HEARING
ARTICLE 15-6 INVESTIGATION
OF THE
800th MILITARY POLICE
BRIGADE
SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION
TABLE OF CONTENTS
References .......................... 3
Background ......................... 6
Assessment of DoD Counter-Terrorism
Interrogation and Detention Operations
In Iraq (MG Miller's Assessment).................. 8
IO Comments on MG Miller's Assessment.............. 8
Report on Detention and Corrections
In Iraq (MG Ryder's Report).................. 9
IO Comments on MG Ryder's Report.................. 12
Preliminary Investigative Actions .................. 12
Findings and Recommendations
Part One (Detainee Abuse). .................. 15
Findings ...................... 15
Recommendations .................. 20
Part Two (Escapes and Accountability) ............... 22
Findings ...................... 22
Recommendations. ................... 31
Part Three (Command Climate, Etc.). ............... 34
Findings ...................... 36
Recommendations .................. 44
Other Findings/Observations ................... 49
Conclusion ........................ 50
Annexes ......................... 51
References
1. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of
Prisoners of War, 12 August 1949
2. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition
of the Wounded and Sick in the Armed Forces in the Field, 12
August 1949
3. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition
of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces
at Sea, 12 August 1949
4. Geneva Convention Protocol Relative to the Status of
Refugees, 1967
5. Geneva Convention Relative to the Status of Refugees,
1951
6. Geneva Convention for the Protection of War Victims, 12
August 1949
7. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of
Civilian Persons in Time of War, 12 August 1949
8. DOD Directive 5100.69, "DOD Program for Prisoners of
War and other Detainees," 27 December 1972
9. DOD Directive 5100.77 "DOD Law of War Program," 10 July
1979
10. STANAG No. 2044, Procedures for Dealing with Prisoners
of War (PW) (Edition 5), 28 June 1994
11. STANAG No. 2033, Interrogation of Prisoners of War (PW)
(Edition 6), 6 December 1994
12. AR 190-8, Enemy Prisoners of War, Retained Personnel,
Civilian Internees, and Other Detainees, 1 October 1997
13. AR 190-47, The Army Corrections System, 15 August 1996
14. AR 190-14, Carrying of Firearms and Use of Force for
Law Enforcement and Security Duties, 12 March 1993
15. AR 195-5, Evidence Procedures, 28 August 1992
16. AR 190-11, Physical Security of Arms, Ammunition and
Explosives, 12 February 1998
17. AR 190-12, Military Police Working Dogs, 30 September
1993
18. AR 190-13, The Army Physical Security Program, 30
September 1993
19. AR 380-67, Personnel Security Program, 9 September 1988
20. AR 380-5, Department of the Army Information Security,
31 September 2000
21. AR 670-1, Wear and Appearance of Army Uniforms and
Insignia, 5 September 2003
22. AR 190-40, Serious Incident Report, 30 November 1993
23. AR 15-6, Procedures for Investigating Officers and
Boards of Officers, 11 May 1988
24. AR 27-10, Military Justice, 6 September 2002
25. AR 635-200, Enlisted Personnel, 1 November 2000
26. AR 600-8-24, Officer Transfers and Discharges, 29 June
2002
27. AR 500-5, Army Mobilization, 6 July 1996
28. AR 600-20, Army Command Policy, 13 May 2002
29. AR 623-105, Officer Evaluation Reports, 1 April 1998
30. AR 175-9, Contractors Accompanying the Force, 29
October 1999
31. FM 3-19.40, Military Police Internment/Resettlement
Operations, 1 August 2001
32. FM 3-19.1, Military Police Operations, 22 March 2001
33. FM 3-19.4, Military Police Leaders' Handbook, 4 March
2002
34. FM 3-05.30, Psychological Operations, 19 June 2000
35. FM 33-1-1, Psychological Operations Techniques and
Procedures, 5 May 1994
36. FM 34-52, Intelligence Interrogation, 28 September 1992
37. FM 19-15, Civil Disturbances, 25 November 1985
38. FM 3-0, Operations, 14 June 2001
39. FM 101-5, Staff Organizations and Functions, 23 May
1984
40. FM 3-19.30, Physical Security, 8 January 2001
41. FM 3-21.5, Drill and Ceremonies, 7 July 2003
42. ARTEP 19-546-30 MTP, Mission Training Plan for Military
Police Battalion (IR)
43. ARTEP 19-667-30 MTP, Mission Training Plan for Military
Police Guard Company
44. ARTEP 19-647-30 MTP, Mission Training Plan for Military
Police Escort Guard Company
45. STP 19-95B1-SM, Soldier's Manual, MOS 95B, Military
Police, Skill Level 1, 6 August 2002
46. STP 19-95C14-SM-TG, Soldier's Manual and Trainer's
Guide for MOS 95C Internment/Resettlement Specialist, Skill
Levels 1/2/3/4, 26 March 1999
47. STP 19-95C1-SM MOS 95C, Corrections Specialist, Skill
Level 1, Soldier's Manual, 30 September 2003
48. STP 19-95C24-SM-TG MOS 95C, Corrections Specialist,
Skill Levels 2/3/4, Soldier's Manual and Trainer's Guide, 30
September 2003
49. Assessment of DOD Counter-Terrorism Interrogation and
Detention Operations in Iraq, (MG Geoffrey D. Miller,
Commander JTF-GTMO, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba), 9 September 2003
50. Assessment of Detention and Corrections Operations in
Iraq, (MG Donald J. Ryder, Provost Marshal General), 6
November 2003
51. CJTF-7 FRAGO #1108, Subject: includes- para 3.C.8 &
3.C.8.A.1, Assignment of 205 MI BDE CDR Responsibilities for
the Baghdad Central Confinement Facility (BCCF), 19 November
2003
52. CJTF-7 FRAGO #749, Subject: Intelligence and Evidence-
Led Detention Operations Relating to Detainees, 24 August
2003
53. 800th MP BDE FRAGO # 89, Subject: Rules of Engagement,
26 December 2003
54. CG CJTF-7 Memo: CJTF-7 Interrogation and Counter-
Resistance Policy, 12 October 2003
55. CG CJTF-7 Memo: Dignity and Respect While Conducting
Operations, 13 December 2003
56. Uniform Code of Military Justice and Manual for Courts
Martial, 2002 Edition
ARTICLE 15-6 INVESTIGATION OF THE
800th MILITARY POLICE BRIGADE
BACKGROUND
1. (U) On 19 January 2004, Lieutenant General (LTG) Ricardo
S. Sanchez, Commander, Combined Joint Task Force Seven
(CJTF-7) requested that the Commander, US Central
Command, appoint an Investigating Officer (IO) in the
grade of Major General (MG) or above to investigate the
conduct of operations within the 800th Military Police
(MP) Brigade. LTG Sanchez requested an investigation of
detention and internment operations by the Brigade from 1
November 2003 to present. LTG Sanchez cited recent
reports of detainee abuse, escapes from confinement
facilities, and accountability lapses, which indicated
systemic problems within the brigade and suggested a lack
of clear standards, proficiency, and leadership. LTG
Sanchez requested a comprehensive and all-encompassing
inquiry to make findings and recommendations concerning
the fitness and performance of the 800th MP Brigade.
(ANNEX 2)
2. (U) On 24 January 2003, the Chief of Staff of US Central
Command (CENTCOM), MG R. Steven Whitcomb, on behalf of
the CENTCOM Commander, directed that the Commander,
Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC), LTG
David D. McKiernan, conduct an investigation into the
800th MP Brigade's detention and internment operations
from 1 November 2003 to present. CENTCOM directed that
the investigation should inquire into all facts and
circumstances surrounding recent reports of suspected
detainee abuse in Iraq. It also directed that the
investigation inquire into detainee escapes and
accountability lapses as reported by CJTF-7, and to gain
a more comprehensive and all-encompassing inquiry into
the fitness and performance of the 800th MP Brigade.
(ANNEX 3)
3. (U) On 31 January 2004, the Commander, CFLCC, appointed
MG Antonio M. Taguba, Deputy Commanding General Support,
CFLCC, to conduct this investigation. MG Taguba was
directed to conduct an informal investigation under AR 15-
6 into the 800th MP Brigade's detention and internment
operations. Specifically, MG Taguba was tasked to:
a. (U) Inquire into all the facts and circumstances
surrounding recent allegations of detainee abuse,
specifically allegations of maltreatment at the Abu
Ghraib Prison (Baghdad Central Confinement Facility
(BCCF));
b. (U) Inquire into detainee escapes and accountability
lapses as reported by CJTF-7, specifically allegations
concerning these events at the Abu Ghraib Prison;
c. (U) Investigate the training, standards, employment,
command policies, internal procedures, and command
climate in the 800th MP Brigade, as appropriate;
d. (U) Make specific findings of fact concerning all
aspects of the investigation, and make any
recommendations for corrective action, as appropriate.
(ANNEX 4)
4. (U) LTG Sanchez's request to investigate the 800th MP
Brigade followed the initiation of a criminal
investigation by the US Army Criminal Investigation
Command (USACIDC) into specific allegations of detainee
abuse committed by members of the 372nd MP Company, 320th
MP Battalion in Iraq. These units are part of the 800th
MP Brigade. The Brigade is an Iraq Theater asset, TACON
to CJTF-7, but OPCON to CFLCC at the time this
investigation was initiated. In addition, CJTF-7 had
several reports of detainee escapes from US/Coalition
Confinement Facilities in Iraq over the past several
months. These include Camp Bucca, Camp Ashraf, Abu
Ghraib, and the High Value Detainee (HVD) Complex/Camp
Cropper. The 800th MP Brigade operated these facilities.
In addition, four Soldiers from the 320th MP Battalion
had been formally charged under the Uniform Code of
Military Justice (UCMJ) with detainee abuse in May 2003
at the Theater Internment Facility (TIF) at Camp Bucca,
Iraq. (ANNEXES 5-18, 34 and 35)
5. (U) I began assembling my investigation team prior to
the actual appointment by the CFLCC Commander. I
assembled subject matter experts from the CFLCC Provost
Marshal (PM) and the CFLCC Staff Judge Advocate (SJA). I
selected COL Kinard J. La Fate, CFLCC Provost Marshal to
be my Deputy for this investigation. I also contacted
the Provost Marshal General of the Army, MG Donald J.
Ryder, to enlist the support of MP subject matter experts
in the areas of detention and internment operations.
(ANNEXES 4 and 19)
6. (U) The Investigating Team also reviewed the Assessment
of DoD Counter-Terrorism Interrogation and Detention
Operations in Iraq conducted by MG Geoffrey D. Miller,
Commander, Joint Task Force Guantanamo (JTF-GTMO). From
31 August to 9 September 2003, MG Miller led a team of
personnel experienced in strategic interrogation to HQ,
CJTF-7 and the Iraqi Survey Group (ISG) to review current
Iraqi Theater ability to rapidly exploit internees for
actionable intelligence. MG Miller's team focused on
three areas: intelligence integration, synchronization,
and fusion; interrogation operations; and detention
operations. MG Miller's team used JTF-GTMO procedures
and interrogation authorities as baselines. (ANNEX 20)
7. (U) The Investigating Team began its inquiry with an in-
depth analysis of the Report on Detention and Corrections
in Iraq, dated 5 November 2003, conducted by MG Ryder and
a team of military police, legal, medical, and automation
experts. The CJTF-7 Commander, LTG Sanchez, had
previously requested a team of subject matter experts to
assess, and make specific recommendations concerning
detention and corrections operations. From 13 October to
6 November 2003, MG Ryder personally led this
assessment/assistance team in Iraq. (ANNEX 19)
ASSESSMENT OF DoD COUNTER-TERRORISM INTERROGATION AND
DETENTION OPERATIONS IN IRAQ (MG MILLER'S ASSESSMENT)
1. (S/NF) The principal focus of MG Miller's team was on
the strategic interrogation of detainees/internees in
Iraq. Among its conclusions in its Executive Summary
were that CJTF-7 did not have authorities and procedures
in place to affect a unified strategy to detain,
interrogate, and report information from
detainees/internees in Iraq. The Executive Summary also
stated that detention operations must act as an enabler
for interrogation. (ANNEX 20)
2. (S/NF) With respect to interrogation, MG Miller's Team
recommended that CJTF-7 dedicate and train a detention
guard force subordinate to the Joint Interrogation
Debriefing Center (JIDC) Commander that "sets the
conditions for the successful interrogation and
exploitation of internees/detainees." Regarding
Detention Operations, MG Miller's team stated that the
function of Detention Operations is to provide a safe,
secure, and humane environment that supports the
expeditious collection of intelligence. However, it also
stated "it is essential that the guard force be actively
engaged in setting the conditions for successful
exploitation of the internees." (ANNEX 20)
3. (S/NF) MG Miller's team also concluded that Joint
Strategic Interrogation Operations (within CJTF-7) are
hampered by lack of active control of the internees
within the detention environment. The Miller Team also
stated that establishment of the Theater Joint
Interrogation and Detention Center (JIDC) at Abu Ghraib
(BCCF) will consolidate both detention and strategic
interrogation operations and result in synergy between MP
and MI resources and an integrated, synchronized, and
focused strategic interrogation effort. (ANNEX 20)
4. (S/NF) MG Miller's team also observed that the
application of emerging strategic interrogation
strategies and techniques contain new approaches and
operational art. The Miller Team also concluded that a
legal review and recommendations on internee
interrogation operations by a dedicated Command Judge
Advocate is required to maximize interrogation
effectiveness. (ANNEX 20)
IO COMMENTS ON MG MILLER'S ASSESSMENT
1. (S/NF) MG Miller's team recognized that they were using
JTF-GTMO operational procedures and interrogation
authorities as baselines for its observations and
recommendations. There is a strong argument that the
intelligence value of detainees held at JTF-Guantanamo
(GTMO) is different than that of the detainees/internees
held at Abu Ghraib (BCCF) and other detention facilities
in Iraq. Currently, there are a large number of Iraqi
criminals held at Abu Ghraib (BCCF). These are not
believed to be international terrorists or members of Al
Qaida, Anser Al Islam, Taliban, and other international
terrorist organizations. (ANNEX 20)
2. (S/NF) The recommendations of MG Miller's team that the
"guard force" be actively engaged in setting the
conditions for successful exploitation of the internees
would appear to be in conflict with the recommendations
of MG Ryder's Team and AR 190-8 that military police "do
not participate in military intelligence supervised
interrogation sessions." The Ryder Report concluded that
the OEF template whereby military police actively set the
favorable conditions for subsequent interviews runs
counter to the smooth operation of a detention facility.
