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Politics: 2024 Election

Iran planned parliamentary elections and the Assembly of Experts elections on 01 March 2024. Ali Vaez, the director of Iran Project at the International Crisis Group, argues that "the regime has reached a stage where it has given up on the majority of the Iranian people, who for their part have given up on the regime." The constitution provides citizens the ability to choose the president, as well as members of the Assembly of Experts and parliament, but candidates must be vetted and approved by the Guardian Council. Elections are based on universal suffrage. Candidate vetting conducted by unelected bodies, however, abridged this right in all instances. Government constraints on freedom of expression and media, peaceful assembly, association, and the ability freely to seek, receive, and impart information and campaign also limited citizens’ right to freely choose their representatives in elections.

While political parties exist, they are not active. The "conservatives" (often referred to as principal-ists or fundamentalists) and "reformists" are generally considered to be the main political forces. The reformists favour expanded social freedoms and engagement with the West.

The parliamentary and Assembly of Experts elections in Iran was held on Friday. There are currently 290 seats in the Iranian Parliament, known as Majlis, elected by direct vote of people in nationwide elections for four years. The Assembly of Experts is a high-ranking body that elects and oversees the activities of the Leader of the Islamic Revolution. Members of the assembly are directly elected to office by people for an eight-year term. It holds biannual meetings to appoint a new chairman.

The Islamic Republic of Iran is an authoritarian theocratic republic with a Shia Islamic political system based on velayat-e faqih (guardianship of the jurist). Shia clergy – most notably the rahbar (supreme leader) – and political leaders vetted by the clergy dominate key power structures. The supreme leader is the head of state and holds constitutional authority over the judiciary, government-run media, and other key institutions. Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has held the position since 1989. The Assembly of Experts selects and may dismiss the supreme leader. Although assembly members are nominally directly elected in popular elections, the supreme leader has indirect influence over the assembly’s membership via the Guardian Council’s vetting of candidates and control over the election process. The supreme leader appoints half of the 12-member Guardian Council, while the head of the judiciary (who is appointed by the supreme leader) appoints the other half. The supreme leader also has indirect influence over the legislative and executive branches of government. The Guardian Council vets candidates for the presidential and Islamic Consultative Assembly (parliament/majles) elections, routinely disqualifying a significant number of candidates based on political or other considerations and controls the election process. Neither the 2021 presidential elections nor the 2020 parliamentary elections were considered free and fair.

Iran experienced widespread unrest during the year. Multiple nationwide protests began after the September 16 death of Mahsa (Jina) Amini in the custody of morality police after she allegedly violated mandatory veiling laws, and security forces used lethal force against protesters. In September, 22-year-old Mahsa Amini, also known by her Kurdish first name Jina, died after reportedly being beaten while in the custody of the morality police. On September 13, police detained Amini for her alleged “improper hijab” while she was visiting Tehran from her home in the Kurdistan region.

Authorities claimed Amini had suffered a “heart problem” while in custody and was pronounced dead on September 16. A photograph was later circulated showing Amini lying in a hospital bed with apparent severe facial injuries. Her father told domestic media outlet Rouydad 24 that the hospital at first would not allow her family to see her, and when they did, her head and body were entirely covered to hide her bruises.

Women and youth led the protests, chanting “Women, Life, Freedom” and “Death to the Dictator.” By the end of the year, security forces killed more than 500 persons, including at least 69 children, and arrested more than 19,000 protesters, including children, according to the nongovernmental organization Human Rights Activists News Agency. Some of those arrested faced the death penalty, including children. The government also routinely disrupted access to the internet and communications applications to prevent the free flow of information and to attempt to interrupt or diminish participation in protests.

At year’s end, Human Rights Activists News Agency (HRANA) reported 512 persons had been killed by security officials in protest-related clashes or had died due to unknown causes while in detention since the protests began and published the identities of 481 individuals, including 69 children. NGOs and international media reported numerous instances of protesters being tortured, beaten, or raped in detention.

Islamic law as applied by the country’s judicial system allows for the execution of juvenile offenders, starting at age nine for girls and 13 for boys, the legal age of maturity. Although many individuals were executed during the year reportedly for homicide, the law also provides for the death penalty in cases of conviction for “attempts against the security of the state,” “outrage against high-ranking officials,” moharebeh (which has a variety of broad interpretations, including “waging war against God”), fisad fil-arz (“corruption on earth”, including apostasy or heresy; see section 1.e., Transnational Repression), rape, adultery, recidivist alcohol use, consensual same-sex sexual conduct, “working to undermine the Islamic establishment,” “cooperating with foreign agents or entities,” and “insults against the memory of Imam Khomeini and against the supreme leader of the Islamic Republic.”

