Are you sure there's no god?

In today’s entry, I address the third question from Michael Brown’s 7 honest questions for atheists.

Earlier installments in this series can be found here:

1. Why are you an atheist? 

2. Can an atheist have purpose?

Brown’s third question has to do with certainty, and whether or not an atheist can be certain that there is no god. I will address this from my own standpoint – I do not presume to speak for all atheists. Readers are invited to share their own thoughts in the comments, either in reply to Brown’s question or in response to my own efforts to address it. 

A Reply to Stefan on Induction and Deduction

On my blog Sye Ten Bruggencate vs. the Absolute Laws of Logic which I posted back in July, a visitor posting under the moniker StefanMach (to whom I will refer as Stefan henceforth) recently left a comment about the relationship between induction and deduction and presuppositionalism.

Specifically Stefan inquired about the consequences induction has for deductive conclusions given the view that “inductive argument conclusions are classified as either strong or weak and can never be classified as true or false.”

This is topical given that deductive arguments attempt to draw conclusions from at least one premise which, as a generalization, must be the conclusion of an inductive inference. Thus if an inductive inference can only produce a conclusion that is at best “strong” (as opposed to “weak”), then any attempt to draw a conclusion by means of deduction from an inductive conclusion would necessarily inherit the tentativeness already present in the inductive conclusion. Consequently, how can any deductive conclusion be accepted as reliably true or certain?

Can the Water in My Drinking Glass Turn into Merlot?

Chris Bolt is apparently unsatisfied with my response (which can be found in this blog) to his question on how I can be certain that the water in my drinking glass will not turn into merlot (a type of wine), given my own worldview’s “presuppositions.”

Bolt’s dissatisfaction for my response was expressed in his reply to Dr. Funkenstein’s own resounding indictment of presuppositionalism, both of which can be found in the comments section of Bolt’s blog Dawson Bethrick, The Man Who Builds His House Upon The Sand.

In response to his expressed dissatisfaction with my initial response to his question, I posted the following comment to his blog:

Chris,

You apparently do not accept the answer I gave to your question about knowing whether or not water will turn into merlot the next time I drink it. My short answer to this was: by a means of knowledge, specifically by reason (since reason is my only means of knowledge).

I gather that my answer was insufficient for you, possibly because the concept of reason is foreign to your understanding of human conscious activity. Fair enough. Please allow me to provide a little more detail (without writing 20 pages on the matter).

First, it is important to understand what reason is. Reason is “the faculty that identifies and integrates the material provided by man’s senses.” Its method is logic, “the art or skill of non-contradictory identification.” (These definitions come from Rand’s essays “The Objectivist Ethics,” in her book The Virtue of Selfishness, p. 20, and “Philosophical Detection,” in her book Philosophy: Who Needs It, p. 15, respectively.) Objectivism is correct to take the “testimony” of the senses as metaphysically given, precisely because they are metaphysically given (they are part of our identity as biological organisms). I suspect that you’ll have a problem with this, but I’ll leave it up to you to raise your own objections here.

Now, on an objective understanding of reality, which Objectivism provides, there would need to be something which causes the water in a drinking glass to turn into merlot. In other words, since we reject the notion of "causeless action" as self-contradictory, the conditions which could cause water to turn into merlot would have to exist in order for the water in a drinking glass to turn into merlot.

Since the objective view of reality is firmly premised on the primacy of existence, this securely eliminates any form of wishing or commanding as a potential cause for water in any drinking glass to turn into any type of wine. Given the primacy of existence (a principle which would have to be true for someone even to deny it), then, the idea of an invisible magic being willing water into wine must be rejected as contrary to reality. The actions of consciousness cannot alter the identity of objects. Why? Because existence holds metaphysical primacy, i.e., the objects of consciousness hold metaphysical primacy over the subject of consciousness. Hence Objectivism. The negation of this principle, that a subject holds metaphysical primacy over its objects, is known as metaphysical subjectivism. On a worldview premised in metaphysical subjectivism, one cannot in principle raise any objection to the idea that a consciousness can alter the objects of its awareness, such as by an act of will. When a theist affirms that wishing doesn’t make it so, or that atheism is not true simply because the atheist does not believe in a god, he is in effect borrowing from worldview which fundamentally unlike his professed theistic worldview (though he probably does not realize this, since he is not accustomed to examining worldview questions in terms of the subject-object relationship).

