Hothi / Houthi / Huthi
Ansar Allah / Ansarallah
al-Shabab al-Mum'en / Shabab al-Moumineen (Believing Youth)

"Over the past months, Yemen-based Houthi militants have engaged in unprecedented attacks against United States military forces and international maritime vessels operating in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden" National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan said 17 January 2024. "These attacks fit the textbook definition of terrorism. They have endangered U.S. personnel, civilian mariners, and our partners, jeopardized global trade, and threatened freedom of navigation. The United States and the international community have been united in our response and in condemning these attacks in the strongest terms. Today, in response to these continuing threats and attacks, the United States announced the designation of Ansarallah, also known as the Houthis, as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist.... "If the Houthis cease their attacks in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden, the United States will immediately reevaluate this designation. The designation will take effect 30 days from now, to allow us to ensure robust humanitarian carve outs are in place so our action targets the Houthis and not the people of Yemen. We are rolling out unprecedented carve outs and licenses to help prevent adverse impacts on the Yemeni people. The people of Yemen should not pay the price for the actions of the Houthis. We are sending a clear message: commercial shipments into Yemeni ports on which the Yemeni people rely for food, medicine and fuel should continue and are not covered by our sanctions. This is in addition to the carveouts we include in all sanctions programs for food, medicine, and humanitarian assistance." The Department of State announced 17 January 2024 the designation of Ansarallah, commonly referred to as the Houthis, as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist group, effective 30 days from today. This designation and the associated general licenses will be effective on February 16, 2024.

Since November 2023, the Houthis have launched unprecedented attacks against international maritime vessels in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden, as well as military forces positioned in the area to defend the safety and security of commercial shipping. These attacks against international shipping have endangered mariners, disrupted the free flow of commerce, and interfered with navigational rights and freedoms. This designation seeks to promote accountability for the group’s terrorist activities. If the Houthis cease their attacks in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden, the United States will reevaluate this designation.

Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken said "The Houthis must be held accountable for their actions, but it should not be at the expense of Yemeni civilians. As the Department of State moves forward with this designation, we are taking significant steps to mitigate any adverse impacts this designation may have on the people of Yemen. During the 30-day implementation delay, the U.S. government will conduct robust outreach to stakeholders, aid providers, and partners who are crucial to facilitating humanitarian assistance and the commercial import of critical commodities in Yemen. The Department of the Treasury is also publishing licenses authorizing certain transactions related to the provision of food, medicine, and fuel, as well as personal remittances, telecommunications and mail, and port and airport operations on which the Yemeni people rely."

This action was taken pursuant to Executive Order 13224, as amended, which targets terrorists, terrorist organizations, leaders of terrorist groups, and those providing support to terrorists or acts of terrorism. Ansarallah is being designated for having committed or attempted to commit, posing a significant risk of committing, or having participated in training to commit acts of terrorism that threaten the security of United States nationals or the national security, foreign policy, or economy of the United States.

The US moved on 05 February 2021 to delist Yemen's Houthi rebels as a terrorist organization, removing a block that humanitarian groups said jeopardized crucial aid as the country's warring sides cautiously welcomed a push for peace by President Joe Biden. The Congressional Progressive Caucus had "consistently supported an end to unconstitutional U.S. participation in the Saudi-led coalition’s brutal war, spearheading the first-ever War Powers Resolution to pass the House and Senate in 2019. The imminent end of Trump’s lawless administration opens the possibility for robust engagement with the UN-brokered peace talks to diplomatically resolve the crisis".

On 10 January 2021 the Department of State notified Congress of the intent to designate Ansarallah – sometimes referred to as the Houthis – as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO), under section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, and as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT) entity, pursuant to Executive Order 13224. I also intend to designate three of Ansarallah’s leaders, Abdul Malik al-Houthi, Abd al-Khaliq Badr al-Din al-Houthi, and Abdullah Yahya al Hakim, as SDGTs.

"If Ansarallah did not behave like a terrorist organization, we would not designate it as an FTO and SDGT. It has led a brutal campaign that has killed many people, continues to destabilize the region, and denies Yemenis a peaceful solution to the conflict in their country. Rather than distance itself from the Iranian regime, it has embraced the world’s leading state-sponsor of terrorism even more. Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) has supplied Ansarallah with missiles, drones, and training, allowing the group to target airports and other critical infrastructure. The Iranian regime continues to thwart the efforts of the United Nations and friendly countries to solve the crisis peacefully and end the conflict. The United States calls on the Iranian regime to stop smuggling weapons to Ansarallah in violation of UN Security Council resolutions and to stop enabling Ansarallah’s aggressive acts against Yemen and towards its neighbors, including Saudi Arabia."

After four years of war, by 2019 the Houthis had transformed themselves from an isolated militia in Saada to a local state that rules the bulk of Yemen's north with an iron fist. They deepened their influence through a combination of force and strengthening alliances with powerful tribes and leading Yemeni figures using political expedience or buying loyalties. On a local level, they have established a system of administration by appointing "supervisors" in every district. The supervisors take all the decisions needed for day-to-day administration, escalating any larger decisions up to higher Houthi management. Their points of focus are largely security, maintaining control, and mobilising more people to fight for their cause. The Houthis had proved to be more capable to govern than the legitimate government. Comparing Sanaa and Aden, Sanaa is better with regard to security.

The popular support for the Houthis today is strengthened by the ever-present threat of aerial bombings by the military coalition led by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. The coalition, which started its bombing campaign four years ago, has resulted in thousands of deaths and enormous destruction to the Arab world's poorest country.

The Houthis are Zaidi Shia originating from Saada in northern Yemen, their official name is Ansar Allah, or the supporters of God. They gained prominence after the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, and have survived repeated attempts by former President Ali Abdullah Saleh, supported by Saudi Arabia, to eradicate them. They share an ideological affinity with Hezbollah in Lebanon, and with Iran by extension.

They are a tiny minority constituting less than 20 percent of the Yemeni population, which is about 26 million citizens. The majority of the Houthis belong to the Shafite, as well as the Zaydi minority. We can even say that the Houthis, also referred to as Ansar Allah, are a minority within the Zaydi minority because of their divergent belief that the legitimate authority should be restricted to the descendants of “Al Hassan and Al Hussein,” or what is often referred to as ‘al-Batnayn’ (the two clans), who consider themselves God’s chosen ones. Therefore, if peace prevails in Yemen, this will mean a return to the principles of Yemen’s September 1962 revolution that toppled the imamate regime that the Houthis promise they have inherited. If the Houthis succeed in reinstating the rule of the imamate in Yemen, this will take the majority of the Yemeni citizens back half a century.

After the advent of the Arab Spring to Yemen, President Saleh was removed and replaced by President Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi, a Sunni politician from the south. The Houthis were unhappy with this arrangement, as well as with their allotment in the proposed reconfiguration of Yemen into a federation of sorts.

In 2014, the Houthis formed an alliance with Saleh and elements of the armed forces who were still loyal to him and opposed to Hadi, who was seen by some as a Saudi puppet. They moved on Sanaa in September 2014 and overthrew Hadi. They soon took the port city of Hodeidah as well and began to move on Aden.

The situation was dangerous for Saudi Arabia, which did not want to see vital shipping lanes under the control of the Houthis and its regional rival, Iran. And thus, Operation Decisive Storm was born, a coalition of nations led by Saudi Arabia and the UAE that went to war to reinstate Hadi and the internationally recognised government he headed.

A hybrid range of forces make up the military element of the Houthis, referred to as Ansar Allah, with some 60 per cent of the former Yemeni army loyal to Saleh having allied with the group. A September 2019 report by Renad Mansour and Peter Salisbury estimate their strength at 180,000-200,000 armed men with access to weapons systems ranging from tanks and technical vehicles to anti-tank guided missiles and long-range ballistic missiles. The group claims many of the advanced parts their arsenal were captured when it captured the state in 2014.

Yemen's government faced a persistent rebellion by Shiite tribesmen. The Houthis led a campaign calling for the replacement of the government and economic reforms. The Houthi motto is: "God is Great, Death to America, Death to Israel, Curse on the Jews, Victory to Islam." Yemen's Sunni-majority government accused them of being a proxy for Iran, blaming the mainly Shi'ite nation for sparking the unrest.

Ansar Allah, previously known as Al-Shabab al-Muminin, is the military wing of the Shiite Houthis Movement. "We are in the end time, the promised Yamani and messenger of Imam Mahdi to the Shia Muslims, the Mahdi who is born in the end time for the Sunnis Muslims..."

One of the deepest root causes of the conflict in Sa'ada is religious. Over the past 20 years, Zaydis - who have historically made up the majority of the governorate's population - have felt increasingly threatened by the radical Sunni Salafism exported from Saudi Arabia (ref b). "Sa'ada is so Shi'a that even the stone is Shi'a," Abdulkader al-Hillal, former head of the Sa'ada Mediation Committee, said, quoting a Yemeni poet. However, Sa'ada's unique Zaydi identity has been challenged by the establishment of Salafi schools and mosques in the governorate, and local residents founded a Zaydi revivalist group called the Believing Youth to teach young people about their Zaydi religion and history. A branch of the Believing Youth later produced the more extreme Houthi ideology and organization. The Houthis are fighting to preserve their unique identity, religious beliefs and practices by seeking to establish their own schools and university.

The government of Yemen argued at every turn that Iran and its surrogate, Hizballah, inspired, financed and trained the al-Houthi rebels. Meanwhile, various sources alleged that the Saudi government was providing significant financial support to the government in its fight against the Houthis.

In an 08 September 2009 interview on al-Jazeera satellite channel, President Saleh alleged that unnamed Iranian parties support the Houthis financially and otherwise. In April 2015 a confidential UN report by a panel of experts presented to the Security Council’s Iran sanctions committee indicated that Iran has been shipping weapons to Yemen’s Houthi rebels since at least 2009. The panel of experts reported on the findings of an investigation into the 2013 seizure by Yemeni authorities of an Iranian ship, the Jihan, that was carrying weapons.

The Al-Houthi rebels were centered on opposing the government, but were also anti-American and criticized Sunni scholars for ordering people to obey "cruel rulers who cooperate with America." In 2008, the leader of the al-Houthi group stated that their new slogan was "God the Greatest, Death to America and Israel, Victory for Islam and Muslims."

Yemen likely has among the highest number of small arms/light weapons per capita in the world, with easy access to many varieties of explosives. Weapons and explosives are easily attainable, and gun markets are well-stocked. Although the presence of weapons is smaller in scale in the larger cities, small arms remain prolific in tribal areas and smaller towns. The Al-Houthi rebellion has also indicated how easy it is to obtain light and heavy weapons in country. In addition, there have been reports of surface to air missiles in the hands of terrorist groups in Yemen.

Yemen was engaged in an intrastate conflict with Shia rebels loyal to Abdul Malik al-Houthi, also known as the Shabab Al-Mu'minin (Believing Youth), or even more recently as the Mujahedeen group, according to recent statements by the group's leader. In the early 1990s, in the face of what Zaydis perceived as religious persecution, Zaydis in Sa'ada founded a Zaydi revivalist group called the Believing Youth as well as the Zaydi-affiliated al-Haq opposition party. It was supposed to be a religious renewal for Zaydis, to teach our young people about the Zaydi religion and history.

This conflict began in mid-2004, and flared up again in the spring of 2005. In late December 2006, the conflict erupted again and has become more intense. There were a large number of violent clashes in Saa'da in Jan/Feb 2007. The conflict remained largely localized in the north until May 2008, when ROYG forces confronted al-Houthi rebels in Bani Hushaysh, an area approximately 12km from the US Embassy. The conflict in this area lasted approximately the entire month of June of 2008, and into early July. On 17 July 2008, the government announced an end to the conflict in Saa'da.

The Houthis are followers of cleric Hussein Badr Eddin al-Houti (Husain al-Huthi), who was killed in September 2004, after months of battles with Yemeni security forces. Sheik al-Houti, a one-time political aspirant in Yemen, had wide religious and tribal backing in Yemen, particularly in Yemen's northern mountains. Hussein al-Houthi was a former member of parliament for the pro-monarchy al-Haqq (Truth) Islamic party. The government of Yemen accused Hothi of setting up unlicensed religious centers.

The Houthis are a group of combatants associated with the Zaydi Revivalist movement in Yemen, which emerged as a result of deep-seated frustrations among those tribes who felt as though they had become marginalized after an Egyptian-backed revolution against the Zaydi Imam in 1962 brought an end to Hashemite domination. Led at first by Badr al-Din al-Houthi and later by his son Hussein al-Houthi, the revivalists that spawned the Houthi presence promoted religious and local identity over national priorities. There was a resentfulness of the central government’s tolerance of growing Sunni Wahabi influence and its policy of concentrating investment in infrastructure and services on Sana’a and areas with economic resources, to the exclusion of the rest of the country, and in particular the Sa’ada-Amran-Hajja area.

