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National Missile Defense: Status of the Debate

97-862 F    National Missile Defense: Status of the Debate
       CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE
              LIBRARY OF CONGRESS
NUMBER:       97-862 F
TITLE:        National Missile Defense: Status of the Debate
AUTHOR:       Stephen Daggett and Robert D. Shuey
DIVISION:     Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division
DATE:         Updated May 29, 1998
TEXT:
Summary
            In recent years, the debate over National Missile
        Defense (NMD) has focused on how best, and how quickly, to
        develop and deploy a system to protect the United States
        against a limited ballistic missile threat   either an
        accidental or unauthorized launch from Russia or China or
        a deliberate attack from a rogue state.  The Clinton
        Administration is pursuing what it calls a "3 plus 3"
        strategy   the goal is to develop NMD technology over the
        three years through 2000 sufficiently to allow a system to
        be deployed three years later, by 2003, if a decision is
        made to do so.  If a decision to deploy is deferred,
        development would continue.  Many missile defense advocates
        in Congress, however, want to set a date for deploying a
        nationwide defense.  Key issues in the debate include how
        quickly rogue nations might acquire long-range missiles,
        whether advances in technology warrant deferring a decision
        to deploy, whether an initial deployment should be followed
        by a more extensive system, cost, and the implications of
        a deployment decision for the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM)
        Treaty and for negotiating further limits on strategic
        offensive weapons.  Faced with the prospect of a
        Presidential veto, Congress has not set a deployment date
        in annual defense authorization or appropriations bills. 
        Instead, Congress has considered freestanding bills to
        establish NMD policy   recently the Senate took up the
        American Missile Protection Act of 1998, S. 1873, but a
        cloture vote failed on May 13.
     National Missile Defense and Theater Missile Defense.  Ballistic
Missile Defense (BMD) programs may be divided into two broad
categories.  National Missile Defense (NMD) is intended to protect
U.S. territory from attacks by long-range, "strategic" missiles. 
Theater Missile Defense (TMD) systems are designed to protect U.S.
military forces deployed abroad, allied military forces, and allied
nations from attacks by short- to intermediate-range missiles.  This
report reviews the status of debate over NMD systems.  For a
discussion of congressional action on funding for TMD as well as NMD
programs, see CRS Report 98-205, Appropriations for FY1999: Defense,
by Stephen Daggett.
     How the National Missile Defense Debate Has Evolved.  Debate
over missile defense policy has gone through several stages since
President Reagan established the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI)
in 1983.  In the early years of the SDI program, debate focused on
the feasibility and cost of a system designed to provide essentially
complete protection of the United States against an all-out missile
attack by the Soviet Union.  At the end of the 1980s, Senator Nunn
and others proposed deploying a smaller-scale system designed to
defend against an accidental or unauthorized missile launch from the
Soviet Union.  The Bush Administration proposed initial deployment
of a limited system, to be followed by a larger-scale deployment as
technology evolved.  With the end of the Cold War, the debate has
focused increasingly on how best and how quickly to develop and
deploy a National Missile Defense system designed to protect the
United States against attacks by rogue nations, such as North Korea,
Iraq, Iran, or Libya.  Such a system would also offer protection
against accidental or unauthorized missile launches of limited size
from Russia or China.  
     Administration Policy.  The Clinton Administration describes its
strategy for protecting the nation against weapons of  mass
destruction as consisting of three lines of defense: (1) prevention of
threats through arms control and nonproliferation treaties,
disarmament assistance to the former Soviet Union, multilateral
export controls, and the framework agreement on North Korea; (2)
deterrence by maintaining the strength of U.S. armed forces; and (3)
missile defense  to provide protection against some means of
delivery if prevention and deterrence fail.  Administration
officials do not believe, however, that potential threats warrant
immediate deployment of a nationwide missile defense.  No rogue
state, they say, is likely to acquire missiles that would threaten
the continental United States within the next fifteen years, and
attacks from Russia or China are deemed unlikely.  
     Because officials believe the most likely threats to be some
years off, the Administration is pursuing what it calls a "3 plus 3"
strategy for developing national missile defense.  Under this
strategy, the goal is to develop NMD technology over the three years
through 2000 (originally 1999) sufficiently to allow a system to be
deployed three years later, by 2003, if a decision is made to do so. 
