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Military


Sierra Leone Navy

In June 1973 President Stevens announced that Sierra Leone had established the nucleus of a navy, disclosing that “a number of young men have been under training, both overseas and locally, to man the boats and aircraft, and the Government will soon invite more men and women interested in these careers." The strength of the navy was estimated at 100 in the mid-1970s.

Intentions of developing a navy were expressed as early as 1964, but its actual creation seems to have been delayed by budgetary restrictions and an absence of real need. Sea and coastal patrols had been necessary only to curtail the traffic in smuggled diamonds and to police fishing by foreign boats.

In 1973 the House of Representatives extended Sierra Leone’s territorial waters to 200 miles. 3). In that same year the People’s Republic of China (PRC) donated two Shanghai-class motor gunboats of 125 tons displacement. The PRC also sent a small naval training team to continue the training of sixty-two Sierra Leoneans who had returned from a short period of training in the PRC. It is possible that this training team replaced an earlier one from the PRC that had provided instruction in light and medium weapons. Because the trainees were apparently selected without regard for skill or aptitude, they had not absorbed the training very effectively.

Nevertheless by late 1974 the gunboats, based in Freetown, were in regular use in Sierra Leonean peninsular waters, although apparently still in training status. It is not quite clear how an insufficiently trained 100-man navy can effectively police a 200-mile expanse of territorial waters. The naval base was at the former seaplane base next to the Hastings airport on the eastern shore of the Sierra Leone Peninsula. The navy’s primary function was coastal and harbor patrol. Its commanding officer was a former police lieutenant.

The Sierra Leone Navy (SLN) was formed in 1981 as a wing of the Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces (RSLAF). There were initially 03 Officers who had gone through Naval Training and 40 Ratings drawn from various technical units of the Army to operate the only patrol boat - TRACKER MK II from England. The offer of two Shangai Class II Offshore Patrol Vessels (OPV) in 1986 by the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) brought about the recruitment of 14 officers and 125 ratings, trained initially at BTC now AFTC and later in various Naval institutions around the world to effectively and efficiently man existing vessels and naval deployments along the coast.

When ECOMOG was formed in 1990 following the escalation of the Liberia civil war, the SLN participated actively in facilitating the movement of Sierra Leone Troops and Logistic to and from Liberia.

The outbreak of the Civil War in 1991, also brought additional responsibilities of deploying troops to strategic areas around the country and the collection of vital logistic supplies from our sister country, Guinea. The intensification of the RUF rebel war saw the Navy being charged to defend the riverine areas around the country, which were of rebel interest. This caused the increase of SLN strength to 24 officers and 539 ratings and becoming an independent service in 1995, when the Defence Headquarters was established, and before the ECOMOG intervention of February 1998.

The SLN had four (04) offshore patrol vessels, five (05) inshore small crafts and several marine equipments. During the interregnum, these vessels and equipments were abandoned and later vandalized with the exception of Patrol Boat 103 - SLN ALMIMAMY RASSIN. Since the establishment of the Navy in the early 80s the Unit has not only been responsible for the protection of the coastline of Sierra Leone but also been engaged in supporting operational activities.

Operations

The MFMR mandated SLN to conduct surveillance and fisheries protection in the waters of Sierra Leone on its behalf. To this date, the Maritime Wing remains committed to this role and over 40 arrests of fishing vessels have been made for various infringements. These arrests yielded much needed revenue to government over the years. When the ADB programme was launched, it enabled a wider coverage, and an increase in revenue generated. In April 2002 and January 2003, Sierra Leone participated in the Sub regional Fisheries Surveillance operations joining the Gambia, Guinea, Senegal and Cape Verde, and continued to be part of the regional surveillance to date. The Maritime Wing has been very instrumental in the gains made by this organisation.

During the rebel war it was the Navy that prevented the occupation of Bonthe Island by RUF rebels and also actively participated in blocking the advancement of rebels on Bonga Town, Tissana, Tombo and other Peninsula Villages during the infamous January 6th 1999 invasion. The Navy was very supportive and in composite with the infantry on operations Barass, extending GoSL influence in Kambia, deployment into the Pujehun District Tompari Ferry etc.

Smuggling is one of the main sources by which government loses revenue. Since the formation from August 2001 to May 2002 ten boats were arrested by the Navy for smuggling and gave the Government Millions of Leones which should have been lost. Together with the SLP Maritime Division, more arrests have been made in the recent past and efforts are being made to increase our presence at sea.