Sheik al-Houti, a Zaidi religious leader, headed an armed group called the Believing Youth. The group led protests against the United States and Israel at mosques. Al-Houti's followers said Yemen's government had become too closely allied with the United States. During the main weekly prayers each Friday, al-Houthi's followers used to chant slogans against Israel and the United States. Yemen's government said the group was modeled on the Lebanese Hizbollah, and that it sought to re-establish a monarchy in Yemen by force. Al-Houti was accused of trying to set himself up as Imam. Hizbollah in Lebanon denied any links with the rebels in Saddah, though some thought the Iranian-backed insurgents were linked.

The Houthis surprisingly avoided assuming a singular tribal identity, which is significant given the country is dominated by tribal allegiances. Instead, the group strategically drew support from tribes of the northern Bakil federation, rival to the Hashid federation which had been a traditional ally of the central government. The Houthis lacked both a political program and a centralised command structure, with varying degrees of coordination applying across four constituent groups: an ideological core with symbolic or political ties to Iran and an anti-Western posture; those driven by concern for Zaydi and Hashemite identity; groups of armed men whose main interest is money; and a majority, tribesmen defending their families and villages against state violence. These trends allowed them to generate immense support, as Yemenis from diverse backgrounds have joined their cause.

Given the opacity of the Houthi rebels in the northern governorate of Sa'ada, as well as the government's misleading claims about the group's goals, as late as 2009 it was difficult to answer the question, "What are the Houthis fighting for?" They were rhetorically anti-American, painting the slogan "Death to America" on buildings and boulders throughout Sa'ada governorate, but they had not targeted U.S. citizens or interests. The Houthis are also anti-Israeli and anti-Semitic, and their threats against the Jewish community in Sa'ada (one of only two remaining Jewish communities in Yemen) caused the Jews to relocate to Sana'a in 2007.

The Houthis' objectives have evolved since the first Sa'ada war began in June 2004, when the Houthis were a small group of fighters defending a member of their family, MP Hussein al-Houthi, from arrest. Hussein al-Houthi was reportedly one of 21 brothers, including current leaders Abdul-Malik and Yahya. For almost three months Houthi and his supporters, who at that time claimed allegiance to the state, fought off government troops from his stronghold in the Marran Mountains, until he was killed on September 10, 2004.

In the years since, as the Houthis gained supporters and territories, the group's objectives have expanded while becoming even murkier. According to the International Crisis Group, there was no evidence of a coherent ideology or political program: "Some groups fighting the government, though referred to as Houthis, appear motivated by multiple, mostly non-ideological factors having little in common with the leadership's proclaimed grievances." These factors include disenfranchisement with the ROYG and the need to avenge the killings of family members or tribesmen unless blood money is paid.

Leader of Yemen’s Ansarullah revolutionary movement Sayyed Abdul Malik Badreddin Al-Houthi lashed out 27 June 2019 at traitorous Arabs over Bahrain summit. “Subordination of some Arab regimes to US and the Zionist entity reached a stage where they offered the nation’s holy sites as gifts,” Sayyed Houthi said. However, neither US, nor the Zionist entity appreciate those gifts by the Arab regimes, he said, adding: “Even Trump himself calls Saudi Arabia a milk cow.”

He further described these Arab regimes as “cheap puppets” with no value. “Bahrain summit is a failed step of the treason scheme” he stressed. “All those who seek normalization with the Zionist entity are conspiring against the oppressed people of Palestine.” Meanwhile, Sayyed Houthi slammed some Arab media for tarnishing the image of the Palestinian resistance and Hezbollah, stressing that Ansarullah is not embarrassed over the relation with Iran, Iraq, Syria and Lebanon whom he called them “are firm on their stance towards Palestine.” He hailed Hezbollah by saying that the Lebanese resistance movement “is a source of pride for our nation.”

The leader of the Iran-backed Houthi militias in Yemen, Abdul Malik Badreddine al-Houthi, on Friday 28 June 2019, gave a hate-spurring speech at a rally to mark their adoption of the “Khomeini Cry”. Al-Houthi reiterated that the Iran-tailored Khomeini culture will remain a “cornerstone in the Houthi group’s fight against the world.” The militia leader also claimed a monopoly over the Palestinian cause, saying that any approach to the decades-long struggle outside the Tehran agenda is invalid and goes against “Islam and Muslims.”

Yemeni observers voiced surprise that he chose to ignore the corruption plaguing the militias with its officials authorizing the theft of public resources and humanitarian relief aid in Houthi-run areas.

“O Death! How beautiful you are as a homeland for those who came to you as martyrs, with their wounds being the homeland.”

Hussein Badr al-Din al-Houthi

The al-Houthis are not tribal, but lived under the protection of tribal sheikhs as descendants of the Prophet Mohammed. Since 2004, the ROYG fought three wars in the Saada governorate with the al-Houthis, with each round more intense and prolonged than the last. History is key to understanding why this conflict began and continues to reemerge. The roots of the conflict lay with Hussein Badr al-Din al-Houthi, the former member of Parliament and inspiration of the first rebellion in 2004. His evolution and radicalization mirror the conflict itself, which continued to gain strength as those supporting the al-Houthis grow in number.

His beliefs began through his experiences as a student in Sudan, grew into an ideology as a teacher, and developed into a movement as a rebel leader. From 1993-1997, Hussein al-Houthi was a member of Parliament, as a representative of the al-Haq party. According to post contacts, President Saleh promised al-Houthi his support in 1997 if he distanced himself from his party and aligned with the ruling GPC party. Al-Houthi thus split from al-Haq, only to be met with empty promises aimed at keeping him under government control in Sanaa, and away from Saada. The President's office subsequently campaigned against al-Houthi, causing him to lose his seat during the 1997 parliamentary elections to another GPC member.

Shortly thereafter, the relatively young al-Houthi received a government scholarship to complete his masters and doctoral studies in Sudan. In 2001, after obtaining his graduate degree, but before completing his doctoral dissertation in Islamic studies, family health issues caused him to return to Saada. During his stay, his scholarship was taken away by the government and he could not return to Khartoum to complete his studies. While in his home village of Marran, a powerful sheikh jailed 14 villagers due to a dispute over a water well. Hussein al-Houthi saw this as a grave injustice, and felt it was his duty to stand-up for his weak and poor compatriots.

Soon thereafter, Hussein al-Houthi joined the Believing Youth, or "Shabab al-Mo'min" in Arabic. He began to host cultural forums for youths, assembling large numbers of followers attracted to his charismatic speaking style. He stressed the importance of loyalty to the group and obedience to the leader. He slowly began breaking away from the Shabab, criticizing them for only being an educational association, and not rising to the next necessary step of becoming a movement. He thus took his disciples and decided to transform his thoughts into an ideology, to bring about a movement. He believed that all of the independent Zaydi scholars in Saada needed to be united under one umbrella.

The invasion of Iraq in 2003 gave him the fuel he was searching for to boast popular interest in his ideas. Al-Houthi and his followers, who still have not established a formal name or leadership structure, began to be known as "harakat al-shi'ar,' or the movement of the slogan.

Capitalizing upon popular fervor against the invasion of Iraq, al-Houthi followers began taking up the slogan, "Death to America, Death to Israel." The slogan also stood as an indirect criticism of the ROYG, which the movement painted as a corrupt stooge of the United States and Israel.

Al-Houthi's following continued to expand in 2002-2003. Some were sent to Sanaa to chant the movement's slogan in the Grand Mosque of the capital. The ROYG took a firm stance against these chanters, arresting approximately 800 individuals throughout numerous Friday prayer ceremonies, further fueling anti-government sentiments.

Al-Houthi took advantage of every opportunity to politically attack President Saleh with the slogan, whether in Sanaa or Saada. An event which parked greater tension between the two men occurred when the President passed through Saada on his way to Hajj pilgrimage in Mecca. Al-Houthi sent protesters to chant the movement's anti-American slogan outside the Saada mosque where Saleh had stopped to pray. After prayers, the President attempted to give a speech, but was impeded by three men loudly chanting the slogan.

In response, Saleh sent a letter to Hussein al-Houthi summoning him to Sanaa, to which al-Houthi agreed. Meanwhile, in June (2004) Saleh visited Washington, DC and upon his return, sent another letter to al-Houthi summoning him again to Sanaa. Al-Houthi agreed once more, but was intercepted on his way by government troops, who were sent to address an unrelated tribal conflict. Three of these troops were killed reportedly, while trying to break-up a drug smuggling confrontation in the province. Saleh believed that al-Houthi was behind the death of the three soldiers.

Following this incident, al-Houthi and his followers took to the mountains of Marran in Saada. The ROYG asked for Hussein al-Houthi to surrender, but he refused, setting off the first armed confrontations with the ROYG in 2004. Hussein was killed on September 10, 2004, after approximately 10 weeks of fighting.

One of the priorities of the "ally of the Qur'an" was the issue of Palestine, which he considered as the central issue at the heart of this nation, his first lecture was "(International Jerusalem Day". One tribute noted "Yemenis were in a deep slumber, and limitless heedlessness until God honored us with that great al-Sayyed Hussein and brought us out of darkness into the light, and revived in us the spirit of dignity, pride and honor.... Sayyed Hussein's supporters and fans realized through what they learned the danger of the American Zionist-Masonic project in the region and the huge amount of their malice, and the management of intrigues, disputes and conflicts in this world."

The death of Hussein al-Houthi in 2004 marked for the ROYG the end of the conflict in Saada. Uprisings in 2005 and 2007, however, led by Hussein's father Badr al-Din and his brother Abdul-Malik, respectively, demonstrated that the rupture between the al-Houthi movement and the ROYG only grew deeper. Fighters in support of al-Houthi numbered more than 4,000. On April 14, President Saleh told Ambassador that more than 3,000 government troops had so far been killed or injured in the fight. Since that date, casualties on both sides have only increased, with more intense fighting displacing thousands within Saada.

This conflict, which broke out in January, spread to include tribes that were not previously involved, but who feel wronged by Saleh, and are taking advantage of the al-Houthis' uprising to put pressure on Saleh.

Despite Hussein al-Houthi's anti-American slogans, observers who were in contact with the al-Houthis believed that Hussein was, and now Abdul-Malik is and continued to be devoted to maintaining a republican regime. Their aim, according to these contacts, was not to return the rule of the imam, as the ROYG claims, but rather to have peace, security, and prosperity in Saada and all of Yemen. These observers claim that the al-Houthis utilized an anti-Western slogan to unite their community against injustice, which they believe is exemplified by the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and the American "occupation" of Iraq. Despite this, however, their primary focus is on their own country, and specifically to the province of Saada, which is notoriously neglected by the ROYG and is deeply impoverished.

The evolution of the al-Houthi phenomenon suggests that this was a classic political and personal struggle between a regional leader who felt wronged and betrayed, and a strong ruler who felt inappropriately challenged. The struggle has expanded with each round of fighting to include those who feel they have little left to lose, and are ready to use religion to further their political goals. Analyzing the conflict from this angle provides at least a degree of hope that what began as a political dispute between two formidable adversaries can also be resolved by political means. The longer the conflict endures, however, and the more actors beyond the al-Houthi family become involved, the more difficult it became to reach such a settlement.

In Yemen's culture of tribal revenge, the involvement of tribes in the fighting did not bode well for a decisive end to the conflict. Combatants from al-Shafa'a and Razamat come from segments of the Wa'ila tribe that follow the Zaydi Shi'a sect (while other parts of Wa'ila are Saudi influenced Salafis). In Beni Ma'ad, however, government forces were fighting the entire Sahara tribe. This was the first time in his presidency that the ROYG has launched a full offensive against an entire tribe (the Sahara). Previously, the al-Houthi rebellion was characterized as a military operation against religious zealots.

From the Yemeni News Agency (Saba)

https://www.saba.ye/ar/category76.htm"> Leader of the revolution

Abdul Malik bin Badr al-Din al-Houthi

Abdul Malik bin Badr al-Din al-Houthi ( 1979- ) is the leader of the Houthi movement in Yemen. He assumed leadership of the movement in 2006 after the killing of his brother Hussein Badr al-Din al-Houthi.

Abdul Malik al-Houthi was born in Saada Governorate into a religious family. His grandfather, Amir al-Din al-Houthi , and his grandfather’s brother , al-Hassan bin al-Hussein al-Houthi , were well-known clerics in the region, and his father was one of the leading Zaidi religious authorities under whom dozens of clerics studied. Abd al-Malik had been traveling since his childhood with his family and his father, who used to move around the countryside and villages of Saada Governorate to teach jurisprudence and to resolve issues of disputes between people.

