Nicaragua - Military Personnel

Nicaragua has no conscription and any form of involuntary enlistment in either the Nicaraguan Army or the National Police is forbidden. Other armed forces in the national territory are not allowed.

The lightly armed Sandinista guerrilla force of about 5,000 in 1979 had grown by 1985 to a 62,000-man active duty force, with an additional 57,000 in the reserves and the militia. In late 1983, the Sandinistas instituted the first draft in Nicaragua's history. This action caused strong popular resentment, with thousands of young Nicaraguans fleeing their homeland to avoid the draft. In rural areas of Nicaragua, there was been open, active resistance by the people against conscription.

Nicaraguans would talk about the “sons of Sandino” or “los cachorros de Sandino” (Sandino’s puppies) - the young conscripts in the Sandinista Popular Army of the 1980s. Daniel Ortega’s presidency was marred by a civil war against Contra (short for contrarevolucionario, or counterrevolutionary) forces organized and financed by the United States. Economic hardship and a military draft combined to lower the FSLN’s popularity.

The Sandinista Army was estimated to be composed of 45,000 troops, of which 25,000 were reservists on active duty. The Air Force had 1,700 members, and the Navy has approximately 1,100 members. In addition, the government trained 25,000 reservists who may be called to active duty to reinforce all three services. The border guards were under army control and consisted of another 3,000 men. The Ministry of the Interior had a security force of about 2,000. An additional 30,000 men and women made up a civilian militia. The goal of the Sandinista government wais to build a ground force that would eventually number 250,000 men.

With respect to the conventional defense of the Pacific Coast and Managua, the army developed a “People’s War” concept which relies heavily on the use of regular forces backed up by large reserves. In October 1985, the army converted the voluntary reserve system into a mandatory approach encompassing conscripts from the 25-to-40~year age group. There were at least 18 reserve light infantry brigades represented at the parade on 08 November 1986 marking the 25th anniversary of the founding of the Frente Sandinista de Liberacion Nacional (FSLN) movement. Conservatively, there were probably 22,000 reservists organized and trained to defend the Pacific Coast and Managua (Military Regions II, III, and IV).

Many of these forces were not highly motivated and received only two weeks of training a year. Officers and NCOs supposedly trained for longer periods of at least one month per year. Permanent forces would probably add another 10,000 to 20,000 tankers, mechanized infantry, artillerymen, and air defenders (along with ap» propriate support contingents and air and naval units) as the structure around which the reserve light infantry units would coalesce. Local militia forces form the final component of the conventional defense concept.

There may have been some 40,000 militia organized to add depth to the battlefield, thus in theory requiring any invading US forces to fight for every square inch of Nicaraguan territory. The general plan would be to fight conventionally as long as possible, then fade into a guerrilla war, harassing occupying forces at every opportunity. Future plans call for a near~term doubling of this force to 80,000 organized into 100 battalions. Long-term plans somewhat unrealistically called for an additional 324,000 men by l995.

Ortega lost the 1990 election to a coalition headed by Violeta Barrios de Chamorro, wife of the slain newspaper publisher, who had briefly served with the Sandinista beore resigning. In April 1990, Gen. Humberto Ortega, the Sandinista military chief, says he aims to trim Nicaragua's army to about 30,000 to 40,000 troops, less than half its current size, under a mandate from President Violeta Barrios de Chamorro. "Our country cannot support a military budget the size it is now," Ortega told reporters at a gala inaugural reception offered by Chamorro after she took power from defeated Sandinista President Daniel Ortega, the general's brother.

Violeta governed as a centrist, anxious to heal the rifts in Nicaraguan society. Years passed since 25 February 1990, but no support program existed to integrate those who fought in the revolutionary war back into the civil sector. Such a program is necessary for lasting peace in Nicaragua and would be a humanitarian gesture for the thousands of Nicaraguans who fought an armed struggle for political and ideological differences, which today have been resolved among national leaders and the foreign powers that incited these differences.