Theater Missile Defenses:
Possible Chinese Reactions; U.S. Implications And Options

Congressional Research Service: Report for Congress, 94-154 S
February 23, 1994

By Robert G. Sutter, Senior Specialist in International Security Policy
Office of Senior Specialists

SUMMARY

There is a wide range of arguments regarding the Clinton Administration's proposal to spend about $2 billion in FY 1995 on developing an advanced theater missile defense (TMD) system. Arguments also center on whether or not interpretations of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty allow for development and deployment of Advanced Antimissile Systems. One set of arguments that has not received much attention focuses on the possible reaction of China. In particular, if the U.S. develops and deploys advanced TMD systems and shares them with allies and associates, the United States could face serious difficulties with China. The Chinese Government might believe it has little choice other than to continue nuclear weapons--and missile- testing, development and deployment--thereby challenging U.S. efforts to halt nuclear tests, curb missile development and reduce the number of nuclear arms.

INTRODUCTION

At present, Congress is considering whether or not the United States should continue to develop an advanced theater missile defense system to meet perceived international missile threats.[1] The Clinton Administration's proposed FY 1995 budget for developing such weapons is about $2 billion.

Some advocates suggest that the United States should develop systems and share them perhaps along with some of the cost of their development--with Russia, Israel, South Korea, Japan, several European countries, and perhaps others. They note that U.S. forces deployed overseas and the other nations mentioned are or soon could be facing theater ballistic missiles ranging from older SCUD missiles to newer North Korean Nodong and more advanced Chinese M-9 and CSS-2 ballistic missiles.[2]

A necessary step for U.S. policy in the process of developing such a system involves dealing with the ABM treaty, which has provisions that govern anti-missile systems. The U. S. Congress has long supported the treaty and is interested in developing and deploying treaty-compliant TMD systems. Congress is also keenly interested in determining the utility for U.S. interests in developing and sharing TMD systems.

There are a wide array of pros and cons regarding U.S. development, deployment, and proliferation of TMDs.[3] Among arguments used by a few critics is the possible reaction of China.[4] With 300 nuclear weapons and missile delivery systems that probably could not penetrate the proposed TMD, China is thought to view the new U.S. effort with concern. In order to assist Members and staff in assessing this aspect of the U.S. debate over TMDs, this report briefly assesses possible Chinese reactions to an advanced U.S. TMD, and reviews consequences for U.S. interests and possible options for U.S. policy.

Chinese Nuclear Forces: Status and Intentions[5]

Since the mid-1950s, China has made strong efforts within its limited economic and technical capabilities to develop a modest nuclear force and related delivery systems in order to:

• help deter superpower or regional (e.g., Indian) aggression and intimidation;
• secure a strategic retaliatory capability in case of a nuclear war; and
• demonstrate China's international power.

China's few dozen nuclear-capable bombers are too slow and technically backward to penetrate modern air defenses. Beijing relies for nuclear weapons delivery mainly on its mobile ground- based and nascent sea-based missiles (about 100 missiles). All of China's current mobile missiles, land- or sea- based, would be blocked by the TMD system proposed by U.S. advocates. About 20 longer-range, mainly silo-based Chinese missiles would travel at speeds sufficient to penetrate the proposed TMD.[6] As static targets, those silo-based missiles are thought to be vulnerable to attack by an adversary with sufficiently accurate ballistic missiles (both Russia and the United States have such missiles).

Against this backdrop, the proposed U.S. development and deployment of an advanced TMD system pose possibly serious complications for China's ability to deal with possible U.S. pressure intimidation or other such actions. If the United States were to share this system with Russia, as well as other Chinese neighbors (e.g., Japan and South Korea), the effects on Chinese nuclear strike calculations could be substantial.

Possible Chinese Reactions

Beijing's possible reactions to U.S. development and deployment of an advanced TMD system and sharing such a system with U.S. allies and associates can be seen following two paths. One involves possible Chinese military-political measures directly related to the U.S. actions. The other revolves broader Chinese international security policy and relations with the United States.

