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Military


Royal Gendarmerie

The Royal Gendarmerie served simultaneously as the FAR's military police and as Morocco's main rural police unit. In 1983 the 10,000-member force had a budget of DH278 million, 68 percent of which was allocated for its personnel. Technically, the gendarmerie was under the operational control of the FAR, but in practice direction of the organization was supervised personally by the king. The gendarmerie commander in 1985, Rrigadier General Housni Ben Slimane, was considered to be a vigorous leader who acted as a rival to the minister of interior for important assignments and the confidence of the king.

The concept of the gendarmerie as rural police was a carryover of the French use of military goums for this purpose during the protectorate period. In addition to its general mission of enforcing public order, the gendarmerie performed a variety of tasks in support of a number of other government agencies. It fulfilled military police responsibilities within the FAR; served the Ministry of National Education by checking on truancy among schoolchildren in rural villages; collected unpaid taxes in rural areas for the Ministry of Finance; provided other ministries with statistics on highway traffic accidents; and checked the registration of automobile radios.

The gendarmerie, whose national headquarters was in Rabat, was organized into companies that were deployed throughout the country. The companies were in turn subdivided into sections and brigades; the latter were its basic operating units. The motorcycle brigades shared responsibility for highway traffic control with the Surete's CMI. Jeep-mounted brigades were employed in patrolling assigned segments of rural territory, and dismounted brigades manned police posts in the small villages. Special brigades were assigned the duties involved in conducting criminal investigations within their assigned jurisdictions, often with the assistance of the Judiciary Police of the Surete. The centrally located Mobile Group of the gendarmerie was maintained for rapid-response deployment to assist in riot control or other special projects. Gendarmerie units were all based in rear areas and had not been used in the fighting against the Polisario.

After the coup attempts by elements of the army and air force in 1971 and 1972, Hassan modified his traditionally primary dependence on the army, giving instead greater credence to the reliability of the gendarmerie. Turning to this rural police unit in the segment of the kingdom where his popularity was a reliable factor, he expanded its size and enhanced its operational capability.

By 1975 new units had been established throughtout the country, advanced training for its NCOs had been introduced, and an improved system of criminological research and intelligence had been initiated. New units and reponsibilities included two companies assigned to the rapid-response requirements of the centrally located Mobile Group; five new territorial brigades; one additional brigade to assist the Surete's Judiciary Police; one parachute squadron to assist isolated communities and to be used in national emergencies; four depots for stockpiling arms, ammunition, and other equipment in strategic areas; and, for the first time, air and maritime units, which were charged with aiding in suppressing violations of the country's navigation laws. There were no indications that the gendarmerie had been expanded further since that time.

Officers in the gendarmerie, like those of the other branches of the FAR, were graduates of the Royal Military Academy; the enlisted personnel were volunteers who had elected to serve five-year tours of duty. Officers received practical training appropriate for duties in the gendarmerie at the service's own postgraduate school in Marrakech. To meet the need for specialized training of its NCOs, the gendarmerie established a system of regional instruction centers; each region was thus in a position to train its personnel in accordance with its own individual needs. The Royal Gendarmerie School for Professional Training, which at one time had trained NCOs, concentrated on the training of young recruits and supervised further instruction at regional centers. Compared with service in the other military branches, the gendarmerie reportedly provided young officers greater opportunities for advancement and responsibility (and, some contended, corruption).

Following the two coups d'etat conducted by Army officers in the early 1970s, King Hassan II placed the military under the surveillance of General Housni Benslimane and his Gendarmerie. Although not a part of the Army, the Gendarmerie Royale supports the Army. The 12,000-man force is an organization for the various uniformed, and in some cases non-uniformed, branches of the state security forces. It is organized into a brigade, 4 mobile groups, an air squadron, a parachute squadron, and a coast guard unit. The Gendarmerie Royale's Coast Guard squadron has 18 boats.

The Gendarmerie Royale is tasked with providing trained personnel to support government non-military air, land, and sea operations. It operates a variety of equipment on behalf of other government agencies. There are bases in all major cities and other strategically important locations, such as the harbor at Tangiers. The Gendarmerie Royale provides armed support when the national police are ill-equipped to respond but the use of the armed forces is judged inappropriate.

Members of the Gendarmerie must accompany all Army movements. And when firing practice is organized, the Gendarmerie is inventories used ammunition. To ensure his generals would not launch a coup d'etat, King Hassan II granted them farms, building sites, and allowed them to engage undisturbed in lucrative, and illicit, trafficking. The approach proved effective. The late king's policies allowed officers to build vast fortunes in real estate, agriculture, fishing, or industry. However, this corruption has institutionalized habits that prohibit or repress reforms, as those who have the authority to make reforms are the same individuals who profit from the status quo.




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