Air Base 201 - Agadez, Niger

The U.S.-constructed air base in Agadez, Niger, is fully operational, carrying out its first unmanned intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance flights in October 2019. The U.S military said the decision to relocate assets from Niamey to Agadez and to construct the base there was reached in consultation and coordination with the government of Niger.

The "Memorandum of Understanding" pertaining to the use of US military bases in Niamey and Agadez was reported by The New York Times on 30 November 2017. The government of Niger requested U.S. Africa Command [AFRICOM] to relocate ISR [Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance] assets from Niamey to Agadez. The move could be part of an effort by the U.S military to have a low profile presence in the region without triggering potential opposition from the local population. The Agadez base has the advantage of making the U.S presence less visible, far from Niger capital, Niamey. This is important, given the clear opposition a significant part of the Niger [population] have voiced about the increasing Western presence in the country.

Air Base 201 and Agadez leadership have a shared vision of a safe, stable, and prosperous future for Agadez, its surrounding villages, and Niger more broadly. U.S. Air Force Lt. Col. John Barrett, 724th Expeditionary Air Base Squadron commander, met 95 January 2023 with key leaders from the local population in Agadez, Niger. This meeting included the Regional Council President, Sultan, Mayor, Zone Two commander (COMZONE2) and National Police Chief. Maintaining relationships with key leaders in Agadez, especially through mutually beneficial partnerships, ensures that Air Base 201 remains a good neighbor to Nigeriens.

At these meetings, leaders discussed shared goals and a desire to increase partnerships between AB 201, Agadez government agencies, and the Niger Armed Forces (FAN). Partnerships and knowledge exchanges, such as English Discussion Groups, are ways AB 201 can share skills and information, which provides a more sustainable and lasting impact in the Agadez area.

U.S. Air Force 409th Expeditionary Group commander, Col. Kevin Lee, and Nigerien Armed Forces Command Zone Two Commander, Col. Abdoulaye Ango held a roundtable discussion July 12, 2022. The discussion followed the 724th Expeditionary Air Base Squadron Change of Command Ceremony and included topics such as the strong relationship between United States military forces and Nigerien Armed Forces, as well as the shared security interests within the Agadez community. “There has been good connection with the American forces and a lot of action to help the local community in Agadez,” said Agadez Governor Magagi Maman Dada. “We hope that the support will continue since there is a lot of insurgency and insecurity in the region and there is a strong need to combat that.”

Building upon strong foundational relationships, the U.S. Air Force prioritizes working with the Nigerien Armed Forces toward the mutual goal of peace and stability within the region. For Lee, the meeting was important to discuss security topics, share thoughts and ideas needed to ensure there is secure, reliable, flexible airpower in North-West Africa and Nigerien Air Base 201, Niger, operations essential to mission success.

Ango presented the base’s previous commander, U.S. Air Force Lt. Col. Christpher Jacobson, an award and certificate of appreciation for his work with the Nigerien Armed Forces for being a good partner and thanked Lee and U.S. Air Force Lt. Col. John M. Barrett, 724th EABS commander, for their relationship. Follow-up meetings will be arranged to discuss security in the region. Partnerships in West Africa remain key to countering the escalating violent extremism in the tri-border region of Niger. The Airmen, Guardians, and Soldiers located at Nigerien AB 201 are determined to maintain peacekeeping operations.

The commercial city of Agadez is a crossroads for travel on the edge of the Sahara. Desert surrounds the city of Agadez, and mixed with the sand dunes and rocky outcrops are wadis—dry streambeds that fill with water and/or vegetation after rainfall. Agadez, formerly spelled Agadès, is the fifth largest city in Niger, with a population of 110,497 based on the 2012 census. Agadez in northern Niger, an area dramatically different from the southern region near Niamey.

Known as "the gateway to the Sahara," Agadez is a desert town with an Arabian nights flavor and home to the Tuareg people. The Tuaregs have dark olive or black complexions and exhibit strong, confident personalities. Historically, they are traders and nomads with an unusual gift for business. The Agadez Region in Niger is experiencing the consequences of destabilization in the Sahel by armed groups while being the gateway to Europe for most Africans. Since the 1990s, Niger’s desert trade route town Agadez became a hub for West African and other Sub-Saharan migrants crossing the Sahara to North Africa and sometimes onward to Europe.

