Forces Armées Royales [FAR]

Since its formation, the Royal Armed Forces [FAR] has undergone several reorganizations. Initially, changes in the structure reflected improvements in the quality and quantity of equipment and manpower as the force was built up on conventional lines using the French army as a model. Later changes were based on the king's desire to head off potential security threats from the FAR by putting practically all units under the direct control of the palace. More recently, the FAR was tripled in size and had to be reorganized to fight effectively against the Polisario in the Western Sahara. Because of its combat experience, the FAR was considered by some observers to be the most powerful military establishment in North Africa despite Algerian and Libyan numerical advantages in equipment.

The FAR underwent numerous changes in its organizational philosophy as it steadily grew to a manned strength of about 50,000 by 1970. Originally based on strategic strongpoints and scattered garrisons inherited from the French, army control of the country was organized on a regional basis in 1959. Sixteen military zones, approximately contiguous with administrative provinces at the time, were established. A shortage of trained senior officers relegated most of those available to the General Staff. Consequently battalions were scattered around the country under the command of junior officers.

The result, although not optimal, was generally in keeping with Hassan's wariness of a powerful intermediate command level within his military establishment. He had been greatly disturbed by an army revolt that had toppled the throne in Iraq in 1958 and was quoted as saying on one occasion, "In Morocco there will be no generals' and colonels' revolt as there was in Iraq, because I do not give command of troops to my generals and colonels."

Despite Hassan's stated concerns, successive reorganizations in the 1960s placed ever more control of the FAR in the hands of professional military officers. By 1965 the army had enough trained senior officers to permit a more centralized territorial organization, and the country was divided into three military zones and one independent sector. By 1971 this arrangement had been changed to six military zones, each commanded by a general having the title of military governor.

The trend toward a strong military command was abruptly ended by the coup attempts of 1971 and 1972. In Hassan's wave of reforms the Ministry of Defense was transformed into the National Defense Administration, which concerned itself exclusively with procurement and logistics matters. Headed by the general secretary for national defense—a military officer—this body was completely divorced from operational control of the armed forces, which was vested exclusively with the king, who again assumed the responsibilities of the chief of staff.

After the coup attempts of 1971 and 1972, FAR personnel policies were overhauled. No new generals were appointed for several years, and most of those on active duty were quickly retired. Officers were no longer allowed to remain at assigned posts for long periods as in the past. At the same time the king established more personal contacts with his senior military officers in an effort to improve his relations with them.

In an attempt to support a new ethos and repair the tarnished image of his military establishment, the king issued a zahir in August 1974 containing regulations relating to discipline in the FAR. The comprehensive regulations covered such wide-ranging subjects as rank and precedence, command and control, military courtesy, leaves and passes, political and union involvement — which was prohibited — and other matters pertaining to the behavior of military personnel.

The pronouncements in the zahir superseded all previous regulations on these subjects. Of particular interest was the preamble that stated "No serviceman may invoke his own ignorance of current laws or regulations, or his superior's position, to justify carrying out orders contrary to the defense of the Country or its institutions." This portion of the zahir apparently was written in response to the defense used at the trials after the two military coup attempts of 1971 and 1972, when some of the accused pleaded not guilty on the grounds of having merely followed orders from higher ranking personnel. Those who used this plea were strongly criticized by the king.

The Moroccan military is a hierarchical structure with the king holding the highest position. King Mohammed VI had unlimited power over the military and monitors them closely. His attentions are a result of a past military coup attempt against the royal family.

In addition, the FAR was completely restructured. Before 1971 it had been organized around military regions whose forces were commanded by officers chosen for their loyalty. After the 1971 coup attempt, Hassan dissolved the military regions; later he reorganized the military so that no units existed that were larger than battalion size. He also instituted a policy of shifting these forces around the country to avoid concentrations of troops in any one place. The artillery units were deployed a great distance from Rabat, and an increased number of FAR units were assigned to civic action projects.