According to human rights organizations and media reports, the government continued to carry out some executions by cruel and inhuman practices, including hanging by cranes, in which prisoners are lifted from the ground by their necks and die slowly by asphyxiation. Adultery remains punishable by death by stoning, although provincial authorities were reportedly ordered not to provide public information regarding stoning sentences since 2001, according to the NGO Justice for Iran.

Significant human rights issues included credible reports of: unlawful or arbitrary killings by the government and its agents, most commonly executions for crimes not meeting the international legal standard of “most serious crimes” or for crimes committed by juvenile offenders, as well as after trials without fair trial guarantees; forced disappearance attributed to the government and its agents; torture or other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment by the government and its agents; arbitrary arrest or detention; harsh and life-threatening prison conditions; political prisoners and detainees; transnational repression against individuals in another country, including killings, kidnappings, or violence; serious problems with the independence of the judiciary, particularly the revolutionary courts; arbitrary and unlawful interference with privacy; punishment of family members for offenses allegedly committed by an individual; serious abuses in a conflict, including enabling abuses by terrorist groups throughout the region, the Syrian government, pro-Iran Iraqi militia groups, and Yemeni Houthi rebels, all of which were credibly accused of abuses, as well as unlawful recruitment or use of child soldiers in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen; severe restrictions on freedom of expression, including violence, threats of violence, and unjustified arrests and prosecutions against journalists, censorship, and enforcement of criminal libel and slander laws; serious restrictions on internet freedom; substantial interference with the freedom of peaceful assembly and freedom of association; severe restrictions on religious freedom; inability of citizens to change their government peacefully through free and fair elections; serious and unreasonable restrictions on political participation; serious government corruption; serious government restrictions on or harassment of domestic or international human rights organizations; lack of meaningful investigation of and accountability for gender-based violence, including domestic or intimate partner violence, sexual violence, workplace violence, child, early and forced marriage, female genital mutilation/cutting, femicide, and other forms of such violence; violence against ethnic minorities, including Kurdish and Baluch minorities; crimes, violence, or threats of violence motivated by antisemitism; trafficking in persons; crimes involving violence or threats of violence targeting lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer, and intersex persons; criminalization of consensual same-sex sexual conduct between adults, and enforcement of such laws; significant restrictions on workers’ freedom of association; and the worst forms of child labor.

There were numerous reports that the government or its agents committed arbitrary or unlawful killings. These included executions for crimes not meeting the international legal standard of “most serious crimes” or for crimes committed by juvenile offenders, as well as executions after trials without due process. Security forces used lethal force against peaceful protesters leading to numerous deaths.

Commonly reported methods of torture and abuse in prisons included threats of execution, rape, and sexual assault, as well as threats of rape of prisoners or their family members, forced vaginal and anal examinations, sleep deprivation, waterboarding, suspension, forced ingestion of chemical substances, deliberate deprivation of medical care, electroshock including the shocking of genitals, burnings, the use of pressure positions, and severe and repeated beatings.

Courts continued to impose corporal punishments. These included flogging, blinding, stoning, and amputation without anesthesia. At least 148 crimes are punishable by flogging, while 20 may carry the penalty of amputation.

As of year’s end 2022, the NGO United for Iran identified at least 1,134 prisoners of conscience in the country. The four most common reasons for imprisonment were “support for underground opposition groups,” “alleged rebellion,” “religious practice,” and “political activism.” The government often charged political dissidents with vague crimes, some of which carry the death penalty, such as “antirevolutionary behavior,” “corruption on earth,” “siding with global arrogance,” “waging war against God,” and “crimes against Islam.”

The country is credibly alleged to have killed or kidnapped persons and used violence and threats of violence against individuals in other countries, including to force their return to the country, for purposes of politically motivated reprisal. In August 2022 Hadi Matar stabbed and severely wounded author Salman Rushdie multiple times as Rushdie prepared to deliver a lecture at the Chautauqua Institution in New York State. Rushdie is the subject of a still active, 33-year-old fatwa issued by Ayatollah Khomeini following the publishing of his book The Satanic Verses, which the then supreme leader deemed blasphemous. In 2019 Ayatollah Khamenei tweeted that his predecessor’s fatwa was “irrevocable.” The Iranian 15 Khordad Foundation offered a bounty of more than three million dollars for Rushdie’s life. Matar pleaded not guilty to second-degree attempted murder and assault charges in a New York state court; the judge ordered him to remain in custody without bail.

