.

That being said, I had a flash of SRBM theory of my own when I first saw this ... and it brought to mind one of the nightmares LTjg Salamander had to ponder one day a bit over 31-yrs ago.

31-yrs is a long time in weapons development. Even in 1991, the Iraqis were using old Soviet Scud kit ... and yet they knew where the ports were that we were using; which piers we would use, etc. Again, they don't move. Anyone can see them.

Even in 1991 with old kit and ... well ... the Iraqi army ... they got close;

c.  February 16th Attack on Al Jubayl (Event 7 in Table 3)

Iraq fired a single Scud at the port city of Al Jubayl early on February 16th.[75] The Patriot battery positioned to defend Al Jubayl was undergoing maintenance at the time and could not engage the Scud.[76] The incoming missile broke up in flight over the harbor and hit in the water just off a large pier where six ships and two smaller craft were tied up. The missile’s impact also was about 500 feet from ammunition storage on the pier.[77] Figure 4 displays a map of the harbor showing the impact location.

Well in to the 3rd decade of the 21st Century we need to realize - regardless to what happened to the Orsk - that fixed ports are as vulnerable as fixed airfields to conventional ballistic missiles tipped with modern multi-spectral seeker-heads and other precision guidance that may or may not require external sources. These warheads are - how can I put this on this net - not dumb.

Especially west of Wake, deep in to our operational rear during a war in the western Pacific, our fixed ports, airfields, repair depots, storage areas, magazines - command locations - you name it - are all well within range of the PRC's rocket force's thousands of S/M/I/RMBs.

How can we mitigate that? Are we taking steps to mitigate that? Do we have enough BMD defenses? Do we have enough alternative places to keep the fight going?

Of course, as regular readers of CDRSalamander, you know the answers to these questions. What you need to ask yourself is why are you letting your government and your Navy continue to act like they don't exist in the reality we have?

---

UPDATE: Looks like the possibility that we are looking at a successful SS-21 attack by the Ukrainians after all. They have a limited supply, so carefully chosen target. From five days ago, the Russians themselves reported on a SS-21 attack on what seems to be the same pier;

On March 19th RT reported posted footage of the remains of a Ukrainian Tochka-U short-range ballistic missile reportedly at the port in Berdyansk which was said to be shot down, meaning Tochka-U’s were in range of the port a few days ago. https://t.co/jx4DmxsOkN pic.twitter.com/IQpxrbRo7f

— ELINT News (@ELINTNews) March 24, 2022

There is also this video from the other side of the port from the first video above that seems to show cluster munitions and a booster falling. If this video holds, the question is; do the Ukrainian SS-21's have the option to have the 9H123K warhead installed with its 50-cluster munitions released at 2,250m?

No sourcing, but this looks like submunitions. pic.twitter.com/SpjrI4k5e5

— John P. Jones (@J_PaulJones) March 24, 2022

Amphibious Operations in the Russo-Ukrainian War SITREP

As navalists are wont to do, first thing I do when looking at the latest developments in Ukraine, I look to the Black Sea coast.

In the run-up to the war, a lot of attention was given to the naval buildup on the area by the Russian Navy, especially  with the bulk of their remaining amphibious warships. Besides a minor operation in the Sea of Azov early on, there has been little seen of them, much less a vaunted amphibious assault around Odessa.

There are many tactical level details we just don’t know about at this date, so as we look to the sea, today we’ll keep this to the big pixels, specifically the fundamentals we already knew but may have forgotten to one degree or another.

Here are the five take-aways as of 21MAR2022 that have been reinforced:

1. The threat of an amphibious landing is greater than a landing itself: for a land component commander, the sea is a dark and mysterious place. Unlike land where you can take out a map and clearly see where terrain limits an enemy and define where you can employ forces to attack or defend – the sea has few natural obstacles that are easy for a land-focused force to understand. Some shores are more suitable than others, especially if the opponent’s amphibious capability is limited in number and capability, but as both the Germans and North Koreans learned the hard way, a risk-tolerant and aggressive opponent will not let that be a deal breaker if the gain is sufficient. 