Hassan also moved to facilitate his ability to communicate directly with his field commanders without having to rely on the regular military chain of command and communications. The so-called Forward Headquarters (Etat-Major Avance) was established in the mid-1970s and included specially selected, loyal officers that transmitted the king's orders directly to units in the field. This system was designed to provide to the palace intelligence on troop movements and officers' political sympathies. The Forward Headquarters also included the kings cousin Mulay Hafid, Guedira, Dlimi, and other close advisers, who served as his military cabinet. As a consequence, the General Staff in Rabat was, in fact if not in name, removed from operational responsibility for the FAR's combat units.

After the wave of reforms centralizing control of the FAR in the palace, civilian politicians' participation in military decisionmaking continued to be severely circumscribed. Inputs from the political parties and the governmental ministries were assured in theory through the existence of the Supreme Council on National Security, an interministerial body created by zahir in November 1957 to lessen political party pressure in matters affecting high-level military decisions. Composed of seven ministers whose governmental agencies were related functionally to the FAR's missions, the council operated in an advisory capacity to the king until the government was disbanded during the state of exception of the late 1960s.

In 1979 the king established the National Defense Council, including representatives of all the major political parties to unite them in the war effort. The council, under Dlimi's chairmanship, was also nominally responsible for directing the activities of Morocco's preeminent intelligence service. Although it remained a formally constituted body in the mid- 1980s, the National Defense Council ceased to be politically useful and seldom met in full session.

The limitations of the highly centralized structure of the FAR were apparent in the Western Sahara war. The fact that the military action against the lightly armed, highly mobile enemy could not be effectively directed from Rabat gradually led to some modification of the king's close control over FAR combat units. The most significant change was the 1980 establishment of the Southern Zone of military operations under the command of Dlimi, who was given unprecedented power to control the forces under his authority. These included up to 80 percent of the FAR's combat ground forces as well as certain air units temporarily assigned to the Southern Zone.

Dlimi, who was the first officer to be appointed to general grade since the 1971 coup attempt, apparently had been able to win a degree of trust from the cautious monarch after many years of faithful service. In addition to his role as Southern Zone commander, he also served as director of the Surete Nationale, director of the Royal Aides de Camp, and director of the nation's most important intelligence service, as well as being one of the king's closest advisers.

Dlimi's death under mysterious circumstances in a January 1983 automobile accident fueled considerable speculation that the king suspected Dlimi of plotting against him. Although dozens of officers were arrested immediately after the general's death, there was no major restructuring of the security forces. With the partial exception of the semiautonomous, geographically distant Southern Zone, the king retained the strict system of royal command and control that had been imposed a decade earlier. Dlimi's command responsibilities were simply parceled out to four officers, none of whom appeared to rival his predecessor in terms of power, influence, or access to the king. The relationship between the king and his soldiers was the subject of considerable conjecture in the two years after Dlimi's death.

Hassan, as FAR commander in chief, took active responsibility for all aspects of the military. Despite the existence of the General Staff and smaller staffs within the air force and the navy that were led by the inspector of each service, most decisions came under the close personal scrutiny of the king and the Forward Headquarters.

The inspector general of the FAR was the highest ranking regular military officer. Major General Ben Aissa, the incumbent in 1985, was the only general officer on active duty with the FAR, but he had little real power. The inspector general did not have troops under his command but supervised the activities of the FAR General Staff. The General Staff administered the FAR's inspectorates of infantry, signals, artillery, armor, transport, and ordnance. It also included the FAR headquarters staff, many of whose policymaking functions duplicated those of the Forward Headquarters and were thus largely irrelevant. The headquarters staff was functionally divided into sections concerned with operations and training, intelligence and security, personnel, and logistics.

The most powerful regular military officer in the field has been the commander of the Southern Zone. The incumbent since Dlimi's death in 1983 had been his former deputy, Brigadier General Abdelaziz Benanni, who served as acting commander until the king gave him full command in mid-1984. Benanni was responsible for almost all of the army's combat elements, as well as air force units that were rotated under his command on a temporary basis. To maintain royal control, the king was thought to remain in almost constant contact with Benanni, who had emerged as an important military adviser.