Changeset 988 for vendor/current/source4/kdc/pac-glue.c

Timestamp:

Nov 24, 2016, 1:14:11 PM (9 years ago)

Author:

Silvan Scherrer

Message:

Samba Server: update vendor to version 4.4.3

File:

• vendor/current/source4/kdc/pac-glue.c (modified) (11 diffs)

vendor/current/source4/kdc/pac-glue.c

@@ -27 +27 @@
 #include "auth/auth.h"
 #include "auth/auth_sam_reply.h"
-#include "kdc/kdc-glue.h"
+#include "system/kerberos.h"
+#include "auth/kerberos/kerberos.h"
+#include "kdc/samba_kdc.h"
+#include "kdc/pac-glue.h"
 #include "param/param.h"
 #include "librpc/gen_ndr/ndr_krb5pac.h"
+#include "libcli/security/security.h"
+#include "dsdb/samdb/samdb.h"
+#include "auth/kerberos/pac_utils.h"
 
 static
@@ -51 +57 @@
 
         pac_info.logon_info.info = talloc_zero(mem_ctx, struct PAC_LOGON_INFO);
-        if (!mem_ctx) {
+        if (!pac_info.logon_info.info) {
                 return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
         }
@@ -72 +78 @@
 krb5_error_code samba_make_krb5_pac(krb5_context context,
                                     DATA_BLOB *pac_blob,
+                                    DATA_BLOB *deleg_blob,
                                     krb5_pac *pac)
 {
         krb5_data pac_data;
+        krb5_data deleg_data;
         krb5_error_code ret;
 
@@ -82 +90 @@
         }
 
-        ret = krb5_data_copy(&pac_data, pac_blob->data, pac_blob->length);
+        ret = krb5_copy_data_contents(&pac_data,
+                                      pac_blob->data,
+                                      pac_blob->length);
         if (ret != 0) {
                 return ret;
         }
 
+        ZERO_STRUCT(deleg_data);
+        if (deleg_blob) {
+                ret = krb5_copy_data_contents(&deleg_data,
+                                              deleg_blob->data,
+                                              deleg_blob->length);
+                if (ret != 0) {
+                        kerberos_free_data_contents(context, &pac_data);
+                        return ret;
+                }
+        }
+
         ret = krb5_pac_init(context, pac);
         if (ret != 0) {
-                krb5_data_free(&pac_data);
+                kerberos_free_data_contents(context, &pac_data);
+                kerberos_free_data_contents(context, &deleg_data);
                 return ret;
         }
 
         ret = krb5_pac_add_buffer(context, *pac, PAC_TYPE_LOGON_INFO, &pac_data);
-        krb5_data_free(&pac_data);
+        kerberos_free_data_contents(context, &pac_data);
         if (ret != 0) {
+                kerberos_free_data_contents(context, &deleg_data);
                 return ret;
         }
 
+        if (deleg_blob) {
+                ret = krb5_pac_add_buffer(context, *pac,
+                                          PAC_TYPE_CONSTRAINED_DELEGATION,
+                                          &deleg_data);
+                kerberos_free_data_contents(context, &deleg_data);
+                if (ret != 0) {
+                        return ret;
+                }
+        }
+
         return ret;
 }
 
-bool samba_princ_needs_pac(struct hdb_entry_ex *princ)
-{
-
-        struct samba_kdc_entry *p = talloc_get_type(princ->ctx, struct samba_kdc_entry);
+bool samba_princ_needs_pac(struct samba_kdc_entry *skdc_entry)
+{
+
         uint32_t userAccountControl;
 
-
         /* The service account may be set not to want the PAC */
-        userAccountControl = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_uint(p->msg, "userAccountControl", 0);
+        userAccountControl = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_uint(skdc_entry->msg, "userAccountControl", 0);
         if (userAccountControl & UF_NO_AUTH_DATA_REQUIRED) {
                 return false;
@@ -118 +149 @@
 }
 