2. Once your force  is there, sooner is better than later: the Russians do not have a lot of naval infantry/marines and ships to host them. As such their risk tolerance is small (warning USN). The longer a war goes on, the more hardened vulnerable shorelines can be made. Approaches can be mined, coastal defenses – both active and passive – can be put in place. Options narrow. 

3. Mobile reserve: not limited by GLOC or tied to a specific ground campaign, when opportunities present themselves ashore that is accessable from the sea, or the land component needs rapid reinforcement not available elsewhere to exploit and advance, bringing your forces ashore can provide combat ready, already provisioned, fresh forces in to theater and directly in to the fight. At sea, combat effectiveness degrades over time, but when employed ashore correctly, they appear almost magically and can be a shock for an opponent not ready for them.

Video of the Black Sea Fleet’s Orsk Project 1171 large landing ship offloading BTR-82A vehicles in Berdyansk. https://t.co/G2RaJM1DaL pic.twitter.com/S21wCfcIbO

— Rob Lee (@RALee85) March 21, 2022

4. Ashore, just another army:  In line with #3, once ashore, especially with limited forces like the Russians have, you lose your amphibious card. Your naval infantry/marines just become a butched up army running around confusing everyone with naval jargon.

5. Golden BB: Without full control of the seas, you don’t have an amphibious capability: again, small numbers exponentially increase operational risk. Especially with today’s amphibious forces where peacetime efficiency drivers put a lot of capabilities and souls on fewer and fewer ships, you are one mine, one ASCM, or a lucky 152mm round away from being operationally ineffective by loosing a critical percentage of your equipment and up to 1,000 dead, wounded, or missing – in an instant.

So, there we are. There is still a chance for an amphibious operation at scale in support an Odessa investiture (I know how I would use them), but as we see in the video embedded above, as more Russian naval infantry/marines are brought ashore to fill shortages in capability in the Russian land force, there simply won’t be much left at sea to do more than a raid here and there … if that.

Burning of the Bonnie Dick

15-months later, we have a lot more information from the burning of the USS Bonhomme Richard (LHD 6) ... and none of it is going to make you feel better.

I am of the "responsibility of command" school, but if you don't feel and smell a larger story here, you aren't paying attention.

More, along with links to the Command Investigation, are over at USNBlog.

It doesn't have to be painted grey, you know

Are we really using the right numbers when it comes to the PLAN"s amphibious capabilities?

Are we paying attention to not-so-subtle capabilities?

I'm pondering the topic over at USNIBlog.

Come on by and join me.

LCS Makes Bad Talking Points

There is a lot going on in Megan Eckstein and Mallory Shelborne’s article on the discussions last week at the Surface Navy Association Symposium, so I’m going to try to focus on two things; LCS talk and talk in general. 

I think we need a public speaking safety standdown for Flag Officers. Seriously. We continue to over promise and under deliver. We say things that simply do not survive the follow on question … but don’t take those kind of questions and get away with it. It degrades credibility and makes everyone look like a bad used car salesman. 

Why do we talk like we are spokesmen for the defense industry as opposed to a customer? Anyway, here we go. 

Surface warfare leaders throughout the Navy last week mused about how to employ new classes of ships such as the Littoral Combat Ship and Expeditionary Sea Base …

Again, for the 1,000th time, LCS is not a new ship. LCS-1 was commissioned over 12 years ago. 

Stop it.

Commander of Naval Surface Forces Vice Adm. Roy Kitchener … “I talk a lot with [U.S. 7th Fleet Commander Vice Adm. Bill Merz] out here, a big fan of LCS. If you look at the things we want to do in the 7th Fleet warfight, and you look at LOCE (Littoral Operations in a Contested Environment) and EABO and things like that, that’s what he wants to use them for,” Kitchener said.

Who here remembers when we had the most senior leaders discuss the need to keep LCS out of any kind of peer conflict? Now, we want them up close and personal? OK. 

For the last decade when it became clear we would never execute PLAN SALAMANDER, I said we would eventually have to find some way with lots of money and Sailor sweat to make something useful of these ships. 

Good people in hard jobs will have to grab all the welding torches, extension cords, and duct tape they can and kludge something together. We are … but don’t oversell what we have here. Don't get me wrong, we are making progress, but there is only so much marginal utility you can squeeze out of LCS. More the LCS-2 Class than the LCS-1 Class ... but not all that much.