The area, which had never been visited by Europeans, was first explored under the combined patronage of the English and Prussian governments in 1850. Renowned explorers James Richardson (1806-1851) and Heinrich Barth (1821–1865) reported that "after being attacked by Tuaricks, threatened with death by the fanatical Moslem priests, who were determined that no infidels should pass through their country, and exposed to demands for tribute from En-noor, the sultan of the kingdom, they were obliged to remain for more than three months awaiting a safe opportunity to proceed further. During this time Dr. Barth made a journey to Agadez, the capital of Aïr, a city containing 8,000 inhabitants, situated in a rich and beautiful valley. The entire kingdom contains a population of 70,000. The climate is healthy for Europeans. The inhabitants appear to be a branch of the Tuarick or desert tribe mingled with the race of Soudan. They are tall and finely formed, and some of them are quite European in features and complexion. After a period of great uncertainty and anxiety, the travelers finally won the good-will of Sultan En-noor, who escorted them over the remaining portions of the desert into Soudan..."

Air Base 201 is a military installation in the desert in Agadez, Niger. When construction is complete, the base will consist of a new runway and hangars, living quarters and life support facilities, base roads, base utilities, base perimeter fence, and other infrastructure. USAFRICOM tasked U.S. Air Forces in Europe–Air Forces Africa (AFAFRICA) to construct Air Base 201 in October 2013. AFAFRICA is the primary liaison between USAFRICOM and the military construction (MILCON) Program Manager, under the Air Force Civil Engineer Center, Europe Division–Design and Construction (AFCEC/CFED). The MILCON Program Manager had oversight and approval authority for construction scope, cost, and schedule changes. AFAFRICA planned and programmed Air Base 201 as a troop labor construction project, with on-site construction provided by the 31st Expeditionary Rapid Engineer Deployable Heavy Operational Repair Squadrons Engineers (31st ERHS).

MILCON is defined as all the work necessary to produce a complete and usable facility. DD Form 1391 is used to obtain congressional authorization and funding for MILCON projects costing over $6 million. MILCON scope of work, in terms of function, size, and quantity, may not be increased above the amount specified in the DD Form 1391 provided to Congress.

In November 2015, Congress approved $50 million of MILCON funding in the FY 2016 National Defense Authorization Act to construct the Air Base 201 airfield and base camp. The Air Force completed the airfield and base camp to support ISR operations in May 2019. Construction to support ISR operations began during the first quarter of FY 2020.

The Department of Defense Inspector General [DODIG] determined that USAFRICOM and the Air Force did not effectively plan, design, and construct Air Base 201 in Niger to provide airfield and base support infrastructure in support of USAFRICOM operations. The Air Force built runway shoulders without congressional authorization when it submitted a DD Form 1391 to Congress that excluded runway shoulders in the project scope. Furthermore, AFAFRICA significantly underestimated the project cost, which created risk that the Air Force would not complete the MILCON project.

The Air Force bypassed congressional notification when it split the construction requirement for ISR operations into six O&M projects totaling $5.4 million, with each O&M project cost ranging from $399,000 to $1.8 million. Because each portion of the project was under $2 million, the Air Force was permitted to use O&M appropriation. AFAFRICA representatives stated that they programmed the six O&M projects to meet USAFRICOM’s urgent operational timeline. However, all of the projects were known and each project on its own would not result in a “complete and useable facility,” which means the projects should have been combined and reported to Congress.

The Air Force potentially violated the Antideficiency Act when it acquired 12 permanent guard towers costing approximately $3.7 million, using Procurement funds instead of MILCON funds, which required Air Force approval and congressional notification. In addition, the Air Force constructed foundations meant for temporary guard towers that could potentially be unusable because the permanent guard towers required larger foundations.