(ANNEX 20)
REPORT ON DETENTION AND CORRECTIONS
IN IRAQ (MG RYDER'S REPORT)
1. (U) MG Ryder and his assessment team conducted a
comprehensive review of the entire detainee and
corrections system in Iraq and provided recommendations
addressing each of the following areas as requested by
the Commander CJTF-7:
a. (U) Detainee and corrections system management
b. (U) Detainee management, including detainee
movement, segregation, and accountability
c. (U) Means of command and control of the detention
and corrections system
d. (U) Integration of military detention and
corrections with the Coalition Provisional Authority
(CPA) and adequacy of plans for transition to an Iraqi-
run corrections system
e. (U) Detainee medical care and health management
f. (U) Detention facilities that meet required
health, hygiene, and sanitation standards
g. (U) Court integration and docket management for
criminal detainees
h. (U) Detainee legal processing
i. (U) Detainee databases and records, including
integration with law enforcement and court databases
(ANNEX 19)
2. (U) Many of the findings and recommendations of MG
Ryder's team are beyond the scope of this investigation.
However, several important findings are clearly relevant
to this inquiry and are summarized below (emphasis is
added in certain areas):
A. (U) Detainee Management (including movement,
segregation, and accountability)
1. (U) There is a wide variance in standards and
approaches at the various detention facilities.
Several Division/Brigade collection points and US
monitored Iraqi prisons had flawed or insufficiently
detailed use of force and other standing operating
procedures or policies (e.g. weapons in the facility,
improper restraint techniques, detainee management,
etc.) Though, there were no military police units
purposely applying inappropriate confinement practices.
(ANNEX 19)
2. (U) Currently, due to lack of adequate Iraqi
facilities, Iraqi criminals (generally Iraqi-on-Iraqi
crimes) are detained with security internees (generally
Iraqi-on-Coalition offenses) and EPWs in the same
facilities, though segregated in different
cells/compounds. (ANNEX 19)
3. (U) The management of multiple disparate groups of
detained people in a single location by members of the
same unit invites confusion about handling, processing,
and treatment, and typically facilitates the transfer
of information between different categories of
detainees. (ANNEX 19)
4. (U) The 800th MP (I/R) units did not receive
Internment/Resettlement (I/R) and corrections specific
training during their mobilization period. Corrections
training is only on the METL of two MP (I/R)
Confinement Battalions throughout the Army, one
currently serving in Afghanistan, and elements of the
other are at Camp Arifjan, Kuwait. MP units supporting
JTF-GTMO received ten days of training in detention
facility operations, to include two days of unarmed
self-defense, training in interpersonal communication
skills, forced cell moves, and correctional officer
safety. (ANNEX 19)
B. (U) Means of Command and Control of the Detention and
Corrections System
1. (U) The 800th MP Brigade was originally task
organized with eight MP(I/R) Battalions consisting of
both MP Guard and Combat Support companies. Due to
force rotation plans, the 800th redeployed two
Battalion HHCs in December 2003, the 115th MP Battalion
and the 324th MP Battalion. In December 2003, the
400th MP Battalion was relieved of its mission and
redeployed in January 2004. The 724th MP Battalion
redeployed on 11 February 2004 and the remainder is
scheduled to redeploy in March and April 2004. They
are the 310th MP Battalion, 320th MP Battalion, 530th
MP Battalion, and 744th MP Battalion. The units that
remain are generally understrength, as Reserve
Component units do not have an individual personnel
replacement system to mitigate medical losses or the
departure of individual Soldiers that have reached 24
months of Federal active duty in a five-year period.
(ANNEX 19)
2. (U) The 800th MP Brigade (I/R) is currently a CFLCC
asset, TACON to CJTF-7 to conduct
Internment/Resettlement (I/R) operations in Iraq. All
detention operations are conducted in the CJTF-7 AO;
Camps Ganci, Vigilant, Bucca, TSP Whitford, and a
separate High Value Detention (HVD) site. (ANNEX 19)
3. (U) The 800th MP Brigade has experienced challenges
adapting its task organizational structure, training,
and equipment resources from a unit designed to conduct
standard EPW operations in the COMMZ (Kuwait).
Further, the doctrinally trained MP Soldier-to-detainee
population ratio and facility layout templates are
predicated on a compliant, self-disciplining EPW
population, and not criminals or high-risk security
internees. (ANNEX 19)
4. (U) EPWs and Civilian Internees should receive the
full protections of the Geneva Conventions, unless the
denial of these protections is due to specifically
articulated military necessity (e.g., no visitation to
preclude the direction of insurgency operations).
(ANNEXES 19 and 24)
5. (U) AR 190-8, Enemy Prisoners of War, Retained
Personnel, Civilian Internees, and other Detainees, FM
3-19.40, Military Police Internment and Resettlement
Operations, and FM 34-52, Intelligence Interrogations,
require military police to provide an area for
intelligence collection efforts within EPW facilities.
Military Police, though adept at passive collection of
intelligence within a facility, do not participate in
Military Intelligence supervised interrogation
sessions. Recent intelligence collection in support of
Operation Enduring Freedom posited a template whereby
military police actively set favorable conditions for
subsequent interviews. Such actions generally run
counter to the smooth operation of a detention
facility, attempting to maintain its population in a
compliant and docile state. The 800th MP Brigade has
not been directed to change its facility procedures to
set the conditions for MI interrogations, nor
participate in those interrogations. (ANNEXES 19 and
21-23)
6. MG Ryder's Report also made the following, inter
alia, near-term and mid-term recommendations regarding
the command and control of detainees:
a. (U) Align the release process for security
internees with DoD Policy. The process of
screening security internees should include
intelligence findings, interrogation results, and
current threat assessment.
b. (U) Determine the scope of intelligence collection that
will occur at Camp Vigilant. Refurbish the Northeast
Compound to separate the screening operation from the Iraqi
run Baghdad Central Correctional Facility. Establish
procedures that define the role of military police Soldiers
securing the compound, clearly separating the actions of the
guards from those of the military intelligence personnel.
c. (U) Consolidate all Security Internee
Operations, except the MEK security mission, under
a single Military Police Brigade Headquarters for
OIF 2.
d. (U) Insist that all units identified to rotate
into the Iraqi Theater of Operations (ITO) to
conduct internment and confinement operations in
support of OIF 2 be organic to CJTF-7. (ANNEX 19)
IO COMMENTS REGARDING MG RYDER'S REPORT
1. (U) The objective of MG Ryder's Team was to observe
detention and prison operations, identify potential
systemic and human rights issues, and provide near-term,
mid-term, and long-term recommendations to improve CJTF-7
operations and transition of the Iraqi prison system from
US military control/oversight to the Coalition
Provisional Authority and eventually to the Iraqi
Government. The Findings and Recommendations of MG
Ryder's Team are thorough and precise and should be
implemented immediately. (ANNEX 19)
2. (U) Unfortunately, many of the systemic problems that
surfaced during MG Ryder's Team's assessment are the very
same issues that are the subject of this investigation.
In fact, many of the abuses suffered by detainees
occurred during, or near to, the time of that assessment.
As will be pointed out in detail in subsequent portions
of this report, I disagree with the conclusion of MG
Ryder's Team in one critical aspect, that being its
conclusion that the 800th MP Brigade had not been asked
to change its facility procedures to set the conditions
for MI interviews. While clearly the 800th MP Brigade
and its commanders were not tasked to set conditions for
detainees for subsequent MI interrogations, it is obvious
from a review of comprehensive CID interviews of suspects
and witnesses that this was done at lower levels. (ANNEX
19)
3. (U) I concur fully with MG Ryder's conclusion regarding
the effect of AR 190-8. Military Police, though adept at
passive collection of intelligence within a facility,
should not participate in Military Intelligence
supervised interrogation sessions. Moreover, Military
Police should not be involved with setting "favorable
conditions" for subsequent interviews. These actions, as
will be outlined in this investigation, clearly run
counter to the smooth operation of a detention facility.
(ANNEX 19)
PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATIVE ACTIONS
1. (U) Following our review of MG Ryder's Report and MG
Miller's Report, my investigation team immediately began
an in-depth review of all available documents regarding
the 800th MP Brigade. We reviewed in detail the
voluminous CID investigation regarding alleged detainee
abuses at detention facilities in Iraq, particularly the
Abu Ghraib (BCCF) Detention Facility. We analyzed
approximately fifty witness statements from military
police and military intelligence personnel, potential
suspects, and detainees. We reviewed numerous photos and
videos of actual detainee abuse taken by detention
facility personnel, which are now in the custody and
control of the US Army Criminal Investigation Command and
the CJTF-7 prosecution team. The photos and videos are
not contained in this investigation. We obtained copies
of the 800th MP Brigade roster, rating chain, and
assorted internal investigations and disciplinary actions
involving that command for the past several months. (All
ANNEXES Reviewed by Investigation Team)
2. (U) In addition to military police and legal officers
from the CFLCC PMO and SJA Offices we also obtained the
services of two individuals who are experts in military
police detention practices and training. These were LTC
Timothy Weathersbee, Commander, 705th MP Battalion,
United States Disciplinary Barracks, Fort Leavenworth,
and SFC Edward Baldwin, Senior Corrections Advisor, US
Army Military Police School, Fort Leonard Wood. I also
requested and received the services of Col (Dr) Henry
Nelson, a trained US Air Force psychiatrist assigned to
assist my investigation team. (ANNEX 4)
3. (U) In addition to MG Ryder's and MG Miller's Reports,
the team reviewed numerous reference materials including
the 12 October 2003 CJTF-7 Interrogation and Counter-
Resistance Policy, the AR 15-6 Investigation on Riot and
Shootings at Abu Ghraib on 24 November 2003, the 205th MI
Brigade's Interrogation Rules of Engagement (IROE),
facility staff logs/journals and numerous records of AR
15-6 investigations and Serious Incident Reports (SIRs)
on detainee escapes/shootings and disciplinary matters
from the 800th MP Brigade. (ANNEXES 5-20, 37, 93, and
94)
4. (U) On 2 February 2004, I took my team to Baghdad for a
one-day inspection of the Abu Ghraib Prison (BCCF) and
the High Value Detainee (HVD) Complex in order to become
familiar with those facilities. We also met with COL
Jerry Mocello, Commander, 3rd MP Criminal Investigation
Group (CID), COL Dave Quantock, Commander, 16th MP
Brigade, COL Dave Phillips, Commander, 89th MP Brigade,
and COL Ed Sannwaldt, CJTF-7 Provost Marshal. On 7
February 2004, the team visited the Camp Bucca Detention
Facility to familiarize itself with the facility and
operating structure. In addition, on 6 and 7 February
2004, at Camp Doha, Kuwait, we conducted extensive
training sessions on approved detention practices. We
continued our preparation by reviewing the ongoing CID
investigation and were briefed by the Special Agent in
Charge, CW2 Paul Arthur. We refreshed ourselves on the
applicable reference materials within each team member's
area of expertise, and practiced investigative
techniques. I met with the team on numerous occasions to
finalize appropriate witness lists, review existing
witness statements, arrange logistics, and collect
potential evidence. We also coordinated with CJTF-7 to
arrange witness attendance, force protection measures,
and general logistics for the team's move to Baghdad on 8
February 2004. (ANNEXES 4 and 25)
5. (U) At the same time, due to the Transfer of Authority
on 1 February 2004 between III Corps and V Corps, and the
upcoming demobilization of the 800th MP Brigade Command,
I directed that several critical witnesses who were
preparing to leave the theater remain at Camp Arifjan,
Kuwait until they could be interviewed (ANNEX 29). My
team deployed to Baghdad on 8 February 2004 and conducted
a series of interviews with a variety of witnesses (ANNEX
30). We returned to Camp Doha, Kuwait on 13 February
2004. On 14 and 15 February we interviewed a number of
witnesses from the 800th MP Brigade. On 17 February we
returned to Camp Bucca, Iraq to complete interviews of
witnesses at that location. From 18 February thru 28
February we collected documents, compiled references, did
follow-up interviews, and completed a detailed analysis
of the volumes of materials accumulated throughout our
investigation. On 29 February we finalized our executive
summary and out-briefing slides. On 9 March we submitted
the AR 15-6 written report with findings and
recommendations to the CFLCC Deputy SJA, LTC Mark
Johnson, for a legal sufficiency review. The out-brief
to the appointing authority, LTG McKiernan, took place on
3 March 2004. (ANNEXES 26 and 45-91)
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
(PART ONE)
(U) The investigation should inquire into all of the facts
and circumstances surrounding recent allegations of detainee
abuse, specifically, allegations of maltreatment at the Abu
Ghraib Prison (Baghdad Central Confinement Facility).
1. (U) The US Army Criminal Investigation Command (CID),
led by COL Jerry Mocello, and a team of highly trained
professional agents have done a superb job of
investigating several complex and extremely disturbing
incidents of detainee abuse at the Abu Ghraib Prison.
They conducted over 50 interviews of witnesses, potential
criminal suspects, and detainees. They also uncovered
numerous photos and videos portraying in graphic detail
detainee abuse by Military Police personnel on numerous
occasions from October to December 2003. Several
potential suspects rendered full and complete confessions
regarding their personal involvement and the involvement
of fellow Soldiers in this abuse. Several potential
suspects invoked their rights under Article 31 of the
Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) and the 5th
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. (ANNEX 25)
2. (U) In addition to a comprehensive and exhaustive review
of all of these statements and documentary evidence, we
also interviewed numerous officers, NCOs, and junior
enlisted Soldiers in the 800th MP Brigade, as well as
members of the 205th Military Intelligence Brigade
working at the prison. We did not believe it was
necessary to re-interview all the numerous witnesses who
had previously provided comprehensive statements to CID,
and I have adopted those statements for the purposes of
this investigation. (ANNEXES 26, 34, 35, and 45-91)
REGARDING PART ONE OF THE INVESTIGATION, I MAKE THE
FOLLOWING SPECIFIC FINDINGS OF FACT:
1. (U) That Forward Operating Base (FOB) Abu Ghraib (BCCF)
provides security of both criminal and security detainees
at the Baghdad Central Correctional Facility, facilitates
the conducting of interrogations for CJTF-7, supports
other CPA operations at the prison, and enhances the
force protection/quality of life of Soldiers assigned in
order to ensure the success of ongoing operations to
secure a free Iraq. (ANNEX 31)
2. (U) That the Commander, 205th Military Intelligence
Brigade, was designated by CJTF-7 as the Commander of FOB
Abu Ghraib (BCCF) effective 19 November 2003. That the
205th MI Brigade conducts operational and strategic
interrogations for CJTF-7. That from 19 November 2003
until Transfer of Authority (TOA) on 6 February 2004, COL
Thomas M. Pappas was the Commander of the 205th MI
Brigade and the Commander of FOB Abu Ghraib (BCCF).
