Department of Defense Office of Inspector General

Report No. D-2007-107
(Project No. D2006-D000CK-0210.000)

June 27, 2007

Procurement Policy for Armored Vehicles

Executive Summary

Who Should Read This Report and Why? Army and the Marine Corps acquisition and contracting personnel should read this report because it concerns armored vehicle procurement decisions that affect Global War on Terrorism mission requirements.

Background. Congresswoman Louise M. Slaughter requested that the DoD Office of Inspector General review the DoD procurement history for body armor and armored vehicles and determine whether officials properly followed contracting policies. Congresswoman Slaughter also requested specific information on why DoD issued contracts to Force Protection, Inc., and Armor Holdings, Inc., for armored vehicles. This report addresses armored vehicles. The DoD Office of Inspector General is conducting a separate audit on body armor.

Armored vehicles provide various levels of protection and are built with integrated protection or are outfitted with armor kits. This report addresses the following armored vehicles: the Buffalo Mine Protected Clearance Vehicle, the Cougar, the Joint Explosive Ordnance Disposal Rapid Response Vehicle, and the High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle.

Procurement History for Armored Vehicles. DoD awarded 15 contracts, valued at $2.2 billion, to Force Protection, Inc., and Armor Holdings, Inc., for armored vehicles and armor kits. Specifically, DoD awarded 11 sole-source contracts, valued at $416.7 million, to Force Protection, Inc., for armored vehicles and 4 sole-source contracts, valued at $1.8 billion, to Armor Holdings, Inc., for armored vehicles and armor kits. In addition, DoD placed two orders, valued at $5.6 million, on a General Services Administration Federal supply schedule contract with Armor Holdings, Inc., for armor kits. DoD contracting and program officials stated that Force Protection, Inc., and Armor Holdings, Inc., were the only sources capable of producing the armored vehicles and meeting the urgent delivery schedules required to support the Global War on Terrorism.

Results. The Marine Corps Systems Command awarded sole-source contracts to Force Protection, Inc., for the Joint Explosive Ordnance Disposal Rapid Response Vehicle even though Marine Corps Systems Command officials knew other sources were available for competition. In addition, TACOM Life Cycle Management Command and Marine Corps Systems Command officials did not adequately justify the commercial nature of three commercial contracts with Force Protection, Inc., for the Cougar and the Buffalo Mine Protected Clearance Vehicle. As a result, the Marine Corps Systems Command continued to award contracts for armored vehicles to Force Protection, Inc., even though Force Protection, Inc., did not perform as a responsible contractor and repeatedly failed to meet contractual delivery schedules for getting vehicles to the theater. In addition, TACOM Life Cycle Management Command and Marine Corps Systems Command decisions to award commercial contracts to Force Protection, Inc., may have limited the Government's ability to ensure it paid fair and reasonable prices for the contracts. The Marine Corps Systems Command should continue to calculate and assess any additional liquidated damages for late delivery of vehicles on contract M67854-05-D-5091 and compete future contracts for the Joint Explosive Ordnance Disposal Rapid Response Vehicle. Additionally, TACOM Life Cycle Management Command contracting officials should procure future Buffalo Mine Protected Clearance Vehicles and Marine Corps Systems Command contracting officials should procure future Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles under FAR Part 15 with negotiated prices based on certified cost and pricing data, and include and enforce a liquidated damages clause on future contracts with Force Protection, Inc. (finding A).

The TACOM Life Cycle Management Command awarded a contract for crew protection kits to Simula Aerospace and Defense Group, Inc., an Armor Holdings, Inc., subsidiary. The subsidiary did not meet the Federal Acquisition Regulation definition of a responsible prospective contractor. Specifically, Simula Aerospace and Defense Group, Inc., did not have the necessary production control procedures, property control systems, and quality assurance measures in place to meet contract requirements for crew protection kits. As a result, the TACOM Life Cycle Management Command received crew protection kits with missing and unusable components, which increased the kit installation time and required additional reinspection of kits. In addition, the TACOM Life Cycle Management Command did not receive all of the crew protection kits in accordance with the contractual delivery schedule. Furthermore, the increased crew protection kit installation time, the additional reinspection of kits in theater, and the late deliveries all resulted in increased risk to the lives of soldiers. As of February 22, 2007, Simula delivered all items ordered on this contract; the contract remained open, however, pending several post-award audits the Defense Contract Audit Agency was conducting. The TACOM Life Cycle Management Command contracting officials should properly implement Federal Acquisition Regulation requirements to ensure that they award future contracts to responsible contractors and properly document determinations of contractor responsibility. In addition, the TACOM Life Cycle Management Command contracting officer should negotiate for consideration from Simula for late deliveries of crew protection kits and missing and nonconforming components (finding B).

TACOM Life Cycle Management Command and Marine Corps Systems Command internal controls were not adequate. We identified material internal controls weaknesses in the award of contracts to Force Protection, Inc., and Armor Holdings, Inc., for armored vehicles and armor kits. As a separate point, the Cougar and Joint Explosive Ordnance Disposal Rapid Response Vehicles have significant and operational value to our warfighters in the field. Information from users on vehicle performance indicated that vehicles performed well and saved lives.

Management Comments and Audit Response. The Acting Chief of Staff, TACOM Life Cycle Management Command, and the Commandant of the Marine Corps commented on finding A and concurred with the recommendations. The comments were responsive and no additional comments are required. A discussion of the management comments is in the Finding section of the report, and the complete text of the comments is in the Management Comments section.

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