If a decision to deploy is deferred, development would continue. 
Under this strategy, a system could be operational within three
years of a decision to go ahead.  
     A key premise of the policy is that early deployment would
freeze technology at a relatively low level, so it is better to
delay deployment while developing more advanced systems.  Two other
aspects of Administration policy are notable:  (1) The
Administration does not plan to pursue deployment of  a larger scale
system once a limited defense is in place.  Although research into
potential "follow-on" technologies continues, the only national
missile defense currently contemplated is to protect against small-
scale attacks.  (2) Because only a limited defense is planned, the
Administration believes that an adequate system can be deployed
while preserving the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty of 1972.
     Recent Congressional Action.  A major issue in the Republican-
controlled 104th and 105th Congresses has been whether to set a date
for deploying a nationwide defense.  In 1995, as part of the FY1996
defense authorization bill (H.R. 1530), Congress included a
subtitle, called "The Missile Defense Act of 1995," that required
the Secretary of Defense to "develop for deployment an affordable
and operationally effective National Missile Defense (NMD) system
which shall achieve an initial operational capability (IOC) by the
end of 2003."  President Clinton vetoed the bill, in part because of
objections to this requirement.  Later, in February 1996, Congress
approved a revised version of the bill (S. 1124) that removed the
deployment date, though other parts of the Missile Defense Act were
retained, including provisions that set dates for deploying TMD
systems.  The President signed this version of the bill into law.  
     In 1996, rather than risk another veto battle on the defense
authorization bill, the congressional leadership decided to pursue
freestanding legislation on missile defense policy.  S. 1635 in the
Senate, sponsored by Sen. Dole, and H.R. 3144 in the House,
sponsored by Rep. Livingston, were identical measures, entitled the
"Defend America Act of 1996," that would have required deployment of
a nationwide defense by 2003, to be followed by later deployment of
a more effective, layered defense including space-based elements. 
Both bills were reported out of committee, but only the Senate bill
was debated on the floor, where a cloture motion failed on June 4,
1996.  Cost was a major issue in debate over these bills (see below
for a discussion of the cost issue).
     In 1997, the congressional leadership again pursued freestanding
legislation to set a deployment date, and the issue was addressed
indirectly in action on the FY1998 defense authorization bill.  S.
7, "The National Missile Defense Act of 1997," sponsored by Sen.
Lott, required deployment by 2003 of a defense against only a
"limited" missile attack and did not mandate a follow-on layered
system.  These changes would substantially reduce costs, though CBO
declined to provide a new estimate on the grounds that critical
information is classified.  The Senate Armed Services Committee
reported the bill on April 30, but no floor action occurred.  The
FY1998 defense authorization act (P.L. 105-85) required (1) that the
NMD program be structured to support a test in 1999 of a system that
could be deployed in 2003 and (2) that the Secretary of Defense
report on year by year funding necessary to deploy a system by then.
     In 1998, the Senate has again addressed the issue in
freestanding legislation.   On April 24, the Senate Armed Services
Committee reported S. 1873, "The American Missile Protection Act of
1998," a bill that was originally sponsored by Sen. Cochran.  The
bill is scheduled for floor debate the week of May 11.  S. 1873
simply states that "It is the policy of the United States to deploy
as soon as is technologically possible an effective National Missile
Defense system capable of defending the territory of the United
States against limited ballistic missile attack (whether accidental,
unauthorized or deliberate)."  CBO estimates that the bill in itself
will have no budgetary impact, though future implementing
legislation would have a cost.  S. 1873 was brought up on the Senate
floor on May 13, but a cloture vote narrowly failed.  Neither H.R.
3616, the House-passed version of the FY1999 defense authorization
bill, nor S. 2057, the version now being considered in the Senate,
establish a date for deploying a nationwide defense.
   Assessing the Threat.  Perhaps the most contentious issue in the
debate over a deployment date concerns estimates of likely threats. 
In assessing threats, officials rely on a National Intelligence
Estimate (NIE), originally prepared in 1993 and revised in 1995,
that reviewed potential long-range ballistic missile proliferation. 
Though the NIE remains classified, its key findings have been
discussed in several open congressional hearings.  The central
finding is that no country other than the declared nuclear powers
will develop or otherwise acquire ballistic missiles capable of
reaching the contiguous forty-eight states within the next fifteen
years.  Other conclusions are that the likelihood of an accidental
or unauthorized missile launch is very low during periods of
stability, though it might increase in times of civil unrest or
political crisis; that North Korea's Taepo Dong II missile may be
made capable of reaching Alaska and the western-most Hawaiian
Islands; that no country now possessing intercontinental missiles is
likely to sell them, though technical assistance may be provided;
that missile flight tests could be detected and that other, earlier
evidence of efforts to acquire missiles could probably be detected
years before missiles could be operational; and that continued close
monitoring is essential.
     Critics of the NIE charged that it was a "politicized" estimate,
that it understated the likelihood that whole missiles could be
acquired by a rogue state, that it essentially dismissed threats to
Alaska and Hawaii, and that it did not adequately review cruise
missile threats.  The FY1997 Defense Authorization Act required the
CIA to appoint a panel to review the NIE.  The panel, headed by
former Director of Central Intelligence Robert Gates, concluded that
the NIE was not politicized, but it criticized the NIE (1) for a
"superficial" analysis of the potential for an unauthorized missile
attack from the former Soviet Union and (2) for "dismissing" cruise
missile threats.  On the whole, however, the panel found the NIE's
conclusions about ballistic missile threats from rogue states to be
persuasive.  The General Accounting Office also reviewed the NIE and
came to similar conclusions.  Threat assessment, however, remains
contentious.  The Senate report on S. 1873 (S.Rept. 105-175) cites
several reasons for uncertainty about the pace at which potential
foes could develop long-range missiles.
     Will Early Deployment Freeze Technology?  A key Administration
argument is that an early deployment date will freeze technology at
a lower, less effective level than would be achieved if deployment
were deferred until the threat warrants it.  DoD will have to begin
procuring the equipment and preparing the missile and radar sites
and command and control structures well before the projected
deployment date.  Given sufficient funds, DoD could continue
developing new system components, and it could replace the initial
systems when better ones are developed.  But DoD has had difficulty
finding enough funds even for its current, limited program.  General
Lyles, the Director of the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization,
said that even though additional funding has been added to the
program, there are very high risks that the system will not work or
will not be ready to deploy within six years.  Critics of the
Administration plan respond that technology is always evolving and
that any system can and should be upgraded over time.  They also
argue that technology will never be made ready for deployment until
a deployment date is established.
     Follow-On Systems and How to Defend All 50 States.  A major part
of the missile defense debate concerns whether to deploy a follow-on
system and, if so, how extensive it should be.  Under the
Administration plan, an initial system would consist of, perhaps, 20
ground-based interceptors at Grand Forks, North Dakota, which would
later be expanded to 100 interceptors.  The initial system would be
able to defend against only a very limited strike   a commonly
discussed scenario is four single-warhead missiles launched by a
rogue state.  The 100 interceptor system would be designed to cope
with a larger threat    perhaps 20 or 30 incoming warheads.  An
unauthorized attack, however, might involve substantially larger
numbers   a renegade Russian submarine, for example, could launch
200 warheads. (See Endnote 1.)  To cope with a threat of that
magnitude might require 400 ground-based interceptor missiles
deployed at several sites and/or a substantial number of space-based
interceptors.  Any system based at a single site in Grand Forks
might not be able to protect all 50 states   Alaska and Hawaii,
especially, might not be covered, and coastal areas of the
continental United States might remain vulnerable to some sea-
launched attacks.
     The Defend America Act of 1996 called for a follow-on system to
include space-based elements and to be able to offer a highly
effective defense against an unauthorized attack.  This led CBO to
assume a large and expensive system in its cost estimate.  The 1997
congressional leadership proposal, S. 7, required defense against a
"limited" threat   presumably fewer that 200 warheads   and did not
specify a follow-on deployment with space-based components.  The
current Senate proposal, S. 1873, does not address the size of
either initial or follow-on systems, but calls for a system able to
defend the "territory of the United States."
     Cost.  Cost may be the most critical issue in the debate over
how sophisticated a missile defense to deploy and on what schedule. 