(ANNEX 31)
3. (U) That the 320th Military Police Battalion of the
800th MP Brigade is responsible for the Guard Force at
Camp Ganci, Camp Vigilant, & Cellblock 1 of FOB Abu
Ghraib (BCCF). That from February 2003 to until he was
suspended from his duties on 17 January 2004, LTC Jerry
Phillabaum served as the Battalion Commander of the 320th
MP Battalion. That from December 2002 until he was
suspended from his duties, on 17 January 2004, CPT Donald
Reese served as the Company Commander of the 372nd MP
Company, which was in charge of guarding detainees at FOB
Abu Ghraib. I further find that both the 320th MP
Battalion and the 372nd MP Company were located within
the confines of FOB Abu Ghraib. (ANNEXES 32 and 45)
4. (U) That from July of 2003 to the present, BG Janis L.
Karpinski was the Commander of the 800th MP Brigade.
(ANNEX 45)
5. (S) That between October and December 2003, at the Abu
Ghraib Confinement Facility (BCCF), numerous incidents of
sadistic, blatant, and wanton criminal abuses were
inflicted on several detainees. This systemic and
illegal abuse of detainees was intentionally perpetrated
by several members of the military police guard force
(372nd Military Police Company, 320th Military Police
Battalion, 800th MP Brigade), in Tier (section) 1-A of
the Abu Ghraib Prison (BCCF). The allegations of abuse
were substantiated by detailed witness statements (ANNEX
26) and the discovery of extremely graphic photographic
evidence. Due to the extremely sensitive nature of these
photographs and videos, the ongoing CID investigation,
and the potential for the criminal prosecution of several
suspects, the photographic evidence is not included in
the body of my investigation. The pictures and videos
are available from the Criminal Investigative Command and
the CTJF-7 prosecution team. In addition to the
aforementioned crimes, there were also abuses committed
by members of the 325th MI Battalion, 205th MI Brigade,
and Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Center (JIDC).
Specifically, on 24 November 2003, SPC Luciana Spencer,
205th MI Brigade, sought to degrade a detainee by having
him strip and returned to cell naked. (ANNEXES 26 and
53)
6. (S) I find that the intentional abuse of detainees by
military police personnel included the following acts:
a. (S) Punching, slapping, and kicking detainees;
jumping on their naked feet;
b. (S) Videotaping and photographing naked male and
female detainees;
c. (S) Forcibly arranging detainees in various
sexually explicit positions for photographing;
d. (S) Forcing detainees to remove their clothing and
keeping them naked for several days at a time;
e. (S) Forcing naked male detainees to wear women's
underwear;
f. (S) Forcing groups of male detainees to masturbate
themselves while being photographed and videotaped;
g. (S) Arranging naked male detainees in a pile and
then jumping on them;
h. (S) Positioning a naked detainee on a MRE Box,
with a sandbag on his head, and attaching wires to his
fingers, toes, and penis to simulate electric torture;
i. (S) Writing "I am a Rapest" (sic) on the leg of a
detainee alleged to have forcibly raped a 15-year old
fellow detainee, and then photographing him naked;
j. (S) Placing a dog chain or strap around a naked
detainee's neck and having a female Soldier pose for a
picture;
k. (S) A male MP guard having sex with a female
detainee;
l. (S) Using military working dogs (without muzzles)
to intimidate and frighten detainees, and in at least
one case biting and severely injuring a detainee;
m. (S) Taking photographs of dead Iraqi detainees.
(ANNEXES 25 and 26)
7. (U) These findings are amply supported by written
confessions provided by several of the suspects, written
statements provided by detainees, and witness statements.
In reaching my findings, I have carefully considered the
pre-existing statements of the following witnesses and
suspects (ANNEX 26):
a. (U) SPC Jeremy Sivits, 372nd MP Company - Suspect
b. (U) SPC Sabrina Harman, 372nd MP Company - Suspect
c. (U) SGT Javal S. Davis, 372nd MP Company - Suspect
c. (U) PFC Lynndie R. England, 372nd MP Company -
Suspect
d. (U) Adel Nakhla, Civilian Translator, Titan Corp.,
Assigned to the 205th MI Brigade- Suspect
e. (U) SPC Joseph M. Darby, 372nd MP Company
f. (U) SGT Neil A. Wallin, 109th Area Support Medical
Battalion
g (U) SGT Samuel Jefferson Provance, 302nd MI
Battalion
h (U) Torin S. Nelson, Contractor, Titan Corp.,
Assigned to the 205th MI Brigade
j. (U) CPL Matthew Scott Bolanger, 372nd MP
Company
k. (U) SPC Mathew C. Wisdom, 372nd MP Company
l. (U) SSG Reuben R. Layton, Medic, 109th Medical
Detachment
m. (U) SPC John V. Polak, 229th MP Company
8. (U) In addition, several detainees also described the
following acts of abuse, which under the circumstances, I
find credible based on the clarity of their statements
and supporting evidence provided by other witnesses
(ANNEX 26):
a. (U) Breaking chemical lights and pouring the
phosphoric liquid on detainees;
b. (U) Threatening detainees with a charged 9mm pistol;
c. (U) Pouring cold water on naked detainees;
d. (U) Beating detainees with a broom handle and a
chair;
e. (U) Threatening male detainees with rape;
f. (U) Allowing a military police guard to stitch the
wound of a detainee who was injured after being slammed
against the wall in his cell;
g. (U) Sodomizing a detainee with a chemical light and
perhaps a broom stick.
h. (U) Using military working dogs to frighten and
intimidate detainees with threats of attack, and in one
instance actually biting a detainee.
9. (U) I have carefully considered the statements provided
by the following detainees, which under the circumstances
I find credible based on the clarity of their statements
and supporting evidence provided by other witnesses:
a. (U) Amjed Isail Waleed, Detainee # 151365
b. (U) Hiadar Saber Abed Miktub-Aboodi, Detainee #
13077
c. (U) Huessin Mohssein Al-Zayiadi, Detainee # 19446
d. (U) Kasim Mehaddi Hilas, Detainee # 151108
e. (U) Mohanded Juma Juma (sic), Detainee # 152307
f. (U) Mustafa Jassim Mustafa, Detainee # 150542
g. (U) Shalan Said Alsharoni, Detainee, # 150422
h. (U) Abd Alwhab Youss, Detainee # 150425
i. (U) Asad Hamza Hanfosh, Detainee # 152529
j. (U) Nori Samir Gunbar Al-Yasseri, Detainee # 7787
k. (U) Thaar Salman Dawod, Detainee # 150427
l. (U) Ameen Sa'eed Al-Sheikh, Detainee # 151362
m. (U) Abdou Hussain Saad Faleh, Detainee # 18470
(ANNEX 26)
10. (U) I find that contrary to the provision of AR 190-8,
and the findings found in MG Ryder's Report, Military
Intelligence (MI) interrogators and Other US Government
Agency's (OGA) interrogators actively requested that MP
guards set physical and mental conditions for favorable
interrogation of witnesses. Contrary to the findings of
MG Ryder's Report, I find that personnel assigned to the
372nd MP Company, 800th MP Brigade were directed to
change facility procedures to "set the conditions" for MI
interrogations. I find no direct evidence that MP
personnel actually participated in those MI
interrogations. (ANNEXES 19, 21, 25, and 26).
11. (U) I reach this finding based on the actual proven
abuse that I find was inflicted on detainees and by the
following witness statements. (ANNEXES 25 and 26):
a. (U) SPC Sabrina Harman, 372nd MP Company, stated in
her sworn statement regarding the incident where a
detainee was placed on a box with wires attached to his
fingers, toes, and penis, "that her job was to keep
detainees awake." She stated that MI was talking to CPL
Grainer. She stated: "MI wanted to get them to talk.
It is Grainer and Frederick's job to do things for MI
and OGA to get these people to talk."
b. (U) SGT Javal S. Davis, 372nd MP Company, stated in
his sworn statement as follows: "I witnessed prisoners
in the MI hold section, wing 1A being made to do various
things that I would question morally. In Wing 1A we
were told that they had different rules and different
SOP for treatment. I never saw a set of rules or SOP
for that section just word of mouth. The Soldier in
charge of 1A was Corporal Granier. He stated that the
Agents and MI Soldiers would ask him to do things, but
nothing was ever in writing he would complain (sic)."
When asked why the rules in 1A/1B were different than
the rest of the wings, SGT Davis stated: "The rest of
the wings are regular prisoners and 1A/B are Military
Intelligence (MI) holds." When asked why he did not
inform his chain of command about this abuse, SGT Davis
stated: " Because I assumed that if they were doing
things out of the ordinary or outside the guidelines,
someone would have said something. Also the wing
belongs to MI and it appeared MI personnel approved of
the abuse." SGT Davis also stated that he had heard MI
insinuate to the guards to abuse the inmates. When
asked what MI said he stated: "Loosen this guy up for
us." Make sure he has a bad night." "Make sure he gets
the treatment." He claimed these comments were made to
CPL Granier and SSG Frederick. Finally, SGT Davis
stated that (sic): "the MI staffs to my understanding
have been giving Granier compliments on the way he has
been handling the MI holds. Example being statements
like, "Good job, they're breaking down real fast. They
answer every question. They're giving out good
information, Finally, and Keep up the good work . Stuff
like that."
c. (U) SPC Jason Kennel, 372nd MP Company, was asked
if he were present when any detainees were abused. He
stated: "I saw them nude, but MI would tell us to take
away their mattresses, sheets, and clothes." He could
not recall who in MI had instructed him to do this, but
commented that, "if they wanted me to do that they
needed to give me paperwork." He was later informed
that "we could not do anything to embarrass the
prisoners."
d. (U) Mr. Adel L. Nakhla, a US civilian contract
translator was questioned about several detainees
accused of rape. He observed (sic): "They (detainees)
were all naked, a bunch of people from MI, the MP were
there that night and the inmates were ordered by SGT
Granier and SGT Frederick ordered the guys while
questioning them to admit what they did. They made them
do strange exercises by sliding on their stomach, jump
up and down, throw water on them and made them some wet,
called them all kinds of names such as "gays" do they
like to make love to guys, then they handcuffed their
hands together and their legs with shackles and started
to stack them on top of each other by insuring that the
bottom guys penis will touch the guy on tops butt."
e. (U) SPC Neil A Wallin, 109th Area Support Medical
Battalion, a medic testified that: "Cell 1A was used to
house high priority detainees and cell 1B was used to
house the high risk or trouble making detainees. During
my tour at the prison I observed that when the male
detainees were first brought to the facility, some of
them were made to wear female underwear, which I think
was to somehow break them down."
12. (U) I find that prior to its deployment to Iraq for
Operation Iraqi Freedom, the 320th MP Battalion and the
372nd MP Company had received no training in
detention/internee operations. I also find that very
little instruction or training was provided to MP
personnel on the applicable rules of the Geneva
Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War,
FM 27-10, AR 190-8, or FM 3-19.40. Moreover, I find that
few, if any, copies of the Geneva Conventions were ever
made available to MP personnel or detainees. (ANNEXES 21-
24, 33, and multiple witness statements)
13. (U) Another obvious example of the Brigade Leadership
not communicating with its Soldiers or ensuring their
tactical proficiency concerns the incident of detainee
abuse that occurred at Camp Bucca, Iraq, on May 12, 2003.
Soldiers from the 223rd MP Company reported to the 800th
MP Brigade Command at Camp Bucca, that four Military
Police Soldiers from the 320th MP Battalion had abused a
number of detainees during inprocessing at Camp Bucca.
An extensive CID investigation determined that four
soldiers from the 320th MP Battalion had kicked and
beaten these detainees following a transport mission from
Talil Air Base. (ANNEXES 34 and 35)
14. (U) Formal charges under the UCMJ were preferred
against these Soldiers and an Article-32 Investigation
conducted by LTC Gentry. He recommended a general court
martial for the four accused, which BG Karpinski
supported. Despite this documented abuse, there is no
evidence that BG Karpinski ever attempted to remind 800th
MP Soldiers of the requirements of the Geneva Conventions
regarding detainee treatment or took any steps to ensure
that such abuse was not repeated. Nor is there any
evidence that LTC(P) Phillabaum, the commander of the
Soldiers involved in the Camp Bucca abuse incident, took
any initiative to ensure his Soldiers were properly
trained regarding detainee treatment. (ANNEXES 35 and
62)
RECOMMENDATIONS AS TO PART ONE OF THE INVESTIGATION:
1. (U) Immediately deploy to the Iraq Theater an integrated
multi-discipline Mobile Training Team (MTT) comprised of
subject matter experts in internment/resettlement
operations, international and operational law,
information technology, facility management,
interrogation and intelligence gathering techniques,
chaplains, Arab cultural awareness, and medical practices
as it pertains to I/R activities. This team needs to
oversee and conduct comprehensive training in all aspects
of detainee and confinement operations.
2. (U) That all military police and military intelligence
personnel involved in any aspect of detainee operations
or interrogation operations in CJTF-7, and subordinate
units, be immediately provided with training by an
international/operational law attorney on the specific
provisions of The Law of Land Warfare FM 27-10,
specifically the Geneva Convention Relative to the
Treatment of Prisoners of War, Enemy Prisoners of War,
Retained Personnel, Civilian Internees, and Other
Detainees, and AR 190-8.
3. (U) That a single commander in CJTF-7 be responsible for
overall detainee operations throughout the Iraq Theater
of Operations. I also recommend that the Provost Marshal
General of the Army assign a minimum of two (2) subject
matter experts, one officer and one NCO, to assist CJTF-7
in coordinating detainee operations.
4. (U) That detention facility commanders and interrogation
facility commanders ensure that appropriate copies of the
Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners
of War and notice of protections be made available in
both English and the detainees' language and be
prominently displayed in all detention facilities.
Detainees with questions regarding their treatment should
be given the full opportunity to read the Convention.
5. (U) That each detention facility commander and
interrogation facility commander publish a complete and
comprehensive set of Standing Operating Procedures (SOPs)
regarding treatment of detainees, and that all personnel
be required to read the SOPs and sign a document
indicating that they have read and understand the SOPs.
6. (U) That in accordance with the recommendations of MG
Ryder's Assessment Report, and my findings and
recommendations in this investigation, all units in the
Iraq Theater of Operations conducting
internment/confinement/detainment operations in support
of Operation Iraqi Freedom be OPCON for all purposes, to
include action under the UCMJ, to CJTF-7.
7. (U) Appoint the C3, CJTF as the staff proponent for
detainee operations in the Iraq Joint Operations Area
(JOA). (MG Tom Miller, C3, CJTF-7, has been appointed by
COMCJTF-7).
8. (U) That an inquiry UP AR 381-10, Procedure 15 be
conducted to determine the extent of culpability of
Military Intelligence personnel, assigned to the 205th MI
Brigade and the Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Center
(JIDC) regarding abuse of detainees at Abu Ghraib (BCCF).
9. (U) That it is critical that the proponent for detainee
operations is assigned a dedicated Senior Judge Advocate,
with specialized training and knowledge of international
and operational law, to assist and advise on matters of
detainee operations.
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
(PART TWO)
(U) The Investigation inquire into detainee escapes and
accountability lapses as reported by CJTF-7, specifically
allegations concerning these events at the Abu Ghraib
Prison:
REGARDING PART TWO OF THE INVESTIGATION,
I MAKE THE FOLLOWING SPECIFIC FINDINGS OF FACT:
1. The 800th MP Brigade was responsible for theater-wide
Internment and Resettlement (I/R) operations. (ANNEXES 45
and 95)
2. (U) The 320th MP Battalion, 800th MP Brigade was tasked
with detainee operations at the Abu Ghraib Prison Complex
during the time period covered in this investigation.
(ANNEXES 41, 45, and 59)
3. (U) The 310th MP Battalion, 800th MP Brigade was tasked
with detainee operations and Forward Operating Base (FOB)
Operations at the Camp Bucca Detention Facility until TOA on
26 February 2004. (ANNEXES 41 and 52)
4. (U) The 744th MP Battalion, 800th MP Brigade was tasked
with detainee operations and FOB Operations at the HVD
Detention Facility until TOA on 4 March 2004. (ANNEXES 41
and 55)
5. (U) The 530th MP Battalion, 800th MP Brigade was tasked
with detainee operations and FOB Operations at the MEK
holding facility until TOA on 15 March 2004. (ANNEXES 41 and
97)
6. (U) Detainee operations include accountability, care,
and well being of Enemy Prisoners of War, Retained Person,
Civilian Detainees, and Other Detainees, as well as Iraqi
criminal prisoners. (ANNEX 22)
7. (U) The accountability for detainees is doctrinally an
MP task IAW FM 3-19.40. (ANNEX 22)
8. (U) There is a general lack of knowledge,
implementation, and emphasis of basic legal, regulatory,
doctrinal, and command requirements within the 800th MP
Brigade and its subordinate units. (Multiple witness
statements in ANNEXES 45-91).
9.
(U) The handling of detainees and criminal prisoners after
in-processing was inconsistent from detention facility to
detention facility, compound to compound, encampment to
encampment, and even shift to shift throughout the 800th MP
Brigade AOR. (ANNEX 37)
10. (U) Camp Bucca, operated by the 310th MP Battalion, had
a "Criminal Detainee In-Processing SOP" and a "Training
Outline" for transferring and releasing detainees, which
appears to have been followed. (ANNEXES 38 and 52)
11. (U) Incoming and outgoing detainees are being
documented in the National Detainee Reporting System (NDRS)
and Biometric Automated Toolset System (BATS) as required by
regulation at all detention facilities. However, it is
underutilized and often does not give a "real time" accurate
picture of the detainee population due to untimely updating.
(ANNEX 56)
12. (U) There was a severe lapse in the accountability of
detainees at the Abu Ghraib Prison Complex. The 320th MP
Battalion used a self-created "change sheet" to document the
transfer of a detainee from one location to another. For
proper accountability, it is imperative that these change
sheets be processed and the detainee manifest be updated
within 24 hours of movement. At Abu Ghraib, this process
would often take as long as 4 days to complete. This lag-
time resulted in inaccurate detainee Internment Serial
Number (ISN) counts, gross differences in the detainee
manifest and the actual occupants of an individual compound,
and significant confusion of the MP Soldiers. The 320th MP
Battalion S-1, CPT Theresa Delbalso, and the S-3, MAJ David
DiNenna, explained that this breakdown was due to the lack
of manpower to process change sheets in a timely manner.
(ANNEXES 39 and 98)
13. (U) The 320th Battalion TACSOP requires detainee
accountability at least 4 times daily at Abu Ghraib.
However, a detailed review of their operational journals
revealed that these accounts were often not done or not
documented by the unit. Additionally, there is no indication
that accounting errors or the loss of a detainee in the
accounting process triggered any immediate corrective action
by the Battalion TOC. (ANNEX 44)
14. (U) There is a lack of standardization in the way the
320th MP Battalion conducted physical counts of their
detainees. Each compound within a given encampment did
their headcounts differently. Some compounds had detainees
line up in lines of 10, some had them sit in rows, and some
moved all the detainees to one end of the compound and
counted them as they passed to the other end of the
compound. (ANNEX 98)
15. (U) FM 3-19.40 outlines the need for 2 roll calls (100%
ISN band checks) per day. The 320th MP Battalion did this
check only 2 times per week. Due to the lack of real-time
updates to the system, these checks were regularly
inaccurate. (ANNEXES 22 and 98)
16. (U) The 800th MP Brigade and subordinate units adopted
non-doctrinal terms such as "band checks," "roll-ups," and
"call-ups," which contributed to the lapses in
accountability and confusion at the soldier level. (ANNEXES
63, 88, and 98)
17. (U) Operational journals at the various compounds and
the 320th Battalion TOC contained numerous unprofessional
entries and flippant comments, which highlighted the lack of
discipline within the unit. There was no indication that
the journals were ever reviewed by anyone in their chain of
command. (ANNEX 37)
18. (U) Accountability SOPs were not fully developed and
standing TACSOPs were widely ignored. Any SOPs that did
exist were not trained on, and were never distributed to the
lowest level. Most procedures were shelved at the unit TOC,
rather than at the subordinate units and guards mount sites.
(ANNEXES 44, 67, 71, and 85)
19. (U) Accountability and facility operations SOPs lacked
specificity, implementation measures, and a system of checks
and balances to ensure compliance. (ANNEXES 76 and 82)
20. (U) Basic Army Doctrine was not widely referenced or
utilized to develop the accountability practices throughout
the 800th MP Brigade's subordinate units. Daily processing,
accountability, and detainee care appears to have been made
up as the operations developed with reliance on, and
guidance from, junior members of the unit who had civilian
corrections experience. (ANNEX 21)
21. (U) Soldiers were poorly prepared and untrained to
conduct I/R operations prior to deployment, at the
mobilization site, upon arrival in theater, and throughout
their mission. (ANNEXES 62, 63, and 69)
22. (U) The documentation provided to this investigation
identified 27 escapes or attempted escapes from the
detention facilities throughout the 800th MP Brigade's AOR.
Based on my assessment and detailed analysis of the
substandard accountability process maintained by the 800th
MP Brigade, it is highly likely that there were several more
unreported cases of escape that were probably "written off"
as administrative errors or otherwise undocumented. 1LT
Lewis Raeder, Platoon Leader, 372nd MP Company, reported
knowing about at least two additional escapes (one from a
work detail and one from a window) from Abu Ghraib (BCCF)
that were not documented. LTC Dennis McGlone, Commander,
744th MP Battalion, detailed the escape of one detainee at
the High Value Detainee Facility who went to the latrine and
then outran the guards and escaped. Lastly, BG Janis
Karpinski, Commander, 800th MP Brigade, stated that there
were more than 32 escapes from her holding facilities, which
does not match the number derived from the investigation
materials. (ANNEXES 5-10, 45, 55, and 71)
23. (U) The Abu Ghraib and Camp Bucca detention facilities
are significantly over their intended maximum capacity while
the guard force is undermanned and under resourced. This
imbalance has contributed to the poor living conditions,
escapes, and accountability lapses at the various
facilities. The overcrowding of the facilities also limits
the ability to identify and segregate leaders in the
detainee population who may be organizing escapes and riots
within the facility. (ANNEXES 6, 22, and 92)
24. (U) The screening, processing, and release of detainees
who should not be in custody takes too long and contributes
to the overcrowding and unrest in the detention facilities.
There are currently three separate release mechanisms in the
theater-wide internment operations. First, the apprehending
unit can release a detainee if there is a determination that
their continued detention is not warranted. Secondly, a
criminal detainee can be released after it has been
determined that the detainee has no intelligence value, and
that their release would not be detrimental to society. BG
Karpinski had signature authority to release detainees in
this second category. Lastly, detainees accused of
committing "Crimes Against the Coalition," who are held
throughout the separate facilities in the CJTF-7 AOR, can be
released upon a determination that they are of no
intelligence value and no longer pose a significant threat
to Coalition Forces. The release process for this category
of detainee is a screening by the local US Forces Magistrate
Cell and a review by a Detainee Release Board consisting of
BG Karpinski, COL Marc Warren, SJA, CJTF-7, and MG Barbara
Fast, C-2, CJTF-7. MG Fast is the "Detainee Release
Authority" for detainees being held for committing crimes
against the coalition. According to BG Karpinski, this
category of detainee makes up more than 60% of the total
detainee population, and is the fastest growing category.
However, MG Fast, according to BG Karpinski, routinely
denied the board's recommendations to release detainees in
this category who were no longer deemed a threat and clearly
met the requirements for release. According to BG
Karpinski, the extremely slow and ineffective release
process has significantly contributed to the overcrowding of
the facilities. (ANNEXES 40, 45, and 46)
25. (U) After Action Reviews (AARs) are not routinely being
conducted after an escape or other serious incident. No
lessons learned seem to have been disseminated to
subordinate units to enable corrective action at the lowest
level. The Investigation Team requested copies of AARs, and
none were provided. (Multiple Witness Statements)
26. (U) Lessons learned (i.e. Findings and Recommendations
from various 15-6 Investigations concerning escapes and
accountability lapses) were rubber stamped as approved and
ordered implemented by BG Karpinski. There is no evidence
that the majority of her orders directing the implementation
of substantive changes were ever acted upon. Additionally,
there was no follow-up by the command to verify the
corrective actions were taken. Had the findings and
recommendations contained within their own investigations
been analyzed and actually implemented by BG Karpinski, many
of the subsequent escapes, accountability lapses, and cases
of abuse may have been prevented. (ANNEXES 5-10)
27. (U) The perimeter lighting around Abu Ghraib and the
detention facility at Camp Bucca is inadequate and needs to
be improved to illuminate dark areas that have routinely
become avenues of escape. (ANNEX 6)
28. (U) Neither the camp rules nor the provisions of the
Geneva Conventions are posted in English or in the language
of the detainees at any of the detention facilities in the
800th MP Brigade's AOR, even after several investigations
had annotated the lack of this critical requirement.
(Multiple Witness Statements and the Personal Observations
of the Investigation Team)
29. (U) The Iraqi guards at Abu Ghraib BCCF) demonstrate
questionable work ethics and loyalties, and are a
potentially dangerous contingent within the Hard-Site.
These guards have furnished the Iraqi criminal inmates with
contraband, weapons, and information. Additionally, they
have facilitated the escape of at least one detainee.
(ANNEX 8 and 26-SPC Polak's Statement)
30. (U) In general, US civilian contract personnel (Titan
Corporation, CACI, etc.), third country nationals, and local
contractors do not appear to be properly supervised within
the detention facility at Abu Ghraib. During our on-site
inspection, they wandered about with too much unsupervised
free access in the detainee area. Having civilians in
various outfits (civilian and DCUs) in and about the
detainee area causes confusion and may have contributed to
the difficulties in the accountability process and with
detecting escapes. (ANNEX 51, Multiple Witness Statements,
and the Personal Observations of the Investigation Team)
31. (U) SGM Marc Emerson, Operations SGM, 320th MP
Battalion, contended that the Detainee Rules of Engagement
(DROE) and the general principles of the Geneva Convention
were briefed at every guard mount and shift change on Abu
Ghraib. However, none of our witnesses, nor our personal
observations, support his contention. I find that SGM
Emerson was not a credible witness. (ANNEXES 45, 80, and
the Personal Observations of the Investigation Team)
32. (U) Several interviewees insisted that the MP and MI
Soldiers at Abu Ghraib (BCCF) received regular training on
the basics of detainee operations; however, they have been
unable to produce any verifying documentation, sign-in
rosters, or soldiers who can recall the content of this
training. (ANNEXES 59, 80, and the Absence of any Training
Records)
33. (S/NF) The various detention facilities operated by
the 800th MP Brigade have routinely held persons brought to
them by Other Government Agencies (OGAs) without accounting
for them, knowing their identities, or even the reason for
their detention. The Joint Interrogation and Debriefing
Center (JIDC) at Abu Ghraib called these detainees "ghost
detainees." On at least one occasion, the 320th MP
Battalion at Abu Ghraib held a handful of "ghost detainees"
(6-8) for OGAs that they moved around within the facility to
hide them from a visiting International Committee of the Red
Cross (ICRC) survey team. This maneuver was deceptive,
contrary to Army Doctrine, and in violation of international
law. (ANNEX 53)
34. (U) The following riots, escapes, and shootings have
been documented and reported to this Investigation Team.
Although there is no data from other missions of similar
size and duration to compare the number of escapes with, the
most significant factors derived from these reports are
twofold. First, investigations and SIRs lacked critical
data needed to evaluate the details of each incident.
Second, each investigation seems to have pointed to the same
types of deficiencies; however, little to nothing was done
to correct the problems and to implement the recommendations
as was ordered by BG Karpinski, nor was there any command
emphasis to ensure these deficiencies were corrected:
a. (U) 4 June 03- This escape was mentioned in the 15-6
Investigation covering the 13 June 03 escape, recapture, and
shootings of detainees at Camp Vigilant (320th MP
Battalion). However, no investigation or additional
information was provided as requested by this investigation
team. (ANNEX 7)
b. (U) 9 June 03- Riot and shootings of five detainees at
Camp Cropper. (115th MP Battalion) Several detainees
allegedly rioted after a detainee was subdued by MPs of the
115th MP Battalion after striking a guard in compound B of
Camp Cropper. A 15-6 investigation by 1LT Magowan (115th
MP Battalion, Platoon Leader) concluded that a detainee had
acted up and hit an MP. After being subdued, one of the MPs
took off his DCU top and flexed his muscles to the
detainees, which further escalated the riot. The MPs were
overwhelmed and the guards fired lethal rounds to protect
the life of the compound MPs, whereby 5 detainees were
wounded. Contributing factors were poor communications, no
clear chain of command, facility-obstructed views of posted
guards, the QRF did not have non-lethal equipment, and the
SOP was inadequate and outdated. (ANNEX 5)
c. (U) 12 June 03- Escape and recapture of detainee #8399,
escape and shooting of detainee # 7166, and attempted escape
of an unidentified detainee from Camp Cropper Holding Area
(115th MP Battalion). Several detainees allegedly made
their escape in the nighttime hours prior to 0300. A 15-6
investigation by CPT Wendlandt (115th MP Battalion, S-2)
concluded that the detainees allegedly escaped by crawling
under the wire at a location with inadequate lighting. One
detainee was stopped prior to escape. An MP of the 115th MP
Battalion search team recaptured detainee # 8399, and
detainee # 7166 was shot and killed by a Soldier during the
recapture process. Contributing factors were overcrowding,
poor lighting, and the nature of the hardened criminal
detainees at that location. It is of particular note that
the command was informed at least 24 hours in advance of the
upcoming escape attempt and started doing amplified
announcements in Arabic stating the camp rules. The
investigation pointed out that rules and guidelines were not
posted in the camps in the detainees' native languages.
(ANNEX 6)
d. (U) 13 June 03- Escape and recapture of detainee # 8968
and the shooting of eight detainees at Abu Ghraib (BCCF)
(320th MP Battalion). Several detainees allegedly
attempted to escape at about 1400 hours from the Camp
Vigilant Compound, Abu Ghraib (BCCF). A 15-6 investigation
by CPT Wyks (400th MP Battalion, S-1) concluded that the
detainee allegedly escaped by sliding under the wire while
the tower guard was turned in the other direction. This
detainee was subsequently apprehended by the QRF. At about
1600 the same day, 30-40 detainees rioted and pelted three
interior MP guards with rocks. One guard was injured and
the tower guards fired lethal rounds at the rioters injuring
7 and killing 1 detainee. (ANNEX 7)
e. (U) 05 November 03- Escape of detainees # 9877 and #
10739 from Abu Ghraib (320th MP Battalion). Several
detainees allegedly escaped at 0345 from the Hard-Site, Abu
Ghraib (BCCF). An SIR was initiated by SPC Warner (320th MP
Battalion, S-3 RTO). The SIR indicated that 2 criminal
prisoners escaped through their cell window in tier 3A of
the Hard-Site. No information on findings, contributing
factors, or corrective action has been provided to this
investigation team. (ANNEX 11)
f. (U) 07 November 03- Escape of detainee # 14239 from Abu
Ghraib (320th MP Battalion). A detainee allegedly escaped
at 1330 from Compound 2 of the Ganci Encampment, Abu Ghraib
(BCCF). An SIR was initiated by SSG Hydro (320th MP
Battalion, S-3 Asst. NCOIC). The SIR indicated that a
detainee escaped from the North end of the compound and was
discovered missing during distribution of the noon meal, but
there is no method of escape listed in the SIR. No
information on findings, contributing factors, or corrective
action has been provided to this investigation team. (ANNEX
12)
g. (U) 08 November 03- Escape of detainees # 115089, #
151623, # 151624, # 116734, # 116735, and # 116738 from Abu
Ghraib (320th MP Battalion). Several detainees allegedly
escaped at 2022 from Compound 8 of the Ganci encampment, Abu
Ghraib. An SIR was initiated by MAJ DiNenna (320th MP
Battalion, S-3). The SIR indicated that 5-6 prisoners
escaped from the North end of the compound, but there is no
method of escape listed in the SIR. No information on
findings, contributing factors, or corrective action has
been provided to this investigation team. (ANNEX 13)
h. (U) 24 November 03- Riot and shooting of 12 detainees #
150216, #150894, #153096, 153165, #153169, #116361, #153399,
#20257, #150348, #152616, #116146, and #152156 at Abu Ghraib
(320th MP Battalion). Several detainees allegedly began to
riot at about 1300 in all of the compounds at the Ganci
encampment. This resulted in the shooting deaths of 3
detainees, 9 wounded detainees, and 9 injured US Soldiers.
A 15-6 investigation by COL Bruce Falcone (220th MP Brigade,
Deputy Commander) concluded that the detainees rioted in
protest of their living conditions, that the riot turned
violent, the use of non-lethal force was ineffective, and,
after the 320th MP Battalion CDR executed "Golden Spike,"
the emergency containment plan, the use of deadly force was
authorized. Contributing factors were lack of comprehensive
training of guards, poor or non-existent SOPs, no formal
guard-mount conducted prior to shift, no rehearsals or
ongoing training, the mix of less than lethal rounds with
lethal rounds in weapons, no AARs being conducted after
incidents, ROE not posted and not understood, overcrowding,
uniforms not standardized, and poor communication between
the command and Soldiers. (ANNEX 8)
i. (U) 24 November 03- Shooting of detainee at Abu Ghraib
(320th MP Battalion). A detainee allegedly had a pistol in
his cell and around 1830 an extraction team shot him with
less than lethal and lethal rounds in the process of
recovering the weapon. A 15-6 investigation by COL Bruce
Falcone (220th Brigade, Deputy Commander) concluded that one
of the detainees in tier 1A of the Hard Site had gotten a
pistol and a couple of knives from an Iraqi Guard working in
the encampment. Immediately upon receipt of this
information, an ad-hoc extraction team consisting of MP and
MI personnel conducted what they called a routine cell
search, which resulted in the shooting of an MP and the
detainee. Contributing factors were a corrupt Iraqi Guard,
inadequate SOPs, the Detention ROE in place at the time was
ineffective due to the numerous levels of authorization
needed for use of lethal force, poorly trained MPs, unclear
lanes of responsibility, and ambiguous relationship between
the MI and MP assets. (ANNEX 8)
j. (U) 13 December 03- Shooting by non-lethal means into
crowd at Abu Ghraib (320th MP Battalion). Several
detainees allegedly got into a detainee-on-detainee fight
around 1030 in Compound 8 of the Ganci encampment, Abu
Ghraib. An SIR was initiated by SSG Matash (320th MP
Battalion, S-3 Section). The SIR indicated that there was a
fight in the compound and the MPs used a non-lethal crowd-
dispersing round to break up the fight, which was
successful. No information on findings, contributing
factors, or corrective action has been provided to this
investigation team. (ANNEX 14)
k. (U) 13 December 03- Shooting by non-lethal means into
crowd at Abu Ghraib (320th MP Battalion). Several
detainees allegedly got into a detainee-on-detainee fight
around 1120 in Compound 2 of the Ganci encampment, Abu
Ghraib. An SIR was initiated by SSG Matash (320th MP
Battalion, S-3 Section). The SIR indicated that there was a
fight in the compound and the MPs used two non-lethal shots
to disperse the crowd, which was successful. No information
on findings, contributing factors, or corrective action has
been provided to this investigation team. (ANNEX 15)
l. (U) 13 December 03- Shooting by non-lethal means into
crowd at Abu Ghraib (320th MP Battalion). Approximately 30-
40 detainees allegedly got into a detainee-on-detainee fight
around 1642 in Compound 3 of the Ganci encampment, Abu
Ghraib (BCCF). An SIR was initiated by SSG Matash (320th MP
Battalion, S-3 Section). The SIR indicates that there was a
fight in the compound and the MPs used a non-lethal crowd-
dispersing round to break up the fight, which was
successful. No information on findings, contributing
factors, or corrective action has been provided to this
investigation team. (ANNEX 16)
m. (U) 17 December 03- Shooting by non-lethal means of
detainee from Abu Ghraib (320th MP Battalion). Several
detainees allegedly assaulted an MP at 1459 inside the Ganci
Encampment, Abu Ghraib (BCCF). An SIR was initiated by SSG
Matash (320th MP BRIGADE, S-3 Section). The SIR indicated
that three detainees assaulted an MP, which resulted in the
use of a non-lethal shot that calmed the situation. No
information on findings, contributing factors, or corrective
action has been provided to this investigation team. (ANNEX
17)
n. (U) 07 January 04- Escape of detainee #115032 from Camp
Bucca (310th MP Battalion). A detainee allegedly escaped
between the hours of 0445 and 0640 from Compound 12, of Camp
Bucca. Investigation by CPT Kaires (310th MP Battalion S-3)
and CPT Holsombeck (724th MP Battalion S-3) concluded that
the detainee escaped through an undetected weakness in the
wire. Contributing factors were inexperienced guards,
lapses in accountability, complacency, lack of leadership
presence, poor visibility, and lack of clear and concise
communication between the guards and the leadership. (ANNEX
9)
o. (U) 12 January 04- Escape of Detainees #115314 and
#109950 as well as the escape and recapture of 5 unknown
detainees at the Camp Bucca Detention Facility (310th MP
Battalion). Several detainees allegedly escaped around
0300 from Compound 12, of Camp Bucca. An AR 15-6
Investigation by LTC Leigh Coulter (800th MP Brigade, OIC
Camp Arifjan Detachment) concluded that three of the
detainees escaped through the front holding cell during
conditions of limited visibility due to fog. One of the
detainees was noticed, shot with a non-lethal round, and
returned to his holding compound. That same night, 4
detainees exited through the wire on the South side of the
camp and were seen and apprehended by the QRF. Contributing
factors were the lack of a coordinated effort for
emplacement of MPs during implementation of the fog plan,
overcrowding, and poor communications. (ANNEX 10)
p. (U) 14 January 04- Escape of detainee #12436 and
missing Iraqi guard from Hard-Site, Abu Ghraib (320th MP
Battalion). A detainee allegedly escaped at 1335 from the
Hard Site at Abu Ghraib (BCCF). An SIR was initiated by SSG
Hydro (320th MP Battalion, S-3 Asst. NCOIC). The SIR
indicates that an Iraqi guard assisted a detainee to escape
by signing him out on a work detail and disappearing with
him. At the time of the second SIR, neither missing person
had been located. No information on findings, contributing
factors, or corrective action has been provided to this
investigation team. (ANNEX 99)
q. (U) 26 January 04- Escape of detainees #s 115236,
116272, and 151933 from Camp Bucca (310th MP Battalion).
Several Detainees allegedly escaped between the hours of
0440 and 0700 during a period of intense fog. Investigation
by CPT Kaires (310th MP Battalion S-3) concluded that the
detainees crawled under a fence when visibility was only 10-
15 meters due to fog. Contributing factors were the limited
visibility (darkness under foggy conditions), lack of proper
accountability reporting, inadequate number of guards,
commencement of detainee feeding during low visibility
operations, and poorly rested MPs. (ANNEX 18)
36. (U) As I have previously indicated, this investigation
determined that there was virtually a complete lack of
detailed SOPs at any of the detention facilities.
Moreover, despite the fact that there were numerous
reported escapes at detention facilities throughout Iraq
(in excess of 35), AR 15-6 Investigations following these
escapes were simply forgotten or ignored by the Brigade
Commander with no dissemination to other facilities.
After-Action Reports and Lessons Learned, if done at all,
remained at individual facilities and were not shared
among other commanders or soldiers throughout the
Brigade. The Command never issued standard TTPs for
handling escape incidents. (ANNEXES 5-10, Multiple
Witness Statements, and the Personal Observations of the
Investigation Team)
RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING PART TWO OF THE INVESTIGATION:
1. (U) ANNEX 100 of this investigation contains a detailed
and referenced series of recommendations for improving the
detainee accountability practices throughout the OIF area of
operations.
2. (U) Accountability practices throughout any particular
detention facility must be standardized and in accordance
with applicable regulations and international law.
3. (U) The NDRS and BATS accounting systems must be
expanded and used to their fullest extent to facilitate real
time updating when detainees are moved and or transferred
from one location to another.
4. (U) "Change sheets," or their doctrinal equivalent must
be immediately processed and updated into the system to
ensure accurate accountability. The detainee roll call or
ISN counts must match the manifest provided to the compound
guards to ensure proper accountability of detainees.
5. (U) Develop, staff, and implement comprehensive and
detailed SOPs utilizing the lessons learned from this
investigation as well as any previous findings,
recommendations, and reports.
6. (U) SOPs must be written, disseminated, trained on, and
understood at the lowest level.
7. (U) Iraqi criminal prisoners must be held in separate
facilities from any other category of detainee.
8. (U) All of the compounds should be wired into the
master manifest whereby MP Soldiers can account for their
detainees in real time and without waiting for their change
sheets to be processed. This would also have the change
sheet serve as a way to check up on the accuracy of the
manifest as updated by each compound. The BATS and NDRS
system can be utilized for this function.
9. (U) Accountability lapses, escapes, and disturbances
within the detainment facilities must be immediately
reported through both the operational and administrative
Chain of Command via a Serious Incident Report (SIR). The
SIRs must then be tracked and followed by daily SITREPs
until the situation is resolved.
10. (U) Detention Rules of Engagement (DROE), Interrogation
Rules of Engagement (IROE), and the principles of the Geneva
Conventions need to be briefed at every shift change and
guard mount.
11. (U) AARs must be conducted after serious incidents at
any given facility. The observations and corrective actions
that develop from the AARs must be analyzed by the
respective MP Battalion S-3 section, developed into a plan
of action, shared with the other facilities, and implemented
as a matter of policy.
12. (U) There must be significant structural improvements
at each of the detention facilities. The needed changes
include significant enhancement of perimeter lighting,
additional chain link fencing, staking down of all
concertina wire, hard site development, and expansion of Abu
Ghraib (BCCF) .
13. (U) The Geneva Conventions and the facility rules must
be prominently displayed in English and the language of the
detainees at each compound and encampment at every detention
facility IAW AR 190-8.
14. (U) Further restrict US civilians and other
contractors' access throughout the facility. Contractors
and civilians must be in an authorized and easily
identifiable uniform to be more easily distinguished from
the masses of detainees in civilian clothes.
15. (U) Facilities must have a stop movement/transfer
period of at least 1 hour prior to every 100% detainee roll
call and ISN counts to ensure accurate accountability.
16. (U) The method for doing head counts of detainees
within a given compound must be standardized.
17. (U) Those military units conducting I/R operations must
know of, train on, and constantly reference the applicable
Army Doctrine and CJTF command policies. The references
provided in this report cover nearly every deficiency I have
enumerated. Although they do not, and cannot, make up for
leadership shortfalls, all soldiers, at all levels, can use
them to maintain standardized operating procedures and
efficient accountability practices.
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
(PART THREE)
(U) Investigate the training, standards, employment, command
policies, internal procedures, and command climate in the
800th MP Brigade, as appropriate:
Pursuant to Part Three of the Investigation, select members
of the Investigation team (Primarily COL La Fate and I)
personally interviewed the following witnesses:
1. (U) BG Janis Karpinski, Commander, 800th MP Brigade
2. (U) COL Thomas Pappas, Commander, 205th MI Brigade
3. (U) COL Ralph Sabatino, CFLCC Judge Advocate, CPA
Ministry of Justice (Interviewed by COL Richard Gordon,
CFLCC SJA)
4. (U) LTC Gary W. Maddocks, S-5 and Executive Officer,
800th MP Brigade
5. (U) LTC James O'Hare, Command Judge Advocate, 800th MP
Brigade
6. (U) LTC Robert P. Walters Jr., Commander, 165th MI
Battalion (Tactical Exploitation)
7. (U) LTC James D. Edwards, Commander, 202nd MI Battalion
8. (U) LTC Vincent Montera, Commander, 310th MP Battalion
9. (U) LTC Steve Jordan, former Director, Joint
Interrogation and Debriefing Center/LNO to the 205th MI
Brigade
10. (U) LTC Leigh A. Coulter, Commander, 724th MP Battalion
and OIC Arifjan Detachment, 800th MP Brigade
11. (U) LTC Dennis McGlone, Commander, 744th MP Battalion
12. (U) MAJ David Hinzman, S-1, 800th MP Brigade
13. (U) MAJ William D. Proietto, Deputy CJA, 800th MP
Brigade
14. (U) MAJ Stacy L. Garrity, S-1 (FWD), 800th MP Brigade
15. (U) MAJ David W. DiNenna, S-3, 320th MP Battalion
16. (U) MAJ Michael Sheridan, XO, 320th MP Battalion
17. (U) MAJ Anthony Cavallaro, S-3, 800th MP Brigade
18. (U) CPT Marc C. Hale, Commander, 670th MP Company
19. (U) CPT Donald Reese, Commander, 372nd MP Company
20. (U) CPT Darren Hampton, Assistant S-3, 320th MP
Battalion
21. (U) CPT John Kaires, S-3, 310th MP Battalion
22. (U) CPT Ed Diamantis, S-2, 800th MP Brigade
23. (U) CPT Marc C. Hale, Commander, 670th MP Company
24. (U) CPT Donald Reese, Commander, 372nd MP Company
25. (U) CPT James G. Jones, Commander, 229th MP Company
26. (U) CPT Michael Anthony Mastrangelo, Jr., Commander,
310th MP Company
27. (U) CPT Lawrence Bush, IG, 800th MP Brigade
28. (U) 1LT Lewis C. Raeder, Platoon Leader, 372nd MP
Company
29. (U) 1LT Elvis Mabry, Aide-de-camp to Brigade Commander,
800th MP Brigade
30. (U) 1LT Warren E. Ford, II, Commander, HHC 320th MP
Battalion
31. (U) 2LT David O. Sutton, Platoon Leader, 229th MP
Company
32. (U) CW2 Edward J. Rivas, 205th MI Brigade
33. (U) CSM Joseph P. Arrington, Command Sergeant Major,
320th MP Battalion
34. (U) SGM Pascual Cartagena, Acting Command Sergeant
Major, 800th MP Brigade
35. (U) CSM Timothy L. Woodcock, Command Sergeant Major,
310th MP Battalion
36. (U) 1SG Dawn J. Rippelmeyer, First Sergeant, 977th MP
Company
37. (U) SGM Mark Emerson, Operations SGM, 320th MP
Battalion
38. (U) MSG Brian G. Lipinski, First Sergeant, 372nd MP
Company
39. (U) MSG Andrew J. Lombardo, Operations Sergeant, 310th
MP Battalion
40. (U) SFC Daryl J. Plude, Platoon Sergeant, 229th MP
Company
41. (U) SFC Shannon K. Snider, Platoon SGT, 372nd MP
Company
42. (U) SFC Keith A. Comer, 372nd MP Company
43. (U) SSG Robert Elliot, Squad Leader, 372nd MP Company
44. (U) SSG Santos A. Cardona, Army Dog Handler, 42nd MP
Detachment, 16th MP Brigade
45. (U) SGT Michael Smith, Army Dog Handler, 523rd MP
Detachment, 937th Engineer Group
46. (U) MA1 William J. Kimbro, USN Dog Handler, NAS Signal
and Canine Unit
47. (U) Mr. Steve Stephanowicz, US civilian Contract
Interrogator, CACI, 205th MI Brigade
48. (U) Mr. John Israel, US civilian Contract Interpreter,
Titan Corporation, 205th MI Brigade
(ANNEXES 45-91)
REGARDING PART THREE OF THE INVESTIGATION, I MAKE THE
FOLLOWING SPECIFIC FINDINGS OF FACT:
1. (U) I find that BG Janis Karpinski took command of the
800th MP Brigade on 30 June 2003 from BG Paul Hill. BG
Karpinski has remained in command since that date. The
800th MP Brigade is comprised of eight MP battalions in
the Iraqi TOR: 115th MP Battalion, 310th MP Battalion,
320th MP Battalion, 324th MP Battalion, 400th MP
Battalion, 530th MP Battalion, 724th MP Battalion, and
744th MP Battalion.
(ANNEXES 41 and 45)
2. (U) Prior to BG Karpinski taking command, members of the
800th MP Brigade believed they would be allowed to go
home when all the detainees were released from the Camp
Bucca Theater Internment Facility following the cessation
of major ground combat on 1 May 2003. At one point,
approximately 7,000 to 8,000 detainees were held at Camp
Bucca. Through Article-5 Tribunals and a screening
process, several thousand detainees were released. Many
in the command believed they would go home when the
detainees were released. In late May-early June 2003 the
800th MP Brigade was given a new mission to manage the
Iraqi penal system and several detention centers. This
new mission meant Soldiers would not redeploy to CONUS
when anticipated. Morale suffered, and over the next few
months there did not appear to have been any attempt by
the Command to mitigate this morale problem. (ANNEXES 45
and 96)
3. (U) There is abundant evidence in the statements of
numerous witnesses that soldiers throughout the 800th MP
Brigade were not proficient in their basic MOS skills,
particularly regarding internment/resettlement
operations. Moreover, there is no evidence that the
command, although aware of these deficiencies, attempted
to correct them in any systemic manner other than ad hoc
training by individuals with civilian corrections
experience. (Multiple Witness Statements and the
Personal Observations of the Investigation Team)
4. (U) I find that the 800th MP Brigade was not adequately
trained for a mission that included operating a prison or
penal institution at Abu Ghraib Prison Complex. As the
Ryder Assessment found, I also concur that units of the
800th MP Brigade did not receive corrections-specific
training during their mobilization period. MP units did
not receive pinpoint assignments prior to mobilization
and during the post mobilization training, and thus could
not train for specific missions. The training that was
accomplished at the mobilization sites were developed and
implemented at the company level with little or no
direction or supervision at the Battalion and Brigade
levels, and consisted primarily of common tasks and law
enforcement training. However, I found no evidence that
the Command, although aware of this deficiency, ever
requested specific corrections training from the
Commandant of the Military Police School, the US Army
Confinement Facility at Mannheim, Germany, the Provost
Marshal General of the Army, or the US Army Disciplinary
Barracks at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. (ANNEXES 19 and
76)
5. (U) I find that without adequate training for a civilian
internee detention mission, Brigade personnel relied
heavily on individuals within the Brigade who had
civilian corrections experience, including many who
worked as prison guards or corrections officials in their
civilian jobs. Almost every witness we interviewed had
no familiarity with the provisions of AR 190-8 or FM 3-
19.40. It does not appear that a Mission Essential Task
List (METL) based on in-theater missions was ever
developed nor was a training plan implemented throughout
the Brigade. (ANNEXES 21, 22, 67, and 81)
6. (U) I also find, as did MG Ryder's Team, that the 800th
MP Brigade as a whole, was understrength for the mission
for which it was tasked. Army Doctrine dictates that an
I/R Brigade can be organized with between 7 and 21
battalions, and that the average battalion size element
should be able to handle approximately 4000 detainees at
a time. This investigation indicates that BG Karpinski
and her staff did a poor job allocating resources
throughout the Iraq JOA. Abu Ghraib (BCCF) normally
housed between 6000 and 7000 detainees, yet it was
operated by only one battalion. In contrast, the HVD
Facility maintains only about 100 detainees, and is also
run by an entire battalion. (ANNEXES 19, 22, and 96)
7. (U) Reserve Component units do not have an individual
replacement system to mitigate medical or other losses.
Over time, the 800th MP Brigade clearly suffered from
personnel shortages through release from active duty
(REFRAD) actions, medical evacuation, and demobilization.
In addition to being severely undermanned, the quality of
life for Soldiers assigned to Abu Ghraib (BCCF) was
extremely poor. There was no DFAC, PX, barbershop, or
MWR facilities. There were numerous mortar attacks,
random rifle and RPG attacks, and a serious threat to
Soldiers and detainees in the facility. The prison
complex was also severely overcrowded and the Brigade
lacked adequate resources and personnel to resolve
serious logistical problems. Finally, because of past
associations and familiarity of Soldiers within the
Brigade, it appears that friendship often took precedence
over appropriate leader and subordinate relationships.
(ANNEX 101, Multiple Witness Statements, and the Personal
Observations of the Investigation Team)
8. (U) With respect to the 800th MP Brigade mission at Abu
Ghraib (BCCF), I find that there was clear friction and
lack of effective communication between the Commander,
205th MI Brigade, who controlled FOB Abu Ghraib (BCCF)
after 19 November 2003, and the Commander, 800th MP
Brigade, who controlled detainee operations inside the
FOB. There was no clear delineation of responsibility
between commands, little coordination at the command
level, and no integration of the two functions.
Coordination occurred at the lowest possible levels with
little oversight by commanders. (ANNEXES 31, 45, and 46)
9. (U) I find that this ambiguous command relationship was
exacerbated by a CJTF-7 Fragmentary Order (FRAGO) 1108
issued on 19 November 2003. Paragraph 3.C.8, Assignment
of 205th MI Brigade Commander's Responsibilities for the
Baghdad Central Confinement Facility, states as follows:
3.C.8. A. (U) 205 MI BRIGADE.
3.C.8. A. 1. (U) EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY COMMANDER
205 MI BRIGADE ASSUMES RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE
BAGHDAD CONFINEMENT FACILITY (BCCF) AND IS
APPOINTED THE FOB COMMANDER. UNITS CURRENTLY AT
ABU GHRAIB (BCCF) ARE TACON TO 205 MI BRIGADE FOR
"SECURITY OF DETAINEES AND FOB PROTECTION."
Although not supported by BG Karpinski, FRAGO 1108 made
all of the MP units at Abu Ghraib TACON to the Commander,
205th MI Brigade. This effectively made an MI Officer,
rather than an MP Officer, responsible for the MP units
conducting detainee operations at that facility. This
is not doctrinally sound due to the different missions
and agendas assigned to each of these respective
specialties. (ANNEX 31)
10 (U) Joint Publication 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces
(UNAAF), 10 July 2001 defines Tactical Control (TACON) as
the detailed direction and control of movements or
maneuvers within the operational area necessary to
accomplish assigned missions or tasks. (ANNEX 42)
"TACON is the command authority over assigned or
attached forces or commands or military capability made
available for tasking that is limited to the detailed
direction and control of movements or maneuvers within
the operational area necessary to accomplish assigned
missions or tasks. TACON is inherent in OPCON and may
be delegated to and exercised by commanders at any
echelon at or below the level of combatant commander."
11. (U) Based on all the facts and circumstances in this
investigation, I find that there was little, if any,
recognition of this TACON Order by the 800th MP Brigade
or the 205th MI Brigade. Further, there was no evidence
if the Commander, 205th MI Brigade clearly informed the
Commander, 800th MP Brigade, and specifically the
Commander, 320th MP Battalion assigned at Abu Ghraib
(BCCF), on the specific requirements of this TACON
relationship. (ANNEXES 45 and 46)
12. (U) It is clear from a comprehensive review of witness
statements and personal interviews that the 320th MP
Battalion and 800th MP Brigade continued to function as
if they were responsible for the security, health and
welfare, and overall security of detainees within Abu
Ghraib (BCCF) prison. Both BG Karpinski and COL Pappas
clearly behaved as if this were still the case. (ANNEXES
45 and 46)
13. (U) With respect to the 320th MP Battalion, I find that
the Battalion Commander, LTC (P) Jerry Phillabaum, was an
extremely ineffective commander and leader. Numerous
witnesses confirm that the Battalion S-3, MAJ David W.
DiNenna, basically ran the battalion on a day-to-day
basis. At one point, BG Karpinski sent LTC (P)
Phillabaum to Camp Arifjan, Kuwait for approximately two
weeks, apparently to give him some relief from the
pressure he was experiencing as the 320th Battalion
Commander. This movement to Camp Arifjan immediately
followed a briefing provided by LTC (P) Phillabaum to the
CJTF-7 Commander, LTG Sanchez, near the end of October
2003. BG Karpinski placed LTC Ronald Chew, Commander of
the 115th MP Battalion, in charge of the 320th MP
Battalion for a period of approximately two weeks. LTC
Chew was also in command of the 115th MP Battalion
assigned to Camp Cropper, BIAP, Iraq. I could find no
orders, either suspending or relieving LTC (P) Phillabaum
from command, nor any orders placing LTC Chew in command
of the 320th. In addition, there was no indication this
removal and search for a replacement was communicated to
the Commander CJTF-7, the Commander 377th TSC, or to
Soldiers in the 320th MP Battalion. Temporarily removing
one commander and replacing him with another serving
Battalion Commander without an order and without
notifying superior or subordinate commands is without
precedent in my military career. LTC (P) Phillabaum was
also reprimanded for lapses in accountability that
resulted in several escapes. The 320th MP Battalion was
stigmatized as a unit due to previous detainee abuse
which occurred in May 2003 at the Bucca Theater
Internment Facility (TIF), while under the command of LTC
(P) Phillabaum. Despite his proven deficiencies as both
a commander and leader, BG Karpinski allowed LTC (P)
Phillabaum to remain in command of her most troubled
battalion guarding, by far, the largest number of
detainees in the 800th MP Brigade. LTC (P) Phillabaum
was suspended from his duties by LTG Sanchez, CJTF-7
Commander on 17 January 2004. (ANNEXES 43, 45, and 61)
14. (U) During the course of this investigation I conducted
a lengthy interview with BG Karpinski that lasted over
four hours, and is included verbatim in the investigation
Annexes. BG Karpinski was extremely emotional during
much of her testimony. What I found particularly
disturbing in her testimony was her complete
unwillingness to either understand or accept that many of
the problems inherent in the 800th MP Brigade were caused
or exacerbated by poor leadership and the refusal of her
command to both establish and enforce basic standards and
principles among its soldiers. (ANNEX 45 and the
Personal Observations of the Interview Team)
15. (U) BG Karpinski alleged that she received no help from
the Civil Affairs Command, specifically, no assistance
from either BG John Kern or COL Tim Regan. She blames
much of the abuse that occurred in Abu Ghraib (BCCF) on
MI personnel and stated that MI personnel had given the
MPs "ideas" that led to detainee abuse. In addition, she
blamed the 372nd Company Platoon Sergeant, SFC Snider,
the Company Commander, CPT Reese, and the First Sergeant,
MSG Lipinski, for the abuse. She argued that problems in
Abu Ghraib were the fault of COL Pappas and LTC Jordan
because COL Pappas was in charge of FOB Abu Ghraib.
(ANNEX 45)
16. (U) BG Karpinski also implied during her testimony that
the criminal abuses that occurred at Abu Ghraib (BCCF)
might have been caused by the ultimate disposition of the
detainee abuse cases that originally occurred at Camp
Bucca in May 2003. She stated that "about the same time
those incidents were taking place out of Baghdad Central,
the decisions were made to give the guilty people at
Bucca plea bargains. So, the system communicated to the
soldiers, the worst that's gonna happen is, you're gonna
go home." I think it important to point out that almost
every witness testified that the serious criminal abuse
of detainees at Abu Ghraib (BCCF) occurred in late
October and early November 2003. The photographs and
statements clearly support that the abuses occurred
during this time period. The Bucca cases were set for
trial in January 2004 and were not finally disposed of
until 29 December 2003. There is entirely no evidence
that the decision of numerous MP personnel to
intentionally abuse detainees at Abu Ghrabid (BCCF) was
influenced in any respect by the Camp Bucca cases.
(ANNEXES 25, 26, and 45)
17. (U) Numerous witnesses stated that the 800th MP Brigade
S-1, MAJ Hinzman and S-4, MAJ Green, were essentially
dysfunctional, but that despite numerous complaints,
these officers were not replaced. This had a detrimental
effect on the Brigade Staff's effectiveness and morale.
Moreover, the Brigade Command Judge Advocate, LTC James
O'Hare, appears to lack initiative and was unwilling to
accept responsibility for any of his actions. LTC Gary
Maddocks, the Brigade XO did not properly supervise the
Brigade staff by failing to lay out staff priorities,
take overt corrective action when needed, and supervise
their daily functions. (ANNEXES 45, 47, 48, 62, and 67)
18. (U) In addition to poor morale and staff
inefficiencies, I find that the 800th MP Brigade did not
articulate or enforce clear and basic Soldier and Army
standards. I specifically found these examples of
unenforced standards:
a. There was no clear uniform standard for any MP
Soldiers assigned detention duties. Despite the
fact that hundreds of former Iraqi soldiers and
officers were detainees, MP personnel were allowed
to wear civilian clothes in the FOB after duty hours
while carrying weapons. (ANNEXES 51 and 74)
b. Some Soldiers wrote poems and other sayings on
their helmets and soft caps. (ANNEXES 51 and 74)
c. In addition, numerous officers and senior NCOs have
been reprimanded/disciplined for misconduct during
this period. Those disciplined include; (ANNEXES
43 and 102)
1). (U) BG Janis Karpinski, Commander, 800th MP
Brigade
ú Memorandum of Admonishment by LTG Sanchez, Commander,
CJTF-7, on 17 January 2004.
2). (U) LTC (P) Jerry Phillabaum, Commander,
320th MP Battalion
ú GOMOR from BG Karpinski, Commander 800th MP Brigade, on
10 November 2003, for lack of leadership and for failing to
take corrective security measures as ordered by the Brigade
Commander; filed locally
ú Suspended by BG Karpinski, Commander 800th MP Brigade,
17 January 2004; Pending Relief for Cause, for dereliction
of duty
3). (U) LTC Dale Burtyk, Commander, 400th MP
Battalion
ú GOMOR from BG Karpinski, Commander 800th MP Brigade, on
20 August 2003, for failure to properly train his Soldiers.
(Soldier had negligent discharge of M-16 while exiting his
vehicle, round went into fuel tank); filed locally.
4). (U) MAJ David DiNenna, S-3, 320th MP
Battalion
ú GOMOR from LTG McKiernan, Commander CFLCC, on 25 May
2003, for dereliction of duty for failing to report a
violation of CENTCOM General Order #1 by a subordinate Field
Grade Officer and Senior Noncommissioned Officer, which he
personally observed; returned to soldier unfiled.
ú GOMOR from BG Karpinski, Commander 800th MP Brigade, on
10 November 03, for failing to take corrective security
measures as ordered by the Brigade Commander; filed locally.
5). (U) MAJ Stacy Garrity, Finance Officer, 800th
MP Brigade
ú GOMOR from LTG McKiernan, Commander CFLCC, on 25 May
2003, for violation of CENTCOM General Order #1, consuming
alcohol with an NCO; filed locally.
6). (U) CPT Leo Merck, Commander, 870th MP
Company
ú Court-Martial Charges Preferred, for Conduct Unbecoming
an Officer and Unauthorized Use of Government Computer in
that he was alleged to have taken nude pictures of his
female Soldiers without their knowledge; Trial date to be
announced.
7). (U) CPT Damaris Morales, Commander, 770th MP
Company
ú GOMOR from BG Karpinski, Commander 800th MP Brigade, on
20 August 2003, for failing to properly train his Soldiers
(Soldier had negligent discharge of M-16 while exiting his
vehicle, round went into fuel tank); filed locally.
8). (U) CSM Roy Clement, Command Sergeant Major,
800th MP Brigade
ú GOMOR and Relief for Cause from BG Janis Karpinski,
Commander 800th MP Brigade, for fraternization and
dereliction of duty for fraternizing with junior enlisted
soldiers within his unit; GOMOR officially filed and he was
removed from the CSM list.
9). (U) CSM Edward Stotts, Command Sergeant
Major, 400th MP
Battalion
ú GOMOR from BG Karpinski, Commander 800th MP Brigade, on
20 August 2003, for failing to properly train his Soldiers
(Soldier had negligent discharge of M-16 while exiting his
vehicle, round went into fuel tank); filed locally
10). (U) 1SG Carlos Villanueva, First Sergeant,
770th MP Company
ú GOMOR from BG Karpinski, Commander 800th MP Brigade, on
20 August 2003, for failing to properly train his Soldiers
(Soldier had negligent discharge of M-16 while exiting his
vehicle, round went into fuel tank); filed locally.
11). (U) MSG David Maffett, NBC NCO, 800th MP
Brigade,
ú GOMOR from LTG McKiernan, Commander CFLCC, on 25 May
2003, for violation of CENTCOM General Order #1, consuming
alcohol; filed locally.
12) (U) SGM Marc Emerson, Operations SGM, 320th
MP Battalion,
ú Two GO Letters of Concern and a verbal reprimand from
BG Karpinski, Commander 800th MP Brigade, for failing to
adhere to the guidance/directives given to him by BG
Karpinski; filed locally.
d. (U) Saluting of officers was sporadic and not
enforced. LTC Robert P. Walters, Jr., Commander of
the 165th Military Intelligence Battalion (Tactical
Exploitation), testified that the saluting policy
was enforced by COL Pappas for all MI personnel, and
that BG Karpinski approached COL Pappas to reverse
the saluting policy back to a no-saluting policy as
previously existed. (ANNEX 53)
19. (U) I find that individual Soldiers within the 800th MP
Brigade and the 320th Battalion stationed throughout Iraq
had very little contact during their tour of duty with
either LTC (P) Phillabaum or BG Karpinski. BG Karpinski
claimed, during her testimony, that she paid regular
visits to the various detention facilities where her
Soldiers were stationed. However, the detailed calendar
provided by her Aide-de-Camp, 1LT Mabry, does not support
her contention. Moreover, numerous witnesses stated that
they rarely saw BG Karpinski or LTC (P) Phillabaum.
(Multiple Witness Statements)
20. (U) In addition I find that psychological factors, such
as the difference in culture, the Soldiers' quality of
life, the real presence of mortal danger over an extended
time period, and the failure of commanders to recognize
these pressures contributed to the perversive atmosphere
that existed at Abu Ghraib (BCCF) Detention Facility and
throughout the 800th MP Brigade. (ANNEX 1).
21. As I have documented in other parts of this
investigation, I find that there was no clear emphasis by
BG Karpinski to ensure that the 800th MP Brigade Staff,
Commanders, and Soldiers were trained to standard in
detainee operations and proficiency or that serious
accountability lapses that occurred over a significant
period of time, particularly at Abu Ghraib (BCCF), were
corrected. AR 15-6 Investigations regarding detainee
escapes were not acted upon, followed up with corrective
action, or disseminated to subordinate commanders or
Soldiers. Brigade and unit SOPs for dealing with
detainees if they existed at all, were not read or
understood by MP Soldiers assigned the difficult mission
of detainee operations. Following the abuse of several
detainees at Camp Bucca in May 2003, I could find no
evidence that BG Karpinski ever directed corrective
training for her soldiers or ensured that MP Soldiers
throughout Iraq clearly understood the requirements of
the Geneva Conventions relating to the treatment of
detainees. (Multiple Witness Statements and the Personal
Observations of the Investigation Team )
22. On 17 January 2004 BG Karpinski was formally admonished
in writing by LTG Sanchez regarding the serious
deficiencies in her Brigade. LTG Sanchez found that the
performance of the 800th MP Brigade had not met the
standards set by the Army or by CJTF-7. He found that
incidents in the preceding six months had occurred that
reflected a lack of clear standards, proficiency and
leadership within the Brigade. LTG Sanchez also cited
the recent detainee abuse at Abu Ghraib (BCCF) as the
most recent example of a poor leadership climate that
"permeates the Brigade." I totally concur with LTG
Sanchez' opinion regarding the performance of BG
Karpinski and the 800th MP Brigade. (ANNEX 102 and the
Personal Observations of the Investigating Officer)
RECOMMENDATIONS AS TO PART THREE OF THE INVESTIGATION:
1. (U) That BG Janis L. Karpinski, Commander, 800th MP
Brigade be Relieved from Command and given a General Officer
Memorandum of Reprimand for the following acts which have
been previously referred to in the aforementioned findings:
ú Failing to ensure that MP Soldiers at theater-level
detention facilities throughout Iraq had appropriate SOPs
for dealing with detainees and that Commanders and Soldiers
had read, understood, and would adhere to these SOPs.
ú Failing to ensure that MP Soldiers in the 800th MP
Brigade knew, understood, and adhered to the protections
afforded to detainees in the Geneva Convention Relative to
the Treatment of Prisoners of War.
ú Making material misrepresentations to the Investigation
Team as to the frequency of her visits to her subordinate
commands.
ú Failing to obey an order from the CFLCC Commander, LTG
McKiernan, regarding the withholding of disciplinary
authority for Officer and Senior Noncommissioned Officer
misconduct.
ú Failing to take appropriate action regarding the
ineffectiveness of a subordinate Commander, LTC (P) Jerry
Phillabaum.
ú Failing to take appropriate action regarding the
ineffectiveness of numerous members of her Brigade Staff
including her XO, S-1, S-3, and S-4.
ú Failing to properly ensure the results and
recommendations of the AARs and numerous 15-6 Investigation
reports on escapes and shootings (over a period of several
months) were properly disseminated to, and understood by,
subordinate commanders.
ú Failing to ensure and enforce basic Soldier standards
throughout her command.
ú Failing to establish a Brigade METL.
ú Failing to establish basic proficiency in assigned
tasks for Soldiers throughout the 800th MP Brigade.
ú Failing to ensure that numerous and reported
accountability lapses at detention facilities throughout
Iraq were corrected.
2. (U) That COL Thomas M. Pappas, Commander, 205th MI
Brigade, be given a General Officer Memorandum of
Reprimand and Investigated UP Procedure 15, AR 381-10, US
Army Intelligence Activities for the following acts which
have been previously referred to in the aforementioned
findings:
ú Failing to ensure that Soldiers under his direct
command were properly trained in and followed the IROE.
ú Failing to ensure that Soldiers under his direct
command knew, understood, and followed the protections
afforded to detainees in the Geneva Convention Relative to
the Treatment of Prisoners of War.
ú Failing to properly supervise his soldiers working and
"visiting" Tier 1 of the Hard-Site at Abu Ghraib (BCCF).
3.(U) That LTC (P) Jerry L. Phillabaum, Commander, 320th MP
Battalion, be Relieved from Command, be given a General
Officer Memorandum of Reprimand, and be removed from the
Colonel/O-6 Promotion List for the following acts which
have been previously referred to in the aforementioned
findings:
ú Failing to properly ensure the results,
recommendations, and AARs from numerous reports on escapes
and shootings over a period of several months were properly
disseminated to, and understood by, subordinates.
ú Failing to implement the appropriate recommendations
from various 15-6 Investigations as specifically directed by
BG Karpinski.
ú Failing to ensure that Soldiers under his direct
command were properly trained in Internment and Resettlement
Operations.
ú Failing to ensure that Soldiers under his direct
command knew and understood the protections afforded to
detainees in the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment
of Prisoners of War.
ú Failing to properly supervise his soldiers working and
"visiting" Tier 1 of the Hard-Site at Abu Ghraib (BCCF).
ú Failing to properly establish and enforce basic soldier
standards, proficiency, and accountability.
ú Failure to conduct an appropriate Mission Analysis and
to task organize to accomplish his mission.
4. (U) That LTC Steven L. Jordan, Former Director, Joint
Interrogation and Debriefing Center and Liaison Officer to
205th Military Intelligence Brigade, be relieved from duty
and be given a General Officer Memorandum of Reprimand for
the following acts which have been previously referred to in
the aforementioned findings:
ú Making material misrepresentations to the Investigating
Team, including his leadership roll at Abu Ghraib (BCCF).
ú Failing to ensure that Soldiers under his direct
control were properly trained in and followed the IROE.
ú Failing to ensure that Soldiers under his direct
control knew, understood, and followed the protections
afforded to detainees in the Geneva Convention Relative to
the Treatment of Prisoners of War.
ú Failing to properly supervise soldiers under his direct
authority working and "visiting" Tier 1 of the Hard-Site at
Abu Ghraib (BCCF).
5. (U) That MAJ David W. DiNenna, Sr., S-3, 320th MP
Battalion, be Relieved from his position as the Battalion
S-3 and be given a General Officer Memorandum of
Reprimand for the following acts which have been
previously referred to in the aforementioned findings:
ú Received a GOMOR from LTG McKiernan, Commander CFLCC,
on 25 May 2003, for dereliction of duty for failing to
report a violation of CENTCOM General Order #1 by a
subordinate Field Grade Officer and Senior Noncommissioned
Officer, which he personally observed; GOMOR was returned to
Soldier and not filed.
ú Failing to take corrective action and implement
recommendations from various 15-6 investigations even after
receiving a GOMOR from BG Karpinski, Commander 800th MP
Brigade, on 10 November 03, for failing to take corrective
security measures as ordered; GOMOR was filed locally.
ú Failing to take appropriate action and report an
incident of detainee abuse, whereby he personally witnessed
a Soldier throw a detainee from the back of a truck.
6. (U) That CPT Donald J. Reese, Commander, 372nd MP
Company, be Relieved from Command and be given a General
Officer Memorandum of Reprimand for the following acts
which have been previously referred to in the
aforementioned findings:
ú Failing to ensure that Soldiers under his direct
command knew and understood the protections afforded to
detainees in the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment
of Prisoners of War.
ú Failing to properly supervise his Soldiers working and
"visiting" Tier 1 of the Hard-Site at Abu Ghraib (BCCF).
ú Failing to properly establish and enforce basic soldier
standards, proficiency, and accountability.
ú Failing to ensure that Soldiers under his direct
command were properly trained in Internment and Resettlement
Operations.
7. (U) That 1LT Lewis C. Raeder, Platoon Leader, 372nd MP
Company, be Relieved from his duties as Platoon Leader
and be given a General Officer Memorandum of Reprimand
for the following acts which have been previously
referred to in the aforementioned findings:
ú Failing to ensure that Soldiers under his direct
command knew and understood the protections afforded to
detainees in the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment
of Prisoners of War.
ú Failing to properly supervise his soldiers working and
"visiting" Tier 1 of the Hard-Site at Abu Ghraib (BCCF).
ú Failing to properly establish and enforce basic Soldier
standards, proficiency, and accountability.
ú Failing to ensure that Soldiers under his direct
command were properly trained in Internment and Resettlement
Operations.