USAFRICOM and the Air Force did not perform complete site surveys to gather information needed for design and construction of the airfield. Specifically, the Air Force did not conduct complete soil sampling and topographic analysis, which created airfield pavement compaction and drainage problems. The Air Force also experienced logistical problems such as material and equipment shortages during construction because the site survey did not identify sources of construction materials.

The Air Force did not construct Air Base 201 infrastructure to meet safety, security, and other technical requirements established in DoD, Air Force, and USAFRICOM directives. The Air Force also constructed a base perimeter fence that lacked the required without informing and requesting the required waiver from USAFRICOM. Furthermore, the Air Force installed solar airfield lighting that did not conform to the requirements to provide continuous uninterrupted visual airfield lights.

These problems occurred because USAFRICOM and the Air Force did not adequately oversee and coordinate with stakeholders on the delivery of Air Base 201. As a result, the airfield and base camp needed to support the USAFRICOM ISR mission was delayed by almost 3 years from the original planned date of completion. In addition, the problems that we identified relating to the aircraft rescue and firefighting facility, and airfield lights could lead to increased risk in safety and security. Furthermore, the construction of the infrastructure necessary to support has not been completed. To accept the risk associated with the lack of infrastructure, the Air Force approved temporary waivers in June 2019 to allow ISR operations at Air Base 201. However, operating without the infrastructure to support ISR increases the safety risk for personnel operating at Air Base 201.

Both the USAFRICOM Chief of Staff, responding for USAFRICOM, and the AFAFRICA Commander disagreed with the overall DODIG finding, stating that USAFRICOM and the Air Force accomplished the construction of an ISR and C-17 capable airfield in an operationally challenging environment with changing requirements during the construction period. The IG acknowledged the immense work and efforts put forth by USAFRICOM and the Air Force. However, the circumstances did not negate the Air Force’s responsibility to ensure that construction projects were programmed in accordance with appropriation laws and regulations; construction, operations, and security standards were adhered to; and the appropriate waivers were coordinated and approved by the appropriate authorities, as necessary.

The AFAFRICA Commander also disagreed that the Air Force split the construction requirement for ISR operations. The AFAFRICA Commander maintained that each project is a “complete and usable facility,” but did not provide additional information that addressed the requirements of the GAO appropriation guide. Therefore, DODIG did not change finding that AFAFRICA split multiple projects that were required to be combined into a single project.

The AFAFRICA Commander also disagreed that the Air Force potentially violated the Antideficiency Act when it accounted for the permanent guard towers as equipment and acquired them with Procurement funds. The AFAFRICA Commander stated that the basis of the finding of cost, weight, time to erect and foundation requirements can be applied to assets that the DoD uses and procures as equipment. However, AFI 32-1032 stated that a guard tower structure is considered a real property construction if it is permanently installed and not relocatable in practice. Based on the description in AFI 32-1032, we considered cost, weight, time to erect, and foundation requirements as critical factors in concluding that the permanent guard towers were real property construction and should have been acquired with MILCON funds. Therefore, DODIG did not change the finding that AFAFRICA acquired permanent guard towers without congressional notification.

The AFAFRICA Commander further disagreed that there was lack of oversight and coordination in the planning, design, and construction of Air Base 201. The AFAFRICA Commander stated that oversight of planning, design, and construction solutions were discussed and approved at the appropriate levels during key stakeholder meetings. However, AFAFRICA did not provide additional information to explain how the oversight and coordination problems in the report were addressed through the key stakeholder meetings.

USAFRICOM Chief of Staff, responding for USAFRICOM, disagreed with DODIG recommendation to establish a coordination and decision-making process for troop labor construction projects, stating that the USAFRICOM J4 has effective methods in place to communicate with all stakeholders. However, we found that the communications methods that were in place were not effective because key stakeholders stated that their interaction with USAFRICOM personnel was limited and they often received new USAFRICOM requirements that were not based on USAFRICOM official taskings. Furthermore, we did not find evidence that USAFRICOM J4 recommended policies and priorities for construction and procurement of construction materials, such as the policy on the use of solar airfield lights and procurement of permanent guard towers. Therefore, the recommendation is unresolved. We request that the USAFRICOM Commander provide comments in response to the final report.