FOBS Programs

SOVIET MILITARY SPACE ACTIVITIES

By Dr. Charles S. Sheldon II [1917-1981], was Chief of the Science Policy Research Division of the Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service

1971-1975

FRACTIONAL ORBIT BOMBARDMENT SYSTEM SATELLITES

This study is not directly concerned with military missiles beyond their use as launch vehicles in the space program and as the use of their navigation, guidance and reentry technologies may be applied to space systems as well. But there is one area in which military missiles and spacecraft come together: that of the fractional orbit bombardment system satellites—known as FOBS.

Every long range ballistic missile flight is really a space flight. The missile is given sufficient velocity during initial firing to carry it out of the atmosphere, often flying higher than low orbit satellites, to gain the speed without the friction of the atmosphere, and without the disturbances of winds throughout most of the flight before arrival at target. The path followed is that dictated by the same laws of celestial mechanics as govern space flights. The orbital path flown is one which intersects the Earth, thus terminating the flight. Such missiles fly a great circle path above the Earth on their way from the launch site to the intended target. There may or may not be some terminal guidance as the destination is approached. But essentially, if one knows the location of the launch site for a missile and what its intended target would be, the path it will follow can be known years in advance. (New MARV missiles would add complexities, however. The acronym refers to "maneuvering reentry vehicles" able to evade defensive missiles by changing course.) It was to this end that the BMEWS (ballistic missile early warning) system was constructed in Clear, Alaska; Thule, Greenland; and Fylingdales, England to fan out radar signals which would intercept at the earliest practical time the flight of missiles from the Soviet Union against the United States, Canada, and parts of Western Europe.

It is understandable that the Russians to increase the credibility of their forces would look for ways to thwart vulnerability, early warning, and predictability on the U.S. and NATO side. One way was to protect their own launch sites by hardening them in silos. Another way was to consider the possibility of adding mobility to the launchers. A third was to shift from a land system to an ocean-based system by building on ballistic missile submarines.

There are other opportunities as well. Changes in the simple orbital path is one. Instead of flying to a high point , which gives maximum warning to waiting defensive radars watching for anything to come over the horizon, it is also possible to fly a depressed trajectory to delay the time before radars will pick them up. This requires an orbital adjustment to hold down the apogee of the orbit and to steer the flight downward again as the target is approached.

As such flights go greater and greater distances, ultimately the point is readied where the initial thrust is sufficient to push the missile into orbit. As it falls back it is going far enough and fast enough that it "falls" around the curvature of the Earth, and does not intersect the Earth. It is then in orbit and will stay there either until air drag finally pulls it to "decay", or until a retrorocket is fired to brake it to a commanded reentry.

The opportunity to send a rocket at global distances provides new military options. Such a rocket can make a direct great circle flight to its target with a depressed trajectory to minimize early warning. Or it can fly the long way around the world on the other part of a great circle path to arrive at its target in exactly the opposite direction from which the principal defending radars have been pointed. For example, if the big defense radars are in the Arctic , and the missile comes to a U.S. target by way of Antarctica , that main defense system would miss it.

And there is still a further step which can be considered in any tabulation of options: Instead of having a missile called down short of one orbit, it might be placed in a sustained orbit and called down from orbit only when hostilities were to begin. This possibility will be discussed later in greater detail.

USE OF THE F-l-M LAUNCH VEHICLES AT TYURATAM

The newest of the Soviet space launch vehicles to come into use has been that derived from the SS-9 Scarp very large ICBM. In at least one of its versions, it may be carrying an upper stage which was paraded in Moscow as the final stage of the SS-10 Scrag which itself

never entered the operational missile inventory. But the SS-10 appellation as "global" used in parade descriptions ultimately was transferred to the SS-9 and this may have been brought about by salvaging for further use this final stage. The F series of launch vehicles is unique in that not one has been applied to any civilian program. There have not even been accounts of supplemental scientific payloads. Further, this larger vehicle, capable of carrying up to 4,500 kilograms of payload, and unlike the awkwardly shaped A class vehicles with their cryogenics, uses storable propellants, and can be placed in a silo launch facility.

With its size and general flexibility, the vehicle has been used for several quite different kinds of missions, indicated by the marked differences in flight mode among each of the groups and even with these groups. Also, with inertial guidance almost certainly a feature, these vehicles have shown some versatility in being launched at a greater variety of azimuths from a given launch facility. All the space launches with the F vehicles have come from Tyuratam.

Table 6-5 which follows summarizes all the F class flights.