In August 2022 the U.S. Justice Department announced charges against Shahram Poursafi, also known as Mehdi Rezayi, for “the use of interstate commerce facilities in the commission of murder for hire and providing and attempting to provide material support to a transnational murder plot” against former U.S. national security adviser John Bolton.

Presidential elections held in June 2021 did not meet international standards for free and fair elections, primarily because of the Guardian Council’s controlling role in the political process, including determining which individuals could run for office and, in certain instances, arbitrarily removing winning candidates. State-controlled media selectively promoted government-preferred candidates. The election turnout of 48.8 percent was the lowest in the history of the country.

Among the 144 candidates of the sixth term of the elections of the Assembly of Leadership Experts, whose qualifications were confirmed by the Guardian Council, 105 people have been included in the list of candidates and 39 others entered the election pit independently. Although the 12th Parliament elections are the most hot these days, when March 11th arrives, in addition to determining the assignments of the 12th Assembly seats, the assignment of 88 seats of the 6th Assembly of Experts should also be determined.

After the announcement of the final names of the candidates of the Assembly of Experts, as per the tradition of every election of experts, this time, the eyes were fixed on the fundamentalist and reformist clerical organizations to publish the electoral lists. Although the two reformist organizations, the Fighting Clergy Association and the Association of Researchers and Teachers, remained silent and no reformist list has been published for this election, but the two fundamentalist organizations of the Fighting Clergy Association and the Association of Teachers, first the list of Tehran and a short distance later, the list they published of their candidates all over the country.

The teaching community and the clergy community have a common opinion on 71 candidates out of 144 qualified candidates of the sixth election cycle of the Assembly of Leadership Experts by the Guardian Council across the country. On the other hand, the communities had not reached an agreement on some candidates; In addition to the 71 candidates who are in common with the militant clerical community, the teachers' community of Qom seminary included 15 other candidates in its supported list, In addition to the 71 common candidates with the community of teachers, the clergy community has supported 19 other candidates.

In addition to the 105 candidates who have been included in the list of the militant clerical society and the teachers' society of Qom seminary, there are also 39 other candidates who have independently entered the competition in the elections.

The head of the electoral headquarters of the Voice of the Nation list in Tehran said: We are negotiating with national figures of reform and moderation such as Mr. Larijani, Mr. Rouhani and Mr. Khatami. According to Khabaronline news agency , Esmail Dosti, one of the members of the Mellat Voice list and the head of the election headquarters of this list in Tehran, pointed out the features of the Mellat Voice list and said: The list that Mr. Motahari created with the help of the four parties of moderation and development and the agents of Etemad Melli and the call of the Iranians Prepared is a combined list.

In a conversation with Fars, he further said: We are currently negotiating with national figures of reform and moderation such as Mr. Larijani, Mr. Rouhani and Mr. Khatami, and we declare that if you support this list, you will not regret it. He added: "The voice of the nation" list is a combination and it was formed with the presence of reformists, moderate and independent fundamentalists and moderates, and it is the first time that such a list has come out in the country.

Hassan Bayadi, referring to the association of this front with the Unity Council, announced the announcement of a joint list with the presence of some candidates from the Unity Council list and a group of other candidates with the aim of fundamental change in the parliament.

The Rajanews news site affiliated with the Stability Front announced: Despite the speculations about the consensus of the Coalition Council and the Stability Front, unity has not yet been formed between these two currents. However, since last night, some media figures published a list and claimed that the coalition council and the stability front have reached a consensus. The efforts of these two currents to reach a consensus continue. However, if there is no agreement between the Sustainability Front and the Coalition Council, the Sustainability Front will publish a separate list.

Hasan Biadi, Secretary General of Iran's Islamic Youth Settlers Front and a member of the Unity Council, in response to the question of what factors caused the fundamentalists to reach the multiplicity of lists, said: "Most fundamentalist groups, when they give lists, use parameters that define each other. does not match. The political-social flow of the country is such that it leads in the same direction. There are totalitarian groups that refuse to participate fairly. In a conversation with Ilana, in response to the question of what was the reason for not achieving unity among fundamentalists, Biadi said: totalitarianism. This issue caused the failure to reach unity.

The Council of the Coalition of Islamic Revolution Forces chose the joint list of this coalition and the Stable Front for the 12th Parliament elections. The final list of candidates of the Alliance of Volunteers Council for the 12th term of the Islamic Council elections was announced by Ismail Begmohammadi, the head of the council. The Chairman of the Council of the Volunteers Coalition said: "The independent and non-partisan list of this council for the 12th session of the Islamic Council has been finalized, and election campaigns will begin.

