| COVER PAGE |
| I. INTRODUCTION | 1 |
| A. Understanding Intelligence Analysis | 4 |
| | 1. Developing Professional Intelligence Analysts | 4 |
| | 2. An Analyst's Daily Taskings | 7 |
| | 3. The Finished Product | 7 |
| B. Weapons of Mass Destruction Capabilities | 8 |
| | 1. What is an NIE? | 9 |
|
| | 2. The 2002 NIE on Iraq's Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction | 12 |
| | 3. Overall Conclusions - Weapons of Mass Destruction | 14 |
| C. Iraq's Ties to Terrorism | 29 |
| | 1. Overall Conclusions - Terrorism | 32 |
|
| II. NIGER | 36 |
| A. The Original Niger Reporting | 36 |
| B. Former Ambassador | 39 |
| C. Continuing Analysis | 47 |
| D. The British White Paper | 49 |
| E. The National Intelligence Estimate | 51 |
| F. The Cincinnati Speech | 55 |
| G. The Niger Documents | 57 |
| H. The Fact Sheet | 60 |
| I. The State of the Union | 64 |
| J. Secretary Powell's UN Speech | 66 |
| K. Niger Conclusions | 72 |
|
| III. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY ANALYSIS OF IRAQ'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM | 84 |
| A. Background | 84 |
| B. Nuclear Reconstitution | 85 |
| 1. Aluminum Tubes | 87 |
| | a. The National Intelligence Estimate | 95 |
| b. Other Assessments of the Tubes | 115 |
| 2. Procurement Attempts for Magnets, High-Speed Balancing Machines and Machine Tools | 119 |
| 3. Iraq's Efforts to Re-Establish and Enhance Its Cadre of Weapons
Personnel as well as Activities at Several Suspect Nuclear Sites | 120 |
| a. The Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission is Expanding the Infrastructure - Research Laboratories, Production Facilities, and Procurement Networks - to Produce Nuclear Weapons | 121 |
| b. Many of Iraq's Nuclear Scientists Recently Have Been Reassigned to the IAEC | 121 |
| c. Renewed Regular Contact Between Saddam and the IAEC, as Well as Enhanced Security, Suggests the IAEC is Again the Focal Point of Saddam's Nuclear Program | 122 |
| d. Activity at Several Suspect Nuclear Sites | 124 |
| C. Niger | 125 |
| D. Explaining Uncertainties | 126 |
| E. Intelligence Agencies' Analysis on Reconstitution Prior to Publication of the NIE | 126 |
| F. Analysis of Iraq's Currently Accurate, Full and Complete Disclosure | 128 |
| G. Nuclear Conclusions | 129 |
|
| IV. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY ANALYSIS OF IRAQ'S BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS PROGRAM | 143 |
| A. Background | 143 |
| B. Baghdad Has Transportable Facilities for Producing Bacterial and Toxin BW Agents | 148 |
| 1. Other Sources | 150 |
| 2. CURVE BALL | 152 |
| ( )3. | 157 |
| 4. INC Source | 160 |
| ( )5. | 161 |
| 6. Intelligence Community Mind Set Concerning Mobile BW Programs | 161 |
| C. Baghdad Has Been Able to Renovate and Expand its Fixed Dual-Use B W Agent Production Facilities | 162 |
| 1. Amiriyah Serum and Vaccine Institute | 163 |
| 2. Habbaniyah I Castor Oil Plant | 164 |
| 3. Dawrah Foot and Mouth Disease Vaccine Production Plant | 165 |
| D. We Assess That Iraq Has Some BW Agent and Maintains the Capability to Produce a Variety of BW Agents | 166 |
| 1. Smallpox | 166 |
| 2. Other Agents | 170 |
| E. In the Absence of UN Inspectors, Iraq Probably Has Intensified and Expanded Research and Development in Support of Iraq's BW Program. Baghdad Probably Has Developed Genetically Engineered BW Agents | 175 |
| ( )1. Research Activity | 176 |
| 2. Reported BW Testing Near Qadisiyah Reservoir | 177 |
| F. We Assess That Baghdad Also Has Increased the Effectiveness of its BW Arsenal by Mastering the Ability to Produce Dried Agent | 178 |
| G. Iraq's Capability to Manufacture Equipment and Materials and to Procure Other Necessary, Dual-use Materials... Makes Large-scale BW Agent Production Easily Attainable | 179 |
| 1. Foreign Procurement | 179 |
| 2. Indigenous Iraqi Efforts | 181 |
| H. The Nature and Amounts of Iraq's Stored BW Material Remain Unresolved by UNSCOM Accounting | 182 |
| I. We Judge That We Are Seeing Only a Portion of Iraq's WMD Efforts, Owing to Baghdad's Vigorous Denial and Deception Efforts | 183 |
| J. Explaining Uncertainties | 184 |
| K. Intelligence Agencies' Analysis of Iraq's Biological Weapons Program Prior to Publication of the NIE | 185 |
| L. Biological Conclusions | 187 |
|
| V. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY ANALYSIS OF IRAQ'S CHEMICAL WEAPONS (CW) PROGRAM | 195 |
| A. Background | 195 |
| B. Baghdad Has Chemical Weapons | 199 |