-/* Was the krbtgt an RODC (and we are not) */
-bool samba_krbtgt_was_untrusted_rodc(struct hdb_entry_ex *princ)
-{
-
-        struct samba_kdc_entry *p = talloc_get_type(princ->ctx, struct samba_kdc_entry);
-        int rodc_krbtgt_number;
-
-        /* Determine if this was printed by an RODC */
+/* Was the krbtgt in this DB (ie, should we check the incoming signature) and was it an RODC */
+int samba_krbtgt_is_in_db(struct samba_kdc_entry *p,
+                          bool *is_in_db,
+                          bool *is_untrusted)
+{
+        NTSTATUS status;
+        int rodc_krbtgt_number, trust_direction;
+        uint32_t rid;
+
+        TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx = talloc_new(NULL);
+        if (!mem_ctx) {
+                return ENOMEM;
+        }
+        
+        trust_direction = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_int(p->msg, "trustDirection", 0);
+
+        if (trust_direction != 0) {
+                /* Domain trust - we cannot check the sig, but we trust it for a correct PAC
+                   
+                   This is exactly where we should flag for SID
+                   validation when we do inter-foreest trusts
+                 */
+                talloc_free(mem_ctx);
+                *is_untrusted = false;
+                *is_in_db = false;
+                return 0;
+        }
+
+        /* The lack of password controls etc applies to krbtgt by
+         * virtue of being that particular RID */
+        status = dom_sid_split_rid(NULL, samdb_result_dom_sid(mem_ctx, p->msg, "objectSid"), NULL, &rid);
+
+        if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
+                talloc_free(mem_ctx);
+                return EINVAL;
+        }
+
         rodc_krbtgt_number = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_int(p->msg, "msDS-SecondaryKrbTgtNumber", -1);
-        if (rodc_krbtgt_number == -1) {
-                return false;
-        } else if (rodc_krbtgt_number != p->kdc_db_ctx->my_krbtgt_number) {
-                return true;
-        }
-
-        return false;
+
+        if (p->kdc_db_ctx->my_krbtgt_number == 0) {
+                if (rid == DOMAIN_RID_KRBTGT) {
+                        *is_untrusted = false;
+                        *is_in_db = true;
+                        talloc_free(mem_ctx);
+                        return 0;
+                } else if (rodc_krbtgt_number != -1) {
+                        *is_in_db = true;
+                        *is_untrusted = true;
+                        talloc_free(mem_ctx);
+                        return 0;
+                }
+        } else if ((rid != DOMAIN_RID_KRBTGT) && (rodc_krbtgt_number == p->kdc_db_ctx->my_krbtgt_number)) {
+                talloc_free(mem_ctx);
+                *is_untrusted = false;
+                *is_in_db = true;
+                return 0;
+        } else if (rid == DOMAIN_RID_KRBTGT) {
+                /* krbtgt viewed from an RODC */
+                talloc_free(mem_ctx);
+                *is_untrusted = false;
+                *is_in_db = false;
+                return 0;
+        }
+
+        /* Another RODC */
+        talloc_free(mem_ctx);
+        *is_untrusted = true;
+        *is_in_db = false;
+        return 0;
 }
 
 NTSTATUS samba_kdc_get_pac_blob(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
-                                struct hdb_entry_ex *client,
+                                struct samba_kdc_entry *p,
                                 DATA_BLOB **_pac_blob)
 {
-        struct samba_kdc_entry *p = talloc_get_type(client->ctx, struct samba_kdc_entry);
         struct auth_user_info_dc *user_info_dc;
         DATA_BLOB *pac_blob;
@@ -146 +229 @@
 
         /* The user account may be set not to want the PAC */
-        if ( ! samba_princ_needs_pac(client)) {
+        if ( ! samba_princ_needs_pac(p)) {
                 *_pac_blob = NULL;
                 return NT_STATUS_OK;
@@ -183 +266 @@
 NTSTATUS samba_kdc_update_pac_blob(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
                                    krb5_context context,
-                                   krb5_pac *pac, DATA_BLOB *pac_blob)
+                                   const krb5_pac pac, DATA_BLOB *pac_blob,
+                                   struct PAC_SIGNATURE_DATA *pac_srv_sig,
+                                   struct PAC_SIGNATURE_DATA *pac_kdc_sig)
 {
         struct auth_user_info_dc *user_info_dc;
@@ -189 +274 @@
         NTSTATUS nt_status;
 
-        ret = kerberos_pac_to_user_info_dc(mem_ctx, *pac,
-                                           context, &user_info_dc, NULL, NULL);
+        ret = kerberos_pac_to_user_info_dc(mem_ctx, pac,
+                                           context, &user_info_dc, pac_srv_sig, pac_kdc_sig);
         if (ret) {
                 return NT_STATUS_UNSUCCESSFUL;
@@ -201 +286 @@
 }
 
-/* this function allocates 'data' using malloc.
- * The caller is responsible for freeing it */
-void samba_kdc_build_edata_reply(NTSTATUS nt_status, DATA_BLOB *e_data)
-{
-        PA_DATA pa;
-        unsigned char *buf;
-        size_t len;
-        krb5_error_code ret = 0;
-
-        if (!e_data)
-                return;
-
-        pa.padata_type          = KRB5_PADATA_PW_SALT;
-        pa.padata_value.length  = 12;
-        pa.padata_value.data    = malloc(pa.padata_value.length);
-        if (!pa.padata_value.data) {
-                e_data->length = 0;
-                e_data->data = NULL;
-                return;
-        }
-
-        SIVAL(pa.padata_value.data, 0, NT_STATUS_V(nt_status));
-        SIVAL(pa.padata_value.data, 4, 0);
-        SIVAL(pa.padata_value.data, 8, 1);
-
-        ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(PA_DATA, buf, len, &pa, &len, ret);
-        free(pa.padata_value.data);
-
-        e_data->data   = buf;
-        e_data->length = len;
-
-        return;
+NTSTATUS samba_kdc_update_delegation_info_blob(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+                                krb5_context context,
+                                const krb5_pac pac,
+                                const krb5_principal server_principal,
+                                const krb5_principal proxy_principal,
+                                DATA_BLOB *new_blob)
+{
+        krb5_data old_data;
+        DATA_BLOB old_blob;
+        krb5_error_code ret;
+        NTSTATUS nt_status;
+        enum ndr_err_code ndr_err;
+        union PAC_INFO info;
+        struct PAC_CONSTRAINED_DELEGATION _d;
+        struct PAC_CONSTRAINED_DELEGATION *d = NULL;
+        char *server = NULL;
+        char *proxy = NULL;
+        uint32_t i;
+        TALLOC_CTX *tmp_ctx = talloc_new(mem_ctx);
+
+        if (tmp_ctx == NULL) {
+                return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY;
+        }
+
+        ret = krb5_pac_get_buffer(context, pac, PAC_TYPE_CONSTRAINED_DELEGATION, &old_data);
+        if (ret == ENOENT) {
+                ZERO_STRUCT(old_data);
+        } else if (ret) {
+                talloc_free(tmp_ctx);
+                return NT_STATUS_UNSUCCESSFUL;
+        }
+
+        old_blob.length = old_data.length;
+        old_blob.data = (uint8_t *)old_data.data;
+
+        ZERO_STRUCT(info);
+        if (old_blob.length > 0) {
+                ndr_err = ndr_pull_union_blob(&old_blob, mem_ctx,
+                                &info, PAC_TYPE_CONSTRAINED_DELEGATION,
+                                (ndr_pull_flags_fn_t)ndr_pull_PAC_INFO);
+                if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(ndr_err)) {
+                        kerberos_free_data_contents(context, &old_data);
+                        nt_status = ndr_map_error2ntstatus(ndr_err);
+                        DEBUG(0,("can't parse the PAC LOGON_INFO: %s\n", nt_errstr(nt_status)));
+                        talloc_free(tmp_ctx);
+                        return nt_status;
+                }
+        } else {
+                ZERO_STRUCT(_d);
+                info.constrained_delegation.info = &_d;
+        }
+        kerberos_free_data_contents(context, &old_data);
+
+        ret = krb5_unparse_name(context, server_principal, &server);
+        if (ret) {
+                talloc_free(tmp_ctx);
+                return NT_STATUS_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+        }
+
+        ret = krb5_unparse_name_flags(context, proxy_principal,
+                                      KRB5_PRINCIPAL_UNPARSE_NO_REALM, &proxy);
+        if (ret) {
+                SAFE_FREE(server);
+                talloc_free(tmp_ctx);
+                return NT_STATUS_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+        }
+
+        d = info.constrained_delegation.info;
+        i = d->num_transited_services;
+        d->proxy_target.string = server;
+        d->transited_services = talloc_realloc(mem_ctx, d->transited_services,
+                                               struct lsa_String, i + 1);
+        d->transited_services[i].string = proxy;
+        d->num_transited_services = i + 1;
+
+        ndr_err = ndr_push_union_blob(new_blob, mem_ctx,
+                                &info, PAC_TYPE_CONSTRAINED_DELEGATION,
+                                (ndr_push_flags_fn_t)ndr_push_PAC_INFO);
+        SAFE_FREE(server);
+        SAFE_FREE(proxy);
+        if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(ndr_err)) {
+                kerberos_free_data_contents(context, &old_data);
+                nt_status = ndr_map_error2ntstatus(ndr_err);
+                DEBUG(0,("can't parse the PAC LOGON_INFO: %s\n", nt_errstr(nt_status)));
+                talloc_free(tmp_ctx);
+                return nt_status;
+        }
+
+        talloc_free(tmp_ctx);
+        return NT_STATUS_OK;
 }
 
@@ -241 +384 @@
 
         if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(nt_status, NT_STATUS_PASSWORD_MUST_CHANGE))
-                ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_KEY_EXPIRED;
+                ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_KEY_EXP;
         else if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(nt_status, NT_STATUS_PASSWORD_EXPIRED))
-                ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_KEY_EXPIRED;
+                ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_KEY_EXP;
         else if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(nt_status, NT_STATUS_ACCOUNT_EXPIRED))
                 ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_CLIENT_REVOKED;
@@ -287 +430 @@
         return nt_status;
 }
-