SRINF, Short-Range Intermediate Nuclear Forces

In 1981 the Reagan administration, at the insistence of Europeans, adopted the following categories for nuclear systems deployed in Europe: 1) longer-range intermediate-range nuclear forces (LRINF) with ranges of 1000-5500 kilometers, 2) shorter-range intermediate-range nuclear forces (SRINF) with ranges of 500-1000 kilometers, and 3) short-range nuclear forces (SNF).

Shorter range intermediate-range nuclear forces (SRINF) had ranges from beyond the immediate battlefield to 1,000 km [some sources state 1,800 km]. The Soviet modernization of SRINF systems continued in the 1980s. Deployment of the SS-23 missile, with its improved accuracy, would significantly increase the capability of SRINF systems facing NATO. The number of SRINF missiles available to the Warsaw Pact was expected to grow considerably during the rest of the 1980s. SRINF missiles provided the Soviet Union with a significant capability. The forward deployment of SRINF systems would reduce the number of Soviet LRINF systems required to accomplish targeting objectives.

Withdrawal of US PERSHING 1a missiles from Europe was completed in 1985 in conjunction with the deployment of the PERSHING II systems. With this withdrawal, the German PERSHING 1 a missiles are the only SRINF missiles remaining in the NATO inventory.

The Intermediate Nuclear Force (INF) Treaty was signed by President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev on December 8, 1987. The INF Treaty eliminated 867 American an 1836 Soviet missiles from NATO and Warsaw Pact arsenals by the end of 1991 with intrusive verification measures to be employed over the following decade. The treaty was hailed as the most important arms control agreement in the cold war era, representing tne first negotiated reversal of the Soviet buildup of nuclear weapons.

In a November 1985 meeting, President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev agreed to focus on an interim INF agreement. In a January, 1986 letter to Reagan, Gorbachev proposed the complete elimination of nuclear weapons over a 15 year period and agreed to exclude British and French nuclear forces. NATO now found itself in a difficult position. In order to avoid appearing hypocritical by wishing to back out of the zero option proposal, NATO now raised additional problems that they stipulated had to be resolved before an agreement could be reached, including the issue of short-range intermediate nuclear forces (SRINF).

As articulated in "Establishing a U.S. Negotiating Position on SRINF Missiles", National Security Decision Directive Number 278 June 1987, "The United States' consistent position in the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) negotiations in Geneva has been that any INF Treaty must include concurrent constraints on Shorter-Range INF systems (SRINF), constraints which are global, result in equality between the United States and Soviet Union, apply to only U.S. and Soviet systems, and enhance the security of the NATO Alliance." Gorbachev again caught everyone off guard by proposing that the SRINF should also be reduced to zero.