US Army Space and Missile Defense Command (SMDC) Press Release 10/14/03

Comparison of Operation Desert Storm (1991) and

Operation Iraqi Freedom (2003) from a Space Perspective

Following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, the United States launched the largest military operation since Vietnam. More than 500,000 U.S. troops arrived in Saudi Arabia to protect the interests of the United States and its allies in the Persian Gulf region. Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm provided a testing ground for the Army's Space-based technologies. Desert Storm has been called the "first Space war" because every aspect of military operations depended, to some extent, on support from Space-based systems. The Army used these systems for position/navigation, weather, communications, imagery and tactical early missile attack warning. The assistance rendered was invaluable and the new technology changed the way the Army fought. The conflict was a watershed event and after the war, the Army viewed Space as an integral part of any attempt to achieve firepower and information dominance on the battlefield of the future. Space became the Army's new "high ground." After the Gulf War, the challenge for the Army was to normalize Space and missile defense and make the tools they would bring to the fight an integral part of the planning process. An historical comparison of Operation Desert Storm and Operation Iraqi Freedom shows the distance the Army has traveled in normalizing Space and missile defense and incorporating these capabilities into its operations.

In the 1990-1991 Gulf War, soldiers from the Army Space Institute, Army Space and Army Space Program Office deployed as individuals or as members of ad hoc task forces, with little formalized training. In Iraqi Freedom, Army Space had an established force structure consisting of the 1st Satellite Control (SATCON) Battalion, the 1st Space Battalion and a Colorado National Guard unit, the 193rd Space Battalion. These units control the satellite links for tactical and strategic warfighter communications networks, and support Army, Joint and Coalition warfighters worldwide through the Army Space Support Teams (ARSSTs) and the Joint Tactical Ground Station (JTAGS) systems.

Before and during Desert Storm the Army Space Institute worked to integrate Space-based systems across the spectrum. Since then, there has been significant progress through Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) and the SMDC Force Development and Integration Center (FDIC), among others, as well as progress in the Joint arena. This has included creating a new Military Occupational Specialty (MOS), Functional Area 40, and integrating Space-based systems into training and exercises and into Army and Joint doctrine.

For position and navigation capabilities, in 1990, the Army owned only 500 demonstration Small Light Weight Global Positioning Satellite (GPS) Receivers. There were problems in getting them out to the tactical units because there were too few available. The Army Space Institute began a crash-training program in their use. By 2003, there was real-time global position, navigation and timing capabilities embedded within the tactical units. This was supplemented by new applications for precision strike and Space-based Blue Force Tracking.

Missile warning was revealed to be a particularly difficult problem in Desert Storm. In order to warn against Iraqi Scud missile attacks, a new Tactical Event Reporting System (TERS) had to be assembled in an ad hoc manner. Based in the United States, it pushed data to the troops in theater and could be unreliable. Due to the deficiencies of this system, the Army developed the JTAGS, which deploys with the troops. It pulls data from satellites with a direct downlink and processes and distributes it in theater. It supports active defense, passive defense and attack operations.

In Desert Storm, the military long-haul communications system was supplemented by using commercial systems. The demand for bandwidth exceeded the supply and called for better planning and asset integration. By 2003, communications had improved, resulting in reliable on-demand communications and reduced in-theater footprint for communications assets.

Weather forecasting also improved between 1991 and 2003. In Desert Storm, the Defense Meteorological Satellite Program (DMSP) system was augmented by WRAASE receivers and there was a demand for weather support at progressively lower tactical levels. In Iraqi Freedom, great progress had been made in moving to real-time tactical weather prediction with enhanced systems and capabilities. In 1991, the Army used commercial sources to augment its map-making capabilities. It had dated maps at the outset of the campaign and faced delays in getting more accurate topographical products. It was able to combine several systems to achieve success. In Iraqi Freedom, the military map-making system had been significantly enhanced. Real-time, accurate tactical terrain data was available to units and readily updated using digitized databases and models.

The Army also used missile defense in Operation Desert Storm. In 1991, the threat was from Scuds or modified Scuds. In 2003, the threat came from shorter-range systems and cruise missiles. In terms of missile defense readiness, Opera-tion Desert Shield/ Desert Storm seemed more like a crisis response operation. The 11th ADA Brigade began to move to the theater on C+5. The warning system TERS was assembled. By 2003, there was a well-integrated missile defense system with new systems and capabilities that had been extensively tested and exercised. Missile defense units in 2003 benefited from more than a decade of experience in the Persian Gulf.

Missile defense posture also changed. In 1990-1991, missile defense was concentrated around key cities and supported combatant Corps in breaching operations. In 2003, there was an integrated missile defense network that allowed the units to maneuver with the V Corps deep in Iraq.

In the Gulf War of 1990-1991, the Iraqis launched 93 missiles against Coalition targets. The Army claimed that it intercepted 79 percent of the missiles targeting Saudi Arabia and 40 percent of those targeting Israel. A GAO investigation determined that only nine percent of the claimed interceptions could be verified. In 2003, according to open sources, the Iraqis launched 17 ballistic missiles and two cruise missiles. All ballistic missiles were intercepted or were considered to pose no danger and declared "out of bounds." One cruise missile eluded the defenses. In Operation Desert Storm, the primary issue was the failure to intercept incoming missiles, while in Operation Iraqi Freedom the discussion has revolved around incidents of fratricide involving missile defense units.

The challenge in Desert Storm was to normalize and operationalize Space-based capabilities in the Army. This had been accomplished by the late 1990s and the use of Space-based systems has been integrated into Army training and exercises and into Army and Joint doctrine. The challenge now is to leverage Space in the process of Army transformation.