Myanmar - Military Ppersonnel

In a country that’s been at war since its independence in 1948, the ranks of ethnic armies in Myanmar total more than one-fifth of the 400,000-strong national military.

Military service obligation is 18-35 years of age (men) and 18-27 years of age (women) for voluntary military service. There is no conscription (a 2010 law reintroducing conscription has not yet entered into force). The 2-year service obligation for males (ages 18-45) and females (ages 18-35) professionals (including doctors, engineers, mechanics) serve up to 3 years. Service terms may be stretched to 5 years in an officially declared emergency.

Overall strength of the armed forces was approximately 180,000 as of the early 1980s -- a relatively small number when compared with the total available manpower, which was estimated at 7.5 million. By 2018, the total strength was nominally about 400,000, out of a total population of about 55,000,000. Under these circumstances military service did not affect the economy adversely by creating manpower shortages. On the contrary, in light of the limited employment opportunities in the nation, the armed forces probably provided jobs for many who might otherwise be unemployed.

Orbat.com reported a total of 540 battalions [335 Light Infantry Battalions and 205 Infantry Battalions], and IISS reports 437 battalions [100 infantry battalions and another 337 regional command battations], while wiki reported a total of 337 infantry battalions, including 266 light infantry battalions [thus 71 mechanized battalions].

According to wiki, the Myanmar Army had some 370,000 active troops in the year 2000 [implying a typical battalion strength of 110 soldiers], while IISS reported a strength of 375,000 as of 2011 [implying a typical battalion strength of 86 soldiers]. As of 2009 orbat.com reports a total authorized strength of 450,000 with only 250,000 actually on hand. While orbat.com reports that "Generally battalions are 200 strong as against an authorized TO of about 750 (TO = 500 for Light Infantry Battalions), but often are no more than company size of even just a couple of platoons" their 540 reported battalions would be a mere 46 soldiers apiece averaged over their "on hand" headcount.

According to articles 170 and 171 of the 1974 Constitution, "every citizen has the duties to "protect and safeguard the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity" of the nation and to "undergo military training and undertake military service for the defense of the State." Although these provisions, in addition to the National Defense Law of 1959, established a legal basis for conscription, as of the early 1980s, except in the cases of a few needed doctors, engineers, and technicians, enlistments had been more than adequate to meet required military force levels, and the armed forces have been maintained entirely on a volunteer basis. Enlistment was generally for a two-year period.

Articles 170 and 171 were also frequently cited as providing a basis for mobilizing the population into a consolidated defense force, in accordance with the national defense strategy of "people's war." As of the early 1980s an estimated 35,000 men and women served in units of the People's Militia, which was maintained by the Ministry of Defense and organized on a local basis to provide for village defense. Thousands of students, members of mass organizations, and government and factory workers had also been given rudimentary training in self-defense, the use of small arms, and military discipline. As far as could be determined, however, no detailed mobilization plan had been developed; and unless equipment, facilities, and training instructors were augmented considerably, it would be very difficult for these forces to contribute significantly to the nation's military defense capability. Even members of the People's Militia units were sometimes armed only with swords or bamboo stakes.

Very little information was made public concerning armed forces personnel because such matters were considered to relate to the national security. Specific data regarding ethnic and regional background were especially sensitive in view of the government's commitment to build national unity and to downplay ethnic differences. It appeared, however, that the armed forces were ethnically integrated at all levels and that a military career provided a very successful channel of upward mobility for members of ethnic minorities. Female personnel in the armed forces numbered under 500, representing less than 1 percent of the total. They were primarily assigned medical and clerical duties, but a few worked in supply, signals, or engineering units. None were in combat fields.

The general environment and physical conditions surrounding garrison life conformed to British patterns, most installations retaining the atmosphere of a colonial post. While some army units were assigned to fixed posts, the constant state of hostilities in some areas required many troops to spend most of their time in the field.

For the most part, the serviceman was well cared for by the authorities, and conditions of service were at ahigh level of dignity and comfort in relation to local standards. Daily routine was exacting and often dangerous, but discipline was not severe. The serviceman had status, recognition, and security. Military posts compared favorably with civilian facilities, and their type of tropical construction met the needs of the services. Quarters, food, and pay were as good as a man could find outside the service and, in many cases, considerably better.

There were several advantages that added attraction to a military career, such as accrual of leave, medical care, retirement, and survivor benefits. Pay was considered good in relation to that of comparably skilled groups in the civilian sector. Supplementary allowances for quarters, rations, families, special skills, and hazardous duty substantially augmented basic rates to attractive levels. Rations were good and provided greater variety and balance than local dietary patterns provided.

Retirement may be for disability, length of service, or age and can be statutory or granted upon request. Retirement pay may reach a maximum of 75 percent of the active duty rate. There was also a scale of survivor benefits that provided pensions to widows of men disabled or killed onactive duty or in action. Leave policies were liberal, men of all ranks accruing thirty days a year. All personnel received free medical attention, and their families were also eligible when facilities were available.