In general, this CONOPS is sub-optimal, though I do like the neo-LSTs – but the LCS oversell here is comical;

The new Light Amphibious Warships will be the primary ships conducting EABO, carrying groups of about 75 Marines as they maneuver around island chains and shorelines, stopping to conduct missions ashore and then heading back out to sea to evade targeting by the adversary. Though the Marines will carry some land-based anti-ship missiles with them, integrating LCS into that mission set would provide a sea-based strike capability for the Marines as they move around and conduct their missions.

Who is giving you air and submarine protection? It ain’t LCS. 

Remember many moons ago I told you the LCS CONOPS was garbage because they will be asked to do things they were never designed to do because they would wind up being the only thing in the toolbox? Commanders would have to put Sailors in sub-optimal platforms with a greater risk of death and mission failure? People said all sorts of things in the comments section telling us how wrong we were. Well, kiss my grits.

In the coming years, the LCSs will only grow more lethal and survivable to take on whatever mission fleet commanders ask of them. … Kitchener said in his speech that the LCSs would be “on the front lines” in the Pacific and that the fleet would keep pushing to make them as lethal and as reliable as possible for any future fight.

All of it is coming to pass. All of it.

Moton added that the package included upgrading the Independence-variant ships to an Aegis-based common combat system, adding the Nulka decoy system and the SEWIP Lite electronic warfare package to all the LCSs in the fleet, along with other upgrades.

Note no mention of FREEDOM Class upgrades. 

In summary, they/we are trying to make LCS something like a light frigate … something like one. Close as you can given the limitations. Bookmark that. 

…and here we have our friend Rear Admiral Casey Morton, USN PEO for Unmanned and Small Combatants … I think he is trolling me here.

“I see it as a fairly youthful platform, and I think we’ve learned a lot with these deployments, and we’re figuring out how to make them more lethal, and we think we’ve figured out what missions we want them to do out there, and so I think it’s going to be kind of exciting,” he said.

It is 2021. Again, LCS-1 was commissioned 12 years ago with all the missions identified. All those mission modules … you know the drill. We are in the land Salamander promised you we would be in … and yet … and yet … we don’t learn.

“Talking to the Woody Williams skipper and the other ESB skippers, they are not at all fearful of mines because it’s highly survivable,” he said. “We’re going to get surprised – even though we want to keep the man out of the minefield, if you’re going to get close to a minefield, it’s probably best to be in an ESB because she can take a hit and keep on ticking.”

This quote has nothing to do with LCS per se, but it is unalloyed LCS mindset. Bullshit. 

We need to stop with the happy talk. “…not at all fearful of mines…”? Even if you hit one of the relatively small MN103 MANTA mines like Tripoli and Princeton did, you are at least mission killed. 

Something larger? 

I don’t want CO’s “…not at all fearful of mines…” You can call it “guarded respect” instead of fear if you wish, but I want someone in charge of such a high demand, low density asset as an ESB to have a healthy bit of it. We only have two commissioned, two under construction and one more ordered. 

How is that LCS mission module going anyway?

Crossposted to substack.

By 2030 Who Will Have the Largest Amphibious Force in the Pacific?

If you haven't been tracking the Chinese Navy's growing amphibious capability, now is the time to start doing so.

I'm pondering a nice article over at USNIBlog.

Come on by and give it a read.

The Burning of the USS Bonhomme Richard (LHD 6)

The pic on the right is from 0700 local time in San Diego via Denis Bondarenko, a civmar across the pier. Over the last 24-hrs, she has burned bow to stern, and overnight fire made it up the island to the bridge, the aft mast collapsed and more. That is only what we can see from the outside, you can imagine the damage internally.

BHR spent the last two years in a yard period. The 22-yr old big-deck amphib was being modernized and made ready for F-35B and to be a critical part of our fleet through this decade. Last night when I realized that after the ship was abandoned, we now had firefighting crews back on board, I was uncharacteristically optimistic, but with the morning not anymore.