So this means that, if one wants to entertain the notion that water could turn into merlot, he would have to identify a cause for such transformation which squares with the primacy of existence. We know that merlot wine is produced by a process which involves the fermentation of a specific kind of grape in large quantities. This process requires a sufficient amount of time for the fermentation of the grapes to take place. Without the grapes, the fermentation, and the time it requires for the grapes to ferment, merlot is not going to be produced. (Ask any viniculturalist if you’re unsure on this.) Since a glass of water has no grapes to ferment (we can know this by inspecting the glass of water), we know that the causal conditions for producing wine in the glass of water do not exist. Given this fact, one can be wholly certain that the water in his glass is not going to turn into any type of wine, including merlot. You can even let the glass of water stand for several days, but since the causal conditions for the production of merlot are not present, the water in the glass is not going to turn into merlot.

Now, I highly doubt that any of this is going to satisfy your inquisitiveness, since you’re probably eager to find some way to discredit it, and - as we have seen so far - you tend to critique rival positions according to your own worldview's premises. But how are you going to do this without tacitly employing the very principles which Objectivism affirms? And what would motivate such eagerness, if not religiously-motivated resentment for the fact that people who disbelieve in your god have solid grounds for certainty? Meanwhile, I have yet to see how someone who affirms the existence of a universe-creating, reality-ruling consciousness which is known for turning water into wine (cf. John chap. 2), could know that the water in his water glass will not turn into merlot, without of course borrowing from a worldview which diametrically conflicts with his own theistic premises.

Regards,
Dawson

Now, my answer to Chris Bolt’s question is strictly in keeping with Objectivism’s premises, in particular the primacy of existence and its understanding of the law of causality, which is that the actions of an entity necessarily depend on the nature of that entity. Certainly my response to Chris Bolt is not a form of raising my hands in utter bewilderment and exclaiming Duh, I donno! Must be God did it! Though more and more I am sensing that this kind of response, a response of desperation, resignation and contentment to rest on ignorance, is the only one which would satisfy Bolt. Is that the case? Well this depends on him. There is nothing I can do to change the mind of someone who holds to a worldview which rests on the primacy of consciousness.

I welcome all comments on the reply I have given to Chris Bolt above. If you as my reader suspect that there is a weakness in the content of my response, that its wording could be improved, or that I am simply off my rocker, please feel free to comment. I want to hear from you. As my readers should know, I do not moderate the comments that are posted in response to my blogs. I don’t even delete so-called “drive-by comments,” regardless of how annoying they can be. So don't be shy.

by Dawson Bethrick

Bolt's Leaking Boat

In a recent post, Chris Bolt has accused me of dishonesty. He has accused me of dishonesty when I have asked him to clarify something he stated without explanation.

One thing that is clear from Bolt’s side of the recent discussion regarding knowledge of the world, is that omniscience and infallibility are the standard of certainty in his worldview, whereas in my worldview the facts of reality and of the nature of man’s consciousness provide the standard, and man’s nonomniscience is in no way a barrier to discovering and validating knowledge. Details can be found here.

In my previous discussion of Bolt’s questions, where I pointed out the failure of his “global skepticism” argument (at least when it’s directed at my position), I made the following statement:

I openly admit that I am neither omniscient nor infallible. But neither is he. So we’re in the same boat.

Bolt’s response to this statement was the following:

Of course this is not true, as I believe in an all-knowing God who has revealed Himself to us and cannot lie.

As stated here, it is not clear what Bolt has in mind as the antecedent of the pronoun “this” in the statement “this is not true.” He did not make any effort to clarify that he was disagreeing with my statement that he too is neither omniscient nor infallible, or with my statement that he’s not in the same boat because of something he believes. That is why I had asked in a comment to Bolt’s blog the following:

So, Chris Bolt is omniscient and infallible? Or you simply believe in something that you imagine is omniscient and infallible? Big difference here. If it's the former, perhaps you can demonstrate your amazing powers of knowledge by producing the VIN and license number of my car. If it “is not true” that you are neither omniscient nor infallible, this should be a snap.

If it's the latter, what does merely believing "in an all-knowing God who has revealed Himself to us and cannot lie" have to do with anything? How does this provide certainty? It's one thing to claim these kinds of things, Chris, but entirely another to explain the specifics and demonstrate their alleged truth.

Even Chris Bolt should see that there is a big difference in what he could mean here, and that failure to be clear in his original statement could easily lead to some major misunderstandings. I prefer to let people speak for themselves rather than trying to interpret their hazy statements without giving them a chance to explain themselves. That is why I ask for clarification.

But Bolt apparently found my query tiresome. In a follow-up blog, Bolt complained about my question:

When I write, “Of course this is not true, as I believe in an all-knowing God who has revealed Himself to us and cannot lie” the referent of "this" is the statement regarding being in the same boat together. Is Bethrick really so ignorant of Christian beliefs that he thinks I am claiming omniscience for myself? Of course not. It is just more dishonest, empty rhetoric. I ask the reader to question why someone would need to constantly resort to this type of tactic.

At any rate, I’m glad that Bolt has at least clarified part of what he has stated. But why suppose that I was being dishonest when I asked him to clarify his own ambiguous statement? Why must asking for clarification be construed as a “tactic” and my motivation for inviting Bolt to clarify himself be called into question? When I point out that both I and my opponent are neither omniscient nor infallible and therefore in the same boat, and my opponent responds by saying “of course this is not true,” how am I to know what part my opponent is objecting to, especially when he holds omniscience as a standard of certainty, rejects the philosophy of reason, and claims to receive knowledge via some “internal sense” from a supernatural being?

Bolt suggests that I have asked my question in ignorance of Christian beliefs, but this is not accurate, nor is it a fair statement. Christians come in a huge variety of flavors, each seeming to affirm something a bit different from the next on some particular issue or another. Sometimes Christians have very profound disagreements among themselves, so what one Christian affirms may not reflect what another believes. Such internal disagreements have raged for centuries throughout Christendom, resulting in hundreds if not thousands of denominations, sects, splits, schisms, etc. That is why I prefer that a Christian speak for himself, and let the chips fall where they may. In fact, I’ve encountered numerous Christians who carry on as if they were omniscient and infallible, so much so that they don’t have to state it for the record that they think they are. So it only seems to me that the honest thing to do is to ask Bolt for clarification, which is what I did, rather than presume to know what precisely he means to say. Either Chris Bolt thinks he’s omniscient and infallible, or he doesn’t.

At least we’re making progress now. Bolt admits that he is neither omniscient nor infallible, just like me.

So why are we not in the same boat?

Now that we can parse his original statement in light of his more recent clarification, Bolt was saying that we’re not in the same boat, in spite of his (now) admitted nonomniscience and fallibility, because he believes “in an all-knowing God who has revealed Himself to us and cannot lie.” In that case, my second question applies.

Recall what I had asked:

…what does merely believing "in an all-knowing God who has revealed Himself to us and cannot lie" have to do with anything? How does this provide certainty?

Unfortunately, while calling me dishonest for asking if he meant to say that he is himself omniscient and infallible, Bolt gave the following response to my question:

I trust that the reader is competent enough to understand the argument and that Bethick has no answer for it, hence the pretended ignorance. All-knowing, truthful God revealing His certain knowledge to us provides us with certain knowledge of what has been revealed. I am sorry, this is not difficult.

Apparently what this means is that the Christian god can “reveal” things such as (for example):

- Noah built an ark
- Moses freed his people from the Egyptians
- David slew Goliath
- Jonah was swallowed by a whale
- Jesus was baptized by John the Baptist
- Peter was a fisherman
- Paul was a Pharisee
- Etc.

and believers like Chris Bolt, because they believe in this god, can somehow be certain that it’s all true.

What this really seems to mean, when it is boiled down, is that the believer reads things like this in the bible, and accepts it is as certain truth for no reason other than that it is stated in the bible. This is apparently the Christian’s formula for certainty. I don’t know of any historian worthy of the title who would treat any ancient text in such a manner. But here’s the Christian, who moments before reading any passage in the bible had no knowledge of things like Noah's ark, the liberation of the Jews, baptism, Pharisees, etc., but once he’s breezed through the biblical passage in his reading, he can be certain that what it says is true.

But what good does this do the believer in regard to the plethora of matters on which biblegod has not revealed any knowledge, such as the elemental composition of water, or how rainclouds make rain? If the Christian god has not revealed items of knowledge such as this (and Bolt has given no good reason to suppose it has), then it seems that Bolt is in fact in the same boat as someone like myself, for, just like me, he would have to discover this knowledge through some kind of cognitive process which one must perform firsthand.

It doesn’t even have to be something as technical as the elemental composition of water, but something more practically accessible, such as finding the nearest gas station when he’s out driving around, determining his bank account balance, or figuring out why his TV set isn’t working. One is not going to find items of knowledge like this in “Scripture,” but maybe he might say that his god delivers this knowledge to him via the “sensus divinitatus.” This remains to be seen, but as I mentioned before, it seems that this would be testable. For instance, he could demonstrate how he determines his bank account balance while blindfolded, so that there’s no peeking going on.

If Bolt thinks that the philosophy of reason (i.e., Objectivism) is an inherent failure, and claims to have a superior means of establishing knowledge about the world, it would be refreshing if we could see some details as to how it works. If the only alternative to theism is skepticism, as he seems to think, how does believing that an omniscient and infallible mind which allegedly created the universe ex nihilo overcome skepticism, especially if this sovereign mind can alter the objects in the universe at will at any time without consulting with believers to inform them about upcoming changes first? Simply saying “I believe in an all-knowing God who has revealed Himself to us and cannot lie” does not answer such questions. A mere belief does not an epistemology make. If merely believing the teachings of a mystical philosophy were sufficient to inform an epistemology suited to man’s consciousness, it seems that one could escape skepticism by saying “I believe in an all-knowing Blarko who has revealed Himself to us and cannot lie.” But if Christianity and Blarko-belief are two different worldviews, the one opposed to the other, then this means that skepticism is answered by conflicting worldviews. Meanwhile, there seems to be no concern on Christianity’s part when it comes to establishing reasonable principles by which believers can reliably distinguish between what is real and what is merely imaginary. Is that any cause for confidence that Christianity can answer the skeptic? Not that I can see.

If Bolt insists that we’re not in the same boat, then he’s in a different boat, one whose hull is leaking badly. I would recommend that he abandon ship as soon as possible, otherwise he’ll go down with it.

by Dawson Bethrick

Chris Bolt’s Questions

Because Blogger now limits the number of characters allowed in a comment, I find more and more that my comments are better posted on my blog as separate entries. This is only in keeping with my ambition to write – as Chris Bolt calls them – “lengthy, arrogant posts.” After all, I have a reputation to uphold.

In a comment which he recently posted to his own blog, Bolt asked me a series of questions.

While I am happy to address them, I surmise that Bolt will probably not interact with my answers. I have responded to Bolt’s questions before (see for example here, here, here, and here), with no further discussion on Bolt’s part. One can interpret the situation in a variety of ways, such as that Bolt cannot respond to my answers, that Bolt doesn’t care to, that he’s still working on a response, that he’s utterly flabbergasted by them, that he has not read them, or that he’s not interested in pursuing the matter any further once I’ve had my say. The upshot is that, if he thinks I am wrong, he passes up the opportunity to make his points known.

The kind of questions which Bolt typically asks me, seems to be aimed at exposing some crucial area of uncertainty on my part. And while I have no problem admitting that there are many areas of inquiry in which I have little or no knowledge (things like the history of papier mâché, Tagalog, Azerbaijani cuisine, Britney Spears’ discography, etc., come to mind), let alone certainty, I would suppose that Bolt is essentially in a similar position, having little or no knowledge of many things, and thus no certainty on a variety of topics. Whatever relevance this has, needs to be explained. Is one’s lack of knowledge or certainty on a certain subject important for some reason? Is that where we are going to discover something that cancels out everything else we know? If this is the predicament which I allegedly face, it seems that the same predicament would apply to every human being, including those who claim to have knowledge “revealed” to them from a supernatural source.

Bolt asks:

What do you mean by "previously validated knowledge"?

Previously validated knowledge is knowledge that has already been validated, specifically in the context of new discoveries. For instance, when a scientist studies the flow tendencies of rain water in a particular valley, he does not have to begin every day of his research by discovering the elemental make-up of water. Once this has been discovered and validated, he can move on to exploring new discoveries. That water is composed of hydrogen and oxygen, is knowledge that has, in the context of the scientist’s research, been previously validated. He does not need to continue to discover and validate this knowledge over and over again before he proceeds to other areas of study.

Now I had used the phrase “previously validated knowledge” in my 31 Aug. comment on Bolt’s blog, when I explained to him that his own comment (posted on the same date) did not deal with the failure of his “global skepticism” argument. Clearly it is important to Bolt that I lack certainty in some area of my knowledge. But I openly admit that I am neither omniscient nor infallible. But neither is he. So we’re in the same boat. (And appeal to “revelation” does nothing to shore up a Christian's own ignorance, as I show here.) My statement specifically was:

We take in facts and integrate them, as we discover them. But these facts do not unseat previously validated knowledge.

I don’t know what is so controversial about what I’ve stated here. But this is where Bolt asked what I mean by “previously validated knowledge.” It is odd that I should have to explain this to someone who insists that the view that “God does not lie” is something that any Sunday school child should blindly believe simply because he’s been instructed to.

Bolt then asked:

Is it not a possibility that you will come across some fact in future experience which will overturn your apparent knowledge concerning what rain is made up of?

I do not ascribe to the epistemological model which equates “possibility” with whatever the human mind can imagine. I can imagine breathing water, but I do not accept it as a possibility that I will ever be able to breathe water. To affirm a possibility, one needs at least some evidence to support it, and no evidence against it. I have already allowed (in a comment I made to Bolt’s blog) that rain can be composed of different substances, such as on Saturn’s moon Titan (evidence discovered by scientists studying this moon suggests that it rains methane). The rain with which I am personally familiar here on earth is composed primarily of water droplets formed from water vapor in the atmosphere. If Bolt knows of any facts that can overturn this, I invite him to produce it.

Perhaps Bolt thinks I need to go out and test every raindrop that has ever fallen on earth in order to be “certain” that rain is composed of water droplets. With such requirements for any generalized certainty, it seems to be an unattainable commodity, even for someone who thinks he’s receiving knowledge from a supernatural source (which prohibits any testing whatsoever). But if we understand the causal process which produces rain (cf. condensation of water vapor in the atmosphere), why would such tests be needed? Do people who depend on and collect rain water for their survival need to perform such tests?

Of course, I would not accept as a “possibility” the proposal that rain is actually composed of 24-caret diamonds or automobiles cleverly disguised by a reality-controlling consciousness to look like water droplets. If I believed such a consciousness actually existed, I have no idea how I could rule out such proposals as legitimate possibilities, since on such a view “all things are possible” (Mt. 19:26). But that’s not my problem.

Bolt then stated:

So far as I know Christianity does not teach anything about an invisible magic being who manipulates a lawless world;

But I know this, since I know what Christianity teaches. It teaches that the world was created by an invisible magic being and that the things which exist in it are what that invisible magic being wishes them to be. If Christianity taught that the universe were inherently lawful, it would make no sense for Christians to assert that an invisible magic being (i.e., “God”) created and sustains it through its magical powers. Now how is it that a non-Christian understands what Christianity teaches better than an adherent of Christianity?

Bolt then asked:

but really, how do you know that water might not turn into merlot the next time you drink it?

Oh, if only it were so easy to make merlot!

But to answer Bolt’s question, it is simple: I know this by a means of knowledge. Specifically, by means of reason. Its method is called logic, an objective method of integrating new knowledge with previously validated knowledge, beginning with the truth of the axioms.

Of course, if we are not allowed to be certain that water will not magically turn into merlot the next time I am about to drink some, how can Christians claim to be certain that their god is real, or that what they call “God” is not really some malevolent agent deceitfully portraying itself as what Christianity defines as “God”? Blank out.

Bolt’s next question was:

What percentage of the universe do you think you have access to anyway? Does 4% sound reasonable?

There are many, many things throughout the universe to which I have no access and never will have access. I’ve never made any claim otherwise. I have no statistics on this, so I cannot give a precise answer to Bolt’s question. I would assume it is even less than his proposed 4% though. If Bolt has any more knowledge than this, it seems that we should be asking him all the questions, and he should be prepared to answer them, since he has so much more knowledge than us.

Bolt then asked:

Do you really believe you have enough facts in to make the kinds of judgments you do?

Yes, I do. I wouldn’t attempt to make the judgments I make if I didn’t think I had enough facts. There are times when I withhold judgment just because of this.

Bolt then made a confession:

I am not even sure why you would think your conceptual map meshes with the external world, if there is such a thing.

Bolt’s understanding in this area would be greatly improved if he familiarized himself with the objective theory of concepts. (See specifically Ayn Rand’s Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology.) It is not as if there were “the external world” on the one hand, and this huge sum of knowledge existing independently of it in my head on the other, and somehow they have to come together and “mesh” with each other. Armchair omniscience is not the proper standard for knowledge; reason is. There is the world, and there is my awareness of the world (which in fact is part of the world), and my knowledge of the world builds on the basis of my awareness of the world. If I build my knowledge according to an objective method (which the objective theory of concepts supplies) from the basis of what I perceive and observe, then the resulting knowledge is in fact knowledge of the world, since it is based on facts discovered in the world.

On the other hand, Christianity takes armchair omniscience seriously as the ideal model for knowledge, which means that knowledge is ultimately unattainable by man. Consequently, for him to know anything, an invisible magic being needs to spoonfeed it to him, and man, on this model, has no choice but to accept whatever he receives from this alleged source at face value, and believe it unquestioningly, without examination, on faith. Which means: he can never really know anything, since independent verification is prohibited. How this model provides something that constitutes “knowledge” is never explained, since the Christian worldview does not provide a theory of concepts, and man’s knowledge is undeniably conceptual in nature. It requires that we “just believe,” while many non-believers simply want to know. It is no accident that the thing which was prohibited to Adam and Eve in the Garden was knowledge. They were punished when they acquired knowledge. On Christianity’s terms, we’re not supposed to know, and when we know, we’re condemned for knowing.

Bolt then asked:

I know, "existence exists" (whatever that means), but what types of things exist and how do you know? I mean are we talking about external things?

Many categories have been formed to identify and classify the things which we discover in existence. The concept ‘existence’ is the widest concept, including all the things we discover in existence. From there, we form categories which subdivide the things we find in existence according to various purposes, which can vary from context to context. For instance, we might use the categories “natural” and “man-made” to distinguish between those things which are naturally occurring (such as rocks, rivers, rainbows, planetary bodies, etc.) from those which are artifacts produced by human action (such as kitchenware, computers, automobiles, the US Constitution, etc.). Or, we can divide what we discover in the world by the categories of animate objects (e.g., reptiles, rose bushes, bobcats, cuttlefish, human beings, etc.) and inanimate objects (e.g., rocks, mountains, ash, silverware, paper, etc.). These are conceptual categories into which we integrate objects as we discover them. If an object we discover is entirely new, we can formulate a new category to classify it. But if it exists, it can due to this fact still be integrated into the concept ‘existence’, which again is the widest of all concepts.

How do we know? By means of reason: the faculty which identifies and integrates what we perceive or observe.

Are we talking only of “external things”? Bolt himself posed the question, so he needs to address this. But if “external things” is understood to refer to things distinct from conscious activity, I would point out that the same method by which we identify and integrate “external things” so defined, applies in principle to identifying and integrating the actions of consciousness. See specifically chapter 4, “Concepts of Consciousness,” of Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology, which deals specifically with this area of inquiry.

The answers are there. If Bolt is truly interested, he can seek them out and enlighten himself.

by Dawson Bethrick

RazorsKiss on the Christian God as the Basis of Knowledge – Part 6: RK on the Christian’s “Certainty”

In the opening statement of his debate with Mitch LeBlanc,Christian apologist “RazorsKiss” (“RK” hereafter) claimed that

Christians have the privilege of certainty

which implies that no one else does.

But privileges can be taken away.