Weapons Use of the F-l-r Launch Vehicle

Chapter One has already discussed the major known events related to the development and use of the F class vehicles. In this context, our interest is in defining the missions of these flights for military purposes. In greater detail than already summarized in the earlier chapter, the weapons use of the F-l-r came to be recognized through the following sequence of events. Table 6-6 gives greater details on these flights.

Reference has already been made to Soviet analyses of U.S. military space plans carried in Red Star and other Soviet newspapers. When Col. Glazov wrote his attack on U.S. purported misuse of space, he divided these activities into (1) those of military support and control, and (2) military destruction of objects on Earth or in space. He claimed that the reason the U.S. Department of Defense would not publish statistics after early 1962 on the Discoverer satellites was that these were practicing the techniques of calling down warheads from orbit when they retro fired their capsules to Earth. He claimed U.S. development of orbital bombs was well along. He said U.S. ability to use satellites for intercepting and destroying other satellites was understood in principle and would be sought, but was much farther away from being operational. In America 's relatively open society we have a perspective which permits us to distinguish between unofficial proposals for such systems and the hard realities of no authorizations and no funds for pursuing this type of work. The United States today has neither orbital bombardment systems nor space-based interceptor systems. But there has often been the suspicion in the Western world that when the Soviet authorities approve the printing of charges against other nations we may be experiencing symptoms of their own psychological defense mechanisms at work attempting to put the blame on others for what they themselves either are considering or are already doing on a covert basis. There have been enough examples over the years to make this not an unreasonable suspicion even if not true in every instance. In any case, Col. Glazov supplied some interesting descriptions of coming technologies. (21)

The military parade through Red Square in May 1965 included a new, very large three-stage liquid fueled ICBM, the SS-10 Scrag. The Soviet radio announcer said:

Three-stage intercontinental missiles are passing by. Their design is improved. They are very reliable in use. Their servicing is fully automated. The parade of awesome battle might is being crowned by the gigantic orbital missiles. They are akin to the carrier rockets which confidently put into space our remarkable spaceships like Voskhod 2. For these missiles there is no limit to range. The main property of missiles of this class is their ability to hit enemy objectives literally from any direction, which makes them virtually invulnerable to anti-missile defense means. (22)

The corresponding parade in November that same year included the same Scrag missiles, and the description given was:

Now in front of the rostrum giant missiles are passing. These are orbital rockets. Warheads of orbital rockets are able to inflict sudden blows upon an aggressor on the first or any other orbit around the Earth. (23)

These parades of orbital rockets brought negative reactions in foreign circles, particularly because the Soviet Union was a leading participant in the draft treaty banning weapons of mass destruction from outer space. Izvestiya replied editorially, noting that a U.S. Department of Defense spokesman had said that the U.N. Resolution banning weapons from orbit did not preclude production of such rockets.

McCloskey was forced to agree with these pronouncements. How could he do otherwise when the world knows that the United States has long used outer space for espionage purposes and its aggressive military ends. Further, it is clear to everyone that intercontinental missiles are also space weapons. They are fired via outer space, and the United States , as frequently stated by the Pentagon brass, is constantly increasing their output. (24)

In December 1965, the Soviet Union announced test flights of a "variant of a space vehicle landing system, with some elements of the carrier rockets falling" at the specified Pacific Ocean danger zone. There was no claim that a pay load would be recovered at this location. (25) This showed that a multistage vehicle of some complexity was being used. With most systems, the lower stages usually fall m the Soviet Union , with a final stage and payload perhaps going beyond. By contrast, this time, a discarded stage was falling in the Pacific, and the payload, which was sub orbital must have been called down by retrofire into Soviet territory. In light of developments which came in the next two years, we can surmise that the F class vehicle was being applied to the early stages of testing what was to become the Fractional Orbital Bombardment System—FOBS.

In May 1966 the Moscow parade still contained the Scrag missiles and they were still described as orbital, but were given very brief mention. (28) The same was true in the November 1966 parade. (27) That same month, Lt. Gen. Pavel B. Dankevich made passing reference to the fact that silo launchers could be used for both intercontinental and orbital missiles, and these missiles could carry warheads ranging from several dozen to 100 megatons of nuclear explosive force. (28)

On September 17 and again on November 2, 1966 , the Russians made space launchings which were the first since January 1963 to be totally unacknowledged. One can only speculate whether these were launches which failed their ultimate purpose to the extent of being ignored, like the Venus, Mars, and Moon flights of 1962-63, or whether they were not regarded as anything other than related to the military global rocket program and therefore somehow not necessary to acknowledge. These flights came out of Tyuratam on a new inclination - 49.6 degrees suggesting use of a new rocket or new launch pad or both. Debris or staging were left at several altitudes. It was even possible that more than one stage had been deliberately blown up in orbit to protect this hardware from chance compromise should it later decay nearly intact in some place it might be recovered.