I’ll go ahead and make this bet; the ship is a total loss. The big battle now is to make sure the ship does not sink pierside.

There is a lot we do not know, and even though almost everyone who served has their pet theories about fires in a yard, it is best to see what is discovered during the upcoming investigation. With this much damage, finding the cause might be difficult, but we have the world’s best at this, so I’m willing to wait.

There are a few observations that have been top of mind over the last day.

1. We were not ready for the inevitable: I don’t care if it were a Sunday, the Navy was MIA from the information flow as one of our nation’s premier cities was blanketed with smoke from a capital ship burning in the heart of the city. We almost seemed paralyzed and waiting for everything to be fully smooth and approved while the city and nation wondered what was going on. In San Diego especially, there is a special bond between the city and its Navy. We let them down by not showing in a very public way who was the face and voice of the Navy during this crisis.

2. We are not as good at safety as we think we are: Fires during maintenance availability are not uncommon for any navy. How and why was this fire allowed to spready so fast and so far? There are rumors, but I won’t repeat them here as they are just speculation, but this should be known far and wide once the investigation is done. The people of San Diego and the nation need to know. No overclassification issues here. Don’t even try.

3. Can you get underway?: The USS FITZGERALD was right across the pier from BHR and was the first, under a blinding cloud of smoke, to get underway and out of the way. BZ to her crew. From the cheap seats though, that took way too long and not enough ships joined her. That story, along with the other ships close to BHR, sitting there soaking in all those toxic fumes, is another story I want told. That doesn’t even begin to discuss what would have happened if the fuel stores on BHR went.

4. We got lucky: we got lucky the ship was not full of Sailors and so far there have been no deaths. We are lucky that there were no weapons onboard. We are lucky this was not a nuclear powered ship. We are lucky, at least as of 11am Eastern, BHR has not sunk.

PACFLT has had a bad run the last three years, this is just another black eye. More to follow.

Presence Mission Done Right

Hidden behind all the COVID-19 news this week is another standoff in the South China Sea that had a bit more energy than usual.

Via Sam LaGrone at USNINews;

On Monday, USNI News first reported USS America (LHA-6) was operating in the vicinity of the site of a tiff between China and Malaysia over mineral-rich territory in Malaysia’s Exclusive Economic Zone. The region has been marked by the increased presence of naval and paramilitary ships from China, Vietnam and Malaysia since Malaysian drillship West Capella began exploring the region in October. Currently, the Chinese survey ship Haiyang Dizhi 8 has been operating in Malaysia’s EEZ since April 16 with an escort of China Coast Guard vessels.

Chinese officials typically call out U.S. actions in the South China Sea that conflict with Beijing’s interests. However, during a Tuesday press conference, the foreign ministry presented a toned-down response to questions about U.S. ships near the territorial dispute.

We seem to have put together a team to make a point;

“USS America (LHA-6) and USS Bunker Hill (CG-52) are forward-deployed to the region and are currently operating in the South China Sea,” U.S. Indo-Pacific Command spokeswoman Lt. Cmdr. Nicole Schwegman said in a statement to USNI News.
...
America and Bunker Hill are operating in concert, with the cruiser serving as an air defense escort for the amphibious warship. Guided-missile destroyer USS Barry (DDG-52) is also operating in the region.

Then look who came out to play;

HMAS Parramatta (FFG 154) began sailing with Ticonderoga-class guided missile-cruiser USS Bunker Hill (CG 52) then rendezvoused with amphibious assault ship USS America (LHA 6) and Arleigh-Burke class guided missile destroyer USS Barry (DDG 52) April 18.

Isn't this a great view?

That is the way it is done. I think we need to get the Australians a properly sized battle-flag, but that is a minor quibble.

Photo credit, IPN.

The French Navy Sorties Against COVID-19

There are different responses a navy can take in respond to COVID-19.

You can:

1. Assume readiness risk by pulling ships in, decrease manning/training/etc for a few weeks or months to enable social distancing and stop COVID-19 was spreading crud-like through your battleforce ships.

2. Continue as before because those readiness reports and stop light PPT won't wright themselves.

3. Deploy what you must for critical presence missions, hard operational necessity, or to help the fight against COVID-19.