Abd al-Malik did not study formal education or obtain any academic degree due to his living in rural areas that might not have been possible. Government education is available there, but he studied writing and religious sciences from his father according to the “Zaidi doctrine” in teaching sessions in the village mosque from an early age [It was said that his father allocated a special teaching curriculum for him when he reached thirteen, so his father used to call him “Tariqa.” (i.e. “mark”) and that he had come a long way in his academic achievement . It was said that Abd al-Malik had married when he was fourteen years old.

In the mid-1990s, Abdul Malik left Saada Governorate for the Yemeni capital, Sana’a , to live with his older brother Hussein , the founder of the “Believer Youth” group (later known as the Ansar Allah group ). He was greatly influenced by him until he later became like a spiritual father to him and a role model for him, and he worked as his brother’s bodyguard. Hussein , who was at that time a member of the Yemeni parliament for the Al-Haq Party , and although he was his brother’s guard, it was said that in Sana’a he learned the culture of cities different from the culture of villages, and his awareness of party affiliations , geography , ideology, and the political aspect opened, according to what “Abed Al-Mahdhari” mentioned in a newspaper article. He, a journalist close to Al-Houthi, wrote a biography about Abdul Malik’s life.

The first war took place after the government accused him of creating an armed organization similar to Hezbollah. The failure of ROYG forces to quickly and decisively end the rebellion when it broke out in June sent shockwaves through the military and security apparatus. During the increasingly bloody conflict, MOD sources reported bitter finger pointing between President Saleh's cousin, al-Ahmar, and his son and Commander of the Special Forces Ahmed Saleh, as well as clashes between the MOD and MOI on field tactics and deployment techniques.

Rebel cleric Hussein Badr Eddine al-Houthi was killed early morning on September 10 near Haidan in the Sa'da Goverornate. His death came at the end of a two-day siege conducted by Yemeni Central Security Forces (CSF) on caves defended by al-Houthi supporters near Haidan. A USG-trained CSF Counter Terrorism (CT) team led the operation, resulting in the fatal shooting of al-Houthi and the loss of one member of the CT unit, and two regular CSF. After identification by family members, al-Houthi's body was transported to an undisclosed Army medical facility in Sanaa. Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh officially congratulated ROYG Military leaders on their victory over forces of rebel cleric Hussein Badr Eddine al-Houthi on September 10, declaring an end to the 10-week long rebellion.

Al-Houthi's religious teachings may not resonate widely with the Yemeni population, but his rebellion may have enjoyed some public support due to anti-Americanism or latent anti-regime sentiment. It is premature to rule out the possibility remnants of al-Houthi supporters could regroup to exploit ROYG weaknesses, or even target western and/or foreign interests should the opportunity arise.

Abdul Malik took over the leadership of the rebel movement against the Yemeni government after the killing of its founder, his brother Hussein, and the first war stopped at that time. Shortly after the killing of Hussein Badr al-Din al-Houthi, Abdul Malik received a written letter from him containing directives and plans for confrontations with the government. Abdul Malik withdrew with his companions to a mountainous area on the border with Saudi Arabia.

On 21 September 2014 , the Houthis stormed the headquarters of the First Armored Division led by Ali Mohsen Al-Ahmar and Al-Iman University , but they stopped there and took control of security institutions, camps, government ministries and important facilities in the center of the capital without resistance from the security and army, and they stormed the palaces of Ali Mohsen Al-Ahmar and Hamid Al-Ahmar . The peace and national partnership agreement was then signed between “Ansar Allah” and the other political components

Abdul Malik Al Houthi's foreign policy, which appears during his speeches directed abroad, is characterized by the fact that he is moving and heading his group in the same direction as the movements and countries known as the axis of resistance, which are known for their opposition to American policy in the Arab world.

After Abdul Malik al-Houthi took over the leadership of the Houthi group , he paid great attention to the media aspect of his group, which was almost completely absent during the period of the group’s inception. He realized the importance and role of the media in public, political, and advocacy life, so he quickly established many satellite channels, the most prominent of which was the Al-Masirah channel , the first experimental broadcast of which was launched. On March 23 , 2012 that satellite channel had a major role in communicating the group’s ideas and the ideas of the religious message of the movement’s founder, Hussein Badr al-Din al-Houthi, to a large and broad audience inside Yemen itself.

He took over the leadership of the Houthis after a dispute within the group regarding who should lead it, especially in light of the emergence of the field commander at the time, Abdullah Al-Razami. The younger and less experienced Abdul-Malik was chosen as the leader of the group in response to the desire of his father, who supported his assumption of leadership.

His name began to be mentioned as the leader of the group during the rounds of war in Saada with the government forces, which continued intermittently until 2010, and became more prominent after the success of the Yemeni revolution in forcing Ali Abdullah Saleh in 2012 to give up power in accordance with the terms of the Gulf Initiative.

After the fall of Saleh, the Houthis, led by Abdul Malik, entered the Yemeni national dialogue and became known as the “Ansar Allah group,” but they escalated their tone towards the government and some of the Yemeni political parties partnering in the dialogue.

In mid-2014, the group - under his leadership - accompanied its verbal escalation with military operations that led to its control of Amran Governorate on July 8, 2014 after confrontations with the Yemeni army.

On November 7, 2014, the UN Security Council imposed sanctions on former President Ali Abdullah Saleh and two senior Houthi military commanders, Abdul Khaleq al-Houthi (brother of Abdul-Malik) and Abdullah Yahya al-Hakim, known as “Abu Ali al-Hakim,” accusing them of threatening peace and stability in the country. Yemen, and the United States took similar measures on the tenth of the same month.

The United States previously blacklisted Abdul-Malik al-Houthi and Abdullah Yahya al-Hakim, in addition to ousted President Ali Abdullah Saleh, on charges including “involvement in actions that directly or indirectly threaten peace, security and stability in Yemen.

The Houthi group, led by Abdul-Malik, established its control over government in Yemen by issuing a constitutional declaration on February 6, 2015, according to which Parliament was dissolved, a temporary National Council was established, and a Presidential Council was formed.

The new developments prompted President Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi to resign, before he succeeded in arriving in Aden on February 20, 2015, announcing the withdrawal of his resignation, renewing his rejection of the Houthi coup, and proceeding to receive senior officials, including the Secretary-General of the Gulf Cooperation Council, Abdul Latif Al-Zayani, who He met him on Wednesday, February 25, 2015.

https://ar.wikishia.net/view/%D8%A8%D8%AF%D8%B1_%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AF%D9%8A%D9%86_%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D9%88%D8%AB%D9%8A Badr al-Din al-Houthi

Badr al-Din bin Amir al-Din bin Hussein al-Houthi ( November 23 , 1926 - November 25, 2010 ) is one of the most prominent jurisprudential authorities of the Zaidi Hadawis. He was born in the city of Dahyan in Saada Governorate in the Yemeni Mutawakkilite Kingdom (a state that existed in northern Yemen from 1918 until the September 26 Revolution in 1962). He is one of the founding members of the Yemeni Al-Haq Party . He was the spiritual leader of the Ansar Allah Zaidi armed group known as the “Houthis.” He is the father of Abdul-Malik al-Houthi (the current leader of the Ansar Allah group), Hussein (the founder of the “Believer Youth” group, which later became the Ansar Allah group ), and Yahya (a former member of the Yemeni House of Representatives).

The Houthis attribute to their imam Badr al-Din al-Houthi (1926-2010 AD), one of the most prominent jurisprudential authorities of the Zaydi al-Jarudiyyah tradition. He is considered the actual founder of the Yemeni Al-Haq Party, and the spiritual leader of the Ansar Allah Zaidi armed group known as the “Houthis.”

He was born in the village of Dahyan in Saada, northern Yemen, which, along with its neighbors in the governorates of Hajjah, Sana’a, Amran, Dhamar, and Al-Mahwit, is geographically considered the historical spread of the Zaidi sect, the closest Shiite sect to the Sunnis, and

The Houthi group announced his death from asthma at the age of eighty-six, while the Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula group in Yemen claimed that it targeted his convoy on the Day of Ghadir with a bomb between Saada and Al-Jawf.

Mr. Badr al-Din bin Amir al-Din bin al-Hussein bin Muhammad al-Houthi was born on 17 Jumada al-Awwal in the year 1345 AH in the city of Dahyan , and grew up in Saada in a scholarly family. He started seeking knowledge at an early age. He is one of the most prominent Zaidi scholars in Yemen , and he has many works - printed and manuscripts - on various Islamic sciences. He devoted himself to teaching and writing, and dozens of scholars and students of knowledge were apprenticed to him. He contributed to responding to those who opposed the Ahl al-Bayt school . He was famous for his stances against injustice, which made him targeted by his opponents. He immigrated to Najran , Jordan , and the Islamic Republic of Iran , before deciding to return to Yemen .

Among his sheikhs are his father, Sayyid Amir al-Din al-Houthi , who died in the year 1394 AH, and his uncle, the scholar Al-Hassan bin al-Hussein al-Houthi, who died in the year 1388 AH, and he was greatly praised by them.

