Satellite Interceptor (SAINT) Program 706

The first full-scale US ASAT system was SAINT, which never reached the flight test stage. The Aeronautics and Space Reports of the President for the time period involved here indicate that the acronym SAINT stood for Satellite Inspector. Other reference sources state that it meant Satellite Interceptor, or Satellite Inspection and Negation.

The idea for an on orbit satellite inspection system had originated in an Air Research and Development Command (ARDC) a paper study conducted in 1956. Planning and preliminary studies for the US Air Force SAINT was begun in 1957. In the same year when Ar.my General Gavin testified to the Senate of his hopes for US satellites, which he foresaw performing functions of reconnaissance, geodetics and mapping, and weather reporting, he simultaneously coupled these hopes for US satellites with the explicit recommendation for an antisatellite capability to prevent another country from acquiring similar capabilities over US or allied territory. Senator Saltonstall was surprised, in the same Hearings, to hear an indus- trial executive of the North American Corporation refer to a prospective "antispace" program and antispace operations.

Only a year later (1958) the National Aeronautical Space Administration, NASA, presented testimony to Congress on research that it was carrying out under the funding of the US Deptment of Defense (ARPA) on both anti-ballistic missiles (ABM) and anti-satellite weapon systems. In this case, the design of the antisatellite weapon was "to nullify the information that the enemy obtain with the reconnaissance satellite ... (not) necessarily knock it down, but to nullify it so no one can get the information off of it."

On 11 June 1959, the Air Force let a contract to RCA for research into ASAT techniques, and the Air Force Ballistic Missile Division began development on 20 August 1959 when DOD gave final approval for full-scale development of SAINT. ARPA kept this Air Force idea alive with very limited contracts for RCA to study such an inspection system until the Air Force formally proposed on 5 April 1960 that prototypes of the SAINT system be built.

SAINT was to employ the orbital rendezvous technique of interception. The Air Force also envisioned the system as an active defense against Soviet ASATs. It was to defend US satellites, search for orbital nuclear weapons, and rendezvous with and inspect suspect satellites via a TV camera. Not only would the satellite look for nuclear weapons but it also was to differentiate between weather satellites and reconnaissance satellites. Satellites found to be benign would be left alone. Those found to be hostile would be earmarked for destruction.

Soviet threats to orbit nuclear weapons made US development of an ASAT system imperative. Such a system would be a countermeasure to space weapons and, as such, could enforce any agreement banning orbital weapons. ASATs would also provide a means to destroy such a weapon before it could reach its target. Since no one knew how far along the Soviets were in their development program, little time was available for development in the US program. Therefore the US decided to adapt existing hardware. SAINT used much off-the-shelf equipment to keep costs and development time down.

In order to sell its proposal, the Air Force had to stress the inspection feature rather than any possible ASAT capability of the SAINT but the proposal still faced considerable political pressure and the staunch opposition of Science Advisor Kistiakowsky. As the result of this emphasis on only the non-lethal aspects of SAINT (which was unpopular within the Air Force) and the fact that the Air Force had been directed by DDRE York to pay all costs associated with its development, the system now had to face increasing pressure within the Air Force as well.

After more than three years of study, a developmental contract was awarded to the Radio Corporation of America (RCA) in the spring of 1961 to develop SAINT. Although the program was given DoD permission to proceed, the program was primarily viewed by policy-makers as strictly an inspection system that could provide additional information to ground-based assets. The highly ambitious and technically challenging program was comprised of three distinct phases:

• Phase 1 — In phase I, SAINT was strictly a satellite inspector using the Atlas-Agena B combination. Demonstration of a prototype spacecraft that could rendezvous with and inspect an unidentified satellite of one square meter radar cross-section in an orbit up to 740 km altitude. Once operational, SAINT was to transmit its data to the North American Air Defense Command (NORAD).
• Phase 2 — An automated vehicle that could make multiple orbital changes and rendezvous and inspect satellites up to 1850 to 7400 km altitude. Air Force initally planned phase II to include a "kill" capability, perhaps using small, spin-stabilized rockets. However, in July 1960, DOD directed the Air Force to stop referring to a kill capability for SAINT.
• Phase 3—An anti-satellite vehicle that would not only inspect but destroy enemy satellites.

RCA envisioned the SAINT project to be comprised of a ground station for command and control (C2) operated from Colorado Springs, a launch vehicle consisting of an Atlas-Agena first and second stage rocket, and a final stage vehicle from which on-orbit inspections would be conducted. The program was originally budgeted for 19 vehicles at its inception with a total programmatic cost of $1.28 billion and a full operational capability (FOC) by the summer of 1967. The DoD directed the Air Force to use its own internal funding for the project.

During discussions in 1960 of the US proposals for the Satellite Inspector (SAINT) program, it was flatly stated that, "The Soviet Union has been considering similar systems, and some US scientists believe Russia will have an antisate11ite capability by 1963". Secretary McNamara believed that the US needed assurance that "if the Soviets or anyone else started playing around with our satellites we should have the ability to do like-wise." This position was presented by Secretary of the Air Force Zuckert in 1961, both in the specific context of the SAINT program, and in support of obtaining authorization for general US military space efforts. However, it was not until well after the initiation of the USSR ASAT testing program in 1968 -- in fact, not until 1976-1977 -- that this became the overriding rationale for US ASAT proposals.

The lack of strong political and financial support, in addition to the program’s complex technical challenges, eventually led to the program’s cancellation in 1962. By that time, technical problems with the program, the international law implications of on orbit inspection, fears of instigating a space-based ASAT race, and the open possibility of accomplishing this mission more easily and cheaply in other ways combined with the dwindling support for SAINT both within and outside of the Air Force. The on-orbit inspection of Soviet satellites had significant political implications and improving electro-optical ground based telescopic camera systems were eventually deemed a more efficient and politically expedient option for satellite identification and characterization.

The Air Force decided to "reorient" the SAINT program on 03 December !962. The reoriented SAINT program (program 706) was a study program only. The Air Force, noting that ASAT requirements were increasing, planned to use the Blue Gemini and the Manned Orbital Development Station (MODS) programs to test manned ASAT techniques. Gerald M Steinberg's interviews with former Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell L. Gilpatric, former Air Force Secretary Eugene M. Zuckert, and retired General Schriever indicate that McNamara personally canceled the SAINT program, primarily due to his fears of an action-reaction space-based ASAT race.