These two events threw confusion into U.S. information policies again as similar secret Soviet launches had in 1962. On the earlier occasion, the Goddard Satellite Situation Report was forced to suspend publication for many months while officials wrangled over whether it would endanger security or strain relations if the United States listed such Soviet launches. That time, the giveaway even to library readers was that the sequential COSPAR numbers assigned all objects in orbit were being skipped. This time, those making the decisions apparently thought the thing to do was to ignore the Soviet launches by not assigning them COSPAR numbers as well as omitting them from the Goddard report. But this did not work either. Objects were in orbit and astronomers and radar operators were finding them, and it made it look as if the United States either was playing games or suddenly had lost its ability to track. So eventually, the secret Soviet flights were given COSPAE numbers, the only flights whose numbers were out of chronological sequence. This showed the difficulty of trying to make decisions by fiat when obvious physical facts cannot be made to conform to a directive for something to "disappear". It was clearly awkward for the United States in all of its processes of orderly record keeping and impartial openness in what probably should have been a non-sensitive area. Perhaps within the Soviet Union there were similar struggles among scientists, engineers, public relations (propaganda), and security people. All we know is for the nine years since that time, the Russians have announced all space flights without regard to their program or how they performed.

Because of the amount of debris and conflicting information on sizes of pieces related to these particular flights, one can make only arbitrary judgments as to what elements to list in a table. The launch of September 17 apparently had clusters of debris from a second stage in low circular orbit, more debris from a third stage in eccentric orbit, and a payload somewhat higher. More than 100 pieces were detected. Apogees ranged from about 250 kilometers to about 1,300 kilometers.

The similar flight of November 2 also left debris in perhaps 50 pieces and at apogees ranging from 500 kilometers to about 1,500 kilometers, again suggesting that the Russians must have triggered separate explosions in each abandoned stage and in the payload after at least some of these had performed their different though related functions.

A third flight of the same kind came in 1969, but was announced as Kosmos 316. This time there was no evidence of wholesale explosions. Some kind of stage or platform was left with an apogee of 920 kilometers, while a final rocket stage had an apogee of 1,581 kilometers, and the payload reached 1,650 kilometers.

All three of these flights had low enough perigees that orbital stay time was relatively brief from a few weeks to a few months. When Kosmos 316 decayed, it broke up into a number of parts, which is not uncommon, and these parts largely rained down across the American Midwest, providing some spectacular fireworks. Presumably most fragments burned in the atmosphere, but some chunks did reach the surface and were recovered. These were in Oklahoma , Kansas , and Texas . Some were said to measure up to a meter and more in maximum dimension, and weighed up to tens of kilograms. In accordance with international agreements, these pieces after preliminary study were shipped to Washington to be returned to the Soviet Union , which refused to accept them as theirs. A possible consideration for their reluctance was related to concern over potential damage claims. What was interesting is the rumor that some of the pieces more nearly resembled parts of a bomb casing than a normal rocket structure. This latter report is here say evidence and not document able from published records.

Most analysts seem to have classified these three flights as FOBS flights which in some fashion malfunctioned, and then were exploded. This analysis does not seem to stand up because the placement of the stages and debris are not that closely akin to the FOBS flights patterns which are much lower. Also, some pieces of these flights produced telemetry for varying amounts of time beyond what would be expected if there had been early explosions which made the whole flights errant.

What one can say is that the three mystery flights went at an inclination which has been flown only by FOBS, and using a vehicle- exclusively tied to military programs. Under these circumstances, the flights seems to be weapons-related. The question which has come up in some minds, was whether they related to an orbital bomb program, since the Russians had indicated it was possible to call down weapons either during the first orbit or to leave them up longer. That question cannot be answered to complete satisfaction. A potential weapon which was to have a long stay-time in orbit would presumably be given a higher perigee, closer to circular. But if the flight were developmental, and there was a desire to insure that exploded remnants of any test vehicle would be down in a few months, then the patterns chosen might make sense. Near-Earth space would be less cluttered for many years to come, and any whole parts not exploded would not be in orbit long enough to be inspected in some future year when such capabilities finally became available. Also, a weapon (in follow-on to these experiments) put up in a crisis lasting for only a few weeks would perhaps find acceptable deployment with the kind of eccentric orbits selected.