A number of scholars approved it, mentioning them in his book “ The Key to the Zaidi Asanid ,” and in the introduction to his book “Explanation of the Amali of Imam Ahmad ibn Isa ibn Zaid ibn Ali.” The scholars of his time, led by Sayyid Majd al-Din bin Muhammad bin Mansour al-Muaydi, praised him, and he said in his translation of him: “He is the learned Master, the infant of knowledge and study, and the protégé of knowledge and guidance. He is of the highest level of knowledge and action, and for his insightful thought and sound consideration he has the greatest fortune and exalted honor.” He said about him in his poem: The honorable star, Badr Al-Din The son of imams of the converted stars It is not surprising that he gained sovereignty at a young age He is generous and whoever nurtures him is generous I give him one of the pioneering ideas of the Net contracts decorated by the organization Welcome to publish from her good taste I hope its sealed fragrance exudes Here, O Badr, is this guidance Sorry, you know what you see I am still in love with you The best of all worlds He revives the science drawings after their lessons You will gain what is spoken and understood And the cook smiled brightly at you From our Lord, honor and peace The master scholar Hussein bin Hassan Al-Houthi said: “The master, the perfect scholar, the source of knowledge, the best of the best and the rest of the rest...” until his saying: “He who was distinguished by piety, asceticism, and every virtue.” [3] His advocacy and reporting activity Mr. Badr al-Din devoted himself to teaching and writing, and dozens of scholars and students of knowledge studied under him. He played an important role in responding to those who disagree with Zaidiism . He has many printed and manuscript works, including his interpretation of the Holy Qur’an , and he has well-known jurisprudence. The Master and the Islamic Revolution in Iran After the victory of the Islamic Revolution in Iran, Mr. Al-Houthi’s admiration for Imam Khomeini became apparent , as is the case with many Yemenis. Imam Khomeini, through his career, emulated the values ??that the Zaidis of Yemen were raised on. The Yemenis, including the Houthi family, were looking forward to Imam Khomeini (Jerusalem) as the liberator of this nation, and that he restored the teachings of the Qur’an to the people, and restored to the nation the hope of the establishment of a just Islamic state, far from Eastern or Western international hegemony. Among the most prominent sayings of Sayyed Badr al-Din regarding the Islamic Revolution: “ All those who stood against the Islamic Revolution in Iran during the days of Imam Khomeini, we saw them, country after country, tasting the evil of what they had done, those who stood with Iraq against the Islamic Republic, which was and still is one of the fiercest enemies of the Americans and the Israelis, as Imam Khomeini (may God have mercy on him) was keen to He wanted to liberate the Arabs and liberate the Muslims from the hegemony of America and the Western countries, and set out to eliminate Israel, but everyone stood up to him, and we saw how everyone who stood up to him was beaten by those who helped them, and those whose actions were in their favor. Kuwait was struck, and Iraq was struck. Isn't it? Saudi Arabia was also struck by Iraq, and was struck economically and burdened by the Americans. Yemen itself participated in large numbers of the army who went to fight the Iranians, to fight the Islamic revolution in Iran. Imam Khomeini was a just imam, he was a pious imam, and a just imam cannot have his invitation rejected, as stated in the hadith. It is expected that the president and the Yemeni army must be punished for what he did . [4] His morals The Master was known for his excellence throughout his life in complete piety, asceticism, worship, and humility. [5] It was part of his humility that if you sat with him at first, you would think that he knew nothing at all, because he did not show any of his knowledge, and if he was asked, he would answer only to the extent of the question and not more than that, and if you carefully examined the question, he would answer you to the extent of that; This is how you discover his knowledge. Money would come to him from some lovers, but he would never spend any of it for himself. Rather, at times he would borrow and have a lot of money. As for that money, he would spend it on students of knowledge and charitable works. Then he would wait until the produce and crops of his land in Khawlan came to him, so he would eat and spend it on himself. He did not accept gifts from rulers or kings or the like because it was possible that even one riyal of illicit money might be included among them. As for his worship, the master would wake up two hours before the call to prayer for dawn, perform ablution, and after performing the ablution he would perform the night prayer. When the time for the call to prayer for dawn came, he would call for prayer and perform the prayer. If he heard it from him, they would enter his room or prayer area and pray dawn with him as a group, and when he prayed dawn, he would begin with the specific remembrances. Then he should never speak to anyone after the Fajr prayer until the sun has risen. Rather, he should not move from the carpet until the sun has risen. [6] Yemeni politician, events pushed him to the forefront. His brother, the founder of the Houthi group, died, so his father pushed him to the leadership despite his young age. He surprised his opponents with the Houthis’ military capabilities, so they seized Amran, the capital, Sana’a, and other cities in mid- 2014. Birth and upbringing There are conflicting reports about the date of birth of Abdul-Malik al-Houthi, as some say that he was born in 1979, while others confirm that he was born in 1982, in the city of Dahyan in Saada Governorate. He is the youngest son of the spiritual leader of the Houthis, Badr al-Din al-Houthi, who was one of the most prominent jurisprudential authorities. In the Zaidi sect in Yemen before it turned to the Jarudi sect - which is close to the Twelver sect - after his residence in Iran during the period between 1994-2002. In the mid-nineties, Abdul Malik left Saada Governorate for the Yemeni capital, Sana’a, to live with his older brother Hussein, the founder of the “Believer Youth” group - which was later known as the Ansar Allah group - and he was greatly influenced by him until he later became like a spiritual father to him, and he worked as a personal bodyguard for his brother Hussein, who He was then a member of the Yemeni parliament for the Al-Haq Party. Study and training: He received a religious education from his father, and he was famous for accompanying him in all his jurisprudence lessons, so he allowed him to receive the religious sciences that he studied from him when he was 18 years old. No studies are known about him outside of that, nor is it known that he obtained a formal education degree, whether it was at the basic, secondary, or university level. The intellectual orientation belongs to the Zaidiyyah, which is considered the closest Shiite sect to the Sunnis, and it believes that the imamate of Abu Bakr, Omar, and Uthman, may God be pleased with them, is valid. None of its followers said that any of the companions were considered infidels, and the imamate for them is not hereditary, but is based on the pledge of allegiance. advertisement !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 2016 In the early 1980s, religious activity was widespread in all the regions of Saada Governorate, and religious lesson circles in its areas were limited. The migrations of Dahyan, Saada, and Rahban were the remaining remnants of the old regions that used to hold lesson circles and receive a small number of immigrants. To seek knowledge, most of whom migrated to seek a living, not to seek knowledge. " It is known that Al-Houthi and his group belong to the Zaidi sect, which is classified as a primarily political movement. " When Salafism entered those areas under the leadership of Sheikh Muqbil Al-Wadaei (died in 2001), it focused on attacking the followers of the Zaidi sect, their scholars, beliefs, jurisprudence, customs and traditions, who represent the highest percentage of the region’s population, which led to an adverse reaction that pushed the scholars of the Zaidi sect towards confronting what they called the Wahhabi invasion. They wrote books, held debates, were active in establishing lesson circles, and spread out in the villages to deliver sermons and lectures, which made the religious activity of the followers of the Zaidi doctrine escalate, but slowly and limitedly. However, the reactions towards those they considered enemies of the sect predominated in that activity. Most of those in charge of it were elderly scholars and scholars, in addition to the adoption of old methods and curricula and the absence of organization and planning. In 1986, the region witnessed the establishment of scientific schools and cultural gatherings, most of which were made up of young people. They were scattered and limited and existed only in Al-Hijr Al-Ilmiyyah and some of the villages of Saada. However, after the unification of Yemen (in 1990), the country entered a new phase in which people tended to form parties and groups, the most prominent of which was the Youth Forum. Al-Mu’min, whose influence expanded until it overshadowed the Salafist trend, expanded at the expense of traditional schools, and became a significant popular base for him, especially in Saada Governorate. The Faithful Youth Movement reached its peak in spread in 1998, and then its leadership was divided between two movements, one of which believed that the reason for the movement’s success and steadfastness in the face of its opponents was its openness to others, its commitment to renewing curricula and visions, and freedom from some parts of the traditional Zaidi heritage. While the other team preferred to adhere to the traditional Zaidi approach and school, and to remain on the front line with the Sunni doctrine on the basis that it is the secret of success and the guarantee for the movement’s survival and growth. There, the rift began to appear and expand between the two groups until it came to light in 2000, when Hussein Badr al-Din al-Houthi was able to impose himself on the believing youth with the help of his brother Muhammad Badr al-Din, who was one of the founders of the “Believer Youth” Forum, and the believing youth accepted it alongside Abdullah. Al-Razami, Yahya Al-Houthi and others. In late 2001, Hussein Al-Houthi demanded the abolition of the “Believer Youth Forum” and announced his rejection of its approach and goals, after he found that it was not moving in the direction he wanted. He began recording his lectures and transcribing them into study notebooks, and considered them an alternative to the “Believer Youth” curricula. He went in another direction and ended up confronting the state militarily, the repercussions of which are still present and escalating every day. The political intellectual background of the Houthis The goals of the Houthi movement The interim goals of the wars The Houthis, the regime, and the relationship with Iran The future of the Houthi movement The difficult solution and the outcome of the crisis The political intellectual background of the Houthis It is known that Al-Houthi and his group belong to the Zaidi sect, which is classified as a political movement in the first place. However, the Zaidi sect, like other sects, can have its theories read in different ways, and it is known about the Zaidis that they were divided in the field of political thought - into two currents: One of them was known as “Salihiyya” in reference to Al-Hasan bin Saleh bin Hayy (who died in 169 AH), and it is a trend characterized by tolerance and flexibility, avoiding exaggeration in individuals, and exaggeration in legitimizing political theories, and views the imamate as a means to serve society, and then It must meet his basic needs and requirements, and therefore people have the right to formulate the system of government - through Shura - in a way that suits the time, place and circumstances. The second is a movement known as “Al-Jarudiyyah,” which is a title given to those who follow two principles from Zaydiyyah: One of them: that the Messenger of God, may God’s prayers and peace be upon him, designated Imam Ali bin Abi Talib as a caliph after him with qualities that only exist in him, and they considered those qualities to be like declaring him in his name, so they see that those who directed the matter to someone else had gone astray and caused the nation to deviate. The other: that the Imamate is a divine right specific to the children of Ali bin Abi Talib from Fatima in particular, and society has no choice but to accept and submit to what is chosen for it, whether by stipulating that the Imamate is a right specific to the children of Ali bin Abi Talib from Fatima Al-Zahra, or that the Imam has a right. He is absolute in managing matters, and that Shura is required but not binding on him, and that people are obligated to follow him, considering that he represents the Prophet, may God’s prayers and peace be upon him and his family, and that he is supported by God, knowing what they do not know and realizing what they do not realize, even if he is not infallible. " The Houthis still believe that they can impose themselves on the regime by force, while the army still believes that it can end the rebellion with military decisiveness. It is true that there is no radical solution to the problem without ending the military appearance of the Houthi movement. " They were called Jarudiyah because Abu al-Jaroud Ziyad bin al-Mundhir (who died in 150 AH), was the first to express these opinions among the Zaidis, and according to the description of the Zaidis who differed from Abu al-Jaroud, Abu al-Jaroud was an imam of the doctrine and not a Zaydi. He joined the companions of Imam Zayd, and his opinion about the imamate and the companions did not appear until after The martyrdom of Imam Zaid served as a bridge for transferring the Imami ideas to the Zaidi ones, and then those who agreed with him were known as the Jarudis. Note that the Jarudiyyah is not considered a completely independent sectarian sect, such that it has opinions on various intellectual issues as is the case with the famous sects. Nor does it mean here that calling Jarudiyya someone who belongs to the Zaydiyyah has deviated from the sect in everything, but rather that is merely a title by which he is distinguished. Who agreed with Abu al-Jaroud in political thought, especially the issues of imamate and preference and their consequences, such as the negative attitude towards the Rightly Guided