Military-Political Measures:

• Beijing could choose to wait until the U.S. and its allies and associates actually develop and deploy defensive systems affecting Chinese missile forces. Chinese leaders have seen Washington and Moscow debate such anti-ballistic missile systems for a long time, going back to the 1960s. But the results have not substantially jeopardized Chinese missile capabilities.
• Beijing could endeavor to use arms control initiatives to halt or curb TMD development and/or deployment. In the process, China might be prepared to offer concessions in other areas (e.g., nuclear weapons testing, nuclear missile proliferation) deemed important to the United States and its allies and associates.
• China could seek formal reassurances from the United States that advanced TMD systems would not be directed at China, and that the United States and Russia would deploy them in ways that would be seen by Beijing as not primarily directed against Chinese missiles. (This may be hard to do, and could prove to be especially difficult if Japan and South Korea were to receive TMD systems to protect against the North Korean threat. Such deployments would presumably work just as effectively in protecting these countries against most Chinese missiles).
• China could pursue military measures to counter missile defenses. This could involve developing a greater number and more capable missiles, using decoys and so- called penetration aids, developing multiple warheads for existing or future Chinese missiles, increasing the mobility of China's longest range missiles, and other steps.

Chinese International Security Policy:

U.S. action on TMD may affect an on-going debate in China over international security policy and relations with the United States.[7] Even if U.S. intentions were otherwise, Chinese leaders could conclude from such U.S. development and deployment that the United States and its partners see China as a real or potential adversary that cannot be trusted and needs to be checked with theater missile defenses. Others in China who argue that China's interests are best served through closer economic, political and other interaction with the U.S. and its allies could be placed on the defensive.

The outcome of this debate will be among the factors determining how accommodating China is prepared to be on the wide range of bilateral, regional, and global issues important to the United States. Issues range from Chinese policies on nuclear and missile proliferation, trade questions, and human rights conditions, to Beijing's role in dealing with the danger posed by North Korea's nuclear program, global arms control efforts, and other issues.[8]

U.S. Implications and Options

This brief review of possible Chinese reactions suggests that the United States may face serious difficulties regarding China if the U.S. develops and deploys an advanced TMD system and shares it with allies and associates. Most notably, China might see little choice other than to continue nuclear weapons and missile testing, development and deployment--thereby challenging U.S. interests in halting nuclear tests, curbing missile development, and reducing the numbers of nuclear arms.

The United States might attempt to reassure China that it is not the target of the new systems, perhaps even offering to share the system with China. Although Beijing is thought to be interested in learning about TMD, this benefit may not be sufficient to offset the negative impact of the TMD system on Chinese missile forces and missile modernization. The United States could endeavor to offset China for this impact on Chinese security concerns with gestures in other areas. Possibilities include more liberalized U.S. technology transfer policies, easing Chinese market access to the United States, stronger support for China's entry into GATT, stronger U.S. backing for Beijing's position vis-a-vis Taiwan, and other steps. Of course, each of these gestures would have consequences for other kinds of U.S. interests.

1. For background information, see Hildreth, Steven, Theater Missile Defense Policy, Missions and Programs: Current Status, CRS Report 93-585F, Washington, Congressional Research Service, June 10, 1993, 38 p. See also Hildreth, Steven, Theater Missile Defense: Indigenous Programs and Interest Among U.S. Allies and Friends, CRS Report 93-703F Washington, Congressional Research Service, July 27, 1993, 18 p.

2. See, for instance, "Clinton Puts ABM on Target," Defense News, January 31, 1994, p. 15.

3. See sources in footnote 1.

4. Interviews conducted in Washington, DC, January-February 1994.

5. For background, see Sutter, Robert, China's Nuclear Weapons and Arms Control Policies, CRS Report 88-374F, Washington, Congressional Research Service, May 16, 1988, 42 p. More recent coverage is provided in the Institute for International Strategic Studies (London) Publications, notably the Military Balance.

6. An advanced TMD system is assumed to have missiles capable of destroying an incoming ballistic missile at a speed which includes ballistic missiles with a range of about 3,200 km or less. The longest range Chinese missiles move toward targets at speeds that would prevent them from being intercepted by missiles currently envisioned for the U.S. TMD. Interviews conducted in Washington, DC, February 1994.

7. For background see Sutter, Robert; Kan, Shirley; Dumbaugh, Kerry; China In Transition, Issue Brief 93114 (updated regularly), Washington, Congressional Research Service, January 31, 1994.

8. See Dumbaugh, Kerry, China-U.S. Relations, Issue Brief 94002 (updated regularly), Washington, Congressional Research Service, January 11, 1994.