One is left with unresolved questions about these three flights. In 1967, there were new developments in the use of the F class vehicles. As flights occurred, they were promptly announced and given Kosmos names and numbers. All flew at 49.5 to 50 degrees from Tyuratam. All were distinctive in that the orbital elements as announced included the inclination, apogee and perigee, but not the orbital period. Since all had pieces which stayed in orbit for a number of hours or even over a day, it was clear that the Russians regarded these pieces of debris in lingering orbit as something different from the significant payload portion, whose stay time was less than one orbital period. Typical was the TASS bulletin on the first of these flights:

A routine launching of the artificial satellite Kosmos 139 took place in the U.S.S.R. Scientific apparatus intended for the continuation of research into outer space is installed on board.

The satellite has been put Into an orbit with the following parameters: maximum distance from the surface of the Earth—apogee—210 kilometers; minimum distance from the surface of the Earth—perigee—144 kilometers; inclination of orbit 50 degrees. (29)

The insertion of the word "routine", not normally used, almost arouses one's curiosity as to what was up; and of course, this has been one of the most controversial programs for space undertaken by any nation. The open literature very quickly reflected the special nature of these flights, that the payload was being retro-fired just short of one orbit, leaving staging and debris to decay naturally in the hours and orbits to follow. Some writers immediately speculated that there was a weapons implication. Others were sure what they were seeing were reentry tests in follow-up to the death of Komarov in Soyuz 1. It is interesting how strongly this view was held, considering the facts weighing against this. The first flight came before the death of Komarov. The orbit flown was different from that used for any manned flight, when tests would normally be close analogs of what men would do later if the tests were to provide valid data and experience. During 1967 alone there were nine of these flights. The public explanation came on the afternoon of November 3, 1967 from the U.S. Secretary of Defense, who tagged them as probable FOBS flights. He pointed out that such test flights did not of themselves violate the space treaty and resolutions banning weapons of mass destruction from orbit, both because they flew less than one orbit, and because in all likelihood they did not carry nuclear warheads while undergoing development. He pointed out that the launch vehicle when used as a FOBS would carry a smaller warhead than when the same vehicle was used as an ordinary ICBM, and also that a FOBS might be less accurate in finding its target. He did note that the flights heightened U.S. interest in developing a precautionary interception capability, and also escalated the arms race. He noted that if a FOBS came by the most direct route over the north polar regions that it would fly with a lower apogee than regular ICBM's and hence would give a shorter warning time to the BMEWS defense radars. If it came the long way around over the southern approaches, there was less detection equipment to note its approach. If a warhead were to be fired from what otherwise seemed to be a routine satellite flight, it would take about six minutes for it to move from previous orbit to impact its target on the surface of the Earth.

It was interesting that every one of the FOBS flights from 1967 until 1971 when they were terminated on that initial fractional orbit did not once cross the continental territory of the United States . The regular path at that inclination carried them mostly eastward and very slightly north from Tyuratam across Siberia , down through the central Pacific, across the lower part of South America , up the Atlantic , and across Africa and the Mediterranean to impact after retrofire on Soviet territory not far from the launch site. Some miscellaneous debris stayed up enough orbits that with the rotation of the Earth, the debris crossed over the United States .

After the nine flights of 1967, apparently the testing phase was complete, for only one or two flights a year continued in the next four years. In connection with the SALT talks, or perhaps coincidentally, all flights ceased in 1971, not to resume in the next four years since then.

In 1967, at the end of that busy year of intensive testing, and just days after the American Secretary of Defense had drawn public attention to FOBS, there came the long awaited fiftieth anniversary Moscow parade. As in the several previous parades, the Scrag missile was displayed, but it was no longer described as an orbital rocket:

They were followed by three-stage Intercontinental rockets firing [sic] new, highly efficient kinds of propellant. They need little time to be readied for firing and can be launched from silos and other launching ramps. (30)

The account went on to describe the following rockets which were being unveiled for the first time. These were the SS-9 Scarp. TASS reported:

30. TASS, November 7, 1967 , 0710 GMT.

The last to appear were mammoth rockets each of which can deliver to target nuclear warheads of tremendous power. Not a single army in the world has such warheads. These rockets can be used for intercontinental and orbital launchings. (31)

Radio Moscow elaborated a little bit on the same occasion:

And here they are showing a new type of rocket . . . with a new type of fuel, one of the new high efficiency fuels that they are now using. I can see everyone intently watching this display. And now they are showing what are perhaps the most powerful strategic rockets; they have blunt noses; they can carry the most powerful nuclear warheads and deliver them to any point on Earth. These are ballistic rockets; they can also be used for orbital flights—a very heavy type of rocket. (32)

Department of Defense testimony before Congress has indicated that the SS-10 Scrag did not enter the operational inventory; indeed it may not even have flown. But the SS-9 Scarp of course has become well known as the heaviest Soviet missile until very recently, now exceeded by the new SS-18. The Department of Defense also identified the SS-9 as providing the basic stages for the FOBS flights. We do not know why the SS-10 did not become the orbital rocket it was supposed to, but there is always the possibility that the final stage of the SS-10 survived to become the orbital stage on the SS-9, giving us the F-l-r rocket which was tested from 1965 to 1971.

What is the meaning of no flight activity since 1971 ? It could mean that the Russians decided that FOBS flights are not cost effective, as did the United States . It could mean that they are fully operational and sitting in their silos intermixed with regular SS-9's. It could even be that behind the scenes, missile commanders chafe at the restrictions on troop training, normally afforded by practice flights, and at limits on product improvements through evolution, all in the interest of a political decision not to risk detente and future arms agreements.

The American Secretary of Defense pointed out some of the limitations of a FOBS system. Military planners have pointed out that the right pattern of bombs in orbit, fractional or otherwise, would not have to be large in number to destroy most of the available Strategic Air Command (SAC) bases, and certainly to raise hob with many other aspects of U.S. second strike capabilities. Such a sudden call-down would take six minutes, as the Secretary of Defense reported. But the number of FOBS or similar flights required to take out SAC aircraft would not also take out all the U.S. missiles in silos and in submarines at sea. There would almost certainly be unacceptable losses to the Soviet Union of military power, industrial capacity, and human lives from the U.S. second strike after such a FOBS or related attack. A similar equation would apply in reverse if the United States had a FOBS, which now it both lacks and does not plan to acquire.

Every additional weapon system which another powerful nation acquires complicates the defense of other nations. While FOBS was not technically a violation of the treaty against orbiting weapons of mass destruction, it was not calculated to ease tensions between the two super powers.

ORBITAL BOMBS STATIONED IN SPACE

Space writers and staff studies have explored the possibility of stationing bombs in orbit. Such an operation is now outlawed by treaty, and there is no real likelihood that any weapons of mass destruction are in orbit. Before such activities were banned, and while such activities might have been contemplated, it is not likely that technology had yet reached the place where such stationing could be carried out. The question of whether there were any developmental flights of the basic hardware is one which will be assessed later in this chapter. It may be helpful to discuss the subject for some perspectives on the issue. Setting aside the matter of the treaty for the moment, and looking at the kind of proposals which have been made in the past one can reach some conclusions.

In assessing the merits if any and the drawbacks which are considerable of any orbital bomb system, one must recognize that technology is not stationary, and what may be the right answer today on technological feasibility may be different tomorrow. For example, in some future age, one might imagine a highly developed ability to travel with ease throughout the solar system, and some kind of future cosmic chess game where mankind somehow still had national rivalries and weapons of mass destruction, but had arrived at a situation where the ultimate confrontation would take place many millions of miles from Earth, with both contenders realizing that the battle of the space fleets would also settle the future of Earth—that is, the surviving space fleet would be in a position to dictate the terms on which the conflict would end. This is not possible today, and few people would like to see human efforts pointed that way when a different effort might solve the problems of the arms race.

One can speak only in terms of current capabilities and currently attainable systems. Technically a bomb can be placed in orbit, but that is not to say that it is practical. If only one bomb or a very few bombs were to be placed in orbit, their presence might be kept secret or

disguised. But such an action would have limited military effectiveness. If the fact were advertised as a form of threat or blackmail, the launching state would run high risks of counter moves including a preemptive strike, and no responsible power really acts as if nuclear exchanges were a rational policy. Several states feel tied to a policy of credible deterrence, but not to nuclear war as an active policy. A nation threatened by a bomb in orbit might surrender if it felt powerless, but most states have client relationships with other states, and the ultimate consequences could be too unpredictable to have such a threat an effective policy.