Caliphs and their supporters among the Companions, as well as the rulers who came after them to this day. In Yemen, Al-Jarudiyyah had a presence that reached its peak in the sixth century AH, until Nashwan bin Saeed Al-Himyari (573 AH) said: “There are no Zaydi sects in Yemen other than Al-Jarudiyyah, and they are in Sana’a, Saada, and what follows them.” Then they declined to their lowest level during the time of the scientific renaissance in the seventh and eighth and ninth centuries, and after that their ideas reappeared, but to a limited extent. Nowadays, many recent scholars from the Zaidi youth tend towards the Jarudi school of thought, due to their influence by the Twelver Shiite movement and the reaction resulting from Salafist pressure. The Zaidi “believing youth” agreed with Al-Salhiyya in their political views, while Al-Houthi and his group agreed with Al-Jarudiyyah, even if they do not favor or accept that ratio; But Al-Houthi’s words and the scenes of his behavior clearly and clearly match Al-Jaroudiya’s theories. In some of his lectures, we find him attacking the Zaidi imams who did not believe in the divinity of the imamate, describing them as: “unqualified and unworthy of leadership,” and criticizing what they went by in saying that experience, knowledge of religious and worldly affairs, and people’s choice and satisfaction, are sufficient to merit the imamate, considering that merely: “ Material standards came to undermine divine standards and brought decadence to the nation.” He believes that the appointment of the imam can only be from God Almighty, not by name but by descriptions that are only available in him, and the nation must search for someone who meets those descriptions and take him as an obedient guardian in the affairs of religion and the world. Objectives of the Houthi movement The lessons taught by Hussein Al-Houthi indicate that his movement aims to restore what he sees as the right of the Ahl al-Bayt to govern the affairs of Muslims, considering this a divine choice in which the people have no hand or choice, and there is no way for the nation to be saved from what it is in unless it comes together under the banner of the Ahl al-Bayt. This can only be achieved by returning the absolute “right of guardianship” to them. He confirms in more than one place that the Rightly-Guided Caliphs and the Companions who supported them robbed the Ahl al-Bayt of that right, and the successive caliphs continued to oppress and exclude them until today, which caused the nation to become weak, humiliated, and defeated before its enemies, stressing that the nation’s salvation and glory could only be at the hands of the Ahl al-Bayt. . Then he classified the Zaidiyyah into two groups that did not deserve to bear responsibility: One: It is open to all other Islamic schools of thought and partners with them in adopting the principles of legislation and methods of thinking. This group cannot be relied upon to support what is right or to defeat what is wrong. Because he was influenced by the cultures of others, which he considered a source of misguidance and deviation. In this regard, he says: “Frankly, I say: Zaidiism is not expected to rise unless we look objectively to correct our culture. What was brought to us through Sunnism, and what was in reality is from the heritage of Sunnism. The principles of jurisprudence are Sunni. It is not true that it is from the Sunni heritage.” The knowledge of Ahl al-Bayt, it entered the Ahl al-Bayt and it entered the Zaidiyyah, and they absorbed it. The science of theology came from the Mu’tazila, and the Mu’tazila are Sunni... These are sciences that came to us from a misguided group, and they actually led us astray, and we bear witness to our own misguidance.” We find him accusing the Zaidiyyah of failing to adhere to what he calls the Thaqalayn, and he sees it as the cause of weakness and misguidance. He says: “We want to know how many of us Zaidis here in this place consciously believe in the cause of the Thaqalayn. It is the issue that is necessary in being guided by religion (I am leaving behind among you what If you adhere to it, you will never go astray after me. The Book of God and my family, my family. Isn’t this a guarantee against misguidance in all areas of religion and in all areas of life? This misguidance that the Messenger said does not mean that you fall into a sin that enters into one of this known falsehood, but rather misguidance in its entirety. Misguidance in belief, misguidance in thought, misguidance in life, what is misguidance in life? Isn’t it wandering, ignorance, lowliness, humiliation, lack of strength, misery? Isn’t this what misguidance is? " Little by little, Al-Houthi pushed his followers towards confronting those who disagreed with them: with rebellion, disobedience, and fighting. The tragedy began with sharp intellectual confrontations with his Zaidi opponents, whether from the “Believer Youth” or other scholarly schools, and ended in a war with the state. " The other group: believes in its unique right to faith, politics, and jurisprudence, and has not been influenced by the cultures of other sects, but in its view it is weak, defeated, and an oppressed warrior, searching for justifications and ways out for itself. Regarding this, he says: “And this person reads, reads, then searches for a way out of this duty, from this divine command, and from this Qur’anic verse, so they are lost, and if the Ahl al-Bayt are lost, the nation is lost, and the loss of the nation is a great responsibility on the Ahl al-Bayt. They are responsible for "The nation is lost and gone astray." Therefore, in his view, there was nothing left for the nation but to adopt the approach that he had accepted for his group, warning that people could not chart out a path of guidance for themselves, “But God is the one who appoints figures of guidance who follow them and dissolve in their personalities. As for the constitutions of Islamic countries, they suffice with the ruler with conditions.” "Easy so that every person can be a leader of the nation. He stated that democracy is merely a conspiracy to eliminate the Islamic system based on appointing people worthy of being flags for the nation and its guardians." He confirms: “God did not leave the nation neglected. He appointed Ali Ibn Abi Talib as a landmark for the nation after the Messenger of God, and after him the righteous from among his family and no one else. But the nation changed, changed, and installed other notables, such as Abu Bakr and Omar, and they preferred, lost, and were defeated in front of the enemies. Pointing out that Any movement or leader cannot achieve victory for the nation, no matter how sincere, unless he is from the People of the House.” Little by little, Al-Houthi pushed his followers towards confronting those who disagreed with them: with rebellion, disobedience, and fighting. The tragedy began with sharp intellectual confrontations with his Zaidi opponents, whether from the “Believer Youth” or other scholarly schools, and ended in a war with the state, which expanded and moved from country to country, and its results and demands changed. And its goals year after year. Interim goals of wars Within the framework of the previously mentioned primary goal came the successive wars that the Houthis fought, albeit under different titles. The first wars were under the title of self-defense and freedom of expression, which gained them the sympathy of some people and expanded the circle of their supporters. They were helped in this by what appeared to be opponents of the Zaidi sect exploiting that strife to settle sectarian scores through state institutions, in addition to the fact that some media outlets presented them. In a certain sectarian way, it suggested that this was one of the most important justifications for their fighting. Before the last (sixth) war, their actions on the ground indicated that they had entered a new phase, where they benefited from the state of peace, so they began to expand and extend their influence over more regions, where they became an alternative to the state, while continuing to say that they were defending themselves and that they They demand freedom of expression and that they have no purpose in seeking power and regime change. It is noted that their political goals are ambiguous, and change and alter according to stages and circumstances, but the religious framework remains the same and does not change and remains strongly present in their literature with which they fight and for which, and perhaps from here comes the difficulty of mediating between them and the state, because meeting the demands they declare does not achieve the purpose. And do not cut off the path of strife, as the real demand - because of which wars have been repeated - is unstable and unclear, while the religious framework that fuels the war and encourages its repetition is not something they can give up on or some of its jurisprudential forms, according to what appears so far, because in their view it is a legitimate right that is not permissible. Waiving it, although some of them may see that it can be frozen or suspended until favorable conditions are created. The Houthis, the regime, and the relationship with Iran From an ideological standpoint, the Houthis do not believe in the republican system, nor in the Yemeni constitution and law, neither after the war nor before, but they treat this as a fait accompli, and describe the revolution against the imam’s regime as a coup against legitimate rule, and they do not hide their desire to change the regime if they were able to do so. . They showed some actions that indicate this in the areas they control, where they lowered the national flag, which is the symbol of the state and its republican system, in addition to assuming the role of the state, as they interfered in the affairs of the local authority and even abolished it in some areas. They set up courts, established prisons, and changed... In the school curricula, they reappointed teachers and mosque preachers, collected zakat, and made sure to expand alongside the border with Saudi Arabia so that they could internationalize their cause and attract the support of some regional powers. " From an ideological standpoint, the Houthis do not believe in the republican system, nor in the Yemeni constitution and law, neither after the war nor before, but they treat this as a fait accompli. " The Houthis’ relationship with Iran falls within this context, as it is the relationship of a party independent of the state (the Houthis) with another state (Iran), and with this consideration they do not care about being a tool to play a role in favor of Iran as long as that is in harmony with their independent entity and not with the security and stability of the nation as a whole. Especially with what they see as Saudi Arabia’s interference in supporting their sectarian opponents (Wahhabis) to expand at their expense. In addition, many Yemenis, especially the people of Saada, have great admiration for the Iranian revolution, and other liberation and resistance movements such as Hezbollah, Hamas, and Islamic Jihad, which constituted support for the Houthi movement’s direction towards dealing positively with Iran and supporting its revolution on the ideological level. On the other hand, the Iranians and other Shiites in the world feel affection towards the Houthis for religious and political reasons, even if they do not agree with them in doctrine, especially since they belong to the Zaidis, and the Zaidis are classified as a Shiite sect, although their ideas are moderate and are described as the closest Shiite sect to the Sunnis. The future of the Houthi movement There is no future expected for the Houthi movement in Yemen, even if it is able to draw attention to itself and control some areas, for several reasons, the most important of which are: It stems from a sectarian sectarian background that restricts it and does not allow it to go beyond its sectarian scope at its best, knowing that the general picture indicates that it is a narrow branch of a larger sect, i.e. Zaidiism. The Houthis do not have a reform project with clear definitions and path. It is based on the mere expectation that things will improve as soon as the state returns to its people, and after that there are no details that can be relied upon politically, socially, and economically. The Houthis do not have the mechanism capable of implementing reform, service and development projects, given that most of its members so far are simple people and not experienced. The Houthis' reliance on force as a tool for expansion increases its opponents, and soon local regional opposition will form against it, which may topple it with the recurrence of crises and wars and their accompanying repercussions and consequences on the population. Their reliance on the idea that the truth is one and that it is with them, and that survival of the fittest has been determined within them, will drown them in the mire of permanent confrontations and liquidations with their opponents. The difficult solution and outcome of the crisis It is difficult at the current stage to build a vision for an effective solution to the ongoing war between the government and the Houthis, because the Houthis still believe that they can impose themselves on the regime by force, while the army still believes that it can end the rebellion with military decisiveness, and it is true that there is no radical solution to the problem without ending the appearance. Military of the Houthi movement, and in general, the outcomes of matters do not go beyond three forms: The first is if the army is able to weaken the Houthis, then the state will negotiate with them from a strong position, and will push them to accept peace on its terms and conditions, and will inevitably only respond to what it deems legitimate and reasonable of their demands. The second is for the authority to enter into a direct dialogue with the Houthis through local or regional mediation, in which the state accepts some of the movement’s demands and gives them what the constitution and the law did not give them. This is a difficult choice that may have serious consequences, and it will not be useful, especially if the Houthis deal with it temporarily, and then they will not accept less than Fully achieve their goals. Third , it does not rule out the emergence of popular movements that move against the Houthis in their areas and are launched with self-motivated motives. They may use the same method that the Houthis used against the state (guerrilla warfare), and it is possible that they will receive qualitative support from the government. _______________Yemeni researcher COMMENT https://twitter.com/army21ye?lang=en"Brigadier General Yahya Saree