The spokesman for the Law Enforcement Command of the Islamic Republic of Iran said around 190,000 Police forces have been tasked with ensuring the security of the upcoming nationwide elections on March 1. As the responsibility for the security of elections in Iran legally lies with the Police, a total of 190,000 Police forces will be protecting security on the election day on March 1 in cooperation with the other security organizations, such as the Basij (voluntary) units, General Saeed Montazeralmahdi said.

Iran's clerical establishment used voter turnout in elections as proof of its legitimacy, especially to the outside world. But with anti-establishment sentiment among the public rising and unprecedented protests erupting against the authorities in recent years, the legitimacy of Iran's rulers has been severely undermined. That coincided with record-low turnouts in recent presidential and parliamentary elections. As Iranians prepared to go to the polls on March 1, the authorities urged the public to vote amid fears of another poor turnout.

In remarks on 18 February 2024, Leader of the Islamic Revolution Ayatollah Seyed Ali Khamenei described the elections as a reflection of the republican system and the Islamic Republic's values, which are in conflict with the Arrogant Powers’ plans. "Elections are a manifestation of the republican system and this is why the Arrogant Powers and the US, who are opposed to both republicanism and the Islamic nature of the Islamic Republic, are against the elections and the enthusiastic participation of the people at the ballot boxes," the Leader added.

Khamenei said the road to reforms passes through ballot boxes. On the anniversary of Tabriz Popular Uprising on February 18, 1978, a large number of people from East Azerbaijan Province of Iran met with Ayatollah Khamenei in Tehran. "Elections are a manifestation of the republican system and this is why the Arrogant Powers and the US, who are opposed to both republicanism and the Islamic nature of the Islamic Republic, are against the elections and the enthusiastic participation of the people at the ballot boxes," Ayatollah Khamenei said.

The Leader stated that in the past, a US president once called on the Iranian nation to boycott elections while it actually backfired and in opposition to him, people participated with even more enthusiasm. “After that they stopped saying this directly, but they still try to distance people from the elections using various methods,” the Leader said. The Leader emphasized, "Over the decades, there has never been an election violation in the sense claimed by the enemy, and what they allege is baseless. In the cases where some allegations were made, some violations were identified after investigations were carried out and assessments were made. However, those violations were never such to cause a change in the overall results. And the elections in the country have always been healthy, valid, and dignified."

Ayatollah Khamenei highlighted the progress and increasing strength of the Revolution over its 45-year history despite facing a storm of challenges and plots. He explained that, "The Revolution, meaning the nation and the system, by passing through the challenging passageways, is now stronger and more powerful. And it has a more penetrating viewpoint and influence. At present, we must recognize our key responsibilities and address them in a timely manner.”

The Leader regarded "looking at oneself and looking at the enemy" to be two essential duties for everyone. In this regard, he said, “We must have a correct assessment of ourselves and the enemy, and neglecting this duty is a great tragedy.”

Imam Khamenei emphasized that the objective of knowing oneself means the appreciation, preservation, and enhancement of strengths, while addressing and overcoming weaknesses at the same time. In delineating the strengths of the Revolution and the nation, he described the overthrow of the tyrannical, unjust, irreligious, thoroughly corrupt, monarchical (Pahlavi) regime as being its most significant accomplishment. “That (tyrannical) system did not give any rights, respect, or roles to the people. And in many cases, the way it actually ruled was based on the command of the Americans and the British embassy,” he asserted. The Leader of the Islamic Revolution added, “Now, in contrast to that corrupt system, the people are the owners of both the country and the system. They determine the direction of the country by directly or indirectly choosing the country’s main officials.”

Spreading the ideas and values of the Revolution - especially in the region, relative success in preventing the spread of Western culture as the dominant culture, formation of voluntary groups of the people, expansion of services to cover all regions of the country, and training international scientists in various fields were some of the successes that the Leader referred to in his assessment of the endeavors of the Revolution.

Imam Khamenei emphasized the imperative nature of protecting national unity as a fundamental responsibility of the people. “Everyone should note that fulfilling these duties and responsibilities is an act of jihad in confronting the enemy, because they do not want these duties to be fulfilled. That is why they are against any positive action that is taken in the Islamic Republic,” he said.

When speaking about the second important duty, which is, "looking at the enemy," the Leader of the Islamic Revolution stated, “We must not be neglectful about the enemy, and we must keep in mind that the enemy is deceitful and cunning and has tools at its disposal. We must not assume that the enemy is weak and incapable. And at the same time, we should not be afraid of the enemy, its threats, pressures, and intimidation.”

Imam Khamenei attributed the tricks and agitation exhibited by Iran's ill-wishers to the strength and progress of the Islamic Revolution. “We must not be passive when confronting the enemy, because their policy is to belittle their opposition and make them passive,” he said.

