Guinea Army

The Army is the main component of the Guinean armed forces. The Guinean army is a major advantage for the defense. Of 10 000 men, it is a professional army, which work in the same way that all the gendarmerie components, air and sea, is being reorganized. The missions of the Army on the following areas:

• defense of territory and maintaining operations in the order and defense of sensitive points;
• participation of peacekeeping operations,
• civilian protection missions.

The Army also also fulfills various missions through the engineering battalion which includes components: engineering road, rural engineering and building engineering with specific means adapted. The battalion participates actively in the implementation of important civilian and military infrastructure and food security.

To ensure these missions the Army has:

• territorial units at each of the four military regions (1st RM: Kindia; 2nd RM: Labé; 3rd RM: Kankan 4th RM: N'Zérékoré); cf. p card. 17.
• autonomous special units (airborne troops, armored battalion, Autonomous Presidential Security Battalion, Conakry security battalion) at the special zone of Conakry.

From 2000-2001, following attacks on its southern border, the army contributes heavily to the permanent mission of securing the borders now deployed continuously strong operating device.

1 x armor battalion 5 x infantry battalions 1 x special forces battalion 1 x ranger battalion 1 x commado battalion 1 x artillery battalion 1 x engineering battalion 1 x air defence battalion

Every time a president came to power, he promoted people who took advantage of situations to settle accounts with impunity. Thus Sékou Toure took advantage of the plots - real or supposed - to send his opponents to die at Camp Boiro. Lansana Conte, his successor, did not do better. The repression that followed the failed coup d'état of Colonel Diarra Traoré on June 4, 1985, was the occasion of dozens of assassinations. Moussa Dadis Camara did not deviate from the rule. Those responsible for the massacre of more than 150 opponents on 28 September 2009 in a Conakry stadium were not harassed. In February 2010, Human Rights Watch was upset by the promotion given by Sékouba Konaté (Dadis Camara's successor) to some of the officials involved in the massacres, citing Major Claude Pivi and Lieutenant-Colonel Moussa Tiegboro Camara, who were on the prohibited list. They were confirmed by Condé, as Minister for the presidential security for the former, and as director of the National Agency for Drugs, Large Banditry, Organized Crime and Terrorism for the latter.

By October 2009, West African leaders denounced the worsening situation in Guinea, where the nation's military leaders have been slow to act following the killings and rapes by security forces at a pro-democracy rally in September 2009. Sporadic gunfire by disaffected soldiers continued, and junta leader Captain Moussa Dadis Camara said in a radio interview that he didi not control segments of the army, raising concerns that Guinea's problems could destabilize the region. The murder of more than 150 peaceful protestors, sexual assaults, public rapes and loss of control of the army overwhelmed any claim he had to remain in office.

The new Republic, born December 2010, inherited a problem army. Criminal activities, ethnic cleavages, conflicts of generations, corruption of high-ranking officers, excessive numbers, impunity, indiscipline, insubordination, lack of education and training, non-regulatory recruitment, whimsical promotions, human rights violations. The list of malfunctions, prepared by the International Crisis Group (ICG) in a report published in September 2010, continued to grow.

The demilitarization of the capital made it possible to relocate heavy weapons inside the country, notably in Kindia (135 km from Conakry), Guinea's first military region, where the reinforcements came on 19 July 2010. But anti-tank rocket launchers (LRACs) are still in the Alpha-Yaya-Diallo camp, where the coup d'etat by Moussa Dadis Camara had installed the seat of his regime. It's obvious that senior officers hijacked weapons. There was no control over the purchases, which borrowed doubtful circuits and which were subject to the prerogative of only a few senior officers.