Sudan - Fourth Civil War - 2023-20??

In the end there can be only one. Violence erupted over the planned integration of Daglo's paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) into the regular army. The integration was a key element of talks to finalise a deal that would return the country to civilian rule and end the political and economic crisis sparked by their 2021 coup in one of the world's poorest countries. Official sources stated that the early July 2024 clashes between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) had escalated on multiple fronts across Sudan, notably in Sinnar, West Kordofan, and North Darfur states.

The terms “Arab” and “non-Arab” are slippery labels in many regions in Sudan. Both communities are Black and Muslim and have inter-married for centuries. The labels mostly denote communal ways of life. “Arabs” are traditionally pastoralists and camel herders, while “non-Arabs” are sedentary farmers.

Commanded by Gen. Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, known as Hemedti, the Rapid Support Forces was formed in 2013 as a paramilitary force composed mostly of former Janjaweed fighters. The Janjaweed were notorious for their involvement in the Darfur genocide, which began in 2003 and was considered one of the worst humanitarian crises of the 21st century. Since its formation, the RSF had been accused of human rights abuses, including rape, torture, and extrajudicial killings. In 2019, the RSF was involved in a violent crackdown on pro-democracy protesters in Khartoum, which resulted in the deaths of more than 100 people. The RSF had also been involved in the ongoing conflict in the Darfur region, where it had been accused of committing war crimes and ethnic cleansing against non-Arab groups. After the Darfur Genocide, Hemedti faced a one-way ticket to The Hague.

The military in Sudan sought to disempower civilians after its October 2021 coup, a cause that united different factions within the security sector, including Hemedti. The Sudanese people who had been protesting for four years, demanding a democratic civilian government, had been right all along, and everyone forcing them to compromise with the army and the militia had been wrong. Democracy would bring stability to Sudan, yet civilians are disunited on everything.

The International Crisis Group noted "In courting the civilian elites, Hemedti exploited the fact that many of them – much as they distrust the RSF – view the army as their historical enemy, a redoubt of Bashir sympathisers including Islamists who had staffed the former president’s bureaucracy. In December 2022, a framework agreement promising to restore civilian rule accentuated their rivalry. While Burhan signed the deal only under heavy external pressure, Hemedti championed it, due to clauses he saw as giving him autonomy from Burhan and the army. The agreement recognised the RSF as a regular entity affiliated with the armed forces but placed it under the direct command of a civilian head of state, rather than the army chief, during a transition period. The deal also required the RSF to integrate into the army but left the timetable open to negotiation. This arrangement only deepened the distrust between Sudan’s two military overlords."

By April 2023, with civilians removed from the political process, the inevitable clash between Hemedti and al-Burhan erupted. Sudanese soldiers shouted Allahu Akbar, celebrating the capture of other Sudanese soldiers wearing a slightly different camouflage uniform, all boasting the Sudanese flag on their chests.

Violence broke out on 15 April 2023 between forces loyal to Sudanese Armed Forces chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and his deputy turned rival Mohamed Hamdan Daglo, who commands the powerful paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF). Previous allies worked together to overthrow the interim Sudanese government in 2021, now clashed for power with neither party gaining a visible advantage. Negotiations had been under way to get the country back on a path to democracy. Under international pressure, Burhan and Hemedti agreed in December 2022 to a framework agreement with political parties and pro-democracy groups. But the deal was vague on key points of dispute, including how the RSF would be integrated into the armed force and who would have final control. The framework agreement ratcheted up tensions when it elevated Hemedti's position into Burhan's equal, rather than his deputy. That shift in power was why conversations about security sector reform and integration of the RSF ended up in armed conflict rather than heated debate around the table.

Because the SAF and RSF were designed to be complementary rather than competing forces within one state, the conflict setting in Khartoum put both in a deadlock, observers say. At the same time, the rift between al-Burhan and Hemedti had weakened state power. The unclear situation on the ground deterred political actors from intervening, in another blow to the already faltering democratic process. The coup in 2021 made it very clear that powerful figures in the security services were not willing to allow democratisation without serious preservation of their powers and the spoils they are getting from the system. As long as neither RSF nor SAF had the upper hand, a chance for negotiations would not be in sight. Neither of these sides wants to end the fighting. They had agreed to every ceasefire, though they did not implement them. What might create a real opening for dialogue was if one side was about to win. If one side gains a tactical advantage – like if the RSF was driven out of Khartoum – that might create a real opportunity for them to talk.

The military can use long-range artillery and fighter jets to defend their positions. Up close they had tanks and heavy armor. The RSF was not positioned to hold territory and defend positions because it was configured like a guerilla force that strikes and retreats quickly. Many RSF recruits are also unfamiliar with the operational environment in the capital. These are people from the peripheral regions of the country with very little knowledge of the streets and neighbourhoods in Khartoum. The SAF had an advantage there because the SAF knows Khartoum. At the same time, the SAF was not mobile; it cannot defend positions reasonably well and it was not going to be able to chase the RSF around the city.

Still, neither force appeared to be adjusting its combat tactics to its surroundings. RSF used the same tactics from the Janjaweed: they are pillaging, marauding, and looting in neighborhoods. With no established supply lines in Khartoum and their headquarters destroyed, RSF fighters go into people’s homes to steal food, water, supplies, and occupy them].

The United States expected the fighting between two military chiefs in Sudan to continue as neither had an incentive to seek peace, US Director of National Intelligence Avril Haines said. “The fighting in Sudan between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) is, we assess, likely to be protracted as both sides believe that they can win militarily and had few incentives to come to the negotiating table,” Haines told a US Senate hearing on 04 May 2023. “Both sides are seeking external sources of support, which, if successful, was likely to intensify the conflict and create a greater potential for spillover challenges in the region,” she said.

Following the failure of the peace initiative and the offensive of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in December 2023, the commander-in-chief of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), Abdel Fatah al-Burhan, carried out additional recruitment into the SAF under the slogan of “popular resistance”. In the second half of January 2024, the SAF launched an offensive from Shendi (River Nile State) to the northern areas of the Khartoum metropolitan area. One of the main directions for the SAF was an operation in the central part of Omdurman with the goal of “breaking the blockade of the engineering corps.” After prolonged fighting, the SAF finally broke through the ten-month blockade of the Corps of Engineers at Omdurman on 20 February and achieved its first major military victory in a long time.

Among the significant factors that provide new capabilities to the SAF are the Iranian Mohajer-6 UAVs. Their regular supplies are carried out by flights from Iran to Port Sudan. And although the RSF forces have already reported the downing of 3 such UAVs, they continue to be widely and effectively used by the SAF.

Sudan’s war has entered a new phase following an army breakthrough in central Omdurman, the nation’s largest city, in mid-February 2024. The breakthrough relieves the 10-month siege of a military district known as Corps of Engineers, and it represents the army’s first major offensive success of the war. The breakthrough also severs the connection between RSF troops in Ombada and the eastern neighborhoods known as Old Omdurman. Attempts by the army to eradicate RSF resistance in this eastern part of the city could represent the next phase of the Battle of Omdurman, Sudan War Monitor reported. The Sudanese military has suffered major defeats at the hands of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), a rogue paramilitary, which outmatched it in tactics and maneuver warfare early in the war.

The central government has retreated to the Red Sea city of Port Sudan. What little budget it has left it spends on military equipment and operations. It has few international allies. Eritrea and Iran have emerged as its main military backers, while Egypt, in spite of its historical ties with the Sudanese army, has not intervened. Egypt is currently going through a deep economic crisis of its own. China is also a long-time supplier of military equipment to Sudan, though it isn’t play a political role in the war.

Sudan War Monitor reported 12 March 2024 that "The Rapid Support Forces (RSF) are being steamrolled in Sudan’s largest city, Omdurman, losing a large amount territory, men, and equipment under a relentless combined-arms assault involving infantry, drones, and artillery. The latest fighting coincides with the first two days of Ramadan, the Muslim holy month, ignoring appeals by the United Nations for a temporary ceasefire. After relieving the siege of Corps of Engineers in central Omdurman mid-February, the Sudanese army trapped hundreds or possibly thousands of RSF fighters in eastern neighborhoods of the city, an area known as Old Omdurman. In the following weeks, the army consolidated control over northern neighborhoods of this district—including Wad Nubawi, Abu Rof, and Beit al-Mal—confining the RSF troops in an increasingly small pocket of territory centered around the state television and radio complex in Al-Mawrada. The battle culminated today in an attempt by the RSF to break out of this pocket, which failed spectacularly... "