With our hospital ships MERCY and COMFORT, we have done a bit domestically with #3.

The French don't have hospital ships ... but they are doing something very interesting with their big-deck amphibs in line with #3, via David Axe:

The French navy has mobilized all three of its Mistral-class amphibious assault ships and is deploying them across Europe, Asia and the Americas in response to the coronavirus pandemic.

The mobilization of the assault ships Mistral and Dixmude on March 25, 2020 came just five days after the French fleet sent sister vessel Tonnerre to Corsica to transport coronavirus patients to hospitals in mainland France.
...
French President Emmanuel Macron described (Operation) Resilience as an “unprecedented military operation dedicated to supporting public services and the French people in the fields of health, logistics and protection.”

Mistral will support the French territory of Reunion in the Indian Ocean. The ship already was in the region for training when the government announced the pandemic-relief operation. Dixmude at the time of the announcement was in the Mediterranean Sea but will sail west to aid France’s Carribean territories.

What is better than 13 F-35B on a LHA?

20 F-35B on a CVL.

Pics and more over at USNIBlog.

Come by and pay a visit.

Under Air Attack by the Luftwaffe, at Sea

From the USS Ancon (AGC-4) - what we would today call a LCC - a newly found recording from the D-day invasion of Normandy from reporter George Hicks was found ... and it is fantastic.

Head on over to USNIBlog to hear it.

So, how was your deployment?

... good liberty?

A US warship has essentially been quarantined at sea for over two months and has been unable to make a port call due to an outbreak of a viral infection similar to mumps.

Twenty-five sailors and Marines aboard the USS Fort McHenry amphibious warship have been diagnosed with parotitis, which causes symptoms similar to mumps, according to US military officials.

Until CNN asked about the incident, the US military had not disclosed it. The illness first broke out in December, with the most recent case being reported on March 9.

...I guess there is enough time for preservation work now?

What, too soon?

H/t Bob.

Fullbore Friday

This July 4th weekend, we need a FbF with a flag on it, so let's reach back to 2008 for an encore. Funny thing is, look how well the LCS attack holds up 9-yrs later.

Cheers!

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After a few weeks of interesting diversions and side-trips; I have decided to get back to Vince Lombardi FbF.

Late last month there was an interesting gathering in Iowa that highlights a few things dear to my heart. First, there were so many Sailor in so many "less sexy" ships that made such a huge difference in WWII. Secondly, in an age of much slower communication and where engineering was done by hand, not CAD, where leaders led and let their subordinates demonstrate their capability, leaders could not and did not micromanage patronize about small things - we did achieved great things with lighting speed when it came to building ships to meet a specific need. Thirdly, we named and classified our ships by logic, not buzzwords.

By now, all should fully understand that those who designed the Littoral Combat Ship "LCS" were brilliant ignoramuses and their fellow travelers who named it either did not know or care that the US Navy already has a series of ships known as LCS, as in "Landing Craft Support" (AKA "Mighty Midgets" or "Mighty Mites") and arrogantly decided to make a non-Amphib start with "L" just so they could get the late 90s early 00s buzzword in their new budget line - and name their new toy LCS "LCS-1" - what an insult to our Navy and its Sailors.

However, this isn't about my LCS hobby-horse; let us honor to such men as John Hart, left, of Le Mars, Iowa, and Edwin "Ned" Wright of Manahawkin, N.J who you see on the right, as representatives of the men who served on the LCS from WWII to Vietnam.

Let's educate; what were the LCS?

Displacement: 250 long tons (254 t)
Length:------158 ft 6 in (48.3 m)
Beam:--------23 ft 3 in (7.1 m)
Draft:-------5 ft 10 in (1.8 m) (aft, loaded)
Propulsion:--eight Gray Marine diesel engines, twin screws
Speed:-------16.5 knots (30.5 km/h)
Range:-------5500 miles
Complement:--3–6 officers, 55–68 men
Armament:----single 3"50, twin 40 mm or single 40 mm bow gun; 2 twin 40 mm deck guns (one forward, one aft); 4 20 mm cannons; 4 .50 cal (12.7 mm) machine guns; ten MK7 rocket launchers.
Armor:-------10-lb. STS splinter shields

What did the WWII LCS bring to the fight?