8. (U) That SGM Marc Emerson, Operations SGM, 320th MP
Battalion, be Relieved from his duties and given a
General Officer Memorandum of Reprimand for the following
acts which have been previously referred to in the
aforementioned findings:
ú Making a material misrepresentation to the
Investigation Team stating that he had "never" been
admonished or reprimanded by BG Karpinski, when in fact he
had been admonished for failing to obey an order from BG
Karpinski to "stay out of the towers" at the holding
facility.
ú Making a material misrepresentation to the
Investigation Team stating that he had attended every shift
change/guard-mount conducted at the 320th MP Battalion, and
that he personally briefed his Soldiers on the proper
treatment of detainees, when in fact numerous statements
contradict this assertion.
ú Failing to ensure that Soldiers in the 320th MP
Battalion knew and understood the protections afforded to
detainees in the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment
of Prisoners of War.
ú Failing to properly supervise his soldiers working and
"visiting" Tier 1 of the Hard-Site at Abu Ghraib (BCCF).
ú Failing to properly establish and enforce basic soldier
standards, proficiency, and accountability.
ú Failing to ensure that his Soldiers were properly
trained in Internment and Resettlement Operations.
9. (U) That 1SG Brian G. Lipinski, First Sergeant, 372nd MP
Company, be Relieved from his duties as First Sergeant of
the 372nd MP Company and given a General Officer
Memorandum of Reprimand for the following acts which have
been previously referred to in the aforementioned
findings:
ú Failing to ensure that Soldiers in the 372nd MP Company
knew and understood the protections afforded to detainees in
the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners
of War.
ú Failing to properly supervise his soldiers working and
"visiting" Tier 1 of the Hard-Site at Abu Ghraib (BCCF).
ú Failing to properly establish and enforce basic soldier
standards, proficiency, and accountability.
ú Failing to ensure that his Soldiers were properly
trained in Internment and Resettlement Operations.
10. (U) That SFC Shannon K. Snider, Platoon Sergeant,
372nd MP Company, be Relieved from his duties, receive a
General Officer Memorandum of Reprimand, and receive
action under the Uniform Code of Military Justice for the
following acts which have been previously referred to in
the aforementioned findings:
ú Failing to ensure that Soldiers in his platoon knew and
understood the protections afforded to detainees in the
Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of
War.
ú Failing to properly supervise his soldiers working and
"visiting" Tier 1 of the Hard-Site at Abu Ghraib (BCCF).
ú Failing to properly establish and enforce basic soldier
standards, proficiency, and accountability.
ú Failing to ensure that his Soldiers were properly
trained in Internment and Resettlement Operations.
ú Failing to report a Soldier, who under his direct
control, abused detainees by stomping on their bare hands
and feet in his presence.
11. (U) That Mr. Steven Stephanowicz, Contract US Civilian
Interrogator, CACI, 205th Military Intelligence Brigade,
be given an Official Reprimand to be placed in his
employment file, termination of employment, and
generation of a derogatory report to revoke his security
clearance for the following acts which have been
previously referred to in the aforementioned findings:
ú Made a false statement to the investigation team
regarding the locations of his interrogations, the
activities during his interrogations, and his knowledge of
abuses.
ú Allowed and/or instructed MPs, who were not trained in
interrogation techniques, to facilitate interrogations by
"setting conditions" which were neither authorized and in
accordance with applicable regulations/policy. He clearly
knew his instructions equated to physical abuse.
12. (U) That Mr. John Israel, Contract US Civilian
Interpreter, CACI, 205th Military Intelligence Brigade,
be given an Official Reprimand to be placed in his
employment file and have his security clearance reviewed
by competent authority for the following acts or concerns
which have been previously referred to in the
aforementioned findings:
ú Denied ever having seen interrogation processes in
violation of the IROE, which is contrary to several witness
statements.
ú
ú Did not have a security clearance.
13. (U) I find that there is sufficient credible information
to warrant an Inquiry UP Procedure 15, AR 381-10, US Army
Intelligence Activities, be conducted to determine the
extent of culpability of MI personnel, assigned to the
205th MI Brigade and the Joint Interrogation and
Debriefing Center (JIDC) at Abu Ghraib (BCCF).
Specifically, I suspect that COL Thomas M. Pappas, LTC
Steve L. Jordan, Mr. Steven Stephanowicz, and Mr. John
Israel were either directly or indirectly responsible for
the abuses at Abu Ghraib (BCCF) and strongly recommend
immediate disciplinary action as described in the
preceding paragraphs as well as the initiation of a
Procedure 15 Inquiry to determine the full extent of
their culpability. (ANNEX 36)
OTHER FINDINGS/OBSERVATIONS
1. (U) Due to the nature and scope of this investigation, I
acquired the assistance of Col (Dr.) Henry Nelson, a USAF
Psychiatrist, to analyze the investigation materials from
a psychological perspective. He determined that there
was evidence that the horrific abuses suffered by the
detainees at Abu Ghraib (BCCF) were wanton acts of select
soldiers in an unsupervised and dangerous setting. There
was a complex interplay of many psychological factors and
command insufficiencies. A more detailed analysis is
contained in ANNEX 1 of this investigation.
2. (U) During the course of this investigation I conducted
a lengthy interview with BG Karpinski that lasted over
four hours, and is included verbatim in the investigation
Annexes. BG Karpinski was extremely emotional during
much of her testimony. What I found particularly
disturbing in her testimony was her complete
unwillingness to either understand or accept that many of
the problems inherent in the 800th MP Brigade were caused
or exacerbated by poor leadership and the refusal of her
command to both establish and enforce basic standards and
principles among its Soldiers. (ANNEX 45)
3. (U) Throughout the investigation, we observed many
individual Soldiers and some subordinate units under the
800th MP Brigade that overcame significant obstacles,
persevered in extremely poor conditions, and upheld the
Army Values. We discovered numerous examples of Soldiers
and Sailors taking the initiative in the absence of
leadership and accomplishing their assigned tasks.
a. (U) The 744th MP Battalion, commanded by LTC Dennis
McGlone, efficiently operated the HVD Detention
Facility at Camp Cropper and met mission
requirements with little to no guidance from the
800th MP Brigade. The unit was disciplined,
proficient, and appeared to understand their basic
tasks.
b. (U) The 530th MP Battalion, commanded by LTC
Stephen J. Novotny, effectively maintained the MEK
Detention Facility at Camp Ashraf. His Soldiers
were proficient in their individual tasks and
adapted well to this highly unique and non-doctrinal
operation.
c. (U) The 165th MI Battalion excelled in providing
perimeter security and force protection at Abu
Ghraib (BCCF). LTC Robert P. Walters, Jr., demanded
standards be enforced and worked endlessly to
improve discipline throughout the FOB.
4. (U) The individual Soldiers and Sailors that we observed
and believe should be favorably noted include:
a. (U) Master-at-Arms First Class William J. Kimbro,
US Navy Dog Handler, knew his duties and refused to
participate in improper interrogations despite
significant pressure from the MI personnel at Abu
Ghraib.
b. (U) SPC Joseph M. Darby, 372nd MP Company
discovered evidence of abuse and turned it over to
military law enforcement.
c. (U) 1LT David O. Sutton, 229th MP Company, took
immediate action and stopped an abuse, then reported
the incident to the chain of command.
CONCLUSION
1. (U) Several US Army Soldiers have committed egregious
acts and grave breaches of international law at Abu
Ghraib/BCCF and Camp Bucca, Iraq. Furthermore, key
senior leaders in both the 800th MP Brigade and the 205th
MI Brigade failed to comply with established regulations,
policies, and command directives in preventing detainee
abuses at Abu Ghraib (BCCF) and at Camp Bucca during the
period August 2003 to February 2004.
2. (U) Approval and implementation of the recommendations
of this AR 15-6 Investigation and those highlighted in
previous assessments are essential to establish the
conditions with the resources and personnel required to
prevent future occurrences of detainee abuse.
Annexes
1. Psychological Assessment
2. Request for investigation from CJTF-7 to CENTCOM
3. Directive to CFLCC from CENTCOM directing investigation
4. Appointment Memo from CFLCC CDR to MG Taguba
5. 15-6 Investigation 9 June 2003
6. 15-6 Investigation 12 June 2003
7. 15-6 Investigation 13 June 2003
8. 15-6 Investigation 24 November 2003
9. 15-6 Investigation 7 January 2004
10. 15-6 Investigation 12 January 2004
11. SIR 5 November 2003
12. SIR 7 November 2003
13. SIR 8 November 2003
14. SIR 13 December 2003
15. SIR 13 December 2003
16. SIR 13 December 2003
17. SIR 17 December 2003
18. Commander's Inquiry 26 January 2004
19. MG Ryder's Report, 6 November 2003
20. MG Miller's Report, 9 September 2003
21. AR 190-8, Enemy Prisoners of War, Retained Personnel,
Civilian Internees, and Other Detainees, 1 October 1997
22. FM 3-19.40, Military Police Internment/Resettlement
Operations, 1 August 2001
23. FM 34-52, Intelligence Interrogation, 28 September 1992
24. Fourth Geneva Convention, 12 August 1949
25. CID Report on criminal abuses at Abu Ghraib, 28 January
2004
26. CID Interviews, 10-25 January 2004
27. 800th MP Brigade Roster, 29 January 2004
28. 205th MI Brigade's IROE, Undated
29. TOA Order (800th MP Brigade) and letter holding
witnesses
30. Investigation Team's witness list
31. FRAGO #1108
32. Letters suspending several key leaders in the 800th MP
Brigade and Rating Chain with suspensions annotated
33. FM 27-10, Military Justice, 6 September 2002
34. CID Report on abuse of detainees at Camp Bucca, 8 June
2003
35. Article 32 Findings on abuse of detainees at Camp
Bucca, 26 August 2003
36. AR 381-10, 1 July 1984
37. Excerpts from log books, 320th MP Battalion
38. 310th MP Battalion's Inprocessing SOP
39. 320th MP Battalion's "Change Sheet"
40. Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Center's (JIDC)
Slides, Undated
41. Order of Battle Slides, 12 January 2004
42. Joint Publication 0-2, Unified Actions Armed Forces, 10
July 2001
43. General Officer Memorandums of Reprimand
44. 800th MP Battalion's TACSOP
45. BG Janis Karpinski, Commander, 800th MP Brigade
46. COL Thomas Pappas, Commander, 205th MI Brigade
47. COL Ralph Sabatino, CFLCC Judge Advocate, CPA Ministry
of Justice
48. LTC Gary W. Maddocks, S-5 and Executive Officer, 800th
MP Brigade
49. LTC James O'Hare, Command Judge Advocate, 800th MP
Brigade
50. LTC Robert P. Walters Jr., Commander, 165th MI
Battalion (Tactical exploitation)
51. LTC James D. Edwards, Commander, 202nd MI Battalion
52. LTC Vincent Montera, Commander 310th MP Battalion
53. LTC Steve Jordan, former Director, Joint Interrogation
and Debriefing Center/LNO to the 205th MI Brigade
54. LTC Leigh A. Coulter, Commander 724th MP Battalion and
OIC Arifjan Detachment, 800th MP Brigade
55. LTC Dennis McGlone, Commander, 744th MP Battalion
56. MAJ David Hinzman, S-1, 800th MP Brigade
57. MAJ William D. Proietto, Deputy CJA, 800th MP Brigade
58. MAJ Stacy L. Garrity, S-1 (FWD), 800th MP Brigade
59. MAJ David W. DiNenna, S-3, 320th MP Battalion
60. MAJ Michael Sheridan, XO, 320th MP Battalion
61. MAJ Anthony Cavallaro, S-3, 800th MP Brigade
62. CPT Marc C. Hale, Commander, 670th MP Company
63. CPT Donald Reese, Commander, 372nd MP Company
64. CPT Darren Hampton, Assistant S-3, 320th MP Battalion
65. CPT John Kaires, S-3, 310th MP Battalion
66. CPT Ed Diamantis, S-2, 800th MP Brigade
67. LTC Jerry L. Phillabaum, Commander, 320th MP Battalion
68. CPT James G. Jones, Commander, 229th MP Company
69. CPT Michael A. Mastrangelo, Jr., Commander, 310th MP
Company
70. CPT Lawrence Bush, IG, 800th MP Brigade
71. 1LT Lewis C. Raeder, Platoon Leader, 372nd MP Company
72. 1LT Elvis Mabry, Aide-de-Camp to Brigade Commander,
800th MP Brigade
73. 1LT Warren E. Ford, II, Commander, HHC 320th MP
Battalion
74. 2LT David O. Sutton, Platoon Leader, 229th MP Company
75. CW2 Edward J. Rivas, 205th MI Brigade
76. CSM Joseph P. Arrison, Command Sergeant Major, 320th MP
Battalion
77. SGM Pascual Cartagena, Command Sergeant Major, 800th MP
Brigade
78. CSM Timothy L. Woodcock, Command Sergeant Major, 310th
MP Battalion
79. 1SG Dawn J. Rippelmeyer, First Sergeant, 977th MP
Company
80. SGM Mark Emerson, Operations SGM, 320th MP Battalion
81. MSG Brian G. Lipinski, First Sergeant, 372nd MP Company
82. MSG Andrew J. Lombardo, Operations Sergeant, 310th MP
Battalion
83. SFC Daryl J. Plude, Platoon Sergeant, 229th MP Company
84. SFC Shannon K. Snider, Platoon SGT, 372nd MP Company
85. SFC Keith A. Comer, 372nd MP Company
86. SSG Robert Elliot, Squad Leader, 372nd MP Company
87. SSG Santos A. Cardona, Army Dog Handler
88. SGT Michael Smith, Army Dog Handler
89. MA1 William J. Kimbro, USN Dog Handler
90. Mr. Steve Stephanowicz, US civilian contract
Interrogator, CACI, 205th MI Brigade
91. Mr. John Israel, US civilian contract Interpreter,
Titan Corporation, 205th MI Brigade
92. FM 3-19.1, Military Police Operations, 22 March 2001
93. CJTF-7 IROE and DROE, Undated
94. CJTF-7 Interrogation and Counter Resistance Policy, 12
October 2003
95. 800th MP Brigade Mobilization Orders
96. Sample Detainee Status Report, 13 March 2004
97. 530th MP Battalion Mission Brief, 11 February 2004
98. Memorandum for Record, CPT Ed Ray, Chief of Military
Justice, CFLCC, 9 March 2004
99. SIR 14 January 2004
100. Accountability Plan Recommendations, 9 March 2004
101. 2LT Michael R. Osterhout, S-2, 320th MP Battalion
102. Memorandum of Admonishment from LTG Sanchez to BG
Karpinski, 17
January 2004
103. Various SIRs from the 800th MP Brigade/320th MP
Battalion
104. 205th MI Brigade SITREP to MG Miller, 12 December
2003
105. SGT William A. Cathcart, 372nd MP Company
106. 1LT Michael A. Drayton, Commander, 870th MP Company
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