Suppose that a space operating nation decided that instead of a few secret weapons or a few for blackmail purposes, it was going to go all out with an effective fleet of bombs in orbit that might be sufficient to overcome another super power, including its second strike capability. This is not really feasible, either. There are many kinds of sensors and many analytical techniques available to both U.S. and Soviet defense authorities which should start the alarm bells ringing long before such an operation could be completed. Although the aggressor might hope for enough indecision on the part of the intended victim that a sufficiently large force could be deployed in orbit to be decisive, the aggressor might also find that he had telegraphed his punch, and this would lead to a preemptive strike against him. This would be a very large risk on the basis of psychological profiles of political leaders or administrative studies on command and control.

Beyond the issues of war-gaming and possible responses with the most extreme consequences, there are other problems. Developing such a system to attain operational status would take time, and most development plans themselves have tell-tale signs that might provoke either a matching effort or loud public complaints and marshaling of world opinion. Such new systems do not spring full-blown. Their ex tended testing requires many trial flights loaded with diagnostic telemetry _ which may reveal something of the purposes. When the flights continue without telemetry, one suspects the operational phase has been reached.

Suppose that a nation decided it was ready to put actual nuclear weapons in sustained orbit. Not only is there the question of whether they might be detected and neutralized directly or outflanked by some counter move; there is also the question of what happens when the orbit decays. Would the nuclear material be lost? Would it pollute the atmosphere? How long would the orbital bomb remain reliable, and what fail-safe devices would insure that it did not go off when it returned to Earth? How effective would command and control be over such payloads? Could signals be jammed or could spoofing be done? Suppose ultimate need to use such weapons developed: What assurance would there be that they were in the right orbits to strike their assigned targets in timely fashion? If designed as counter force weapons, they would have to be ready to strike the ground weapons in a salvo effect or the other power might launch a return strike against the homeland of the aggressor. If such weapons were to be put up only in a gathering crisis, this would seem a rather powerful activating signal to the intended victim of the bombs. If such weapons were to be put up gradually over a period of time for use in some future year non-specific contingency, then the necessity for long term stability and reliability would carry problems.

Now one can also see the possibility of a space shuttle or its space tug retrieving such a bomb of another nation with all kinds of unpredictable consequences.

The general state of Soviet technology today would seem to preclude any early move to circumvent the treaty and to place bombs in orbit, as a practical danger. There are too many failures of hardware now, and too many payloads decay at. random all over the world with the consequent risk of disclosure of what was going on, if nuclear material were on board a flight.

One hopes and expects the treaty banning such weapons will stay in force and be honored. Meanwhile both the primitive state of technology and the imponderables of countermoves with known weapons will likely discourage any major power from placing live weapons in orbit.

References

1. SOVIET SPACE PROGRAMS, 1971-75, OVERVIEW, FACILITIES AND HARDWARE MANNED AND UNMANNED FLIGHT PROGRAMS, BIOASTRONAUTICS CIVIL AND MILITARY APPLICATIONS PROJECTIONS OF FUTURE PLANS, STAFF REPORT , THE COMMITTEE ON AERONAUTICAL AND SPACE .SCIENCES, UNITED STATES SENATE, BY THE SCIENCE POLICY RESEARCH DIVISION CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, VOLUME – I, AUGUST 30, 1976, GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE, WASHINGTON : 1976.

17. Aviation Week, New York , December 8, 1975 , p. 12 ff.

18. Aviation Week, New York , January 5, 1976 , p. 18.

21. Glazov, V. Cosmic weapons, Red Star, Moscow , January 26/27, 1965.

22. Moscow Radio, May 9, 1965 .

23. Moscow Radio, November 7, 1965 .

24. Quoted by TABS, November 10, 1963 , 1651 GMT.

25. TASS, December 14, 965 , 1848 GMT.

26. Radio Moscow , May 2, 1966 .

27. Radio Moscow , November 7, 1966 . 0736 GMT.

28. Radio Moscow , November 18, 966 , 1430 GMT.

29. TASS, January 25, 1967 , 1708 GMT.

31. Idem.

32. Radio Moscow , November 7, 1967 , 0755 GMT.

A . SOVIET SPACE PROGRAMS: 1981-87, SPACE SCIENCE, SPACE APPLICATIONS, MILITARY SPACE PROGRAMS, ADMINISTRATION, RESOURCE BURDEN, AND MASTER LOG OF SPACEFLIGHTS, Part 2, April 1989, Printed for the use of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE, WASHINGTON, D.C. 1989, Committee print 1981-87- part-2

* Dr. Sheldon, is Chief, Science Policy Research Division, Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress.