Support to Policy

Mindset helps intelligence analysts to put a situation into context, providing a frame of reference for examining the subject. Analysis could not take place if thinking were not bounded by such constructs. However, mindset can also lead analysts to apply certain viewpoints inappropriately or exclusively while neglecting other potentially enlightening perspectives on an issue.

• Evoked-Set Reasoning: That information and concern which dominates one’s thinking based on prior experience. One tends to uncritically relate new information to past or current dominant concerns.
• Prematurely Formed Views: These spring from a desire for simplicity and stability, and lead to premature closure in the consideration of a problem.
• Presumption that Support for One Hypothesis Disconfirms Others: Evidence that is consistent with one’s preexisting beliefs is allowed to disconfirm other views. Rapid closure in the consideration of an issue is a problem.
• Inappropriate Analogies: Perception that an event is analogous to past events, based on inadequate consideration of concepts or facts, or irrelevant criteria.
• Bias of “Representativeness.” Superficial Lessons From History: Uncritical analysis of concepts or events, superficial causality, over-generalization of obvious factors, inappropriate extrapolation from past success or failure.
• Presumption of Unitary Action by Organizations: Perception that behavior of others is more planned, centralized, and coordinated than it really is. Dismisses accident and chaos. Ignores misperceptions of others. Fundamental attribution error, possibly caused by cultural bias.
• Organizational Parochialism: Selective focus or rigid adherence to prior judgments based on organizational norms or loyalties. Can result from functional specialization. Group-think or stereotypical thinking.
• Excessive Secrecy (Compartmentation): Over-narrow reliance on selected evidence. Based on concern for operational security. Narrows consideration of alternative views. Can result from or cause organizational parochialism.
• Ethnocentrism: Projection of one’s own culture, ideological beliefs, doctrine, or expectations on others. Exaggeration of the causal significance of one’s own action. Can lead to mirror-imaging and wishful thinking. Parochialism.
• Lack of Empathy: Undeveloped capacity to understand others’ perception of their world, their conception of their role in that world, and their definition of their interests. Difference in cognitive contexts.
• Mirror-Imaging: Perceiving others as one perceives oneself. Basis is ethnocentrism. Facilitated by closed systems and parochialism.
• Ignorance: Lack of knowledge. Can result from prior-limited priorities or lack of curiosity, perhaps based on ethnocentrism, parochialism, denial of reality, rational-actor hypothesis (see next entry).
• Rational-Actor Hypothesis: Assumption that others will act in a “rational” manner, based on one’s own rational reference. Results from ethnocentrism, mirror-imaging, or ignorance.
• Denial of Rationality: Attribution of irrationality to others who are perceived to act outside the bounds of one’s own standards of behavior or decisionmaking. Opposite of rational-actor hypothesis. Can result from ignorance, mirror-imaging, parochialism, or ethnocentrism.
• Proportionality Bias: Expectation that the adversary will expend efforts proportionate to the ends he seeks. Inference about the intentions of others from costs and consequences of actions they initiate.
• Willful Disregard of New Evidence: Rejection of information that conflicts with already-held beliefs. Results from prior policy commitments, and/or excessive pursuit of consistency.
• Image and Self-Image: Perception of what has been, is, will be, or should be (image as subset of belief system). Both inward-directed (self-image) and outward-directed (image). Both often influenced by self-absorption and ethnocentrism.
• Defensive Avoidance: Refusal to perceive and understand extremely threatening stimuli. Need to avoid painful choices. Leads to wishful thinking.
• Overconfidence in Subjective Estimates: Optimistic bias in assessment. Can result from premature or rapid closure of consideration, or ignorance.
• Wishful Thinking (Pollyanna Complex): Hyper-credulity. Excessive optimism born of smugness and overconfidence.
• Best-Case Analysis: Optimistic assessment based on cognitive predisposition and general beliefs of how others are likely to behave, or in support of personal or organizational interests or policy preferences.
• Conservatism in Probability Estimation: In a desire to avoid risk, tendency to avoid estimating extremely high or extremely low probabilities.
• Routine thinking. Inclination to judge new phenomena in light of past experience, to miss essentially novel situational elements, or failure to reexamine established tenets. Tendency to seek confirmation of priorheld beliefs.
• Worst-Case Analysis (Cassandra Complex): Excessive skepticism. Reflects pessimism and extreme caution, based on predilection (cognitive predisposition), adverse past experience, or on support of personal or organizational interests or policy preferences.

Analysis does not cease when intelligence production begins; indeed, the two are interdependent. The foregoing overview of analytic pitfalls should caution intelligence managers and analysts that intelligence products should remain as free as possible from such errors of omission and commission, yet still be tailored to the specific needs of customers. Consistently reminding intelligence producers of the dangers and benefits of mindset may help them avoid errors and polish their analytic skills. In addition, managers may conduct post-production evaluation of intelligence products, using the biases and misperceptions listed above to identify strengths and weaknesses in individual analysts’ work, and to counsel them accordingly.

In government parlance, the term “finished” intelligence is reserved for products issued by analysts responsible for synthesizing all available sources of intelligence, resulting in a comprehensive assessment of an issue or situation, for use by senior analysts or decisionmakers.

Knowing the customer enables the producer to generate intelligence that highlights the bottom line. Some customers are “big picture” thinkers, seeking a general overview of the issue, and guidance on the implications for their own position and responsibilities. An appropriate intelligence product for such a customer will be clear, concise, conclusive, and free of jargon or distracting detail.71 Conversely, some customers are detail-oriented, seeing themselves as the ultimate expert on the subject area. This type of customer needs highly detailed and specialized intelligence to supplement and amplify known information.

Whether it is produced within the government, or in the business setting, the basic nature of the intelligence product remains the same. The analyst creates a product to document ongoing research, give the customer an update on a current issue or situation, or provide an estimate of expected target activity. In general terms, the product’s function is to cover one or more subject areas, or to be used by the customer for a particular application.