Antipiracy Operations are part of the specific standing operational tasks of the Maritime Wing as a fighting force. Though piracy is not common in the Territorial Waters of SL, Armed Robbery at sea is a concern. One such incident occurred in 2008 when men clad in Guinean security outfits entered SL Waters, attacked some fishing trawlers and tried to loot both their catch and their possessions worth millions of leones. However, in a coordinated operation they were prevented from achieving their objectives.

Piracy has for long time threatened to wreck the fishing industry in Sierra Leone. Many foreign fishing vessels have left this country even before their fishing licenses expired due to armed attacks which resulted in these vessels losing thousands of dollars worth of fish and equipments. The piracy plague appears to be uncontrolled, and at one time a naval RIB was damage by pirates during a shoot-out. However, on the 13th and 14th December 2002, a planned joint operation conducted by the Maritime Wing succeeded in arresting two sets of pirates on the northern axis of Sierra Leone. These operations seem to have sent a strong signal to the pirates. Since 14th December 2002, there has not been a single report of armed robbery in the territorial waters of Sierra Leone.

The SLN has also played an active role in the Humanitarian relief services in Sierra Leone. Since the outbreak of the rebel war in 1991, thousands of Sierra Leoneans have been repatriated by the SLN from Liberia and Guinea both by Government and UNHCR requests.

Search and Rescue is a routine evolution in the SLN. Search and Rescue is a major responsibility of the Sierra Leone Maritime Administration (SLMA), and therefore an implied task for the Maritime Wing, as we are deployed in five (5) locations along the coastline of Sierra Leone. Search and Rescue (SAR) services can be referred to as the search for and provision of aid to people who are in distress or imminent danger at sea. SAR involves the collective efforts and expertise of individuals, agencies and government to effectively manage disasters when they occur, as witnessed in the December 2013 sea collision which claimed the lives of 19 persons. One lesson identified in this incident was that an effective maritime disaster management cannot be handled by one organization alone. This is the very reason for the establishment of the Joint Maritime Committee (JMC), which should be an umbrella body to coordinate all activities within the maritime domain.

To date, over 400 lives have been saved. A higher point in these rescue operations was the saving of 107 people on board MV VAKAPAD which sank north of Cape Sierra Leone in September 2002. The Navy was also first on site at the UN Helicopter crash in November 2001. Although no lives were saved, the Maritime Wing succeeded in retrieving two corpses and assisted salvaging the craft.

It’s a miracle to many as to how the Maritime Wing could achieve so much with its present strength and equipment holdings under such enormous challenges. The secret lies in the fact that the Maritime Wing as a small unit is full of professionals of the various naval departments who are dedicated in performing their service to the state. The unit as it is stated earlier has been performing the role of the Navy as a service. There is no doubt that if the necessary platforms are acquired for the Maritime Wing, it will surely rise to its former status of a navy, one of the principal services of the Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces.

During the October 2000 Conference of International Maritime Organisations (IMO) and the Global Maritime Distress and Safety System (GMDSS) on Search and Rescue in Florence - Italy, it was recommended that there should be a regional approach to the provision of SAR services in Western, Southern and Eastern parts of Africa. Thus, 5 countries in Africa were designated as Maritime Rescue Coordinating Centres (MRCC): Kenya, South Africa, Nigeria, Liberia and Morocco. Each centre is to have its own network of associated sub-centres; Sierra Leone falls under the MRCC of Liberia. For the period 2013 to date, 32 SAR Operations had been conducted and 414 lives have been saved.

Joint Surveillance Operations with US Coastguard Legarde (LEGARE)

The United States Government and the Sierra Leone Government are engaged in a joint surveillance operation known as Africa Maritime Law Enforcement Partnership (AMLEP). The US Coastguard (USCG) Cutter named ‘Legarde’ is the main operational platform used to jointly patrol Sierra Leone EEZ with the view to generate a clear maritime picture to the Government of Sierra Leone. This operation provides training opportunities to S/Leone Maritime Stakeholders on law enforcement capabilities. S/Leone’s declining influence to effectively patrol her EEZ beyond the limits of 70nm due to lack of suitable sea-going chattels provides a sanctuary to rogue operatives; hence the increase in transnational organized crimes which is a concern to our development partners, especially the US.

USCG Legarde sailed to high seas and conduct EEZ surveillance operations. Our patrol boat PB 105 Sir Milton sails to a central position along SL coastline and lie in wait to support ‘Legarde’ on call. In the event of an arrest by Legarde, PB 105 is used to escort arrested vessels to a position where they will be taken over by the nearest Forward Operational Base (FOB), and the subsequent escort to port. Both Legarde and PB 105 remained at sea throughout the period of operations, and the Communication Centre of the Joint Maritime Committee (JMC) remains under operational control throughout the operations.





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