On 22 February 2024 candidates competing in the elections for the 12th term of the Iranian parliament (Majlis) launched their campaign that will continue until the end of this month. Candidates are allowed to go ahead with advertisements and campaign processes beginning from the early morning of Thursday following the publication of the full list of contenders and providing each of them with election code to be used it in the campaigns.

After 3 months of checking qualifications by the supervisory boards and vetting by the Guardian Council, more than 15, 200 candidates were finally selected to compete in the parliamentary elections. The eligibility criteria for candidates included the minimum age of 30 and maximum age of 75 years, a master’s degree or its equivalent, Iranian citizenship, and no dual nationality.

Ahmad Vahidi, the Interior Minister described this year’s election a real competition between various political groups and factions. In Tehran, Ray, Shemiranat, Islamshahr and Pardis constituencies, 3,545 candidates are competing for new parliament. Mohsen Eslami, the spokesman for Iran’s election headquarters said that based Article 74 of the constitution, the executive bodies are obliged to provide the candidates with facilities and capacitoes including conference halls for campaign purposes.

Iranians aged 18 or above will cast their ballots for new parliament on March 1, 2024. The 290 seats are up for grabs while five seats in the Iranian parliament are reserved for religious minorities. The last election was held in 2020 in the backdrop of the anti-West sentiment following the US assassination of anti-terror icon and top military commander, Lieutenant General Qassem Soleimani in January 2020.

Hostile attempts to dissuade Iranians from voting will be frustrated by the turnout of people in the nationwide elections on March 1, the commander of the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps said 24 February 2024. Addressing a cultural event in Qom on Saturday, Major General Hossein Salami said the Iranian people are prepared to create another “political epic” in the parliamentary and the Assembly of Experts elections on the coming Friday.

Pointing to a constant political battle between Iran and the enemies, the general warned that the adversaries are seeking to disconnect Iranians from Islam, impair their determination, and dissuade them from going to the ballot boxes. He expressed confidence that Iranians will once again “punch the enemy hard in the mouth” and prove in practice that they do not pay a single iota of attention to the enemy’s quests.

Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein Amirabdollahian called on all citizens to elevate the country’s standing in the international arena by participating in the upcoming elections. In a post on his X account on Saturday night, Amirabdollahian congratulated the Iranian nation on the birth anniversary of the 12th Shiite imam, Imam Mahdi (AS), known as the Savior or Messiah. He also called for collective efforts to make Iran proud, saying every single ballot that will be cast in the nationwide elections on March 1 will hoist up the glorious flag of Iran higher in international arenas.

There are no formal political parties in Iran, but influential movements, groups, and leaders publish lists of their preferred candidates. The establishment conservative list, Coalition Council of Islamic Revolution Forces (SHANA), was led by Mohammad Bagher Qalibaf, the speaker of the parliament and a former Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) commander with a long political career that includes serving as Tehran’s mayor. There were five important electoral lists in Tehran: Trustees [ Hamid Rasaei], Revolutionary Front [Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf], Iran's Morning Front [Hamid Rasai], Unity Council [Kamal Akbari] and Voice of the Nation [ Ali Motahari].

Iran’s parliament speaker, an old IRGC hand, fears isolation as ultraconservatives have begun forming coalitions to maximize their chances in the 2024 elections. According to Iranian media, Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf and his "neo-con" allies face a preponderance of hardliners who want to win power. Ghalibaf won the speakership of the Majles (parliament) in 2020, despite the fact that his allies constituted a minority among the ultraconservative groups that control the parliament. His winning cards were his close ties to the IRGC and his kinship with Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. Young ultraconservatives formed the Strategic Council of the Supporters of the Islamic Revolution (Persian acronym SHARIAN) led by Bazrpash. A group of conservatives also formed an alliance called the "Society To Revive the Popular Institutions of the Islamic Revolution" led by Tehran Mayor Alireza Zakani. Their party, Paydari, once close to former President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, believes in networking at the bottom and bargaining for power at the top and that is what they have been successfully doing since 2005 when their name was Abadgaran Javan (Young developers).

The elections of the 12th Majlis and Majlis of Experts were held on March 11 with the participation of more than 25 million people of Iran. Hard-liners tightened control of Iran’s parliament in elections marked by a record-low turnout, with all candidates requiring approval from the unelected Guardian Council. The participation of just 41% of eligible voters reflected growing political apathy after a crackdown on anti-government protests in 2022 and worsening living conditions under Western sanctions.