Since President Reagan introduced the Strategic Defense Initiative,
the United States has spent over $40 billion on missile defense
research and development.  Projected costs of procuring and
operating a system have varied greatly, depending in part on the
size of the system being considered and in part on the source of the
estimates.  In 1992, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimated
a cost of $85 billion to acquire, but not to operate, the system
then being proposed by the Bush Administration, which called for an
initial defense against a limited strike, to be followed by a system
with multiple land-based sites and with continuing R&D on space-
based interceptors.  At about the same time, the Strategic Defense
Initiative Organization reportedly produced a draft report that
projected a cost of $43 billion to deploy a defense with space-based
interceptors and/or lasers.  These estimates may reflect potential
costs of relatively large systems.
     More recently, cost estimates have focused on systems ranging
from the limited defense being sought by the Clinton Administration
to the more extensive defense implied by the Defend America Act of
1996.  In May, 1996, CBO estimated that it would cost $31 to $60
billion through the year 2010 to acquire a "highly effective,"
multilayered system required by the Defend America Act.  Later, CBO
estimated that an additional $2-4 billion per year would be required
to operate and maintain the system, largely because of the need to
replace satellites and to deploy space-based interceptors.  The
National Security Council estimated it would cost at least $23
billion to deploy a two-site, ground-based system under the
congressional proposal.  
     Estimated costs of the Administration plan are much lower.  In
mid-1996, Deputy Secretary of Defense John White reported that the
United States could deploy a system capable of defending against a
limited rogue nation or accidental missile strike, but not an
unauthorized attack, for about $10 billion.  Such a system would
begin with 20 interceptors and grow to 100.  The Army said in mid-
1996 it could deploy an NMD system in four years for $3.2 billion,
and the Air Force said it could do so in five years for $2.3
billion.  CBO issued a new estimate that five different limited NMD
systems could be deployed by 2003 at costs ranging from $4 billion
to $13 billion.  These limited systems would cost from $500 million
to $1 billion per year to operate and maintain.  Since S. 1873 does
not specify how large a threat to defend against, its ultimate cost
implications are unclear.
     Implications for the ABM Treaty and Offensive Arms Reduction. 
A final key issue in the debate over National Missile Defense is the
status of the ABM Treaty.  The ABM Treaty, as agreed to in 1972 and
amended in 1974, allows deployment of up to 100 ground-based
interceptor missiles at a single site.  It prohibits deployment or
testing of land-mobile, sea-, air-, or space-based components of a
defense against long-range missiles.  (Note, however, that the
limits on ABM "components," do not apply to "adjuncts," such as
missile tracking satellites that would not guide an interceptor.) 
Administration officials say it is too early to determine whether an
effective NMD system might require amendments to the ABM Treaty to
allow, for example, deployment at more than one site or use of a
space-based component.  They say, however, that preserving the ABM
Treaty is important to U.S. security and that changes, if necessary,
should be negotiated once the architecture of a system is
determined.  
     Major premises of Administration policy are (1) that a defense
adequate to protect against likely threats can be deployed within
ABM Treaty constraints or with negotiable modifications; (2) changes
to the Treaty, if necessary, will be easier to negotiate when the
United States can point to the specific threats that require
deployment and when the system architecture has been defined
precisely; and (3) if the ABM Treaty is abandoned, it will probably
be impossible to negotiate further reductions in strategic offensive
arms, since Russia   and, perhaps, in the future, other nuclear
powers   will be unwilling to limit its deterrent force in the face
of even limited U.S. defenses.
     For their part, many missile defense advocates in Congress
believe that the ABM Treaty is obsolete, especially with the end of
the Cold War.  They argue that the United States should try to
negotiate a transition to a "defense dominant" strategic balance in
which offensive arms reductions, together with the deployment of
missile defenses, will end the threat of nuclear conflict between
the major powers.  If the ABM Treaty is to be preserved, others say,
the Administration should begin now to discuss the need to adjust
the Treaty to allow a limited defense to be deployed.  The failure
to pursue discussions, they complain, reflects the Administration's
lack of commitment to its professed plan to design a system that
could be deployed by 2003.
                          ENDNOTES
1.  For a good overview of the extent of different threats and the
size of a defense system needed to respond, see K. Scott McMahon,
"Star Wars Comes Down to Earth," Jane's International Defense
Review, August 1997, p. 25f.
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