Consequently, Christians cannot know with certainty when they can enjoy this "privilege of certainty," and when they cannot. And given their worldview’s premises, the recognition of the Christian's inherent uncertainty on this matter is accurate.

This is because Christians affirm the existence of a supernatural consciousness which can alter the nature of any thing which exists in the universe at any time, without seeking the prior approval of believers before doing so. (What believer would say that his god needs his approval to do anything?)

In essence, what RK calls “certainty” is based on proclamations inserted into the mouth of a storybook character. But this can only undermine his profession of certainty, not only psychologically, but also philosophically, since its basis (even on Christianity’s own premises) is beyond the reach of the believer’s epistemological grasp.

That the nature of this “certainty” is at best utterly fleeting and elusive for the believer, is especially true given the context in which RK informs his claim to certainty, namely that this is

a certainty based on the most fundamental guarantor of truth.

That “fundamental guarantor of truth,” which, on RK’s worldview, can only mean the Christian god, is no "guarantor" of certainty for the believer at all.

The granddaddy of presuppositionalism, Cornelius Van Til himself, makes this clear when he writes:

God may at any time take one fact and set it into new relation to created law. That is, there is no inherent reason in the facts or laws themselves why this should not be done. It is this sort of conception of the relation of facts and laws, of the temporal one and many, imbedded as it is in the idea of God in which we profess to believe, that we need in order to make room for miracles. And miracles are at the heart of the Christian position. (The Defense of the Faith, p. 27)

Because Christians affirm belief in an omnipotent supernatural being which can do what Van Til claims here, they cannot bank on any fact with any certainty, for unless they are themselves omniscient (which would make them “God,” and there can be only one “God”), they cannot know if or when their god might take any fact and “set it into new relation to created law.” The believer's god is supposed to have a will of its own, independent of the believer's own will. So how can the believer know if or when his god is going to cause another miracle to take place, especially if he relies on "divine revelation" (i.e., information which his god chooses to distribute to the believer) for all his knowledge?

For instance, a believer cannot be certain that the water he is drinking won’t suddenly be turned into wine the instant he puts a glass of water to his lips.

Then again, on Van Til’s view, he might not even notice that what he thought was water was turned into wine, because the facts pertaining to his perception of such things have been “set into new relation to created law.” He may be drinking wine and not know it!

The believer cannot assume that this is a matter of deception, since according to Van Til it would merely be a matter of individual facts being “set into new relation to created law.”

Since the Christian god is under no obligation to its creatures, it has no obligation to give believers advance notice that any facts are about to be “set into new relation to created law.”

So the Christian’s protestation that his god would not deliberately "deceive" him in such a manner, would be misdirected.

Moreover, protests from apologists that their god is “rational” and therefore will not change things willy-nilly, miss the point of Christianity’s own theological teachings.

If one affirms the existence of such a being, why suppose that it would be irrational for it to change water into wine? Blank out.

Was it irrational for Jesus to turn water into wine at the wedding at Cana (cf. John 2:2-11)?

If the Christian affirms that it was not rational for Jesus to change water into wine, then he’s already admitting that he worships an irrational deity anyway.

On the other hand, if the Christian affirms that it was in fact "rational" for Jesus to turn water into wine, then such protests are inapplicable. Whatever Jesus does, is "rational" because Jesus does it. If Jesus decides that a car should blow up and destroy human lives, it is "rational" simply because Jesus decides this. If instead of turning water into wine, Jesus decides that a hurricane should blow into town and take 1836 or more lives, would the believer call Jesus' decision "irrational"?

I trow not.

Similarly, if the believer affirms that Jesus’ miraculous transformation of water into wine was rational at the wedding at Cana, then why suppose it would be irrational for Jesus to do this or anything else on other occasions?

Believers are caught in a pickle of their own doing here, and so long as they remain committed to Christianity’s teachings, they’re simply stuck on this one.

So while RK may think that “Christians have the privilege of certainty,” it’s clear that their worldview does not grant them any epistemic right to certainty whatsoever (they get only "privilege"). They affirm “certainty” in word only, with no objective support for their claim to certainty at all.

Is this a reliable basis for epistemology?

If course it isn't.

by Dawson Bethrick