| C. We Judge That Iraq Is Expanding its Chemical Industry Primarily to Support Chemical Weapons (CW) Production | 202 |
| D. We Assess That Baghdad Has Begun Renewed Production of Mustard, Sarin, GF (Cyclosarin), and VX | 204 |
| E. Although We Have Little Specific Information on Iraq's CWStockpile, Saddam Probably Has Stocked at Least 100 Metric Tons and Possibly as Much as 500 Metric Tons of CW Agents - Much of it Added in the Last Year | 205 |
| F. Iraq Had Experience in Manufacturing CW Bombs, Artillery Rockets, and Projectiles | 206 |
| G. Baghdad Probably Is Hiding Small-Scale Agent Production Within Legitimate Research Laboratories | 206 |
| H. Baghdad Has Procured Covertly the Types and Quantities of Chemicals and Equipment Sufficient to Allow Limited CW Production Hidden Within Iraq's Legitimate Chemical Industry | 207 |
| I. Chemical Weapons Defensive Posture and Procurements | 208 |
| J. Explaining Uncertainties | 208 |
| K. Intelligence Agencies' Analysis of Iraq's Chemical Weapons (CW) Prior to Publication of the NIE | 208 |
| L. Chemical Conclusions | 211 |
|
| VI. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY ANALYSIS OF IRAQ'S DELIVERY SYSTEMS | 215 |
| A. Background | 215 |
| B. Scud-Type Missiles | 217 |
| C. Iraq Was in the Final Stages of Development of the Al Samoud Missile (2000), May Be Preparing to Deploy the Al Samoud (2001), and Was Deploying the Al Samoud and Ababil-100 Short Range Ballistic Missiles, Both Which Exceed the 150-km UN Range Limit (2002) | 218 |
| D. Development of Medium-Range Missile Capabilities | 220 |
| E. Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) | 221 |
| F. Other Possible Missions for the UAVs | 225 |
| G. Using UAVs to Target the U.S. | 227 |
| ( )H. | 231 |
| I. Explaining Uncertainties | 231 |
| J. Intelligence Agencies' Analysis of Delivery Systems Prior to Publication of the NIE | 232 |
| K. Delivery Conclusions | 234 |
|
| VII. IRAQ WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTELLIGENCE IN SECRETARY POWELL'S UNITED NATIONS SPEECH | 239 |
| A. Nuclear Program | 242 |
| B. Biological Weapons | 243 |
| C. Chemical Weapons | 251 |
| D. Delivery Systems | 253 |
| E. WMD Powell Conclusions | 253 |
|
| VIII. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY COLLECTION ACTIVITIES AGAINST IRAQ'S WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION | 258 |
| A. Human Intelligence (HUMINT) | 260 |
| B. Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) | 264 |
| C. Imagery Intelligence (IMINT) | 265 |
| D. Measurement and Signatures Intelligence (MASINT) | 266 |
| E. Impact of Increased Collection on Analysis | 267 |
| F. Collection Directives | 268 |
| G. CIA HUMINT Compartmentation | 268 |
| H. Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Collection Conclusions | 269 |
|
| IX. PRESSURE ON INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY ANALYSTS REGARDING IRAQ'S WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION (WMD) CAPABILITIES | 272 |
| A. Allegations of Influence | 277 |
| B. INR Analyst | 277 |
| C Former INR Office Director | 279 |
| D. Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) Senior Intelligence Analyst | 280 |
| E. Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) Senior Intelligence Officer | 282 |
| F. Former Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) Desk Officer | 282 |
| G. Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Pressure Conclusions | 284 |
|
| X. WHITE PAPER ON IRAQ'S WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION PROGRAMS | 286 |
| A. Differences Between the Classified NIE and Unclassified White Paper | 290 |
| 1. Nuclear Weapons | 290 |
| 2. Biological Weapons | 291 |
| 3. Chemical Weapons | 292 |
| 4. Delivery Systems | 293 |
| B. Primary Differences in the Key Judgments of the Classified National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) and Unclassified White Paper | 294 |
| C. White Paper Conclusions | 295 |
|
| XI THE RAPID PRODUCTION OF THE OCTOBER 2002 NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE ON IRAQ'S CONTINUING PROGRAMS FOR WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION | 298 |
| A. Rapid Production of the National Intelligence Estimate Conclusions | 302 |
|
| XII. IRAQ'S LINKS TO TERRORISM | 304 |
| A. Intelligence Products Concerning Iraq's Links to Terrorism | 304 |
| B. September and October 2001 Papers | 304 |
| C. Iraq and al-Qaida: Interpreting a Murky Relationship, June 2002 | 305 |
| D. Alternate Analysis in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy | 307 |