Brigadier General Yahya Saree

Brigadier General Yahya Saree is the official spokesman for the Yemeni Armed Forces, and Director of the Moral Guidance Department of the Armed Forces. He loves poetry and football. He used to appear on podiums, a few years ago, in his usual military uniform, with three stars on his shoulders with the Republican bird above him, and above his head a red beret, and behind him the official Yemeni flag, where he stands with all firmness, confidence and steadfastness, in order to announce to the local, Arab and international public, about Military operations of the armed forces, in audio and video, and in brief statements. He is the official spokesman for the Yemeni Armed Forces, Brigadier General Yahya Saree, whose name has, in recent times, become closely associated with “good news” and victory for the public that supports him, and with defeat and existential threat to the public that is hostile to him, through the qualitative operations he announces behind the scenes. Brigadier General Yahya Saree was born in Saada Governorate, adjacent to the southern Saudi border, where most of the leaders in the Ansar Allah movement are located. Academically, Brigadier Saree earned bachelor’s and master’s degrees in political science. As for the military, Saree received many military, combat, security, administrative, and specialized courses in military sciences. He was promoted to military formations and assumed a number of missions in the military corps in the Yemeni military establishment since the beginning of the Saudi coalition aggression, until he was appointed head of the “Psychological Warfare” Division in Moral Guidance. For the Armed Forces in 2017, with the rank of Colonel. In mid-2018, he was appointed Director of the Moral Guidance Department of the Armed Forces, and was promoted to the rank of Brigadier General, and was also appointed as an official spokesman for the Yemeni Armed Forces in October of the same year. With his appointment as an official spokesman for the Yemeni Armed Forces, Brigadier General Saree entered a new and important phase in his career, due to the importance of this position, as it represents an effective media and documentation front, especially in times of war, as the Brigadier General became the person that the public waits for to see accurate statements, comments, and reports regarding the operations of the armed forces. and its activities. Since Brigadier General Saree assumed his position, he announced, in his usual brief statements, hundreds of specific military operations carried out by the Yemeni armed forces, the most important of which was the “ Second Yemen Hurricane ” operation, which targeted the Emirati and Saudi depths, and also the “ Third Breaking the Siege ” operation, which targeted Vital points in the Saudi interior, including Aramco facilities in 2022. The last important strategic operations announced by Brigadier General Saree were the operations of the Armed Forces against Israeli ships, and ships heading to the Israeli occupation ports in the Red Sea, as well as the operations of the Air Force, which targeted “Eilat” more than once with ballistic missiles and drones, in support of the people of Gaza and in support of their resistance in The face of the Israeli aggression since October 7th. Since his appointment as the official spokesman for the Yemeni Armed Forces, and until the announcement of Yemen’s accession to the “Al-Aqsa Flood” epic, Brigadier General Saree was distinguished by his television appearances, in which he stood with steadfastness and self-confidence, and by the way he quickly delivered statements in a loud, loud voice in classical Arabic mixed with the Yemeni dialect. This made him a person with clear “charisma and presence,” and gained him local and Arab popularity. What also gained him wide local popularity was his participation and modest presence among the Yemeni people on various occasions, as well as his follow-up of the armed forces with visits on the fronts, as well as his inspection of children and cubs in educational centers, as part of his role as director of the Moral Guidance Department, turning him into a prominent leadership symbol. This popularity among the Yemeni public was expressed in a picture of him that circulated yesterday, riding behind a motorcyclist to take him to “Sabaeen Square” to deliver a military statement in the “With Gaza until Victory” march. Brigadier General Saree honored him by awarding him the shield of the Armed Forces Moral Guidance Department for his position and initiative. Recently, his popularity has also increased in the Arab world. In addition to his role and status among the public, Saree has been distinguished by his active presence on social media sites, especially on the “X” platform, where more than 700,000 people follow him. He adopts a unique method that has propaganda and media dimensions on this platform, as he prepares and excites the public to wait for his statements, by sharing every time, and before his media appearance, a publication in which he writes that the armed forces will announce “an important statement in the coming hours” or at a time that he specifies. His popularity has expanded in the Arab world as the masses, who support Yemen and the Palestinian cause, awaited his statements regarding the Yemeni operations in the Red and Arab Bahrain and Eilat. By monitoring the interaction on his statements on social media platforms, we find thousands of comments in different languages and dialects, supporting him and his leadership and calling for victory for Yemen against the Israeli occupation. Brigadier General Saree, and by performing his duties that led to him gaining this popularity, and by his closeness to the local and Arab audiences through social networking sites and other means, he proved that the task of the official spokesman for the armed forces is an essential function in times of war, and in times of peace as well, in which the official spokesman plays an important role on the media front. He achieves war by achieving several elements required for this, related to his personality and the way he carries out his duties. From his position, the official spokesman for the armed forces, according to the definitions, must be a professional military man, knowledgeable about military affairs, especially the operations of the armed forces, and possess acceptance, professionalism, intelligence, and flexibility in dealing, and possess positive communication skills with all media outlets. and public relations. He should also be distinguished by his good expression in the language he speaks. These specifications come to achieve the goal of choosing a speaker, which is to ensure that statements, comments, and reports are received in a correct manner, in order to have the desired effect, achieve objectivity and transparency in presenting news and report data and information, and end any opportunities for the circulation of rumours, false news, and unconfirmed speculation. In his capacity as an official spokesman for the Yemeni Armed Forces, Brigadier General Saree was able to be one of the most prominent figures practicing the Yemeni psychological and propaganda war against the enemies, by revealing the facts and forming public opinion and directing it towards the correctness of the Yemeni resistance and its military operations that crossed the country’s borders, and also by Identifying the aggressors against the country, and describing them as part of the “Zionist-American” aggression. Shaping and directing public opinion in the statements that Saree announces is also focused, for example, on his beginning most of his statements with Qur’anic verses that indicate the right of jihad, self-defense, supporting the oppressed, and the inevitability of victory, to announce to the world’s ears, after reciting those verses, the achievements achieved by the armed forces in this war. the frame. In the recent period, public opinion has been directed through its selection of specific terms that have historical and moral dimensions, as Saree deliberately used the word “Umm al-Rashrash” in his announcement of the targeting of the Yemeni Armed Forces in “Eilat.” This is an intentional step through which the Palestinian right to its land, which was usurped by the Israeli occupation and changed its landmarks, features, and names of its cities, is consolidated. “Umm al-Rashrash” is a Palestinian town located at the eastern end of the Sinai Peninsula and overlooking the Gulf of Aqaba. However, in 1949, the Israeli army occupied it and changed its name to “Eilat.” In addition, Saree deliberately stressed in every statement that the Yemeni operations come firstly: “a victory for the oppression of the Palestinian people who are being subjected to killing, destruction and siege in the Gaza Strip”, secondly: “in implementation of the directives of Mr. Abdul-Malik al-Houthi”, and thirdly: “in response to the calls of the free people from “The sons of our great Yemeni people and the sons of our nation.” If these confirmations indicate anything, they indicate that the military operations against the occupation are followed by the leadership and enjoy popular support, which refutes all Western propaganda campaigns that aim to withdraw the legitimacy and popular support for the Yemeni armed forces. Brigadier General Saree also reiterates, in every statement, his emphasis that the Yemeni Armed Forces are continuing their military operations against the Israeli entity until its aggression and siege on the Gaza Strip stops, and that is a sentence in which he specifies the objectives of the military operations, as a clear message to everyone who threatens Yemen and pressures it with siege, starvation, and return. War: Sana'a will not yield to pressure or surrender until the Israeli aggression and siege on the Gaza Strip ends. The statements of the Yemeni Armed Forces and the reactions to them, both in favor and in opposition, were able to reflect the important strategic role that Sanaa plays, within the axis of resistance, in supporting and supporting Gaza, which stems from a firm and accustomed doctrine of supporting the Palestinian cause, no matter the cost. Yemen did not hesitate "for a single moment" to support Palestine, and was quick to target “Eilat” with missiles and drones, and then to move the card of the Arab and Red Bahrain and the Bab al-Mandab Strait in the face of the maritime navigation of the Israeli occupation and the Western colonial powers participating in the aggression and siege of the Gaza Strip, and it was the one who did not move this card. During 8 years of aggression and stifling siege on land, sea and air. These operations have exceeded their moral and symbolic depth in Yemen’s support for the Palestinian cause, to constitute a tangible threat to the occupation in the Red Sea, because they affect the requirements of its “national security” due to the sea falling within “Israel’s” southern strategic direction to include the riparian Arab countries and the countries of the Horn of Africa that control its southern entrance. In addition to the Great Lakes region and the sources of the Nile River. The Yemeni operations led to the imposition of an effective complete naval blockade on “Israel” by canceling shipping lines to it, which led to economic losses and harmed food security , according to the Israeli media, because 95% of the goods entering and leaving “Israel” pass through the sea, A large part of it comes from the East, that is, from China and similar countries, including raw materials and final manufactured materials, which pass through the Suez Canal to reach the ports of Haifa and Ashdod, but in light of the Yemeni blockade, ships do not cross Bab al-Mandab. Israeli media have acknowledged that the danger posed by Yemeni threats to Israeli ships and those heading to Israel, more than anything else, endangers the stability of the Israeli economy. From this standpoint, Nicholas Bromfield, a researcher in Middle East politics and maritime security, said in an article on the American Foreign Policy Research Institute website that the Yemeni threat must be taken “seriously,” explaining that what the Yemenis have done historically, and what they are doing now It means that the Yemenis “know what they are doing, and they have strategic as well as ideological reasons for what they are doing. The phrase “Death to America, Death to Israel” has always been their slogan to which they adhere, so that Yemen, with its strategic location and role, represents an authentic and courageous Arab position in its words and deeds. Since October 2023, the Houthis have launched numerous ballistic missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) against vessels transiting the Red Sea and surrounding waterways, striking and causing significant damage to several merchant ships. In November, Houthi forces boarded and hijacked the merchant vessel Galaxy Leader while it was underway in the Red Sea. Mohamed al-Atifi (al-Atifi), the so-called Houthi “Minister of Defense,” has publicly stated that the Houthis will “turn the Red Sea into a graveyard” in response to any perceived action against Yemen by the U.S.-led Operation Prosperity Guardian, a coalition of ten nations deployed to the Red Sea to protect civilian commercial vessels from Houthi attacks. Muhammad Fadl Abd al-Nabi (al-Nabi) is the so-called “Commander” of the Houthis’ maritime forces. Al-Nabi, alongside Mohamed Al-Atifi, visited the Galaxy Leader, the vessel hijacked by the Houthis on November 19, 2023. Al-Nabi has publicly committed to continuing attacks against vessels transiting the Red Sea. Muhammad Ali al-Qadiri (al-Qadiri), the so-called Houthi “Coastal Defense Forces Chief” and “Director of the Houthi Naval College,” was tasked with executing attacks against vessels in the Red Sea. Al-Qadiri has publicly threatened to attack international maritime traffic in the Red Sea using advanced weapons and to expand the Houthis’ attack campaign against vessels sailing along the entire western coast of Yemen. Muhammad Ahmad al-Talibi (al-Talibi), who serves as the so-called “Director of Procurement” for the Houthi forces, leads the Houthis’ efforts to smuggle Iranian-provided weapons, missiles, UAVs, and components needed to manufacture these weapons systems into Yemen. In his role, al-Talibi coordinates arms shipments through the smuggling networks of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and answers directly to principal Houthi forces decision makers. Muhammad Ali al-Qadiri, Muhammad Ahmad al-Talibi, Mohamed al-Atifi, and Muhammad Fadl Abd al-Nabi were designated 25 January 2024 pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, for having materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or good or services to or in support of an act of terrorism, as defined in section 3(d) of E.O. 13224, as amended. This action targets four individuals who have supported the Houthis’ recent attacks against commercial vessels in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden, including holding civilian crews hostage. Concurrent with OFAC’s designations, the United Kingdom is also imposing sanctions on these key figures of Houthi forces. The Houthis are a rebel group that seized the capital in 2014 and forced the internationally recognised government to flee to Saudi Arabia. Since the end of World War II, the survival of any state has been linked to the presence of international recognition, and strengthening local and international conviction increases this regime’s ability to use force and gives its local decisions a mandatory status. It is considered a representation of the will of the people. A peace agreement with Saudi Arabia could set the path to permanent recognition and further territorial gains. On 13 April 2023 , Saudi Arabia’s ambassador to Yemen, Mohammed Al-Jaber, was pictured shaking hands with Houthi political chief Mahdi al-Mashat in Sanaa, ahead of peace talks that also included an Omani delegation. The Saudi visit to Yemen came just weeks after a broader reconciliation between Riyadh and Iran, brokered by China. The Houthis have long aimed to establish military power and control over enough of the country to force the international community to recognise them politically. Until December 2014, Saudi Arabia secretly backed the Houthis, because they were the ones taking on al Qaeda and the Islamic State group in Yemen. When they seized the capital Sanaa, they dissolved parliament and imprisoned some ministers, forcing President Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi and the government from power. At the time, the position of neighbouring Gulf countries was to bring the Houthis to the negotiating table. The UN’s special envoy made countless trips between the Saudi capital Riyadh and Sanaa in an effort to convince the rebels to take part in a sort of national congress. But then the Houthis wanted to force Hadi out of Aden, where he had sought refuge, and Saudi Arabia began amassing its forces on the border. A Saudi-led coalition launched military operations on 26 March 2015 to combat Houthi rebels advancing on the Yemeni city of Aden. The Saudi-led offensive involved a dozen countries, including all of the Gulf countries except Oman, major Arab powers like Egypt and Sudan, as well as countries such as Morocco and Jordan. There was also a crucial regional force in the Middle East and Pakistan. It was also clear that the United States has approved the operation, given that it was announced by Saudi Arabia’s ambassador in Washington, DC. In October 2015, the internationally-recognized government of Yemeni President Abd Rabbu Mansour Hadi announced the severance of all diplomatic ties and political relations with Iran. The Yemeni government repeatedly accuses Tehran of meddling in Yemen and supporting the Houthi rebel group. The Houthis have been controlling the Yemeni capital Sanaa and several other northern provinces since September 2014. On 17 August 2019, the Houthis announced that they had appointed Ibrahim Mohammad al-Dailami as "extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador of the Republic of Yemen to the Islamic Republic of Iran." Dailami handed over his credentials to Iranian President Hassan Rouhani, Houthi media reported. Dailami is a Houthi leader and a member of the political bureau of the militant group. The Yemeni Foreign Ministry on 19 November 2019 strongly condemned Iran's recognition of a representative for the Houthi rebel group and the handover of Yemeni diplomatic headquarters in Tehran. The move was seen as a "blatant violation of the Charter of the United Nations and the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic and Consular Relations," said a ministry statement, blaming Tehran for "the consequences of this flagrant violation." The Yemeni ministry said it would take all appropriate legal measures to deal with this shameful Iranian behavior, calling on the international community and the UN Security Council to "condemn this false and irresponsible behavior." https://arabic.sputniknews.com/military http://www.islamist-movements.com/25855 https://arabic.sputniknews.com/arab_world/201708231025789249 https://www.ansarollah.com/en/ find it at :

“Saleh-Houthi Alliance: Circumstantial Settlements and Structural Fissures.” Al-Dhahab, Ali, Al Jazeera Center for Studies, November 2017

“The Military Balance of Power in Yemen: Transformations and Scenarios,” Al-Dhahab, Ali, Al Jazeera Center for Studies, January 2017

Houthi military power: capabilities and strategies Al-Dhahab, Ali, Al Jazeera Center for Studies, January 1, 2018

The Battle of Taiz: Location stakes and conflicting strategies Al-Dhahab, Ali, Al Jazeera Center for Studies, September 4, 2016

Balancing private security companies in Africa: the case of Central Africa Hakim Aladi Najm al-Din Al Jazeera Center for Studies, February 8, 2024 On November 5th, 2017 The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia announced a list of 40 names of leaders and elements responsible for planning, executing and supporting various terrorist activities by the Houthi terrorist group, as well as financial rewards (shown in front of each of them), for information leading to their arrest or whereabouts. This action was taken based on the dedicated increasing of terrorist activity by Houthi group and their continuous endeavor to harm the Kingdom's security with support of the Iranian regime (the sponsor of the all terrorist organizations in the region) and detected bolstering the Houthi terrorist group's cooperation with the Lebanese Hezbollah terrorist organization within framework of exchanging expertise and enhancing military capabilities among these terrorist organizations and the use of ballistic missiles in a grave precedent in which these dangerous missiles are made available to these rogue terrorist organizations in a direct threat to the Kingdom's cities which aims at terrorizing the innocent and harming the Kingdom's security, stability, tranquility and public order.

name	amount of reward
Abdulmalik Bader Aldain Al-Houthi	$30 million
Saleh Ali Al-Sammad	$20 million
Mohammed Ali Abdulkarim Al-Houthi	$20 million
Zakaria Yahya Al-Shami	$20 million
Abdullah Yahya Al-Hakim	$20 million
Abduqalik Bader Aldain Al-Houthi	$20 million
Mohammed Nasser Al-Atifi	$20 million
Yousef Ahssan Ismail Al-Madani	$20 million
Abdulqader Ahmad Qassem Al-Shami	$20 million
Abdurab Saleh Jurfan	$20 million
Yahya Mohammed Al-Shami	$20 million
Abdulkarim Ammer Aldain Al-Houthi	$15 million
Yahya Bader Aldain Al-Houthi	$10 million
Hassan Mohammed Zaid	$10 million
Safar Mughdi Al-Sofi	$10 million
Mohammed Abdulkarim Al-Ghumari	$10 million
Abdulrazaq Mohammed Al-Marouni	$10 million
Amer Ali Al-Marani	$10 million
Ibrahim Ali Al-Shami	$10 million
Fadhl Mohammad Motaa'	$10 million
Mohsin Salih Alhamzi	$10 million
Ahmad Salih Hindi Daghsan	$10 million
Yosif Abdullah Hosain Alfaishi	$10 million
Hosain Homood Ala'zi	$5 million
Ahmad Mohammad Yahya Hamid	$5 million
Talal Abdulkarim A'qlan	$5 million
Abdulilah Mohammad Hajar	$5 million
Faris Mohammad Hasan Mana'a	$5 million
Ahmad Abdullah Aqabat	$5 million
Abdulatif Homood Almahdi	$5 million
Abdulhakim Hashim Alkhywani	$5 million
Abdulhafidh Mohammad Alsaqaf	$5 million
Mobarak Almashan Alzaydi	$5 million
Ali Saeed Alrazami	$5 million
Salih Mosfir Alshaer	$5 million
Ali Homood Almoshaki	$5 million
Mohammad Sharafaldeen	$5 million
Dhaif-Allah Qasim Alshami	$5 million
Abu Ali Alkahlani	$5 million
Ali Nasir Qarshah	$5 million

