INF Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces

The military-political situation around the USSR by the beginning of 1962 was difficult. The United States deployed its missiles in Europe along the perimeter of Soviet borders (60 Thor missiles were deployed in Great Britain, 30 Jupiter missiles in Italy, and 15 Jupiter missiles in Turkey), and continuous reconnaissance of Soviet territory was carried out from the air.

The missiles in Turkey were of particular concern to the Soviet government, since the flight time to Moscow, according to the Minister of Defense of the USSR Marshal of the Soviet Union R.Ya. Malinovsky, was only 10 minutes. In addition, as of early 1962, the US had an overwhelming superiority in nuclear weapons: the nuclear triad of the Soviet Union consisted of only 405 strategic nuclear warheads, while the US potential was at least 15 times greater. It was necessary to take retaliatory measures in order to reduce the escalation in the whole world, to reduce the global confrontation between the two systems, to reduce the nuclear danger, to force the US and Britain to negotiate nuclear weapons in Europe.

It was supposed to deploy two types of ballistic missiles in Cuba: R-12 (range - about 2000 km) and R-14 (range - up to 4000 km). Both types of missiles were equipped with 1 Mt nuclear warheads. The Minister of Defense also specified that it is planned to deploy 40 missiles, of which 24 RSD R-12 and 16 R-14 missiles. The missiles will be removed from positions in Ukraine and in the European part of Russia. After the installation of these missiles in Cuba, the number of Soviet nuclear missiles capable of reaching US territory doubled. Only on October 14, i.e. almost a month after the arrival of missile regiments, formations and units of air defense, air force, navy and ground forces on the island, US air reconnaissance managed to detect signs of Soviet troops in Cuba.

The term "Long Range Theater Nuclear Forces" (LRTNF) was used by NATO until 1981 to describe what were later identified as intermediate-range and medium range systems. In 1981 the Reagan administration, at the insistence of Europeans, adopted the following categories for nuclear systems deployed in Europe: 1) longer-range intermediate-range nuclear forces (LRINF) with ranges of 1000-5500 kilometers, 2) shorter-range intermediate-range nuclear forces (SRINF) with ranges of 500-1000 kilometers, and 3) short-range nuclear forces (SNF). LRINF and LRTNF are rough equivalents. It was felt that the term "theater" had decoupling connotations; Europeans wanted to emphasize the fact that Europe was more than just another theater.

Longer range intermediate-range nuclear force (LRINF) missiles had ranges between 1,000 and 5,500 km. In late 1983, NATO began implementing its 1979 decision to modernize LRINF with initial deployments of PERSHING II and ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs). These actions were undertaken because of Soviet deployments of SS-20 missiles and the unwillingness of the Soviets to agree to INF reductions after 2 years of negotiation.

Soviet SS-20 systems, with 3 independently targeted warheads per missile, greatly outnumbered the 572 single warhead missiles made available by NATO LRINF deployments. The availability of SS-20 refires and older SS-4s further contributed to the imbalance. In addition, the SS-20 had a much greater range than any NATO LRINF system. The SS-20 could cover the entire European theater, all of East Asia, and other vital areas. The SS-20 could reach most significant targets in Western Europe, even when deployed beyond the NATO LRINF range.

In the mid-1970s the Soviet Union achieved rough strategic parity with the United States. Shortly thereafter, the Soviet Union began replacing older intermediate-range SS-4 and SS-5 missiles with a new intermediate-range missile, the SS-20, bringing about what was perceived as a qualitative and quantitative change in the European security situation. The SS-20 was mobile, accurate, and capable of being concealed and rapidly redeployed. It carried three independently targetable warheads, as distinguished from the single warheads carried by its predecessors. The SS-20s 5,000 kilometer range permitted it to cover targets in Western Europe, North Africa, the Middle East, and, from bases in the eastern Soviet Union, most of Asia, Southeast Asia, and Alaska.

In late 1977, NATOs Nuclear Planning Group ordered a study of the Alliances long-term INF modernization needs, consistent with the doctrine of flexible response. In the spring of 1979, NATO established the Special Consultative Group to formulate guiding principles for future arms control efforts involving INF. That summer, NATO produced the Integrated Decision Document, which set forth the basic aims of the Alliances INF policy. It called for complementary programs of force modernization and arms control.

On November 12, 1979, the NATO ministers unanimously adopted a "dual track" strategy to counter Soviet SS-20 deployments. One track called for arms control negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union to reduce INF forces to the lowest possible level; the second track called for deployment in Western Europe, beginning in December 1983, of 464 single-warhead U.S. ground-launched cruise (GLCM) missiles and 108 Pershing II ballistic missiles.

In 1980, at the start of negotiations on the limitation of nuclear weapons in Europe, the USSR proposed agreeing a moratorium on the deployment of new medium-range nuclear weapons. The United States opposed. Nevertheless, the USSR introduced a unilateral moratorium on their deployment in the European part of the country.

In 1981, the USSR came out for the elimination of nuclear weapons in Europe - both medium-range and tactical. The United States responded with silence. To move the negotiations off the ground, the USSR proposed to reduce the number of carriers of nuclear weapons in Europe to the level of 300 units on both sides, to ban the deployment of nuclear weapons of new types, to provide mutual control. The United States rejected these proposals.

In 1982, Yu.Andropov suggested leaving the USSR in Europe as many medium-range missiles as there were in Britain and France, and also ensuring equality at the lower level for aircraft carriers. The United States and NATO, in response, said that in this case the USSR would have more warheads on its missiles, since the Soviet Pioneer MRS (referred to as SS-20 in the West) are equipped with separable warheads with three warheads of individual guidance. The Soviet leadership took these concerns into account and spoke in favor of the fact that the USSR had no more missiles and no more warheads than NATO.

On August 27, 1983, Yu.Andropov took another step towards the West and declared that the USSR was ready to eliminate all of its medium-range missiles being cut in the European part of the country, and not to relocate them to the East.

On October 27, 1983, the Soviet leadership once again came out in favor of parity both in the number of carriers of medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe and in the number of warheads on them. The USSR expressed its readiness to have in Europe no more than 140 RSD launchers - less than those of Great Britain and France.

During the negotiations, the United States persistently dealt with the deployment of the Pershing-2 MRBM and the KRNB in Western Europe and put forward the so-called “zero” and “intermediate” variants that were obviously unacceptable for the USSR.

For example, in accordance with the “zero” option, in response to the US commitment not to produce and not deploy Pershing-2 MRBMs and the KRNB USSR in Western Europe, they would have to eliminate all their MRBDs, without exception, deployed in both European and parts of the country. In this case, the United States and NATO would have a twofold quantitative superiority over the USSR in medium-range carriers and a threefold superiority in warheads.

The Rubicon was crossed on November 22, 1983, when the Bundestag of the Federal Republic of Germany, by a small majority, adopted a resolution on the beginning of the deployment of Pershing MRBM in the country. Already in December, it was announced that nine Pershing-2 MRBMs in the Federal Republic of Germany and sixteen CRNBs in the UK were brought to combat readiness. The USSR reacted to all this immediately.

The retaliatory measures of the Soviet Union were formulated in the Statement of Y. Andropov of November 24, 1983 and at the December Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU. "Any attempt to break the current military-strategic balance," said Yuri Andropov, "the Soviet Union will be able to give an appropriate response, and his word will not be dispersed with the deed."