There was limited progress in implementing the 2012 joint plan of action between the government and the United Nations to end recruitment of child soldiers and to demobilize and rehabilitate those serving in the armed forces. The United Nations reported that progress on implementation had stalled since May, and there were reports that the military and its middlemen continued to recruit child soldiers from large cities such as Rangoon and Mandalay. The UN Country Task Force on Monitoring and Reporting (CTFMR)--the official mechanism for monitoring and reporting grave violations against children--continued its work with the government, as required by the memorandum of understanding between the United Nations and the government. The CFTMR met quarterly and submitted quarterly reports to the Security Council. During the year 2017 it received 15 complaints of child soldier recruitment.

Normal verification procedures could take up to six months to confirm, and none of the 15 cases had yet completed verification. CFTMR monitoring was limited in part because of limitations on UN access to conflict-affected areas. During the year the government released 49 child soldiers identified within the military’s ranks. The military continued identifying suspected cases in addition to those reported by the CTFMR to the military. The CTFMR received these reports through its hotline, the forced-labor complaint mechanism, and community-based networks. Children who fled military service or received demobilization from civil society organizations rather than through the official CTFMR process continued to face arrest and imprisonment on charges of desertion while the military investigated their cases. Some children who previously were demobilized through the official CTFMR process had been re-recruited by the military once they were of legal age.

The Ministry of Defense undertook efforts to investigate and punish military personnel for recruitment of child soldiers. During the year the military punished 19 officers for previous recruitment of child soldiers. UN experts noted only low-level soldiers were held accountable, despite involvement by higher-level personnel.

The military continued enforcing its ban of all recruitment at the battalion level and continued to sanction military officers and noncommissioned personnel for complicity in child soldier recruitment and use. Former child soldiers generally did not receive meaningful reintegration support, although the military began working with the Union of Myanmar Federation of Chambers of Commerce and Industry, the country’s national chamber of commerce, to help develop the reintegration program for child soldiers to include private-sector opportunities. The military also provided information to the CTFMR that linked specific accountability measures to the respective case(s) of child recruitment or use, allowing for verification of the military’s accountability measures. The military did not make these reports available to the public.

The United Nations reported the government continued upholding its commitment under the action plan to allow UN monitors to inspect for compliance with agreed-upon procedures, to cease recruitment of children, and to implement processes for identification and demobilization of those serving in armed conflict. Nonetheless, UN monitors complained of insufficient access, noting that travel authorizations were often not granted until three or more months after an application was submitted, which complicated the United Nation’s ability to investigate claims effectively. They also noted that access to conflict areas was generally denied.

Soldiers live a cloistered, strictly controlled life, based on a stringent, overarching hierarchy. Soldiers are required to live on army bases and are only allowed to leave if granted permission by superiors. The army dictates what soldiers and their families wear, say and believe in, even how to decorate the home. They can check your house at any moment. The wives of soldiers are not allowed to wear the color red, which is associated with Aung San Suu Kyi's National League for Democracy (NLD), or spout any other political symbols.

Everything is monitored. A monitoring team within the army using Facebook, watches over soldiers and their families' activities, scrutinizing every single like, share and post. Soldiers have to hand over their log-in details for Facebook, including sign-up phone numbers. If people post political things, they can be arrested and put in jail for three or four weeks. Soldiers have been denied promotions after sharing social media posts criticizing the leadership of the Tatmadaw — as Myanmar's military is known — or voicing support for the NLD party.

Low-ranking soldiers are treated like slaves, with their wives forced to clean high-ranking officers' homes without pay. A superior officer might ask the wife of a low-ranking soldier to give him a massage. The woman would acquiesce, knowing that refusing could have negative repercussions for her husband.

Soldiers are fed a steady stream of propaganda that views the Tatmadaw as the guardian of the embattled Buddhist nation of Myanmar. The enemies, according to this propaganda, are made up of a shadowy cabal of Muslims, Aung San Suu Kyi and her NLD party, who are bent on destroying the Buddhist country. It's an ideology that has been forged in a decades-long, at times brutal battle against a myriad of ethnic insurgencies that have been fighting for independence from the Burmese majority and, at times, each other.

In Myanmar, a state with 135 different ethnic groups, where roughly 90% of the population adheres to Buddhism, politics and religion are closely interwoven. Generals have long built pagodas, erected Buddha statues, and paid homage to influential monks to legitimize their claim to power as a unifying force. Anti-Muslim sentiments are widespread, which the Tatmadaw is adept at exploiting for political capital. And this anti-Muslim, Buddhism-first propaganda is instilled into soldiers of all ranks.

The army does not respond kindly to those who attempt to leave its fold. In theory, soldiers can submit a letter of resignation after 10 years. But that is only in the law. In practice, it is not easy and it takes three to four years to submit the process (of leaving the army). And even then, it was not a given that the army would let the soldier go.