These formations represent the party facing the legitimate forces, which adopted the coup, and are composed of units from the former regular army, fighters from the Houthi Popular Committees, and other tribal fighters from areas controlled by the Houthis, and will be detailed as follows: Former regular army Main and subsidiary military units, such as: the 22nd Infantry Brigade, the 17th Infantry Brigade, the 35th Armored Brigade, the military police forces, the Special Security Forces, and the Public Security Forces, in their full strength, formation, and organization, and operationally affiliated with the Fourth District in Taiz, and many of their members owe loyalty to the former president. Ali Saleh. One of its most prominent leaders is Brigadier General Abdullah Dabaan. It is also reinforced from time to time with fighters from new recruits, and battalions from various units of the reserve forces (formerly the Republican Guard) (12) , such as the 10th Brigade stationed in Hodeidah, and battalions from the Special Security Forces (formerly Central Security). Houthi Popular Committees Armed groups consisting of contract Houthi fighters who participated in the six Saada wars from 2004-2010, and new fighters who were recruited during the past two years, and are still awaiting official registration in the records of the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Interior. Some of these formations are given different ideological names, such as: Al-Hussein Brigades. And the Death Brigades. As for the strength of these forces, it is impossible to determine their number. Given the cases of inflation and deflation to which these groups are exposed, for reasons including: escape and murder; The Taiz front is one of the fronts where the Houthis have suffered heavy casualties, and Ali Abu Al-Hakim is considered the most prominent leader on it, in addition to his position as commander of the Fourth District in Taiz, according to the decision of the Revolutionary Committee formed by the Houthis. The Yemeni Armed Forces loyal to the Houthis are a group of military brigades that were affiliated with the Yemeni Republican Guard and brigades from the Yemeni Armed Forces and Security. They have been targeted since 26 March 20155 by the aircraft of the Saudi-led coalition that was conducting a military campaign in Yemen. The Operation Decisive Storm coalition targeted the following military headquarters: Sanaa The Second Aviation Brigade at Al-Dailami Air Base in Sanaa , Sanaa International Airport . Sanaa International Airport . Special Security Forces Camp (formerly Central). Headquarters of the Sixth Military Region Command ( formerly First Armored Division ) Command of the reserve forces in Al-Sawad Camp, south of Sanaa Special Forces brigades in Al-Sabaha camp, west of Sanaa. Missile Brigades Group , Faj Attan . Al-Kharafi Camp of the Reserve Forces (formerly the Republican Guard) north of Sanaa. Weapon stores in Jabal Nuqum, east of Sanaa. Headquarters of the College of Aviation and Air Defense. Supply stores for the armed forces, near Jabal Attan . Camps of the Fifth Missile Brigade and the Sixth Scud Missile Brigade, affiliated with the Missile Brigades, in Jabal “ Attan [ ? ] ” southwest of Sana’a . Military police . First Brigade ( Special Guard ), presidential protection formation 2nd Protection Brigade, Sanaa . 3rd Armored Brigade, Sanaa . 4th Armored Brigade, Sanaa - Camp 48 61st Armored Brigade , Sanaa - Camp 48 . “Camp Al-Hafa” of the Ghamdan Armored Brigade (Yemen) . 89th Infantry Brigade, “Camp Al-Hafa”. Headquarters of the General Command of the Armed Forces, which includes the 314th Mechanized Brigade (Yemen) . Tahrir Directorate [ ? ] . Sana'a Governorate Rayma Hamid camp , Sanhan , south of Sanaa . The 63rd Infantry Brigade camp in Jabal Al-Samaa in Arhab [ ? ] North of the capital. 63rd Infantry Brigade , Bani Jarmouz - Nihm - Sana'a Governorate . 83rd Artillery Brigade , Arhab - Sana'a Governorate 62nd Infantry Brigade , Ministry of Defense Reserve , Arhab - Sana'a Governorate . Seventh Infantry Brigade , Khawlan - Sana'a Governorate , Ministry of Defense Reserve . Saada The 131st Infantry Brigade camp in the Kattaf area of ??Saada. “Kahlan” camp in Saada . Electricity and gas station in Saada . Military sites in Qahza, Jabal al-Ain, and Wadi al-Jabal in Saada. “Kahlan” camp on March 29 . 72nd Infantry Brigade , Sufyan Saada argument Al-Marzaq camp in Haradh District . Ma'rib 180th Brigade Air Defense Base . An air base in Ma'rib Governorate . The 3rd Infantry Brigade (formerly the Republican Guard) on the Ma’rib line [ ? ] Sana'a . 14th Armored Brigade , Marib. middle Damar 9th Infantry Brigade , Dhamar Governorate . Al-Qashla camp White 26th Infantry Brigade , Al Bayda Governorate . Hodeidah 65th Air Defense Brigade , south of the military airport in Hodeidah Governorate on the Red Sea . Tariq Air Base , which houses the 67th Aviation Brigade and the 130th Air Defense Brigade in the city of Hodeidah Hodeidah International Airport Air defense sites in Salif Port, northwest of Hodeidah City , Ibb A military convoy in Yarim , Ibb Governorate . 55th Artillery Brigade , Ibb Governorate - Yarim Taiz Tariq Military Base, east of Taiz Governorate . The 17th Armored Brigade includes Al-Omari Camp and includes a coastal defense missile platform in the city of Al-Mukha, Bab Al-Mandab , west of Taiz Governorate . Coastal defense missiles in the city of Mokha . Al-Dhahra village , 22nd Armored Brigade , Taiz. City Air defense in Jabal Uman in Al-Hawban . Al Saleh Gardens and Al Shehab Schools. The house of Houthi leader Hamid Ali Abdo in Asifra, and the house of Houthi Faisal Rassam in Asifra. A Houthi point on 60th Street, Bani Aoun intersection. Abdullah bin Mubarak School in Negroes. Mount Al-Wash. SS camp. Al-Arous Air Defense Site, Jabal Saber . Camp Khaled, old airport, 35th Armored Brigade . 22nd Armored Brigade . Al Dhalea “Al-Sadrin Camp” affiliated with the 33rd Armored Brigade in Murais , Al-Dhalea, south of Yemen. Lahj The 90th Aviation Brigade , the 39th Aviation Brigade, the 201st Brigade , and the 210th Mechanized Infantry Brigade at Al-Anad Air Base . Labbouza camp, affiliated with the 35th Armored Brigade . Abyan 115th Infantry Brigade in the city of Lauder . 2nd Mountain Infantry Brigade , Lawdar - Abyan . Shabwa Supplies heading to Aden in the Bayhan area . Aden Republican Palace. Aden International Airport and Air Base . Special Security Forces camp . Artillery brigade. National army units By 2016 includes three incomplete brigades, established during the war, from members of various units of the former army, which rejected the Houthi coup and maintained their loyalty and support for President Hadi (9) . 2,000 newly recruited soldiers also integrated there, after undergoing a training period between Lahj and Taiz. These formations are armed with light and medium weapons, provided by the coalition, and a limited number of heavy weapons, which were seized during the confrontations. It is led by the Military Council in Taiz, a number of leaders and officers, most notably the Chairman of the Council, Brigadier General Sadiq Sarhan, Brigadier General Youssef Al-Sharaji, Brigadier Adnan Al-Hammadi, and Brigadier General Abdul Rahman Shamsan. Popular resistance factions Small combat formations with independent commands, and call themselves brigades or battalions, but they do not reach the strength of brigades and battalions of armies, in terms of armament and equipment. It coordinates between itself and the national army while fighting joint battles, the most prominent of which are the following: Brigade of Tramps It consists of a group of politically independent young men, according to what was announced. Some of them belong to the Jabal Sabr region overlooking the city of Taiz, and others to the city itself, with a limited number of those who came from the governorate’s directorates and from other governorates. This group is led by Majid Mahyoub and Al-Hussein bin Ali. . Hasm Brigades A group of fighters who came to Taiz from some southern and eastern governorates, in October 2015, after the withdrawal of the Houthi Popular Committees and the army loyal to them from those governorates, in addition to other fighters from Taiz and other governorates, and led by Adnan Zuraiq, from Shabwa Governorate, He resides in the city of Al-Qaeda in Ibb Governorate. The Hasm Brigades are considered one of the strongest resistance factions, and their strength is increasing day by day, and they have their fingerprints in many battles against the Houthis, the most recent of which was during the liberation of the Sarari area, which the leader of this group described as “Ahwaz Taiz,” in reference to the Arab province of Ahwaz under Iranian control. Some of the villages in this region were the center of military and ideological activity managed by loyalists to the Houthi group (10) . Abu Abbas Brigades An armed Salafist group formed mainly from Salafist fighters from Dar al-Hadith students who were forcibly displaced from the town of Dammaj in Saada (11) . This group is led by Abu al-Abbas Adel Abdo Farea, one of the students displaced from Saada, who remained hidden from the media for a long time because Salafist belief forbids photography, and people soon became aware of it after its pictures spread. This group is considered one of the most powerful factions that played an active role in the confrontations, and officially announced its support for President Hadi as the ruler. Student Brigade A group of fighters, most of whom hold a bachelor’s degree. This brigade played a major role in the battle of Taiz from the first days of the confrontation with the Houthis, and became famous through its prominent activity on the Western Front with the liberation of the headquarters of the 35th Armored Brigade. This brigade is led by Abdo al-Saghir, who works A mathematics teacher in Taiz. Other armed groups Armed groups played prominent roles in all the confrontations, but their presence now is circumstantial and limited. An example of this is: the group of the tribal sheikh and leader of the Popular Congress Party, Arif Jamel. Likewise, the group of the tribal sheikh and leader of the Yemeni Islah Party, Hamoud Al-Mikhlafi, whose group is considered one of the first popular resistance groups in Taiz, but it no longer has an independent role, as a result of Sheikh Al-Mikhlafi’s departure to Riyadh, at the end of March 2016. Some of its members were distributed among the ranks of the National Army and other resistance factions. There was also a formation called the Death Brigades, which consisted of escapees from the central prison, and another group called the Guardians of the Faith, all of which apparently disappeared, but some of its men are still active in other groups. https://www.alhurra.com/arabic-and-international/2024/02/23/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D9%87%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%AF-%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%AE%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%BA%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%B5%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D9%85%D8%A7-%D8%AA%D8%B1%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D8%B3%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%A9-%D9%8A%D9%85%D8%AA%D9%84%D9%83%D9%87%D8%A7-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D9%88%D8%AB%D9%8A%D9%88%D9%86%D8%9F Share on WhatsApp Arab and international After threatening to use "submarines"... What arsenal of weapons do the Houthis possess? Moaz Fraihat - Washington February 23, 2024 The Houthis use weapons and ammunition manufactured in Iran. Archive The Houthis use weapons and ammunition manufactured in Iran. Archive The Houthi group continues to threaten security and stability in the Red Sea, this time by threatening to use what it called "submarine weapons." Abdul-Malik al-Houthi, the leader of the Houthis in Yemen, said Thursday that the group had introduced “submarine weapons” in its attacks on ships, in what he claims was “solidarity with the Palestinians in the Gaza war.” On Monday, the US Department of Defense, the Pentagon, announced the implementation of defensive strikes on five targets in the area controlled by the Houthis in Yemen on Monday, after they used a remotely piloted submarine on Sunday for the first time since the attacks began in the Red Sea. The Pentagon indicated that the strikes targeted a remotely piloted naval boat and anti-ship cruise missiles, which constitute the bulk of the Houthi arsenal, according to a report published by ABC News . The attacks of the Houthi group, which is listed on the US terrorist lists, in the Red Sea led to high ship insurance costs, forcing the majority of shipping companies to avoid crossing the Red Sea, which is a vital route through which about 12 percent of global maritime trade passes, according to Reuters. Houthi rebels targeted commercial ships in the Red Sea (archive) Houthi leader threatens to use "submarine weapons" Abdul-Malik al-Houthi, the leader of the Houthis in Yemen, said on Thursday that the group has introduced "submarine weapons" in its attacks on ships, in what he says is solidarity with the Palestinians in the Gaza war. The conflict broke out in Yemen in 2014, and the Iranian-backed Houthis took control of vast areas in the country, including the capital, Sanaa. The following year, Saudi Arabia intervened at the head of a military coalition in support of the government, exacerbating the conflict that left hundreds of thousands dead and caused one of the worst humanitarian crises in the world. Drone submarines Iranian unmanned submarines announced in late 2023. Archive Iranian unmanned submarines announced in late 2023. Archive In recent years, the Houthis have begun to develop their aerial military capabilities, starting with ballistic missiles and cruise missiles, in addition to drones manufactured with Iranian materials and equipment, according to experts in the field of defense, according to an Agence France-Presse report. But the new addition that was recently revealed was the remotely piloted submarines, which the Pentagon recently observed using. Muhammad Al-Basha, senior Middle