Kosovo at first blush

Aside from the headline-making details -- a charred US embassy in Belgrade, street riots, and Russian belligerence -- I must rely, like most Americans, upon my own sense of history and national interest in understanding the events surrounding Kosovo's declaration of independence, and at first blush I cannot imagine that our quick recognition of Kosovo serves any long-term US interest in the region. But before I lay out my case against Kosovar independence I need to state up front and in no uncertain terms that, from an American perspective, there are no angels in this scenario. Both sides have committed horrible atrocities against the other. What the Serbs might lose by being labeled (at least, in traditional military terms) The Aggressor in this latest episode of ethnic violence, they gain back by nearly any interpretation of sovereignty under international law. For better or worse Kosovo was internationally recognized as a Serbian territory as early as 1912 by a convocation of the Great Powers of Europe; this decision was further reinforced by a subsequent conference in 1926. These facts, by themselves, do not establish anything greater than what they imply, but they are the starting point for our discussions, for they are the only point historically where there was general agreement among the Great Powers vis-a-vis Kosovo, an agreement which we inherit and must contend with.

To cut to the chase: does Serbia's attempted genocide of Kosovar Albanians during the 1990s constitute a justifiable reason under international law for the international community to remove Kosovo from Serbian control? Ultimately, this question pits two equally valid principles against one another -- that of national sovereignty and that of international intervention to prevent human-rights catastrophes. Over the past decade I have read articles and essays amounting to the size of a phone book debating this very question in this very context and honestly cannot come to a definitive answer one way or the other. Temperamentally, I tend to side with the proponents of national sovereignty, but I also cannot stomach the notion of standing idly by while people massacre each other, particularly when soldiers are set loose upon civilians. The problem to my mind is not so much in stopping a genocide -- this requires nothing but a mere show of force. The problem is what happens the day after, the months and years after, a genocide has been averted. Wouldn't national sovereignty, then, with the immanent threat of genocide removed from the scenario, become the overriding concern? But the principle we are seeing applied in Kosovo -- inasmuch there is one -- is that genocidal conduct by a sovereign state can lead, under the right circumstances, to a forfeiture of national sovereignty. I'm not at all comfortable with that.

My unease with this formula derives from two things. First, the application of the principle is not grounded in an international agreement of any kind, but is merely an expediency applied post facto. The United Nations inherited this dilemma from NATO and would have rather not faced the dilemma at all. Once brought kicking and screaming to the table, the UN has shown itself to be incapable of forging a consensus on how such dilemmas should be handled going forward. The reasons for this should be obvious. Too many nation states would face immediate crises of sovereignty under an international system that legitimized intervention on behalf of aggrieved separatists. The Kurds in Iraq should come to mind, given our most recent experience, but this concern extends well beyond unstable parts of the world to touch upon disputes in relatively peaceful countries, such as Spain and its Basque minority, China and its treatment of Tibet, Mexico and the status of Chiapas, and the list goes on. Simply put, there is not enough international support for the application of a general principle because too many countries cannot know how the rule might adversely impact their own fractious populations.

My second concern is that any attempt to legitimize separatism, even when it arises in response to ethnic cleansing, would create an immense gray area in international law that subverts the State's monopoly on violence. The international system as we have known it in the post-colonial era is already experiencing extreme stress as several nation-states have evolved into what are termed failed states. These countries, such as Somalia, cannot collect taxes, provide basic services, conduct meaningful foreign policy, or -- most importantly -- project state power to their own borders. They are black holes of sovereignty in which non-state actors, such as terrorists, can hide from international law enforcement. More threateningly, a state needn't become a fully fledged failed state for this to be a problem. Many states exist in perpetual suspension between failure and functionality, and often, these suspended states serve the terrorists' purpose as well as the failed state. The international community should not support any general principle that would increase the likelihood of failed states, and given our experience with such general principles we should be wary of them in any case, for they are often used as mere pretenses for national self-interest. Unfortunately, the US is as much to blame in this respect as anyone due to our slipshod casus belli in the present Iraq conflict. That notwithstanding, we should act in a manner to strengthen national sovereignty wherever possible.

Our hasty recognition of Kosovar independence does not accomplish this goal. In fact it has only replaced one band of thugs with another. The wisest course of action would have had the United States delay recognition of Kosovar sovereignty, pending further discussion. In other words, business as usual. We should not tolerate defiance from Kosovar Albanians any more than we would tolerate the same from their Serbian rivals, but our quick recognition of Kosovo has removed any flexibility from the equation. And that flexibility on the matter might yet be something, down the road, that we will wish we had. Suppose the Kosovar Albanians prove themselves to be no better at upholding international human rights than the Kosovar Serbs. What then? Do we return in force to Kosovo to save the Serbs? The status of Kosovo has been in flux for 6 1/2 centuries -- I don't see where another 10 years was too much to ask.

From my perspective the recognition of Kosovo at this time is akin to wagering a dollar to win a dime. An independent Kosovo has absolutely zero value to American foreign policy, and in a worst-case scenario it could prove to be more trouble than it is worth.