The preliminary statistics of the electors of March 11 elections show that about 150 of them are fundamentalists, nearly 30 are reformists, and about 50 are independents (statistics are estimated). The way of voting, especially in Tehran, shows that the rule of "list" voting still prevailed, so some analyzes these days that people have completely abandoned the lists are alien to reality. However, this time the names have been selected from several lists. Therefore, among the candidates and even those who went to the second round in Tehran, there are at least two characteristics: first: being famous, second: being in one of the lists. No person who is neither famous nor included in the famous lists, has entered the parliament or made it to the second round!

Among the 14 people who entered the parliament in Tehran, 7 people were on the joint list of the coalition and stability; In the whole country, it is said that about 100 selected people are among the people that Shana introduced. Some practitioners of Shana state higher numbers, but this issue requires a more detailed investigation. About 50 of the elected people are also people who call themselves independent, and about 30 people are among the reformists in the preliminary investigation.

The number of people's participation in the 1402 elections is about 41%; the interpretation of this number in the framework of the context and the present time is also important. Over 41 percent of the eligible people (including foreigners who, unlike the presidential elections, cannot vote in the parliamentary elections according to the law), i.e. 25 million people participated in the elections. More specifically, in this election, more than 4 out of every 10 Iranians went to the polls and cast their votes. In what circumstances? Economically, the disastrous decade of the 90s has become a lost moment for Iran. A decade that part of it was experienced at the end of Ahmadinejad's government and a major part of it was experienced in Hassan Rouhani's government. Iran experienced negative growth for 5 consecutive years in this decade. In such a way that the years 2010, 2011, 2014, 2017 and 2018 have been accompanied by negative growths of 0.4%, 8.5%, 1%, 4.9% and 6.3% respectively.

Between the years of 1989 and 1999, the housing price increased from an average of 1.8 million in Tehran to 33 million, that is, it experienced a growth of 1800% in 10 years. From 1990 to 1400, the price of the Euro has experienced an 18-fold growth, i.e. 1800 percent, and has reached from about 590 thousand tomans to about 10.5 million tomans. The price of the dollar has also had a similar situation.

The ratio of the population below the poverty line to the total population of the country increased from 20% in 2015 to 22% by 2018, which has reached 33% in the latest report of the Ministry of Welfare, which is related to 2018. According to this report, in 1385, the population below the absolute poverty line was 14 million people, which reached 17,000,000 people by 1390 and 27,600,000people in 1498. In other words, between 1390 and 1398, the country's population grew by 11% from 75 million people to 83 million people, but in the same period, the country's population below the poverty line increased by 62% from 17 million people to 27.6 million people.

In terms of the Gini coefficient, in the 90s, Iran has seen the highest Gini coefficient since the revolution (around 43 percent), that is, the worst inequality situation. The increase in the population below the poverty line and the issue of discrimination (inequality) are clear up to this point, but along with them, the issue of the feeling of corruption must also be considered; the feeling of corruption is definitely greater than the existing corruption in the country, which has many reasons.

Politically, socially and culturally, Iran has passed a fateful year (1401) with all-round conflict; In terms of security and politics, there was almost no possibility for Iran's enemy countries not to come forward; The entire capacity of the anti-Iran movement abroad, from the terrorists of Komleh and Democrats in the west of Iran to ISIS in the east of Iran to the monarchist, communist and liberal movements... to Tom Cruise's girlfriend and all the potential of the Israelis, Americans, Canadians, and Englishmen came to the scene to work. Everything, economically, socially, culturally and politically, in Iran is ready for a great transformation.

Some political and cultural mistakes in Iran, from the inappropriate way of holding the 1400 elections to at least the obscenities in the field of virtual space and hijab (instead of correcting the damage in these areas) and... and the effects of the inflationary shock of the implementation of the policy of removing the currency, the space was prepared for the anti-Iran movement for several months.

The anti-Iranian movement that had come to the field with all its capacity, apart from stating that its goal was only the overthrow and transformation of the political order in Iran, it considered any "reformist" determination or will to be one of its most important enemies; As much as this trend was against the foundation of the Islamic Republic, it saw any reform of trends (in its true sense and not what a political group claims) as impossible, undesirable, and an obstacle to subversion, and was hostile to it. Accordingly, he considered the election, which is the most important place and passage for any change or reform in a democratic political order, to be a great enemy and organized a full-scale campaign in cyberspace to socially excommunicate any kind of going to the polls.

The shortcomings of the election institution and the political organization in general in Iran, which have manifested their effects in some way in the past few elections, are also among the issues that should be considered. The short story is that, like the past few elections, the people of Iran only had a week to get to know people whose names they didn't even know until now; At the same time, they did not see a competition in ideas and it was not clear what exactly each person or group has a plan and idea. Competitions were formed in a negative way and with revelations, and people could only come to the conclusion that either all of them themselves admit that we are corrupt or that the principle is based on corruption and deviation, but there is less and more.

