Nicaragua Army

Formed from the cadres of the 1970s revolutionary phase, the Nicaraguan Armed Forces are based in the Sandinista Revolution. All of the senior military officers had their roots in this time period. The Chiefs of the Armed Forces have focused their tenures on the professionalization of their forces.

The army is responsible for external security but also has some domestic responsibilities, including countering illicit trafficking in narcotics and providing for the transportation of election-related materials, including ballots.

As of 1993, the army's strength was estimated at 13,500 personnel. The EPS was organized into six regional commands and two military departments subordinate to the general staff. The largest unit was a motorized infantry brigade of four battalions. In addition, there are a mechanized infantry battalion and three artillery battalions. The Irregular Warfare Battalions had been reduced to ten infantry companies. A Special Forces battalion has been formed from airborne and Special Forces personnel. Most of these units were neither fully staffed nor adequately equipped.

The 1990 Protocol of Transition (Transition Accords) was a formal document through which the newly elected government pledged to respect the army’s institutional integrity and its command structure in accordance with the Constitution and laws of Nicaragua. The accords also supported the army’s professionalization. In exchange for these concessions, the EPS set aside its role as a partisan army and transformed itself into a professional organization that accepted the authority of the newly elected government. The act of transforming itself became the principal guarantee of its stability.

The Military Code subordinated the army to the civilian authority represented by the president as its supreme commander, but it also obligates the president to choose the army commander in chief from a list of candidates presented by the military council. This provision limits presidential power in choosing the army chief, because it allows a measure of autonomy to the military institution. That is, it can practically name its own leaders. Of course the provision also prevents the president from naming a commander in chief on the basis of political affinities or personal preferences, while ignoring objective criteria such as military seniority and professional qualifications.

On Army Day, 02 September 1993, a crisis emerged between the executive branch and the EPS. At the Army Day celebration, President Chamorro announced that, in the absence of any accord with the EPS, she intended to force General Ortega to retire in 1994. General Ortega’s replacement by Cuadra in February 1995 was an important step that led to the success in modernizing and democratizing Nicaragua’s armed forces and consolidating democracy, which helped sever ties the army once had with the FSLN. Backed by the Military Code, the Sandinista People’s Army became the Army of Nicaragua. As President Enrique Bolaños pointed out, “Despite its partisan origins, the current army of Nicaragua has understood the importance of serving the Nation above a person, a family, or a political party.” In 2000, as the Military Code required, Cuadra peacefully handed the reins of his position to General Javier Carrión, thus demonstrating the value the army placed in the Constitution and laws of the republic.

In 1995 the government of Violeta Chamorro, pushed around by the United States, took away the appearance of the grim Sandinista Popular Army and a new law was intended to create a new army independent of politicians, professional, with the name of Army of Nicaragua. This invention was the subject of jokes and hilarity, as a new law in Nicaragua where nobody respects the law.

While the army falls under the Ministry of Defense, many informed observers believed the ministry’s control had been limited since 2007 when the army began functioning as an autonomous force responding directly to the president. Such an impression was reinforced by constitutional reforms and reforms to the military code enacted in 2014, which give the president greater control over the army. The Office of the Inspectorate General is responsible for investigating abuses and corruption, but limited public information was available on its activities.

The Soviets considered the Central American terrain in tailoring the Sandinista armed forces. They provided about 40 heavy flatbed trucks, which were designed to carry the T-55 tank. The Sandinistas had also been provided with six large ferries, which would enable the tanks to be shuttled across rivers to fighting zones, a significant capability given to Honduras would be appreciably reduced, given the fact that long stretches of the borders with Honduras and Costa Rica are rivers. The PT-76s, of course, could cross rivers and be used to secure a beach-head while the T-55s were shuttled across.

The regime in Nicaragua posed psychological threat to the countries of Central America. This fact was readily perceived by the citizens of neighboring countries. Honduras shares a 570-mile border Nicaragua. Should the Sandinistas decide to launch offensive operations against Honduras, the most obvious avenue of approach would be through the area as the Choluteca Gap, in the northwest coastal plain of the Honduran / Nicaraguan border. The Sandinistas have conducted training with tanks, armored personnel carriers, and long-range artillery areas close to the Choluteca Gap.

This narrow routing could prove difficult for the Sandinista tanks if the Honduran Air Force retains the air superiority it enjoyed in 1985. But, if this Honduran deterrent capability was sufficiently neutralized by a strengthened Sandinista air force and an effective air defense system, then the disadvantage of a restricted route into Honduras would be appreciably reduced.

In 1979 the Sandinista National Reconstruction Government, with the approval of Violeta Chamorro and Daniel Ortega, expropriated in excess of 60 properties which were owned by citizens of the United States, Many of these properties were turned over to the Nicaraguan Armed Forces for the military to use as they saw fit. This usage ranged from office spaces to private homes for active and retired General Officers. To date more than 20 properties have either been returned to their original owners, or the owners have been compensated in some manner for the property. Approximately 36 properties remained under dispute and in the hands of the Nicaraguan Armed Forces.