The Battle of Tarawa showed a gap in Navy resources for close in support of landing troops. The time interval between the end of shelling from the large ships and the arrival of the landing craft on the beach allowed the defenders to regroup. The Landing Craft Support was designed to fill this void.

The first Landing Craft Support ships arrived in the Pacific Theater in time for the landings at Iwo Jima.

After providing close in support during the landings at Okinawa, many Landing Craft Support ships were placed on the radar picket stations as anti-aircraft platforms. When not on a picket stations, the ship would create smoke to hide the fleet at anchor and perform "skunk patrol" screening for suicide boats.

In the Borneo Campaign, Landing Craft Support was used in landings in Tarakan and Balikpapan.
(in Okinawa) Kamikaze planes sank two LCS(L)(3)s while they were on radar picket duty to provide anti-aircraft support for destroyers trying to stop enemy planes from reaching the main fleet. On April 12, 1945, while at Radar Picket Station 1 north of Okinawa, LCS(L)(3) 33 shot down one kamikaze plane, dodged a second one that took off the ship’s radio antenna, but sank after being struck by a third one. On April 22 at Radar Picket Station 14 northwest of Okinawa, LCS(L)(3) 15 sank within three minutes after one kamikaze plane in a group of 37 planes crashed into the ship with a bomb carried by the plane exploding soon after. The attack killed 15 men and wounded 11 men. In addition to the two LCS(L)(3)s sunk, 11 others were damaged in kamikaze attacks during the Battle of Okinawa.

Japanese shinyo explosive motorboats sank more LCS(L)(3)s than the two sank by kamikaze planes. About 30 shinyo motorboats attacked LCS(L)(3)s in Mariveles Harbor in the Philippines on February 16, 1945, but the book provides no details on this attack. The explosive motorboats sank LCS(L)(3)s 7, 26, and 49 and severely damaged LCS(L)(3) 27.

Although destroyers provided the primary firepower at radar picket stations around Okinawa, LCS(L)(3) guns also shot down many incoming kamikaze planes. For example, at Radar Picket Station 1 on April 16, 1945, LCS(L)(3) 51 shot down six attacking planes and helped fight fires on the destroyer Laffey (DD 724) after that ship had been hit by several kamikaze planes. LCS(L)(3) 51 received a Presidential Unit Citation for her actions.

During the Battle of Okinawa, several LCS(L)(3)s rescued survivors after kamikaze attacks that sank or heavily damaged other ships. For example, on June 10, 1945, after the destroyer William D. Porter (DD 579) was hit by a kamikaze plane and started to sink, LCS(L)(3)s tried to tow the ship to port but failed. The destroyer, which sank about three hours after the kamikaze plane crash, lost no men due to the superb rescue work of the LCS(L)(3)s. The photo at the bottom of this page shows LCS(L)(3) 122 crowded at her bow with survivors from William D. Porter shortly before she sank. Even though William D. Porter lost no men, LCS(L)(3) 122 was hit the following day by a kamikaze plane and lost 11 men with the number of wounded totaling 29.

The gentlemen above were from LCS-92, and here is a short history of the ship by one of its Commanding Officers, Lt. Joseph J. Cardamone.

It was on the swift-flowing Willamette River at Portland, Oregon that the USS LCS 92 was commissioned on January 8th, 1945. Like the ship itself, the ceremony was simple, compact and diminutive. A superficial but extensive inspection convinced the Captain, the five junior officers and the 65 men who made up the crew that the ship’s builders, Commercial Iron Works, had turned out a good, trim fighting ship.

Ten furious days of outfitting, checking and requisitioning followed. On January 16th the LCS 92 was deemed “in all respects ready for sea”. All lines were cast off and she slipped slowly down the Willamette, through the famed Columbia River and out into the Pacific Ocean.

San Diego, California was the destination, and it was reached on the 23rd of January after a voyage that was full of surprises, some pleasant and some otherwise. Then came a six-week shakedown and training period, a period in which flaws were eliminated from both men and ship.