In the past three or four elections, especially the March 2024 elections, Iran faced less competition of ideas and more negative competition ; Although logically, every choice anywhere in the world is accompanied by a non-choice and saying no; But along with negative motivations, there should be positive ideas as well. In such a way that if people know why and who they are not voting for, at the same time they know what specific idea they are leaning towards from the other group?

Entering politics at night through the back door, a significant number of candidates who were included in these elections, even in famous lists, were unknown people, so that even internet searches could not give significant information about some of them. The worse and more enlightening issue is that it seemed that even some people on the list did not know a significant number of other attendees and did not know who exactly they were on a joint electoral list with!

Although some of them had expertise in some fields, in the last few weeks they had set the foundation for entering politics; However, being a politician is not the same as being an expert in a specialized field. Entering politics, apart from requiring expertise in one or more public fields, requires familiarity with the country's issues and priorities, having clear ideas for solving issues, and also requiring knowledge of alternative ideas.

People had limited opportunity to get to know people and ideas. There was not much news about positive ideas, but people did not even have the opportunity to get to know many people clearly. Considering that many of those present in the lists were unfamiliar elements, but there is very little opportunity for advertising. A week's time, of course, an important part of which is also lost in the backstage wrangling for the list, leaves only a few days for people to get to know people relatively. As a rule, this recognition is almost impossible; Except in cases where sometimes a document and evidence against someone appears in the virtual space in a negative way and makes him famous in this way!

The combination of winners, especially in cities that nominate more than one representative to the parliament, should represent the views of different sections of the people as much as possible. As a rule, in the competition, the views within the framework of the constitution, which are more acceptable, win and promote ideas close to them more for at least 4 years. But especially in a metropolis like Tehran, which is a kind of symbol for elections, is not compatible with the idea of "representation" in the parliament. For example, in 2014, 30 people from the list of reformists entered the elections, and none of the seats went to the fundamentalists. In the 1998 elections, exactly the opposite happened. While in the same year 1994, reformist sociologists such as Abbas Abdi emphasized in their analyzes that if we consider the "weight" of the votes of the lists proportionally, then as a rule, there should not be 30 reformists and zero fundamentalists. become a parliament This proposition could also be true in the 1998 elections. Of course, 30-to-none victories are generally attractive to any group, but considering the "functioning" of the parliament in terms of "representation" for the general society, it is better to adopt a different approach to the elections.

The "partisanship" and "proportional elections" are a solution to these problems, along with some other issues that can be listed, is that the country's political organization could address the issue of serious and real partisanship and change the election system. The Islamic Council could seriously examine the change from "maximum" to "proportionate". The party is a place where the political force is trained, gets acquainted with the real issues of the country, shares its ideas and competes with other ideas within the party, later becomes accountable for its performance and...; Proportional elections also create conditions where elected officials can better represent the diversity of views in today's pluralistic society.

The victory of hardliners in Iran’s March 1 low-turnout parliamentary and Assembly of Experts elections will have implications for Tehran’s foreign policy and the selection of the next Supreme Leader. Turnout hit a record low, with just 41% of eligible voters casting ballots, according to government figures many consider inflated. During the last parliamentary contest in 2020, there was a 42% turnout. This was in keeping with a trend line of diminished electoral enthusiasm in recent years owing to mass candidate disqualifications, disaffection with the Islamic Republic’s system of governance, and dismal state management.

The ascension of the victors in the election represented a further narrowing of the circle of power in Iran. Reformists like former President Mohammad Khatami have been effectively banished from significant positions in the Islamic Republic. Khatami never even received a post from the Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei after his presidency, in contrast with some of his predecessors. Pragmatists have also suffered. Former President Hassan Rouhani was disqualified from running for the Assembly of Experts, despite Rouhani having held a seat there since 2000, and like Khatami, he never received a post-presidential landing spot from Khamenei. Rouhani’s former justice and intelligence ministers were also disqualified.

Even longtime conservatives have suffered in this contest. Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, the current speaker of parliament, who was reelected, nevertheless finished in fourth-place in Tehran, which was a turnaround from Ghalibaf finishing in first-place in 2020. He won fewer votes than ultraconservatives Mahmoud Nabavian, young upstart Amir-Hossein Sabeti, who has been a television host on the state broadcaster IRIB, and Hamid Rasaee.

Ghalibaf’s fall is consistent with a trend of humiliation enjoyed by political dynasties and personalities during Khamenei’s tenure—Ghalibaf’s predecessor as speaker Ali Larijani was barred from running for president in 2021. His brother Sadegh Larijani, a former chief justice and onetime member of the Guardian Council, did not win a seat on the Assembly of Experts in 2024, despite being a member of the chamber since 1999.

The run-off parliamentary elections kicked off in Iran on Friday morning 10 May 2024. A total of 90 candidates are running for the 45 remaining seats in the Iranian Parliament in the run-off elections, held in 22 constituencies where the candidates had failed to receive an absolute majority (more than 50%) of votes during the first round held on March 1. Ayatollah Khamenei said the process of election per se is a “fundamental and significant” issue for Iran and its people. The elections illustrate the presence of people and their will and decision-making, the Leader stated, saying voting is the “national duty” of anybody willing to contribute to the country’s progress. The more the votes are, the stronger the Parliament will be, and the stronger the Parliament is, there will more possibilities for action in the country, Ayatollah Khamenei stated.

The run-off elections are held with electronic voting machines in 22 districts across 15 provinces, including in Tehran, where 32 candidates run against each other. The elections began at 8 am and will continue for 10 hours, but the voting period could be extended at the discretion of the interior minister. Around 61 million Iranian people were eligible to vote, including 3.5 million first-time voters. There are currently 290 seats in the Iranian Parliament, known as Majlis, elected by direct vote of people in nationwide elections for four years.

The current election would not change the fundamentals of the Islamic Republic’s policies or its relations with the United States. Structurally, parliament is subordinate to the decisions and political whims of the Supreme Leader and the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) on the most sensitive files, for example the nuclear program. However, the occupants of the speakership of parliament and the chairmanship of the Assembly of Experts will be important, given that the speaker is a standing member of the SNSC, and the chairman of the new Assembly of Experts may very well be in place when it is constitutionally tasked with selecting a successor to Khamenei, who turns 85 this year.

The political composition of Iran's new Majlis (parliament) after the 2024 elections was heavily dominated by conservative and hardline factions. In the first round of voting, Iranians decided 245 out of 290 seats. A runoff was scheduled to decide the remaining 45 seats. The winners of the first round included:

  • At least 138 hardliners or conservatives
  • 48 independents
  • 25 reformists
  • 11 women

The Guardian Council, which vets candidates, disqualified many reformist and moderate candidates, ensuring a predominantly conservative field. This pattern continued from previous elections, where similar exclusions were evident. In the 2024 elections, hardliners and principlists, supportive of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, secured a majority in the Majlis. The new parliament is expected to align closely with the Supreme Leader's policies, particularly on issues such as nuclear negotiations and foreign policy, where it has historically taken a more hardline stance. The conservative dominance extends to the Assembly of Experts, which will be responsible for selecting Khamenei's successor should the need arise during their term.

"Arman Melli" interviewed Dr. Ismail Garami Moghadam, a former representative of the Islamic Council and deputy of the National Trust Party. Grami Moghaddam believes: "The elections of the 12th parliament were held in such a way that three groups entered the parliament, and for this reason, the political arrangement that will be formed in the next parliament will be around these three groups. The first group that entered the parliament is the Stable Front, which participated in the elections as an organization, and their candidates especially won the parliament and entered the parliament. It seems that the majority of the parliament will also be in the hands of this group. The second group is Mr. Qalibaf and his relatives, who voted in Tehran or some cities. The other group, which will be nearly 50 representatives, is the independent group, which has an acceptable increase compared to the next parliament. Along with the independents, there are about 40-50 people who are considered to be close to the reform process and will be present in the next parliament.

"As a result, the political composition of the next parliament will be formed with the three groups of the Stable Front, Yaran Qalibaf, Independents and Reformists. In the first stage, the stable front, which is considered the radical spectrum of fundamentalism, will try to completely take over the presidency and the board of the presidium of the parliament. At the same time, efforts are being made outside the parliament to re-elect Ghalibaf as the speaker of the parliament and to reach a consensus on his presidency within the parliament. In this situation, if the independents and reformists approach Qalibaf for the presidency of the parliament according to the consultations that are taking place and support him, the possibility that Qalibaf will become the chairman of the parliament again will increase.

"If the stability front comes to the conclusion that Qalibaf has the capability of being their serious competitor, they will also accept Qalibaf's leadership. However, the Stability Front is trying to take over the chairmanship and commissions of the parliament, and it seems that they will succeed in this as well. In such a situation, it is expected that the 12th parliament will be somewhat more moderate than the 11th parliament, and their political composition will also be different. I present this analysis based on the records of those who entered the parliament and I think that according to the knowledge about the behavior of these people, the political composition of the future parliament will be the same.




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