East analyst at the American consulting group Navanti, says that Iran and its proxies in the region have “a long record of developing unconventional warfare techniques, as pictures and video clips of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard show continuous development of remotely piloted weapons, including planes, boats, and vehicles.” And more recently, smart submarines. He pointed out in an interview with Al-Hurra website that late last January, an American force intercepted a smuggling ship in the Arabian Sea in which “spare parts and equipment for manufacturing drone submarine weapons were discovered, as one of the pictures shows the submarine’s helicopter.” The unmanned submarine's equipment was identified in a red frame, according to analyst Mohamed Al-Basha. Archive The unmanned submarine's equipment was identified in a red frame, according to analyst Mohamed Al-Basha. Archive It is likely that this unmanned submarine that appeared in the picture "is the same one that appeared in mid-March of 2022 during the inauguration ceremony of the eighth phase of the inclusion of specialized defensive equipment in the Iranian Revolutionary Guard's naval force, which included remotely piloted submarines for the first time." Al-Pasha stressed that these “unmanned submarines, unlike torpedoes, may be slow, but their range is longer, and they are equipped with an optical system that contributes to identifying the target, and most of them are guided accurately,” explaining that the Houthi leader’s announcement of a “submarine weapon” is not new, as he had alluded to it in Previous letters. The strategic analyst, Al-Basha, explains the technical characteristics of this submarine, suggesting that it includes “a modification of Iranian equipment capable of diving, such as the (Rove) vehicle, which is equipped with an advanced sensor suite, and is used primarily for reconnaissance or possible mine-laying operations. It is a copy of the Italian (Pluto Plus) vehicle.” Or small submarines such as the Iranian Ghadir class. Iranian naval missile systems displayed in March 2022. Archive Iranian naval missile systems displayed in March 2022. Archive He added that what is new about this vehicle, which the Houthi leader spoke about, is that it is a "remotely piloted submarine capable of carrying an explosive warhead." Al-Basha recalled that in 2018, the Houthis seized a smart submarine, the Rems 600, and may have “clone it in order to carry out offensive operations similar to a torpedo weapon against naval vessels.” Defense analyst Mick Mullory told ABC News that "the unmanned submarine, which is a submersible underwater vehicle, shows the Houthis' advanced capability and changing strategy" as they are adjusting "their strategy because they have not succeeded in striking US naval vessels." Mallory, a former Pentagon official, suggested that "detecting and destroying unmanned marine vehicles, whether submersible or moving on the surface of the water, is more difficult than detecting drones and anti-ship missiles." The decision to classify the Houthis as a terrorist group comes into effect on Friday (archive) How will the Houthis be affected by their designation as a terrorist group? With the United States returning the Houthi group to the list of terrorist groups, Yemen is entering a new phase through which Washington aims to obstruct "the financing of terrorist operations" due to the disruption caused by this Iran-linked group to the movement of trade in the Red Sea. He stressed that "it is unlikely that the Houthis will be able to manufacture these weapons on their own, and they are likely coming from Iran." Mullory continued, "If any Houthi unmanned weapons succeed in targeting American sailors, Tehran should expect to be held directly responsible," noting that these unmanned weapons systems "pose a serious threat because they can overwhelm ships' defenses through an attack from multiple dimensions called ( Swarm attack). Strategies for avoiding unmanned submarines Brian Clark, an expert in defense technology affairs at the American Hudson Institute, said that these unmanned submarines that the Houthis may use “pose a danger to ships that are stopped or those that are moving slowly, which may include ships crossing towards the Red Sea due to the narrow Bab al-Mandab and the congestion in the passage.” Important water. He added in an interview with Al-Hurra website that these unmanned submarines “are not fast or capable of searching for a target, but they can be directed to reach previously specified targets using a GPS system.” Clark believes that "defending against submarines or remotely piloted submersible vehicles may pose a challenge because they are difficult to see and may not be able to be hit underwater. Therefore, ships in the region must maintain constant movement so as not to become a target for the Houthis." The defense expert suggests strategies to avoid being hit by these unmanned submarines, which are considered similar to “mobile mines,” by “deploying nets around ships capable of catching or neutralizing these submarines,” noting that the American forces were able, by monitoring the beaches, to detect an unmanned submersible vehicle, which was neutralized. . He points out that the Houthis are using this type of drone submarine for the first time, as they previously targeted Saudi Arabia with drones, and used drone boats traveling on water to target oil tankers. Clark suggested that the source of these submarines was likely “Iran,” especially since Tehran has begun manufacturing drones for Russia and for its own use, and has experience in developing suicide drone boats. Suicide marches A comparison of Iranian and Houthi drones, according to a US Defense Intelligence Agency report A comparison of Iranian and Houthi drones, according to a US Defense Intelligence Agency report The Houthis say they manufacture their drones locally, and unveiled them at a military parade held in Sanaa in March 2021. Their arsenal of drones includes the Iranian “Shahed-136” drones that Russia uses in its war on Ukraine, with a range of about 2,000 km, according to military expert at the International Institute for Strategic Studies Fabian Hinz. The Houthis also have Sammad 3 drones. The range that Iranian drones launched by the Houthis can reach, according to a report by the US Defense Intelligence Agency The range that Iranian drones launched by the Houthis can reach, according to a report by the US Defense Intelligence Agency Haines told Agence France-Presse, “We do not know its exact range, but it is supposed to be about 1,600 kilometres.” They have previously used it in their attacks on the UAE and Saudi Arabia. "Samad 3" can carry 18 kilograms of explosives, according to Houthi media sources and experts. The Center for Strategic and International Studies report in 2020 said that these drones “use GPS guidance and fly autonomously along pre-programmed waypoints” toward their targets. Ballistic missiles A comparison of Iranian and Houthi ballistic missiles, according to a US Defense Intelligence Agency report A comparison of Iranian and Houthi ballistic missiles, according to a US Defense Intelligence Agency report The Houthi arsenal includes “Toofan” ballistic missiles, which are essentially Iranian “Qadr” missiles but renamed, and their range ranges between 1,600 and 1,900 kilometers, according to Haines. He explains that these missiles are "largely inaccurate, at least in the versions they reviewed, but they are supposed to be able to reach Israel." In 2016, Iran conducted tests on Ghadr missiles that struck targets about 1,400 km away. The range that Iranian missiles fired by the Houthis can reach, according to a report by the US Defense Intelligence Agency The range that Iranian missiles fired by the Houthis can reach, according to a report by the US Defense Intelligence Agency Analyst Al-Basha said in previous statements to Agence France-Presse that the Houthis revealed their arsenal of "Toofan" missiles weeks before Hamas launched its attack on Israel on October 7. The Houthis seized the Yemeni army's weapons when they took control of Sana'a and its surrounding areas. Military officials in their ranks say that they were able to manufacture missiles, armored vehicles, and drones. Riyadh and Washington have long accused Tehran of supplying them with weapons, which Tehran denies. Cruise missiles A comparison of Iranian and Houthi cruise missiles, according to a US Defense Intelligence Agency report A comparison of Iranian and Houthi cruise missiles, according to a US Defense Intelligence Agency report The rebels also possess Iranian Quds cruise missiles, according to Haines. Several versions of these missiles are available, some of which have a range of about 1,650 km, “enough to reach Israel,” according to Haines. In 2022, the Houthis announced the use of Quds 2 missiles to target the Emirati capital, Abu Dhabi. The missiles then crossed a distance of 1,126 km from northern Yemen. The Houthis also launched "Quds 2" missiles in 2020 to target facilities in Saudi Arabia. Iran is the source of the Houthis' weapons A comparison of an Iranian and Houthi missile system, according to a US Defense Intelligence Agency report A comparison of an Iranian and Houthi missile system, according to a US Defense Intelligence Agency report Ambassador Robert Wood, from the US mission to the United Nations, said in recent statements during a briefing to the UN Security Council on Yemen, “Tehran cannot deny its role in enabling and supporting the attacks launched by the Houthis, given Iran’s long-term material support for the Houthis and its encouragement of their destabilizing actions.” In the region." She called on Security Council member states, especially those with direct channels with Tehran, to put pressure on Iranian leaders to rein in the Houthis, stop these illegal attacks, and fulfill their obligations under Security Council resolutions. Wood confirmed that the Iranian Revolutionary Guard has provided the Houthis with “an increasing arsenal of advanced weapons since 2014, which they have used to attack commercial ships in the Red Sea,” which violates UN Security Council Resolutions 2140 and 2216. He added that the United States and its partners intercepted at least 18 ships illegally smuggling weapons to the Houthis between 2015 and 2023, and confiscated ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, anti-ship missiles, drones, and other weapons. The US Defense Intelligence Agency ( DIA ) issued a report in early January on the use of drones and missiles used by the Houthis against military and civilian targets throughout the region. The report shows, in a comparative analysis, supported by images, the Iranian missiles and drones used by the Houthis to attack commercial ships in the Red Sea with those that targeted infrastructure and ports throughout the region. The United States has provided new evidence that Houthi attacks on international shipping are being carried out with weapons designed by Iran, according to a report by the Voice of America website . On Thursday, the US Central Command (Centcom) announced in a statement published on the “X” platform that a US Coast Guard ship “confiscated a shipment of advanced conventional weapons and other lethal aid originating from Iran and heading to the areas controlled by the Houthis in Yemen from a ship in Arabian Sea on January 28. Arms shipment confiscated by US forces in the Arabian Sea In pictures: Washington announces the "confiscation" of an arms shipment sent by Iran to the Houthis The United States announced, on Thursday, that a US Navy ship “confiscated a shipment of advanced conventional weapons and lethal aid originating from Iran and destined for areas controlled by the Houthis in Yemen.” The statement added that the shipment contains more than 200 packages that include missile components, explosives and other devices. The statement quoted the leader of Centcom, Michael Eric Corella, as saying, “This is another example of Iran’s malicious activity in the region.” He added, "Their continued supply of advanced conventional weapons to the Houthis... continues to undermine the safety of international shipping and the free flow of trade." On January 16, the US Army announced that, on the 11th of the same month, it had confiscated components of Iranian-made missiles on a boat in the Arabian Sea that were headed to the Houthis, in the first operation of its kind since the Yemeni rebels began targeting ships off Yemen. American forces had announced a night raid on the boat on January 11 Washington press charges against the crew of a boat on which Iranian weapons were seized On Thursday, the US Department of Justice announced the filing of charges against four people in connection with a boat on which the US Navy seized Iranian weapons that were destined for the Houthis in Yemen, in an operation that also caused the death of two American soldiers from the elite Navy forces. Even before the attacks began, the US military repeatedly announced the confiscation of arms shipments that it said were headed from Iran to the Houthis, according to Agence France-Presse. In December, the United States formed a multinational naval force to protect ships in the Red Sea, but this coalition has so far been unable to stop the attacks. Moaz Frai Michael Knights provided a highly detailed assessment in CTC Sentinel: April 2024 Issue of the six-month Houthi war effort that has seen the Tehran-backed group launch missiles at Israel and attack shipping off the coasts of Yemen. He assesses that: “The Houthis have used the Gaza crisis to vault into the front ranks of the Iran-led ‘Axis of Resistance,’ arguably as the only axis partner to truly globalize the conflict through their anti-shipping attacks on the approaches to the Suez Canal. The movement has demonstrated boldness—as the first axis member to fire ballistic missiles at Israel—and resilience in the face of U.S.-U.K. airstrikes. The Houthis are likely to emerge from the war as a more confident, ambitious, and aggressive terrorist army, with a taste for provocative and eye-catching acts of defiance against Israel and the United States.”

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