On March 3rd, 1945, the shakedown program was abruptly ended, and the LCS 92 left the United States Continental limits for Pearl Harbor, arriving there March 12th. A new training schedule was begun at Pearl Harbor. It was called “advanced training” and lasted for a full month.

From Pearl Harbor on the 13th of April the ship sailed to Eniwetok. The anchor was dropped in this Marshall Island stronghold on the 24th of April, 1945.

Some minor repairs, a full supply of provisions, fuel and water and the “92” was ready for another trip. Four days later, April 28th, the ship departed from Eniwetok. The next stop was made at Saipan in the Marianas Group on the 3rd of May. There was just a two-day stopover here and the LCS 92 was again underway, this time for Okinawa, performing convoy duty enroute.

After a safe, uneventful voyage Okinawa was reached May 10th, 1945. The “92” really came in contact with the war for the first time. As the anchor was dropped, the screaming of shells from battleships, cruisers and destroyers could be heard overhead. It was one of the many bombardments the Japs were subjected to. Between the date of arrival and the date of departure from Okinawa, July 22nd, the ship was at General Quarters scores of times. Often “bogeys” were reported nearby several times in a single day. The “Kamikaze Kids” were on a rampage. Most of them were downed but the small percentage that did get through produced severe naval casualties.

On the 25th of May the ship left Okinawa for its first Picket Line duty at Station number 9. Now began ten endless days of patrolling deep in enemy waters. It was on this Radar Picket station on the 29th of May that an unusually intense attack occurred. Hardly had the General Quarters buzzer ceased sounding than a “Zeke” was seen diving across the fantail. The gunners were “on target” immediately and a moment later the plane disintegrated.

Back in Okinawa a few days later the ship was assigned to anti-suicide boat duty and given several smoke screen assignments. Then the LCS 92 returned to picket duty, this time on notorious Radar Picket station 16A, “Mainstreet” for the Kamikazes. At this station there were even more alerts, more enemy planes overhead and more sleepless nights.

Upon returning from this duty the “92” was stationed at Ie Shima, furnishing smoke screens at night and anti-aircraft protection by day. The routine was occasionally broken by orders to check a certain area for floating mines or to conduct a search for “splashed” allied flyiers. One day a flyer, who had bailed out of his wrecked Black Widow after a mission over Kyushu, was picked up.

Finally it was time to leave Okinawa and on the 22nd of July the anchor was housed and the ship got underway for the Philippine Islands, for rehabilitation and availability. Five days later the ship was anchored in San Pedro Bay near Leyte Gulf. Here a number of minor repairs were made, the ship was painted and the crew given some well-earned recreation. This routine continued until V-J day plus one, September 3rd, when the ship once more got underway. The destination was Tokyo, Japan as a part of the Third Fleet Occupational Forces. Here, in Tokyo Bay, the ship remained until 1 October, 1945.

The LCS 92 left Tokyo Bay in February 1946 and sailed to the United States via Guam, Eniwetok and Pearl Harbor, arriving in San Francisco on 1 April 1946, a beautiful, sunny morning. The Golden Gate bridge was a sight to behold. The ship was then placed in the Reserve Fleet at Astoria, Oregon in the summer of 1946. In 1951, the 92 was stricken from the Naval Register and scrapped.

And yes, I ask you to note that our grandfathers Commanded as a LT what today's Navy calls a CDR Command. Just saying...though that isn't fair in that at ~3,000 ton full-load displacement, a modern LCS is 500 tons heaver than the ~2,500 full-load displacement of a WWII era Fletcher Class Destroyer - another topic I will avoid for now.

Finally, we are lucky - the last operational one is returning from Thailand.

From Pattaya Mail (Vol. XV No. 37 Friday September 14- September 20, 2007) "HTMS Nakha set off on her final voyage home on September 2, heading for the Mare Island Naval Shipyard at Vallejo City in the United States where she will become part of a museum of historic ships".

Not bad for a ship designed and built in months.

More photos worth your time here and like the color one of Iwo Jima below here. There is also an excellent book on the ships, if you are inclined, available at the link.



At about the 2:30 point below, you can see the WWII LCS at ~25yr mark in Vietnam.

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UPDATE: Great LCS write by by Eagle1 last NOV.