| E. Iraqi Support for Terrorism, September 2002 | 313 |
| F. Iraqi Support for Terrorism, January 2003 | 314 |
| G. CIA Assessments on Iraq's Links to Terrorism | 314 |
| H. Terrorist Activities Conducted by the IIS | 315 |
| I. Support for Regional Terrorist Groups | 317 |
| J . Iraq's Relationship with al-Qaida | 321 |
| K. Leadership Reporting | 323 |
| L. Detainee Debriefings - Comments on the Relationship | 324 |
| 1. Abu Zubaydah | 324 |
| ( ) 2. | 325 |
| 3. Khalid Shaikh Muhammad | 325 |
| M. Contacts Between the Iraqi Regime and al-Qaida | 326 |
| N. Training of al-Qaida by Iraq | 329 |
| ( ) 1. | 330 |
| 2. Additional Reports from Varying Sources | 331 |
| ( ) 3. Reporting about Activity at Salman Pak | 332 |
| O. The Use of Iraq as a Safehaven | 334 |
| 1. Discussions of Safehaven | 335 |
| 2. Iraqi Regime Knowledge of al-Qaida Presence in Northeastern Iraq | 336 |
| 3. Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi in Baghdad | 337 |
| P. Operational Cooperation Between Iraq and al-Qaida | 338 |
| 1. 1993 World Trade Center Bombing | 339 |
| 2. The September 11th Attacks | 340 |
| 3. The Foley Assassination | 341 |
| Q. Iraq's Use of Terrorist Strikes in the Event of War with the United States | 342 |
| 1. Saddam Hussein's Past Use of Terrorism | 343 |
| 2. The Decision-Making Environment in Iraq | 344 |
| 3. Iraq's Weapons Capabilities | 344 |
| R. Iraqi Links to Terrorism Conclusions | 345 |
|
| XIII. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY COLLECTION ACTIVITIES AGAINST IRAQ'S LINKS TO TERRORISM | 350 |
| A. Human Intelligence (HUMINT) | 351 |
| B. Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) | 353 |
| C. Terrorism Collection Conclusions | 355 |
|
| XIV. PRESSURE ON INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY ANALYSTS REGARDING IRAQ'S LINKS TO TERRORISM | 357 |
| A. Allegations of Influence | 359 |
| 1. CIA Ombudsman for Politicization | 359 |
| 2. Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and "Alternative Analysis" | 361 |
| B. Terrorism Pressure Conclusion | 363 |
|
| XV. POWELL SPEECH - TERRORISM PORTION | 366 |
| A. Powell Speech Conclusions - Terrorism Portion | 369 |
|
| XVI. IRAQ'S THREAT TO REGIONAL STABILITY AND SECURITY | 371 |
| A Background | 371 |
| B. IC Analysis on the Iraqi Threat | 374 |
| C. Agency Level Papers and Current Intelligence Products | 375 |
| D. Key Analysis Topics in Agency Level Documents | 376 |
| E. Review of IC Level Assessments | 377 |
| 1. Summary of Assessments 1991-1994 | 378 |
| 2. Summary of Assessments 1995-1998 | 381 |
| 3. Summary of Assessments 1999- 2003 | 386 |
| F. Iraq's Threat to Regional Stability and Security Conclusions | 391 |
|
| XVII. SADDAM HUSSEIN'S HUMAN RIGHTS RECORD | 394 |
| A. Background | 394 |
| B. Highlights of The Intelligence Record | 395 |
| C. Collection and Analytical Approaches | 400 |
| 1. Information Sources | 400 |
| 2. Collection Issues | 401 |
| 3. Analysis Processes | 401 |
| D. Saddam Hussein's Human Rights Record Conclusions | 402 |
|
| XVIII. THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY'S SHARING OF INTELLIGENCE ON IRAQI SUSPECT WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION SITES
WITH UNITED NATIONS INSPECTORS | 404 |
| A. Background | 404 |
| B. The Lead-up to Renewed Inspections | 405 |
| C. The Sharing of Information - the "Pull" Side of the Exchange | 406 |
| D. The Sharing of Information - the "Push " Side of the Exchange | 407 |
| E. Information Shared Compared to the Intelligence Community's Master Inspection List | 410 |
| F. Multiple Intelligence Community Lists | 413 |
| G. Statements Made by Administration Officials about the Sharing of Information | 415 |
| H. The Intelligence Community's Sharing of Intelligence on Iraqi Suspect Weapons of Mass Destruction Sites with United Nations Inspectors
Conclusions | 417 |
|
| APPENDIX A | 423 |
|
| APPENDIX B | 429 |
|
| GLOSSARY | 431 |
|
| ACRONYMS & ABBREVIATIONS | 437 |
|
| ADDITIONAL VIEWS | 441 |
| Chairman Pat Roberts joined by Senator Christopher S. Bond, Senator Orrin G. Hatch | 441 |
| Vice Chairman John D. Rockefeller IV, Senator Carl Levin and Senator Richard Durbin | 449 |
| Senator Saxby Chambliss with Senator Orrin G. Hatch, Senator Trent Lott, Senator Chuck Hagel and Senator Christopher S. Bond | 465 |
| Senator Olympia Snowe | 470 |
| Senator John Warner | 476 |
| Senator Dianne Feinstein | 479 |
| Senator Ron Wyden | 489 |
| Senator Richard Durbin | 498 |
| Senator Barbara A. Mikulski | 508 |
